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During most of the 1990s, Argentina enjoyed stability and an economic boom 
such that many Argentines felt that their country had entered the path of catching up 
with the industrialised countries, and so would finally approach its deserved place in 
the world. Indeed, the first world was where the country arguably once belonged to: 
barely a century ago, Argentina, the land of silver1, ranked among the richest 
nations in the world: its income per head was on a par with that of Germany and 
France in 19132. This wealth had been achieved through a textbook process of 
catching up via productivity-enhancing technological progress, financed largely by 
foreign investment, in the global free-trade environment of the late 19th and early 
20th century3: both the new technology of deep freezing and the extensive 
construction of railways connecting the remote Pampa areas with the Atlantic coast 
had enabled the country to export its main staples, beef and other agricultural 
products, on a large scale to Europe. Present-day Buenos Aires, the "Paris of the 
South", is still, in its grandeur, witness of these golden years, which attracted 
masses of immigrants4 • 
Entering the 21 st century, the second-largest South American country with its 
well-educated population of mainly European descent and its abundance in natural 
resources has found itself brutally disillusioned. The tragic crisis the country 
experienced in 2001/02 put not only an end to the expectations of catching up fast 
but also added the worst recession in the country's history and another bad political 
turmoil to the series of crises and chronic instability that mark the country's history 
since the 1930s. 
The growth of the 1990s was the result of successful stabilisation via the "Plan 
Convertibilidad", a currency board arrangement cum escorting economic policies, 
with the fixed Dollar exchange rate at its core. The currency board's success in 
putting an end to the previous decades of ever higher inflation, and finally 
1 Argentina's name is derived from "argentum", Latin for silver, due to its erstwhile important 
silver mines on the territories of present-day Bolivia, the exploits of which were shipped through the 
port of Buenos Aires. 
2 See N.N. (2004), p. 4. 
3 See the seminal paper "Catching Up, Forging Ahead, and Falling Behind" written by Moses 
Abramovitz in 1986. 
4 "Eire riche comme un Argentin": this French idiom of the time is further witness of the 
country's former splendour. 
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hyperinflation, was nothing less than spectacular. Today, the judgements about 
"Convertibilidad", seemingly the magic cure of the 1990s, range from "outright 
poison"5 to "flagrantly wrongly administered, but potentially beneficial remedy". The 
Argentine currency board, its justification, its conditionalities, the reasons for its 
collapse, and finally its evaluation is what this treatise is about. 
A thorough analysis of Argentina's currency board requires the detailed 
identification of the historical, economic, and social context of its implementation, 
and this not only for the sake of episodical completeness but, above all, for the 
understanding of the determinants of its choice and configuration. Following this 
introduction, section 2 will therefore analyze the country's desperate situation, 
marked by economic decay and high inflation culminating in hyperinflation, at the 
time when the new government of Carlos Menem took over in mid-1989. The 
complex and devastating interdependencies of causes and effects that fuel the 
accelerating inflationary process and lead to a continuing economic erosion over 
decades, and finally develop into hyperinflation, are analyzed for typical high 
inflations in general, and examined for the case of Argentina during the 1980s in 
particular. From this exercise it will get palpable that, having seen so many failed 
stabilisation attempts before, with the result of ever more eroded policy credibility, 
the country's remaining options for stabilisation in effect excluded all but the strictest 
ones. 
Section 3 gives a detailed exposition of the theory of currency boards. The 
currency board idea, its historical roots, its functioning principles, strengths and 
weaknesses, and the conditionalities a currency board entails with respect to its 
appropriateness, as well as its duration and termination, will be dealt with in detail. 
While the informed reader primarily interested in the Argentine case may well skip 
this section, for any other reader the exercise may well be worth the effort since, all 
too often, much is said about the dangers of the regime and little about its 
potentials. This is especially true for the appealing idea of dual currency boards 
outlined at the end of this section. 
Section 4 focuses on the Argentine currency board's implementation and 
development during the barely 11 years of its existence. Clearly, the two vivid 
growth phases before and after 1995 were owed to the market oriented reforms 
embraced with the Convertibility Plan, but also to favourable external conditions, 
just as the deep recession that started in 1998 was not solely the consequence of 
5 See, e.g., Porzecanski (2003). 
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negative external shocks but also, and fatally, of inconsistencies between the 
macroeconomic framework set by the currency board and the concomitant fiscal, 
but also microeconomic policies. The interactions between these inconsistencies, 
on the one hand, and the exogenous factors aggravating them, on the other, make 
an exciting plot in a story that was long thought to be one of success but instead 
ended as a tragedy. In exploring the plot's determinants, the ground is prepared for 
the evaluation to follow. 
Section 5 summons the main suspects to closer investigation. The spectrum 
ranges from the country's mainly internal responsibilities, such as fiscal lenience, 
the overvalued exchange rate, institutional deficiencies in labour markets as well as 
the industrial and financial sectors, political economy, and, of course, the currency 
board itself, to the multiple external conditionalities such as the behaviour of 
international capital markets, policy constellations within MERCOSUR, the IMF's 
involvement, as well as the economic credo that stood behind the country's 
economic course of the 1990s {the "Washington Consensus"). This allows for the 
extraction of the few main factors responsible, as supported by empirical evidence, 
for the traumatic collapse of Argentina's currency board, which, as will be argued, 
could have been avoided until early 2001. Though necessarily dotted with a degree 
of speculation, some inferences are made about potential exit opportunities during 
different periods of the currency board's existence. They make it seem highly 
plausible that any of these opportunities, if seized, would have had an outcome 
entailing less immediate damage than the one actually undergone. 
Concluding this investigation will require some lessons to be drawn. The 
lessons from the Argentine experience are related to the old and central issues of 
risks specific to hard pegs, of sustainable fiscal policies, and of the importance of 
these issues increasing with global financial integration. These lessons are hardly 
new, but, sadly, they seem to need ever new accentuation "by default" to be paid 
heed to. A concluding assessment of the Argentine currency board experience, from 
an economist's point of view, will be undertaken. To be sure, political scientists, 
sociologists, or even psychologists will have additional clues to help explain this 
recent chapter in Argentina's history, which fits so well into the overall self-
perception of many Argentines, and is prone to be interpreted as just another reflex 
of a tragic socio-economic dynamism6• Unfortunately, the post-collapse 
6 See e.g. the popular volume of Jorge Lanata (2004). 
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developments, despite the fast economic recovery they included, do little so far to 
prove such fatalism wrong. 
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2 Argentina's Stabilisation Challenge 
There is no subtler, no surer means of overturning the existing basis 
of society than to debauch the currency. The process engages all the 
hidden forces of economic law on the side of destruction and does it 
in a manner which not one man in a million can diagnose. 
(John Maynard Keynes)7 
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This section describes the factors that led to the adoption of the Argentine 
currency board arrangement (CBA) in 1991. The central purpose of the currency 
board was to stop inflation, which had been plaguing Argentina since the middle of 
the century and particularly during the 1980s (the so-called "lost decade"), and 
which hit it especially hard with two bouts of hyperinflation in mid-1989 and early 
1990. 
Most high and hyperinflations share a common set of characteristics and a more 
or less typical sequence of events8. In order to understand the special problems 
Argentina faced in the late 1980s, these features will be named and qualified for the 
inflationary bouts that paved the way for the introduction of the currency board. 
Beforehand, a brief overview over the disinflation attempts that preceded this latest 
one will be given, as the Argentine history of failed reforms was an overwhelming 
argument for the adoption of the strict regime of the currency board. 
2.1 Preceding Stabilisation Attempts since the Days of Peron 
Since the Great Depression in the 1920s, Argentina had followed the political 
strategy of import substitution and closing the economy. This proved initially 
encouraging, especially during the years of the 2nd World War, when Argentina built 
up substantial foreign exchange reserves from its agricultural exports that met a 
high demand worldwide. But the increasing tightness of administrative regulations 
and capital controls more and more hindered economic efficiency and growth, and 
produced corruption9. The populist policy of Juan Peron (president from 1946 to 
1955) included broad nationalisation of enterprises, protection against foreign 
7 Keynes (1920), p. 220. 
8 For a comparative analysis of all hyperinflations in history, see Bernholz (2003). 
9 An interesting link between prevailing corruption and left wing ideologies is explored by Di 
Tella/MacCulloch (2004). 
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competition, massive state intervention in the economy, and rapid wage growth. 
After having exhausted the country's foreign exchange reserves, huge losses of 
nationalised enterprises and fiscal deficits were readily financed by printing money, 
which produced rising inflation. 
Peron's removal in a military putsch in 1955, which reflected popular discontent 
with inflation, corruption, demagoguery, and oppression, was followed by a period of 
political instability and further military putsches. High inflation eroded savings and 
living standards, unemployment rose. A first major stabilisation attempt in 1959 
under president Frondizi, including monetary and fiscal discipline and a pronounced 
devaluation of the currency, proved initially effective but failed to deliver lasting 
stability. A second attempt in 1967 added heterodox elements of income policy to 
orthodox fiscal and monetary measures, but equally failed to produce stability in the 
longer run 10. A few months after Peron's re-election in 1973, he died unexpectedly, 
with his wife Isabel following him and continuing in the same protectionist and 
populist policies. An ephemeral stabilisation attempt, initiated by the Peronist11 
government, collapsed in 1975 after various speculative attacks. Economic 
deterioration and political instability paved the way for the military junta again 
seizing power in 1976. The following period, stamped the "guerra sucia" (dirty war), 
was not only the worst period of Argentina's recent history in political and social 
terms, but eventually left the country with a deep economic and financial crisis, 
growing inflation and a rapidly devaluing currency 12. 
Another stabilisation effort, the so-called "Tablita", initiated by the military 
government in 1978, relied on orthodox measures and tried to establish the 
exchange rate as stabilising instrument, using a pre-announced devaluation 
schedule to control inflation expectations. This policy initially produced declining 
inflation rates (although slower than expected) and an improvement of fiscal 
accounts, but fell apart in 1981 after the resurgence of massive budget deficits, a 
deteriorated current account due to the massive real appreciation of the currency, 
and a severe banking crisis 13. A further stabilisation effort, announced by finance 
minister Alemann in 1981, was choked by Argentina's invasion of the Falkland 
10 See Kiguel (1992), p. 103. 
11 The Peronist Party's official name is Partido Justicialista (PJ). 
12 See Jonas (2002), p. 6. 
13 Vegh cites the failed Tablita attempt as a textbook example for a non-credible, exchange 
rate-based stabilisation, generating a boom-recession cycle and U-shaped curves for inflation and 
the real exchange rate. See Vegh (1995), pp. 64 ff. 
Jutta Maute - 978-3-631-75447-4
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 04:44:44AM
via free access
27 
Islands in 1982, itself representing a scarcely masked effort of the military 
government to divert attention away from the severe domestic problems. Warfare 
financing via money printing, as well as severely adverse external factors, such as 
decreasing international commodity prices, increasing foreign interest rates, the 
world-wide recession, and the world debt crisis, led to a culmination of the crisis in 
July 1982. 
Inflation continued to increase and reached 6,000 percent during 1985. The so-
called "Plan Austral", launched by President Alfonsin in 1985, was supported by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and included orthodox tight fiscal and monetary 
policy measures as well as price and wage controls. Again, it proved initially 
effective, but deficits returned massively after the effects of various temporary 
measures had petered out and the necessary fiscal reform was still not undertaken. 
Inflation started to rise again, and, as had happened after each of the previous 
programmes, reached higher levels than before. Two further heterodox programmes 
followed ("Plan Primavera" in 1988, "Plan Bunge y Born"14 in 1989, already initiated 
under president Menem), but they lacked credibility even from the start, as they did 
not tackle the main cause of inflation, the ongoing monetary financing of the budget 
deficit. Each of them produced ever higher inflation rates, runs on the currency, and 
ended with devaluations by several hundred percent 15. 
Figure 1 summarises the chronology of the stabilisation programmes preceding 
the introduction of the currency board in 1991. 
Figure 1: Stabilisation Programmes in Argentina 1959-1990 
Name of Programme Date of Start Date of Crisis/Abandonment 
(Frondizi) 1959 n.a. 
Vasena 3/1967 6/1970 
Gelbard 5/1973 3/1975 
Tablita 12/1978 4/1981 
Alemann 12/1981 7/1982 
Austral 6/1985 9/1987 
Primavera 8/1988 4/1989 
Bunge y Born (BB) 7/1989 2/1990 
Sources: Choueiri/Kaminsky (1999), and Kiguel (1992), own arrangement. 
14 The programme was named after Argentina's largest transnational company, the advisors 
of which were involved in the programme design. 
15 See Choueiri/Kaminsky (1999), p. 9. 
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Since the collapse of the "Tablita" in 1981, exchange rate management was 
highly discretionary and changed between fixing and floating the exchange rate, 
with dual exchange rates and capital controls prevailing over long periods 16. In 
February 1990, the exchange rate was floated and all price controls removed. 
Currency reserves were nearly exhausted. Argentina approached hyperinflation and 
a total economic collapse. In the year between March 1989 and March 1990, the 
price level rose by 20,000 percent. Real GDP fell in 1989 by more than seven and in 
1990 by more than two percent. Argentine real per capita income declined by 26 
percent during 1980-8917. 
Figure 2 gives an overview of Argentine inflation over the seven decades 
preceding 1989. Figure 3 concentrates on the decade 1980-1990. 
Figure 2: Inflation in Argentina 1920-1989(1) 
Period Average Maximum 
1920-29 -1.7 17.1 
1930-39 -0.3 13.0 
1940-49 10.6 31.1 
1950-59 30.3 111.6 
1960-69 23.3 31.9 
1970-79 132.9 444.4 
1980-89 750.4 4,923.3 
(1) CPI change in%, annual basis. 
Source: Cavallo (1996). 
16 See Setzer (2001 ), p. 21 f. 
17 See Leijonhufvud (1990), p. 2. 
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Figure 3: Annual Inflation Rates 1980-1990<1) 
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Source: Oficina de la CEPAL en Buenos Aires, on data of INDEC, BCRA, and other sources.18 
2.2 High and Hyperinflation in Argentina in the 1980s 
Inflations occur in different magnitudes. They are generally classified along the 
three broad categories of moderate inflation, high inflation, and hyperinflation. There 
is no generally agreed clear delimitation line between moderate and high inflations -
though annual price increases between 5 and 10 percent are mostly offered as the 
limit where high inflations start. A qualitative criterion has been proposed by 
Bernholz, who defines an economy as moving into high inflation as soon as the 
(corrected) real stock of money starts to decline 19. 
The delimitation between high and hyperinflations is less disputed. Since Philip 
Cagan's classic study of German post-World War I inflation20 , his definition of 
hyperinflation as price rises exceeding monthly rates of 50% has become generally 
accepted. This criterion is in rough accord with the observation that during moderate 
inflations, a quotation of inflation in percent per year is sufficient for economic 
agents, whereas in higher inflations, people measure price increases in per cent per 
month. When the effective time horizon for quoting money prices falls below one 
18 See Heymann (2000), p. 162. 
19 He defines the corrected real stock of money as the nominal money stock divided by the 
price level and corrected by the growth of GDP. See Bernholz (2003), p. 2. 
20 See Cagan (1956). 
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month, the economy is considered to be in hyperinflation. Thus, we end up with the 
mentioned approximate numerical delimitation between high inflation (up to 50 
percent per month) and hyperinflation (higher than 50 percent per month )21 . 
A more qualitative distinction between high and hyperinflation lies in the 
observation that high inflations can be sustained for years, whereas hyperinflations 
rapidly lead to economic collapse22 . It is generally agreed that hyperinflations should 
be treated as extreme cases of high inflations, since they share the main 
characteristics of the latter but eventually render financial and economic conditions 
unsustainable. Therefore, studying hyperinflations implies studying high inflations as 
the latter deliver the basic insights in the complex interaction of causes and effects 
of inflation and its persisting detrimental impact on the financial sector and the real 
economy. 
"Inflation is the observable outcome of a complex process of political and 
economic interaction in society."23 The observable outcome is an increase of the 
price level over a certain period as measured by one or several price indices24 . 
Such an increase is the result of pricing decisions previously made by innumerable 
firms and individuals. Obviously, these pricing decisions are the most direct cause 
of inflation. But behind them lie market and policy signals, and behind them again 
still other economic and extra-economic causes. Some chains of causation in the 
complex structure of interaction even loop back on themselves in a way that causes 
and effects over time become indiscernible - the so-called "price-wage spiral" being 
the most prominent example. Examining the complete picture of causes and effects 
in the complex interaction called inflation becomes a near to impossible task. 
21 For orientation: a constant monthly inflation rate of 50 percent would result in an annual 
rate of 12,874 percent. The corresponding weekly and daily rates would be 10.67 and 1.36 percent 
respectively. 
22 See Vegh (1995), p. 38f. He uses the term "chronic" inflation for high inflation more or less 
constantly persisting over years, and differentiates between cases in which chronic inflation never 
developed into hyperinflation (as, e.g., in Uruguay), cases where hyperinflation took off without 
preceding chronic inflation (Bolivia), and cases where chronic inflation eventually accelerated into 
hyperinflation (Argentina). 
23 Heymann/Leijonhufvud (1995), p. 11. 
24 This is the generally accepted criterion. Other criteria, such as e.g. the expansion of the 
money supply or of credit, are possible and have in history at times been more at the centre of 
attention. See Bernholz (2003), p. 1. 
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Delving into the vast and controversial field of inflation theories lies beyond the 
scope of this investigation25. The purpose of the following paragraphs is less to 
analyze than to describe the characteristics of high and hyperinflation economies in 
general and of the Argentine case of the 1980s in particular, and, in consulting 
economic and political data, to draw the most plausible conclusions about the 
relevant cause-and-effect-structures. In doing so, it will nevertheless become clear 
that the neo-classical concept of money (neutral) and of inflation (affecting only 
nominal magnitudes, and, apart from a fiscal distortion due to the inflation tax, 
leaving the real economy functioning as normal) is of little use for the explanation of 
high and hyperinflation. More adequate models of high inflation are necessarily less 
clear-cut as they try to account for the complexity of the matter. As will become 
apprehensible, high and hyperinflations must be regarded as "pathological 
processes" and "the products of socio-political persistence in negative sum-
games"26. 
2.2.1 Rising Money Stock 
As Milton Friedman famously noted, "inflation is always and everywhere a 
monetary phenomenon". Indeed, it is an uncontested and empirically well-
documented fact that all persistent inflations are accompanied by a rising stock of 
nominal money27. 
While price level increases cannot occur without commensurate increases in the 
money stock, it is important to note that that the money stock growth is usually less 
than proportionate since the demand for real balances declines. It is identical to say 
that the velocity of money circulation rises, as people effectuate the same volume of 
transactions with reduced amounts of cash that are turned over more frequently in 
order to minimise losses of purchasing power of the money held28. Thus, in 
25 For a detailed argument over existing inflation theories, see Heymann/Leijonhufvud (1995). 
26 Leijonhufvud (1990), p. 2. 
27 See e.g. Vegh (1995), p. 39f. 
28 This can be illustrated with the equation of exchange as expressed by Irving Fisher, M*V = 
P*T: given a constant volume of transactions (T), a rising money stock (M) translates into more 
than proportionately rising prices (P) if and when at the same time the cash balances held by the 
public decrease - or, expressed the other way round, the velocity of money circulation (V) 
increases: Vis reciprocal to the cash balances held by the public (k): V = 1/k. 
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Argentina, M3 amounted only to little more than 10 percent of GDP in 1989 and to 
around 5 percent in 199029 . 
The charts of figure 4 depict the exorbitant nominal money stock growth in 
Argentina during 1989 and 1990. Note that due to the scale necessary to catch 
these increases, the already very high money growth of the previous years -
Argentina experienced high inflation during the whole of the 1980s - gets out of 
sight in these diagrams. To meet this shortcoming, the logarithmic plots are added 
for each of the diagrams. 
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Source: Oficina de la CEPAL en Buenos Aires on the basis of official data. 
2.2.2 Government Finance 
Clearly, the rising money stock itself is not the ultimate cause of inflation. 
Typically, in high inflations, the government's financing requirements induce it to 
allow the money stock to rise at an inflationary rate. Rather than Milton Friedman's 
"monetary phenomenon", and as will become palpable further on, high inflations can 
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better be described as "processes of unreliable interaction between the public and 
the private sector"30 . 
All high inflation histories have in common the persistent failure of fiscal policies 
to operate within its means31 . That said, it is not primarily the size of budget deficits 
that determines the inflationary outcome. Rather, it is the fact that the creation of 
money originates in the government's need for funds. 
Given the undoubted relationship between monetary financing of budget deficits 
and inflation, does it also extend to full-blown hyperinflation? Kiguel (1989) shows 
that this is clearly the case. As soon as a government increases the size of its 
budget deficit to a level that exceeds the maximum inflation tax obtainable, an 
explosive path of inflation is taken32 . 
Figure 5 shows the Argentine budget deficits during the 1980s. They reached 
maximum levels during the first half of the decade. As Heymann (2000) notes, the 
lower deficit levels towards the end of the decade do not properly reflect the 
seriousness of the fiscal situation: the more the economy approaches extreme 
conditions of very high and hyperinflation, the more deficit magnitudes are restricted 
by the abrupt fall in credit supply to the government and the decline in real money 
balances - which constitute the "tax base" for the inflation tax. Thus, the pressures 
on public finances during the late 80s were vastly higher than the figures suggest33 . 
30 Leijonhufvud (1990), p. 2. 
31 See Bernholz (2003), pp. 69 ff. Bernholz substantiates this by the empirical study of all 29 
hyperinflations that occurred worldwide until 2003. All but four of the examined hyperinflations were 
connected with budget deficits of 20 and more percent of expenditures. 
32 The decisive link is a perpetuated disequilibrium in the money market: money press 
financing of an increased deficit creates a temporary excess supply in the money market, thereby 
generating an increased rate of inflation. This reduces the demand for money, which further 
prevents the money market from clearing. Accelerating inflation which develops into hyperinflation 
is the result. This is independent of the assumption on the formation of expectations (adaptive or 
rational). See Kiguel (1989). 
33 See Heymann (2000), p. 63. 
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2.2.2.1 Inflationary Bias of Governments 
35 
What is the motivation behind a (democratic) government's decision to finance 
deficits via inflation? Public choice theory emphasises the so-called political 
business cycle, which describes the incentives of elected governments to choose 
and time their policies so as to maximise their chances of being re-elected. These 
chances are highest when the benefits of policy actions enjoy the highest possible 
popularity while the costs are distributed over the electorate as widely as possible, 
and thus felt as little and late as possible. Higher taxes to finance popularity-
enhancing policies are counterproductive as they incur the costs of lost support from 
the taxed. Instead, higher borrowing is attractive as it does not hurt anyone 
immediately. The debt-financed additional spending, if timed well, stimulates the 
economy prior to the election, while the debt service will hurt later, after the election. 
Over time, however, the debt service consumes ever higher proportions of 
revenues, pushes market interest rates up and so crowds out investment. At some 
point, the perception that the government is an insecure debtor may even add 
significant risk premia to interest rates. 
In such a situation - already highly indebted and struggling to gain voters' 
support -, the incentive for the government to choose money creation to help 
finance the deficit is very high. In the short run, it prevents higher interest rates and 
allows stimulating the economy, while the negative consequences of inflation occur 
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only after the next election. Moreover, inflation has the additional "benefit" of 
reducing the debt stock in real terms. If the government chooses to fight inflation 
afterwards, it has to stop doing so in time and to produce new inflation in order to 
prepare for the next election. The consideration of the political business cycle thus 
leads to the assumption of an inherent inflationary bias of democratic 
governments34 . This will all the more be the case in times of slow or negative growth 
(when higher taxation is even less of an option), or of wars or international tensions 
(which offer the excuse of an extraordinary situation)35. 
Figure 6 highlights the two years when presidential elections took place in 
Argentina: in 1983, after the defeat in the Falkland war and the collapse of the 
military regime, when Raul Alfonsin of the so-called Radical Party won the 
presidency, and in 1989, when Carlos Menem of the Justicialists ("Peronists") took 
over in July amidst the first bout of hyperinflation. While the political business cycle 
argument will doubtlessly be demonstrable for several of Argentina's previous 
elections, the peculiarity of Argentina's situation in the 1980s seems to forbid 
explaining much of its inflationary performance in this way. Both elections were 
staged on the background of catastrophic economic (and, for 1983, political) 
situations, with an electorate plagued by high inflation and disillusioned since 
decades. The economic situation in neither year left much room for economic stimuli 
generated by expansionary monetary policies. Therefore, for the considered decade 
in Argentina, the political business cycle was certainly not of much relevance. 
34 Of course, autocratic governments are subject to similar incentives to secure their power. 
History provides very few examples of dictators that withstood these temptations due to their 
personal ideological belief or benevolence. 
35 See Bernholz (2003), p. 12. 
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However, Argentina doubtlessly constitutes a model case of another instance of 
governments' inflationary bias. This is related to its fiscal federalism, i.e. the 
distribution of tax revenues between the federal state and the provinces36. 
Argentina's inflation in the 1980s is at least partly to be regarded as an outcome of 
the fierce political struggles over the allocation of tax revenues between national 
and provincial jurisdictions. For instance, payments to the provinces under the 
distribution scheme were strategically delayed, to dilute their real value and change 
the real primary distribution. Thus, inflation served to mend the national budget ex-
post, in effect softening aggregate budget constraints37 . Clearly, inflation again fed 
back and gave incentives to the provinces to press for an automatisation of 
distribution mechanisms, thus rendering them even more inefficient and increasing 
budgetary pressures. 
2.2.2.2 Debt Structure 
Existing government liabilities in high inflation countries typically differ 
significantly in structure from those of stable economies: owing to their instable past, 
they have shorter maturities and higher rates that already include inflation 
36 This scheme, the so-called "coparticipaci6n", will be discussed in more detail later. 
37 During the debates that preceded the new (and current) law for federal fiscal relations in 
1988, the threat of inflating the economy as a last resort (in order not to have to further concede in 
distributional negotiations) was even pronounced expressly by the federal government. See 
Saiegh/Tommasi (1999), p. 197. 
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expectations. Foreign debt forms an important proportion of government debt when 
high yields have previously attracted speculative capital imports. 
Often, the government at some point stops servicing foreign debt, or leaves its 
commitment to repayment vague. New lending from abroad is then near to 
impossible. With these financing restraints, governments are tempted to take 
recourse to indirect borrowing in the form of setting high reserve requirements on 
bank deposits. The result is a reduction in bank credit to the private sector - an 
indirect form of crowding out38. Under extreme pressure, the government may also 
fall back on delaying payments to suppliers or state employees. Whether and to 
which degree liabilities are repaid is at some point either arbitrary or determined by 
the pressure exerted by single creditors. 
As the public perceives the financing restraints, the possibility of default enters 
their expectations and calculations, and increases interest premia. The increased 
interest burden in turn renders default more probable, and a run similar to a banking 
panic may occur, itself precipitating default. 
Figure 7 shows the financing of the Argentine government's debt during the 
1980s. Domestic debt played the paramount role in the first half of the decade, but 
ceased to offer much financing potential towards the end. The proportion of public 
debt financed from abroad shows a marked rise after the intermediate stabilisation 
attempt of 1985, but declines again over 1988-1990. The depiction of public foreign 
debt in absolute terms, as shown in Figure 8, confirms the finding that the Argentine 
government found itself increasingly indebted and struggling to find creditors at 
home and abroad during the final years of the 1980s. 
38 Moreover, with high reserve requirements, the government has to pay interest on reserves, 
in order not to cause large spreads between borrowing and lending rates of banks. See 
Heymann/Leijonhufvud (1995), p. 64. 
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Source: Worldbank, 2003 World Development Indicators. 
Figure 8: Foreign Debt 1980-1990 






~ • Pltllic Del:t 30 
~Ai-..aeDel:t iii 20 
10 
0 
~ ~ ~ w ~ w ffi ~ ~ m ~ ,... T" ... T" T" T" 
( 1) Debt Stock at the end of period. 
Source: Oficina de la CEPAL en Buenos Aires on data of the BCRA and the Ministerio de Economia_ 
2.2.2.3 Are Budget Deficits a Cause or a Consequence of Inflation? 
39 
There is a case for asking whether the causation might not be reverse, so that 
budget deficits are caused by inflation. Indeed, the lag between receiving and 
spending public funds works to reduce their purchasing power by high inflation, with 
the consequence that the real budget deficit grows even when expenditures are 
Jutta Maute - 978-3-631-75447-4
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 04:44:44AM
via free access
40 
kept constant (the so-called Olivera-Tanzi effect). Thus, high inflation complicates 
fiscal management and in effect feeds on itself39. 
The proof that budget deficits are not initially caused by inflation can be seen in 
the observation that in nearly all historical cases massive budget deficits preceded 
the occurrence of high inflation. Since these deficits generally cannot have been 
financed exclusively on capital markets, the financing of the budget deficits via the 
money printing press has to be regarded as the initial trigger40 . 
Figure 9 confirms this reasoning for the Argentine case: massive budget deficits 
in the early 1980s preceded the most significant increases in yearly inflation rates of 
1984/85 on the one hand, and of 1989 on the other. 
Figure 9: Budget Deficit and Inflation 1980-1990 
Budget Deficit and Inflation 
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Sources: Worldbank, 2003 World Development Indicators and Oficina de la CEPAL en Buenos Aires on 
the basis of official data. 
2.2.2.4 Erosion of Tax System 
Whereas stable economies most of the time manage to bring their projected 
spending in line with their actual or potential taxing capacity, high inflation 
economies are characterised by a loss of control over their budgets. 
Inadequacies of the tax system typically account for much of the budget deficits. 
The most important taxes, VAT and income tax, usually would offer much more 
financing potential if properly collected. Instead, governments often impose various 
39 See Kiguel (1989), p. 156. 
40 See Bernholz (2003), p. 72. 
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excise taxes at high rates that cause significant distortions and yield little compared 
with other sources of taxation. 
Tax collection is erratic and inefficient, since the performance of the public 
sector in general, and also of the tax agencies, gets worse the more the economic 
disorder caused by high inflation radiates. Corruption and tax evasion get 
widespread, but even for honest taxpayers there are often legal loopholes and 
exemptions. 
With high inflation, the time lag between tax accrual and collection reduces real 
tax revenues. The ever-present incentive for taxpayers to pay late is magnified by 
the additional inducement created by inflation, and real tax revenues dwindle 
further. Indexation of taxes would offer no solution since the time-lag problem is 
unavoidable. 
The first chart of figure 10 shows that Argentine tax revenues covered highly 
variable proportions of GDP over the decade (between 8 and 14 percent). Tax 
revenues never exceeded 15 percent of GDP, which is a poor proportion compared 
with industrial countries with proportions nearer 50 percent, as well as with 
emerging economies' average levels (around 20 percent). The tax structure equally 
proves to have been very instable, as displayed in the second chart: taxes on 
income, profits, and capital gains form a minor part of tax income, whereas taxes on 
goods and services over most of the decade covered more than a third of total 
government revenue. Thus, Argentina's tax system on the whole failed to offer 
sufficient and stable government revenues. Not covered by official tax numbers, of 
course, is the increasing proportion of inflation tax that made up for deficient tax 
revenues. 
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2.2.2.5 Lack of Structured Budgeting Process 
Fiscal stability requires a rational and well-defined budgeting procedure where 
conflicts over the distribution of funds are dealt with in a simultaneous negotiation 
between all entitled groups, and where the result becomes legally binding for the 
whole of the fiscal year. Furthermore, it is important that there is no "shadow 
budget", but that all items of public activity are included in the official budget. 
With high inflation, it becomes impossible to project budgets for a whole fiscal 
year. Planning horizons shorten, and renegotiations, often without due 
parliamentary legitimation, become more frequent. Negotiations with pressure 
groups are not conducted simultaneously, but sequentially, which renders an 
ultimate control of expenditures near to impossible. Then, there is neither potential 
nor incentive for claimants to negotiate compromises with each other, and each 
group tries to maximise its own stake. Government departments, provincial and 
local governments, public utilities, nationalised industries, and other fund claiming 
organisations thus all work in the same direction, i.e. towards a maximisation of the 
deficit. The threat to reduce public services, e.g. in hospitals or schools, works to 
push their claims through, with the effect that these groups de facto operate under 
"soft budgets"41 . 
41 The phenomenon of soft budgets also affects the private sector: with high inflation, money 
fails to be a reliable unit of account, and calculation and cost control become impossible. E.g., to 
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Often, extraordinary expenditures, e.g. for warfare, reparations, or foreign debt 
service, worsen the budget additionally. Furthermore, the government typically 
faces financing restrictions as government debt is not marketable in the required 
volumes and/or at reasonable interest rates. The result is not only allocation 
inefficiency and inequality, but also time-inconsistent and non predictable budgetary 
policies. 
Under these circumstances - unable to contain expenditures, to raise sufficient 
funds by conventional taxation, and to borrow from the public - there is a strong 
incentive for governments to rely on money creation to finance budget deficits. At 
that point, a clear line between fiscal and monetary policies cannot be drawn any 
longer42 . 
The Argentine public sector of the 1980s offers a textbook example of these 
characteristics. A widespread codex of behaviour among officials and functionaries, 
developed over decades at least, was characterised by nepotism and corruption, 
rulings by decree, and a disregard of any legal and judicial institutions meant to 
secure checks and balances43 . The procedures around the official budget were 
shaped correspondingly. In addition to the pressures generated by high inflation, the 
financing of the Falkland war and the mounting foreign debt services put massive 
strain on the budget. 
2.2.2.6 Inflation Tax 
The government's proceeds from money creation, the so-called seigniorage, 
results from the real value of newly created base money as well as from the loss of 
purchasing power of the existing money stock. The latter element in effect acts like 
a tax levied upon holders of money. However, this "inflation tax" differs from other 
forms of taxation in an important aspect: it is not decided upon in the same formal 
way and by the same body as are regular taxes, but rather represents a kind of 
find out whether a profit centre is profitable at all, big Brazilian firms even developed methods that 
used intern input price indices to calculate the amount of inputs the sales revenues of its outputs 
offered command over, i.e. that used physical rather than monetary indicators. See 
Heymann/Leijonhufvud (1995), p. 80. 
42 In the case of complete reliance on money creation for the financing of a budget deficit, the 
real value of the monetary increase must match the real budget deficit. For a formal foundation see 
Heymann/Leijonhufvud (1995), pp. 14ft. 
43 Any compendium of Argentina's history in the 20th century, like e.g. that of the 
Encyclopaedia Britannica, reads like a seemingly endless repetition of the same political behaviour 
patterns, interchangeable between civil and military governments. 
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"emergency" finance for a government unable to stick to a consistent fiscal policy 
and to withstand political pressures on the budget. 
The inflation tax is easy to impose and collect, but carries high social costs 
compared with other forms of taxation. First, there is the amount of time and effort 
spent by individuals to economise on cash balances in order to reduce the "tax 
base". These efforts imply huge overall efficiency losses. Second, the incidence of 
the inflation tax is strongly regressive: lower income people's cash balances form a 
higher proportion of their wealth than those of the better-off, and their possibilities to 
evade or minimise taxation are less. 
The general relationship between tax rates and tax revenues is generally 
described by the Laffer curve. Applied on the inflation tax, an economy can be 
located either on the "good" side of the Laffer curve (where higher inflation leads to 
higher seigniorage revenue) or on the "bad" side (where higher inflation reduces 
seigniorage revenue due to a reduced money demand). When seigniorage is raised 
in excess of the revenue-maximising inflation tax (i.e. the maximum set by the 
prevailing demand for money), inflation accelerates and, if not fought back, 
eventually moves towards hyperinflation44 . 
For the Argentine case, Kiguel/Neumeyer show that for most of the 1980s, the 
economy stayed on the "good" side of the Laffer curve, i.e. increases in inflation 
yielded increases in seigniorage revenue. During the period of 1982/84, however, 
seigniorage reached levels (over 7 percent of GDP) that could not be sustained by a 
stable rate of inflation, and it can be argued that the economy was from that time on 
an explosive hyperinflationary path - a view that is supported by the fact that 
inflation doubled in 1983 and again in 1984. After the intermediate Austral 
stabilisation attempt, seigniorage reached excessive levels again in 1989 (around 9 
percent of GDP), and hyperinflation took oft45. 
Inflation reduces the real value of regular tax revenues. The inflation tax 
therefore must be higher than the real losses in other tax revenues to prevent total 
government revenues from decreasing. By increasing inflation, real tax revenues 
decline further, and the inflation tax revenues have to grow further - a vicious circle 
that results in accelerating inflation. Data on the inflation tax show that in the 1970s, 
44 See Kiguel (1989), p. 149. It is the inflation elasticity of the money demand and the size of 
the fiscal deficit in relation to the maximum seigniorage revenue that decide upon an economy's 
location on the Laffer curve. 
45 See Kiguel/Neumeyer (1995), p. 681. 
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a 4 to 5 percent monthly inflation rate yielded seigniorage of about 5 percent of 
Argentina's GDP, whereas in the late 1980s, a monthly inflation rate of 15 to 20 
percent was necessary to produce the same yield46. 
Finally, an important theoretical consequence is that, if money is issued to cover 
public financing needs in real terms, monetary growth becomes itself dependent on 
the inflation rate, and the money stock is determined endogenously47. The fiscal 
deficit then remains as the only exogenous variable in the complex picture of high 
inflation. 
Figure 11 shows the overall deficits of the Argentine non-financial public sector 
and the way these were financed for three periods of the 1980s. Seigniorage always 
played an important role in financing the deficits. 
Figure 11: Fiscal Deficits, Seigniorage, and Inflation 
1979/80 1982/84 
Fiscal Deficit 7.0 14.6 
Net Borrowing 5.4 4.6 
Seigniorage 5.2 7.8 
Inflation (annual average) 128.3 340.4 
All figures in percent of GDP, except for the rate of inflation which is percent per year. 
Fiscal deficit = domestic borrowing + central bank loans to the treasury. 
Source: Kiguel/Neumeyer (1995), on data from World Bank, IFS, and DATAFIEL 48 . 
2.2.3 Monetary Regime 






Clearly, the monetary constitution plays a key role in the explanation of inflation. 
Historical evidence yields the conclusion that economies with currencies based on a 
metallic (gold or silver) standard experienced little or no inflation, whereas paper 
money standards have been more prone to inflation. Within paper money standards, 
those with central banks independent of political authorities, or those bound by a 
regime of fixed exchange rates to stable currencies (that are themselves either on a 
metallic standard or managed by an independent central bank) are less inflation-
biased49. Clearly, budget deficits can be financed via money creation only when the 
46 See Heymann/Leijonhufvud (1995), p. 20. 
47 See Cagan (1989a), p. 181. 
48 See Kiguel/Neumeyer (1995), p. 673. 
49 See Bernholz (1995b), p. 10. 
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monetary authority can (i.e. is not legally bound to keep a certain ratio between the 
domestic money base and foreign exchange reserves) and will (i.e. is not legally 
and de facto independent from the government) accommodate the government's 
needs50. The criteria "central bank independence" and "exchange rate regime" are 
not independent: a central bank stringently bound to maintain a fixed exchange rate 
necessarily has to have a high degree of independence of political authorities. 
Hence, at least for developing countries, it can be assumed that the type of 
exchange rate regime matters more for the inflationary outcome than mere central 
bank independence51 . 
Before the 1991 Convertibility law, Argentina's central bank never enjoyed any 
notion of independence. As in most developing economies, Argentine civil as well 
as military governments kept ready access to central bank financing. Justification 
could always be constructed from the central bank's Keynesian-inspired charter52 . 
Suiting central bank governors were appointed and at will replaced by the 
respective governments. 
As to the exchange rate regime, there were basically two different regimes in 
Argentina during the 1980s. The famous "Tablita" period (lasting two years from 
January 1979 until January 1981) included a pre-announced path of a devaluing 
exchange rate, and was characterised by a high degree of international capital 
mobility, and market-determined interest rates. The ensuing period, from spring 
1981 until the end of 1989, saw higher restrictions on capital flows and fixed 
exchange rates with discretionary, unannounced devaluations, and the development 
of parallel markets for foreign exchange. 
Thus, over much of the decade, the central bank tried to use the exchange rate 
as a nominal anchor for disinflation, but was less than successful, because there 
50 However, inflation-averse monetary constitutions may well carry some long-term risks of 
inflation: as investors feel secure from inflation by the performance of a central bank that is either 
independent or bound by a fixed exchange rate, they are prepared to lend at lower yields, which in 
turn encourages governments to borrow more. Rising debt ratios at some point are likely to lower 
the hurdles that stand in the way of a government choosing to get hold of the central bank. Also, it 
can be shown that the monetarist hypothesis that a constant budget deficit exclusively financed by 
the issue of bonds is non-inflationary is at least partly invalid. See McCallum (1984). 
51 See Siklos (1995), p. 6. 
52 The Argentine central bank's charter stems from 1935, the Bank's founding year, and was 
designed (primarily by Raul Prebisch) to put an end to the previous currency board, and - in the 
light of the experiences during the Great Depression - to implement a then completely new, anti-
cyclical monetary policy. 
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were neither important efforts to tackle the problem of lax fiscal policy nor attempts 
to restrain the government's access to central bank financing. Rather, frequent 
changes in regulations regarding interest rates and foreign exchange markets led to 
more financial instability (which was only temporarily alleviated by the Austral plan 
and the accompanying liberalisation of interest rates around the middle of the 
decade). Widespread macroeconomic instability persisted over the whole of the 
decade, developing into the extremes of hyperinflation from 1989 onward53 . 
2.2.3.2 Monetary Policy 
Monetary policy in high inflation economies typically does not follow any pre-
defined long-term rule or self-commitment. Rather, it is determined by actual 
economic conditions and political pressures, and it reacts to these pressures in a 
short-term discretionary manner. Decisions to accelerate, keep constant, or 
decelerate the growth of the money stock are made on the basis of currently 
pressing necessities without consideration of their effects in the long run54. That 
means, for the economic agent, that the uncertainty in predicting future price levels 
increases exponentially with distance from the present, and the more so, the more 
frequent and important monetary policy actions are. 
The rapid change of governments and economic policy staff may underline this 
point for Argentina: between 1980 and 1990, Argentina saw 6 different presidents, 
11 ministers of finance and economy, and 10 central bank governors, chosen out of 
military, Radical and then Peronist ranks55. 
The explanation of such conduct of monetary policy generally focuses on the 
time inconsistency problems associated with the reliance on the inflation tax. 
Governments in high inflation economies are supposed to maximise inflation tax 
revenue in the short run and not to commit themselves to a certain inflation limit. In 
other words, their time preference is strong enough as to increase seigniorage in 
the short run at the expense of higher inflation and lower seigniorage in the long 
53 See Kiguel/Neumeyer (1995), p. 674. 
54 This is called a .,random walk monetary standard" by Heymann/Leijonhufvud (1995), pp. 
50ft. 
55 For the period between 1945 and 1990, the respective numbers are: 19 different 
presidents, more than 40 ministers of economy and finance, and equally more than 40 central bank 
governors. See e.g. the central bank's homepage at www.bcra.gov.ar. 
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run56 . Yet, as will be shown below, the interaction between the government's 
incentives and the expectations of private agents leads to an acceleration of 
inflation rates and a reduction of inflation tax revenues. 
2.2.4 Inflation Expectations 
The demand for real money balances is dependent on the expected rate of 
inflation: the higher inflation expectations, the lower the amount of money an 
individual wants to hold. Assumptions over the formation of the public's expectations 
therefore are central when trying to predict the reaction to price increases. 
One way of forming expectations about the future is to look back and project the 
past development into the future. Such adaptive expectations (as described by 
Phillip Cagan in 195657 ) are accurate only under the condition of a constant rate of 
inflation. With rising inflation rates there is a chronic lag of adaptive expectations 
behind actual inflation rates. Backward-looking expectations in a wider sense 
include more data than the inflation rate itself and may calculate the expected 
inflation rate as a stable function of past data. 
Forward-looking expectations, in contrast, are based on anticipated future 
developments. Most influential is the hypothesis of rational expectations (as 
formulated in 1961 by John Muth58), according to which the unboundedly rational 
economic agent is able to predict the inflation rate on the basis of any available 
information, including statistical data and theoretical models as well as political 
assessments. For instance, when given financing needs of a government are 
expected to be financed by the inflation tax, a rational economic agent can estimate 
a rate of money creation and translate it into an expected inflation rate. 
In high inflation episodes, neither the model of adaptive expectations nor the 
over-ambitious notion of perfect foresight fit well with the actual behaviour of the 
public. A more realistic approach to the formation of expectations is to acknowledge 
the fact that the conditions determining an economic outcome are far too many and 
too complex for any individual to be adequately reflected in her decision making. 
Economic agents cope with this complexity by developing certain "reasonable" rules 
56 Cukierman (1995) argues in the light of the German hyperinflation of 1923 that such 
behaviour is not necessarily irrational. See Cukierman (1995), pp. 137 ff. 
57 See Cagan (1956). 
58 See Muth (1961 ). 
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and simplification strategies59. Such reasonable rules are determined by the 
particular state of and experience with policy-making authorities: the public has 
gained experience in recognising the patterns that govern policy-decisions60. In 
forming expectations through pattern recognition in government behaviour, an 
individual relies on incomplete information and is well aware of the limits of her 
ability to predict future policy actions. 
Therefore, even in a stable environment, different sets of observations, different 
internalised "models" and different interpretations of facts across individuals must to 
a certain degree lead to an incoherent "collective state of expectations". When past 
government action has been unsystematic, expectations and ensuing behaviour are 
in addition likely to get highly volatile. Then, in the interaction between policy 
makers and the public, no one can rely on the behaviour of the other, and the 
outcomes of actions get unpredictable61 . 
2.2.5 Symptoms of High Inflation 
Price instability affects every aspect of economic activity in the public as well as 
the private sector. It forces everybody to pay heed to it in even the commonest daily 
transactions. Indeed, the capacity of individuals to live with high inflation is 
sometimes astonishing. It grants that economic activity can go on for a long time -
in an inefficient, resource-wasting and socially damaging way. 
2.2.5.1 Decreasing Demand for Real Money Stock 
As previously pointed out, a decreasing stock of real money can be observed in 
all high inflations. The explanation is straightforward: economic agents try to rid 
themselves of money before it loses much of its purchasing power. At the same 
time, the economy as a whole is swamped by an increasing nominal money stock. 
As the demand for money decreases while its supply rises, prices rise more quickly 
59 "The modern economy has not evolved fully to exploit the cleverness that its inhabitants 
possessed all along. Rather it has evolved to a complexity beyond human understanding, because 
people with limited cognitive capabilities have devised ways of getting along without dealing with 
the full complexity of the system." Leijonhufvud (1990), p. 19. 
60 And, vice versa, political authorities have learnt how the public behaves. This set of mutual 
expectations on the part of the public and of policy-making authorities is caught by the concept of 
the "monetary regime". See Heymann/Leijonhufvud (1995), p. 39. 
61 Heymann/Leijonhufvud call this an "unreliable regime". Regimes can be reliable on the part 
of political authorities either through a gained reputation of consistent behaviour or through rules 
imposed on its behaviour. See Heymann/Leijonhufvud (1995), p. 43. 
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than the money supply. The real stock of money, defined as the nominal stock 
divided by the price level, falls. 
The reduction of real money balances claims high costs in terms of time and 
transactions used to synchronise payments and receipts. The efforts undertaken are 
not only a matter of individual choice, but sometimes also require co-ordination 
between transactors, as e.g. between companies that agree on deals to temporarily 
shift unwanted surpluses of money when their respective cash flows are out of 
phase, or between firms and employees agreeing on a shortening of payment 
periods. Often, these efforts also include physical investments - one example is the 
speeded up installation of automatic teller machines62 . All those efforts are 
necessary because money retains its property as a medium of exchange, although 
taxed exorbitantly. 
The same volume of transactions is now performed with smaller amounts of real 
money. This is possible with three major developments observable during high 
inflations: the rise in money velocity, a return to barter trade, and increasing 
currency substitution. 
2.2.5.2 Currency Substitution 
In high inflations, the reverse of Gresham's law is working: good money drives 
out bad money, the latter quickly losing value (given flexible exchange rates 
between the two)63 . The typical sequence in the course of accelerating inflation is 
that, first, foreign currency is used as a unit of account, then as a store of value, and 
finally as a means of payment. Data on the use of foreign currency circulating is 
scarcely available, as governments are interested in financing their deficits via the 
inflation tax, i.e. enforcing the use of the domestic and suppressing the use of 
foreign currency. Strict foreign exchange controls are often enacted, and circulating 
foreign currency made illegal. 
Currency substitution not only offers people a currency with a lower "relative 
price" to meet their money demand. It can be shown that a high degree of currency 
substitution also reduces the rate of inflation of the original currency. This can be 
explained by the fact that the rate of inflation required to sustain hyperinflation, i.e. 
62 These investments allow to operate with lower money holdings permanently, which means 
that stabilisation will not bring back previous levels of money demand. This hysteresis effect lowers 
the base for the inflation tax in the long run. See Heymann/Leijonhufvud (1995), p. 87. 
63 This can also be called Thier's law. See Bernholz (1995a), pp. 98 ff. 
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to induce people to hold less money, is reduced during the process of financial 
adaptation, and especially dollarisation64 . 
In Argentina, to compensate for the rapid decline in value, domestic currency 
was increasingly replaced by the US-Dollar, starting with Dollar denomination of 
longer-term financial assets and the use of Dollars on markets for real assets and 
durable consumer goods, to extend to ever shorter financial assets and more 
everyday products. One illustration of this is the development of foreign currency 
deposits, as shown in figure 12 (note that the first chart denotes foreign currency 
deposits as percentage of M3 which, as shown above, itself exploded towards the 
end of the decade). In 1991, 40 percent of deposits were denominated in Dollars65 . 
Another dimension of currency substitution is the exodus of capital out of the 
inflationary country. By 1987, an estimated 45 billion US-Dollars were stored abroad 
by Argentine investors, a number which increased by much during the following 
years66. 
Figure 12: Foreign Currency Deposits 1980-1990 
Faeig1 Clnency Deposits as percentage c:A M3 
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64 See Sturzenegger (1994). He explains the lower levels of inflation during the second bout 
of Argentine hyperinflation in early 1990 with the rapid increase in currency substitution during and 
after the first bout in mid-1989. 
65 See Setzer (2001 ), p. 22. 
66 See Pastor/Wise (1999), p. 496. 
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Source: Oficina de la CEPAL en Buenos Aires on the basis of official data67 . 
2.2.5.3 Undervaluation as a Consequence of Currency Substitution 
Most high inflations produce a real undervaluation of the domestic currency, i.e. 
the nominal exchange rate does not reflect the relation of the price levels of the 
domestic economy and the respective trading partner's68. In other words, the 
nominal exchange rate rises, i.e. devalues, faster than domestic prices (corrected 
by foreign prices). Where foreign exchange controls prevent the official exchange 
rate from rising, it is the black market (or parallel) exchange rate that moves towards 
an undervaluation. 
According to Bernholz (2003), the reason becomes obvious when considering 
the individual calculation of a money holder: comparing the opportunity costs of 
holding domestic or foreign currency, the value of domestic money for future uses 
has to be discounted by more as it is subject to higher inflation rates than foreign 
money. Therefore it is valued less than the prevailing purchasing power parity would 
imply69 . 
However, limits to the degree of undervaluation (and to currency substitution) 
are given by three facts: First, the undervaluation of the domestic currency works to 
encourage exports and discourage imports with the result of a higher supply and 
67 See Heymann (2000), p. 174. 
68 That is, the purchasing power parity is not granted: the nominal exchange rate (e,), defined 
as the price for a unit of foreign currency expressed in domestic currency, exceeds the relation of 
the domestic (P;,,) to the foreign price level (P ex1): e, > P;,1 / P ex,-
69 For a formal model that derives undervaluation from the comparison of present values of 
holding domestic or foreign currency, see Bernholz (2003), pp. 90ft. 
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lower demand of foreign currency, which tends to counteract the undervaluation. 
Second, governments usually penalise the holding of foreign currency, i.e. the 
increased costs of holding it moderate the above calculation. Third, and with the 
same effect, the widespread use of domestic currency makes its holding 
comparatively more sensible, as it is easier to find trading partners accepting 
domestic currency. 
Figures 13 and 14 depict the development of the Argentine currency's nominal 
and real exchange rates during the 1980s. Nominal as well as real exchange rates70 
show increases at the beginning of the decade and, more significant, in 1989, 
whereas the mid-1980s saw modest declines following the intermediate stabilisation 
of the Austral. 
Figure 13: Nominal Exchange Rates 1980-1990 
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(2) These numbers refer to the average exchange rate in foreign trade, measured as simple average of the rate which is applied 
for import payments and an export exchange rate which is derived from a weighted average (on the basis of the export 
structure of 1993) of the effective exchange rate for primary export payments and of that for other export payments allowing 
for rights or tax incentives. 
(3) Between Oct. 151n, 1987, and May 191\ 1989, and since Dec. 201\ 1989, free market exchange rate. During other periods, 
parallel exchange rate. 
Source: Oficina de la CEPAL en Buenos Aires on the basis of official data. 
70 The real exchange rate can be defined from different perspectives. One is to correct the 
nominal exchange rate by the relation between the price levels abroad and at home: e, = en• Pext / 
Pint , with e, being the real, en the nominal exchange rate, and P ext and Pint the exterior and interior 
price levels, respectively. The other is to focus on the relative prices of tradable and non-tradable 
goods: e, = en * Pt / Pnt , with Pt being the price of tradables and Pnt the price of non-tradables. Of 
course, under the simplifying assumption that tradables' prices are set by the exterior, while non-
tradables' prices reflect the domestic price level (and allowing for the snag that the domestic price 
index also includes tradables' prices), both aspects condense to the same content. 
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Figure 14: Real Exchange Rates 1980-1990 
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(1) Real exchange rates are defined as: nominal exchange rate * international price index / domestic price index. They have 
been calculated in different modes by using as international price indices alternatively: the price index of Argentine exports, 
here called XPI (expressed in US-Dollars), and the CPI of the United States of America, and as domestic price indices: the 
Argentine CPI and WPI. 
(2) The first of the indicators (Foreign Trade Exchange Rate*XPI/CPI) is calculated by using an average exchange rate for 
exports which is derived from a weighted average (on basis of the structure of 1993) of the effective exchange rate applied to 
primary export products and of that applied to other export products. The two following series are calculated by using an 
average exchange rate for foreign trade which is measured as a simple average of the effective exchange rate for exports as 
defined above and the effective exchange rate for imports. 
Source: Oficina de la CEPAL en Buenos Aires on data of the INDEC and other sources. 
2.2.5.4 Acceleration and Variability of Inflation 
Beyond a certain level, inflations have the tendency to accelerate. Explanations 
are inherent in many of the points discussed above: for one thing, while the nominal 
money stock increases as the government tries to finance its budget deficit, the 
propensity to hold money declines, and prices rise even faster than the money 
stock. This mechanism is amplified by the Olivera-Tanzi effect according to which 
the real budget deficit grows due to the loss of purchasing power of government 
income alone. Moreover, currency substitution reduces the "tax base" on which 
inflation tax can be imposed so that the "tax rate" must rise to generate equal 
revenues. 
The most disturbing factor for the real economy, however, is not acceleration 
itself, but the variability of inflation, which is empirically also shown to rise with 
inflation rates71 . Thus, inflation gets less predictable the higher it becomes. 
This unpredictability causes typical reactions with economic agents and severe 
distortions in the real sector. Considering how prices are set is illustrative in this 
71 See Logue/Sweeney (1981), p. 500. 
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respect. With accelerating inflation, producers and traders realise that their usual 
calculation method does not serve them any longer. The mark-up method, by which 
producers add a profit margin to the production costs, leaves them with real losses 
as the input has become more expensive over the time of the production process. 
Traders cannot replenish their stocks at prices that are covered by the proceeds of 
their effectuated sales. Their reaction is a change in the calculation paradigm: 
selling prices are no longer based on the input costs de facto paid but on the input 
costs that are expected to prevail at the time of selling the product - usually 
calculated with the help of price indices. In other words, backward-looking price-
setting behaviour is replaced by forward-looking behaviour72 . 
As inflation not only accelerates but also gets more variable, this kind of 
calculation gets hazardous. Inflation variability aggravates the main problems 
inherent in using price indices through the effect that higher inflation variability 
causes the real value of indexed prices to get more variable as well73 . Increasingly 
variable inflation leads to even more inadequate price settings than would be the 
case with merely rising inflation, and to highly variable real and relative prices. 
Monthly statistics fail to capture most of intramonth price variability, and this is 
all the more the case for yearly data. Correspondingly, Blejer (1983) demonstrates 
for the period between 1977 and 1981 that individual commodity prices in Argentina 
fluctuated over a much wider range than the aggregated CPI, and that the captured 
disparities are much smaller on a yearly than on a monthly basis. Moreover, he 
found that the deviation of individual price rises from the monthly mean is due to few 
large single rises, and that this "skewness" increases with inflation74 . 
2.2.5.5 Real Price and Wage Variability 
With accelerating and variable inflation rates, real prices inevitably get 
desynchronised with respect to the inflation rate. This is largely due to the existence 
of "menu costs", i.e. the fact that prices cannot be changed instantly to reflect every 
change in inflation, although the intervals of price adjustments generally shorten 
with rising inflation rates. The reaction of price setters is, each time prices are 
72 See Vegh (1995), p. 36. 
73 The situation of importers is somewhat better in that their, much more reliable, "index" is the 
exchange rate. With rising inflation, using the exchange rate as an index spreads gradually 
throughout the economy so that foreign exchange is the measure behind nearly all pricing 
decisions even if it is not (yet) used as a means of payment. See Bemholz (2003), p. 96. 
74 See Blejer (1983), p. 480. 
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changed, to include into their prices the inflation expected until the next price 
change. Therefore, prices are set at higher levels than would correspond with the 
actual inflation rate, but in the course of rising inflation fall below that level - until the 
next price rise occurs. 
The result is a seesaw pattern of real prices, with peaks at the time of price 
rises and subsequent steep declines until the next peak. Not surprisingly, this 
pattern also applies for the development of real wages. When inflation adjustment in 
wages is no longer settled in regular negotiations but gets subject to a price index, 
the deflections are supposed to get shorter and less extreme, but this is again 
counteracted by the increasing variability and acceleration of inflation. Apart from 
allocation inefficiencies caused by highly variable real product and factor prices, 
highly variable real prices and wages have a significant potential to disadvantage 
wage earners. 
Figure 15 shows longer-term trend shifts in real prices and wages. Overall, 
Argentine real wages decreased steadily from 1984 until 1990. They fell between 
1985 and 1990 alone by around 25 percent, thus continuing a trend that had begun 
in the mid-seventies75 . The relation between industrial products and industrial 
wages, itself more variable over the decade, shows a marked rise in the two years 
up to 1989 and thus reflects a decline in wages in relation to prices of industrial 
products. 
Of course, besides prices, the institutional determinants of nominal wages play 
the other role in real wage development. Here, it appears that massive government 
interventions since the days of the military regime in Argentina, covering anything 
between wage freezes and restrictions in trade union activity, probably contributed 
at least as much to the decline in real wages as inflation76. 
75 See Waisgrais (2003), p. 14. 
76 For the institutional and economic determinants of wages see, e.g., Waisgrais (2003). 
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Figure 15: Prices and Real Wages 1981-1990 
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(1) Industrial prices are measured by the national, non-agricultural WPI excluding typical Pampa products. Service prices 
are components of the CPI. Public and private services correspond to the international classifications CUCI and GCE 
(Grandes Categorias Econ6micas). 
(2) Normal salaries are defined as the sum of basic salaries (including extra hours) and bonuses and gratifications. They 
are unit values of the salaries paid during the reference period. 
(3) This refers to the average normal and permanent salaries, which are defined as the sum of basic salaries (including 
extra hours, bonuses and gratifications). They are unit values of the salaries paid during the reference period. 
Moreover, real salaries are defined as lhe amount of nominal salaries earned within a month, deflated by the average of 
the CPI of the current and the following month as an estimate of the value of the payment at month's end. 
Source: Oficina de la CEPAL en Buenos Aires on data of the INDEC and other sources. 
2.2.5.6 Distortion and Excess Variability of Relative Prices 
The characteristics of inflation and price behaviour described above -
acceleration and increasing variability of nominal and real prices - necessarily result 
also in distortions of relative prices, i.e. in prices of one class of goods as expressed 
in another class of goods. An increase in relative price variability is observable both 
across different products and across the same products at different locations. 
Different pricing schemes of various classes of goods add to these inherent 
distortions and may render them grotesque. Most conspicuous are dislocations 
between goods with fix (or "sticky") as opposed to flexible prices, or with regulated 
as opposed to unregulated prices. Also, large single movements in relative prices 
are often caused by "external" disturbances such as devaluations or discrete 
adjustments in public sector prices. Of course, these distortions reflect back on 
inflation and increase its variability. 
A sufficiently stable structure of price relations within an economy forms the 
backbone of calculation and orientation of any economic behaviour. The rising 
instability in the gridwork of relative prices causes manifold violations of the "law of 
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one price", with the effect that market forces no longer work to coordinate supply 
and demand. Markets become more fragmented and local prices more sensitive to 
specific shocks and idiosyncratic expectations. The system gets less well-
coordinated both across space and over time. The limits are reached under the 
conditions of hyperinflation when agents cannot predict even the most immediate 
outcome of their economic actions and consequently reduce their exposure to 
business to a minimum. 
Although relative price distortions are directly tangible for people living through 
high inflations, they are - as is the case with highly variable nominal and real prices 
- rarely adequately reflected in the statistics. While the more lasting components of 
relative price distortions are visible in month-to-month and longer-term data, the 
high intramonth (or even intraweek or intraday) variability of relative prices (the 
"noise" component) is not caught by monthly observations. Therefore, the positive 
relation between inflation rate and relative price variability seems to get weak at 
very high inflation rates. 
The co-existence of nominal rigidities in some prices, arising from frictions in 
price setting ("menu costs"), and a high degree of flexibility in other prices are 
generally perceived as an important source of relative price distortions. Accordingly, 
sticky prices are to blame for much of these distortions as they fail to closely follow 
the inflation rate77 . While the discrete and belated adjustment of nominal wages to 
inflation is the most important example, there are many other inter-sector and inter-
firm price coordination tasks that include stickier and less sticky prices and that fail 
to produce efficient outcomes in high inflation78 . 
A further typical distortion in high inflations is the distortion between goods and 
services supplied (or regulated) by the public sector on the one hand and privately 
supplied and priced goods and services on the other hand. Often, governments try 
as long as possible to keep prices for public goods low compared to overall inflation. 
Therefore, prices such as regulated rents for social housing, railway fares, and 
publicly supplied energy and water grow very cheap in relation, e.g., to food or 
clothing. 
77 However, empirical studies find that fix prices march more in parallel with the relevant 
indices than do flex prices. This reflects the observation that accelerating inflation leads to a higher 
than average number of fix prices being adjusted. Deviations of inflation from the trend therefore 
reflect these adjustments of fix prices, and not, as could be expected, the faster response of flexible 
prices. See Leijonhufvud (1990), p. 11. 
78 See Ball/Romer (1991 ). 
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Real estate and company shares also lose in relative value. This seems 
surprising since real assets are generally considered safe havens from inflation. But 
when rents are regulated, real estate loses its revenue potential and thus its value. 
The loss of value in company shares can be explained by the loss of information 
corporate reports provide: numbers become more meaningless the more the unit of 
account becomes unreliable. The evaluation of corporate performance becomes 
impossible, and stock markets cease to function properly79 . As a consequence, 
stock prices lag behind general inflation because the dividends paid are lower in 
relation to the reported net profits than was the case before the inflation. 
Another source of relative price distortions arises from different kinds of wage 
setting. Although wages generally lag behind inflation to a certain degree, this is 
less so for unskilled labour, whose wages are to a higher degree set by trade unions 
and/or possibly indexed. The higher skill and wages, the bigger gets the gap 
between wage development and inflation80. 
Examining relative prices of three broad product classes (food, non-food goods, 
and services), Blejer (1983) found for Argentina in the years 1977 to 1981 that the 
group of services showed a marked upward movement in its relative price. 
Furthermore, relative price variability within the food sector was much higher than 
within other sectors. Moreover, he showed that an opening of the economy (i.e. an 
increase in import-competition) worked to reduce relative price variability of 
domestic prices81 . 
Figure 16 shows that Blejer's finding of services (here the denominator) growing 
relatively more expensive (here in relation to industrial products) applied also for the 
years 1983 to 1987, but shows the reverse development before and after, when 
prices of industrial products rose even faster than those of services. As for the 
different types of services, the relation of industrial products to public services 
shows less marked changes than the relation of industrial products to private 
services, implying a much closer linked development between industrial products 
and public services - in Argentina, the government obviously did not try to keep 
prices of public services artificially low. As the second chart of figure 16 shows, over 
79 See Heymann/Leijonhufvud (1995), p. 81. 
80 See Bernholz (2003), pp. 98 ff. He gives empirical and anecdotal evidence for the Austrian 
and German hyperinflations of 1922 and 1923 respectively. 
81 See Blejer (1983). 
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the decade, pampa products lost in relative value against industrial products -
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(1) Industrial prices are measured by the national, non-agricultural WPI excluding typical Pampa products. Service prices are 
components of the CPI. Public and private services correspond to the international classifications CUCI and GCE (Grandes 
Categorias Econ6micas). 
(2) This measures the relation between two components of the WPI: the price index for industrial products as defined in the 
previous note and a compound of goods (primary, e.g. wheat, bovine livestock, and manufactured, e.g. beef, flour, vegetable 
oil) which are typical Pampa products or derived from such. 
Source: Oficina de la CEPAL en Buenos Aires on data of the INDEC and other sources. 
2.2.5.7 Contracting Strategies 
As inflation rates and relative prices become highly variable in high inflations, 
their anticipation becomes a difficult task. Uncertainty increases with the length of 
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planning horizons. There are different strategies to cope with this kind of 
uncertainty, each of them suitable for different kinds of transaction, and each of 
them observable in high inflation economies. 
First, nominal contracts remain only if they refer to very short time horizons. This 
is the case in wholesale and retail markets for consumer goods, services, and 
intermediate products. Nominal contracting also remains in markets for short-run 
interest bearing assets, which are in strong demand from three sides: people try to 
move both out of money and out of long-term contracts, and speculative trades that 
exploit differences in inflationary expectations increase. But the higher and more 
erratic inflation, the shorter get the maturities of deposits people accept to hold, and 
in the extreme case of hyperinflation people refuse to keep deposits at all. 
Second, longer-term contracts, for which re-negotiation is costly, such as 
property leases, longer-term customer-supplier relationships, and labour contracts, 
deal with uncertainty by including index clauses. 
There are several problems with indexing: one is the question, which index, i.e. 
which basket of goods, to choose. Linking payments to one of the officially 
published price indices is attractive in several respects: they are available for all at 
the same time, they cannot be manipulated by the contracting parties, and 
bargaining costs are reduced. Furthermore, there is a certain stabilising effect when 
the practice of linking payments to the same index (usually the CPI) becomes 
widespread, because it imparts inertia on the inflation rate, which in turn limits the 
variability of the real value of payments. The main problem with indexing is that it is 
necessarily backward-looking and implies a reporting lag. This does not matter too 
much if the inflation rate is sufficiently steady, but causes serious misalignments 
between actual price movements and those reflected by the index in states of highly 
variable and accelerating inflations. Then, especially long indexed contracts 
generate highly variable real payments. The consequence is that, with highly erratic 
inflation, indexing will remain only up to a certain duration of contracts, and beyond 
that limit markets disappear82 • 
The third strategy, dollarisation, offers a way out of the reporting lag, for the 
exchange rate is a price that is continuously measured and announced83 . But 
82 Heymann/Leijonhufvud formulate the assumption that the duration of the longest remaining 
indexed contracts corresponds to the period during which the variance of the inflation rate remains 
within certain tolerance limits. See Heymann/Leijonhufvud (1995), p. 99. 
83 See Vegh (1995), p. 62. 
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indexing to the exchange rate also has drawbacks because the real exchange rate 
in high inflations also becomes very volatile, and because it is not a domestic but a 
foreign basket of goods over which the exchange rate offers constant command. 
Moreover, governments usually try to forbid indexing to the exchange rate in order 
to keep currency substitution in check as long as possible. The same qualifications 
apply for the direct denomination of contracts in foreign currency. 
Thus, different standards evolve for different kinds of transaction: dollarisation 
prevails in property markets and other long-lasting assets, wage contracts and 
property leases are indexed, while wholesale and retail markets as well as short-
term financial markets continue to trade on a nominal basis. It is obvious that an 
economy operating on different transaction standards cannot function without 
friction, especially in markets that are affected by different standards - most 
conspicuously in the real estate sector84. Real incomes become volatile because the 
adjustment formulae in wage contracts do not properly reflect the changes in 
consumer goods prices. Since long-term financing of investments is not available, 
investors have to make use of several succeeding short-term loans at real interest 
rates that oscillate between positive and negative values. The use of certain kinds of 
indexation does not only imply costs but also significant risks (although intended to 
reduce risks) that reduce people's willingness to make binding long-term 
commitments85 . Thus, financial management gains more resemblance with a daily 
gamble than with a productivity enhancing activity. 
Which contracting strategies prevail depends on the magnitude of inflation, but 
also on a country's institutional characteristics and its experience with inflation. 
Formal indexation of financial contracts86 or official wage adjustments based on 
84 This was the case also in Argentina: Property markets were in Dollars but mortgages were 
available neither in domestic currency nor in Dollars. Leases were indexed; exchange rate 
movements then changed the relative prices of houses and leases, causing excess supply in one 
market and excess demand in the other. 
85 A rather curious example is the Argentine "doctrina de imprevisibilidad" (unforeseeability 
doctrine), a law that allowed a party of an indexed contract to obtain a revision if the agreed 
escalator deviated by much of the actual price development. With high price volatility, however, the 
application of this law sometimes produced the opposite outcome, when the plaintiff was worse off 
with the revised contract because interim price swings undid the intended effects. See 
Heymann/Leijonhufvud (1995), p. 97. 
86 This was practised in Brazil in the 1980s and early 1990s, when even overnight credits with 
amounts higher than the equivalent of 3,000 US-Dollars were indexed. See Bernholz (2003), p. 94. 
Jutta Maute - 978-3-631-75447-4
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 04:44:44AM
via free access
63 
explicit indexing formulae may be chosen by some countries, while in other 
economies indexation remains less widespread. 
The strategies prevailing in Argentina during the 1980s were the shortening of 
contracting periods rather than indexing, which remained a less important practice87 . 
In the mid-1980s, with monthly inflation rates of 20 to 30 percent, wages were 
adjusted monthly, usually with reference to the CPI growth of the previous month, 
but without explicit indexation clauses88 . Given highly variable monthly CPI growth 
rates in Argentina (in the late 1980s between 2 and 200 percent), indexing was of 
only little use, since the real value of payments from indexed contracts got highly 
variable. 
2.2.5.B Disappearance of Markets 
Refraining from economic transaction is another strategy to deal with immense 
uncertainty. In high inflations, certain markets simply disappear, as there is no way 
to cope with uncertainty, especially in the longer term. Long-run positions will at 
most be held abroad. At the end of the 1980s, Argentine "longer-term" credit 
markets had completely vanished, so that the longest available credits had the 
duration of 14 days89 . 
The intertemporal structure of markets shrinks: the higher the inflation rate, the 
shorter the remaining market terms. One aspect of this phenomenon, known 
throughout Latin America as "cortoplacismo", is the substitution of one long-term 
contract by two or more successive short-term contracts: economic agents prefer 
flexibility and forgo higher yields in return of a smaller degree of uncertainty. As a 
consequence, a reduction in short-term real interest rates and even the acceptance 
of persistent negative real rates can be observed90 . Figure 17 depicts the 
development of nominal and real interest rates over the decade. Passive real 
interest rates were mostly negative, while in the years preceding the Austral 
stabilisation attempt, and again in 1989, even active real rates ranged far into the 
negative spectrum. 
The shrinking volume and time dimension of the capital markets hurts the real 
economy. The intertemporal allocation of resources between the sectors of an 
87 See Heymann (2000), p. 85. 
88 See Heymann/Leijonhuvfud (1995), p. 98. 
89 See Bernholz (2003), p. 93. 
90 In this environment, low short-term interest rates should not be interpreted as the result of 
an underestimation of the inflation rate. See Heymann/Leijonhufvud (1995), p. 52. 
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economy is hindered and rendered inefficient by high and erratic inflation: in a 
decentralised market economy, financial institutions and capital markets work to 
coordinate consumption and saving of private households with production and 
investment of firms. Debt financed investment is rendered impossible when long-
term financing is not available. Therefore, under high inflation, investment activity 
decreases, and the capital stock is doomed to get obsolete. 
In the extreme, even retail markets are affected by "disappearance"91 . This is 
illustrated drastically by the view of a sign that appeared in many shops during 
Argentine hyperinflation: "Closed for the lack of prices". Needless to say that at this 
point riots and anarchy are close and the state's survival is at stake. 
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(1) Until Oct. 15''1. 1987, rate fixed by the BCRA on 30 days deposits. Since that date, witnessed rate (weighted average of 
the rates paid by banks on 7, 15, and 30 days deposits). For the first quarter of 1990, witnessed rate on deposits on 
savings accounts. Since April 1990, witnessed rate on time deposits, weighted by all maturities. 
(2) Until Oct. 15°1, 1987, regulated rate. Since that date, rate applied by the Banco de la Naci6n Argentina on discount of 
documents for 30 days. 
(3) Active rate on inter-company operations for 7 days with BONEX guarantee. Average monthly rates. 
Source: Oficina de la CEPAL en Buenos Aires, on data of the BCRA and other sources.92 
2.2.5.9 Economic Performance 
Assuming backward-looking expectations, additional money creation is able to 
produce initial real effects in terms of higher output and employment, since agents -
even if free of money illusion - adapt their behaviour to the higher inflation rate only 
with a lag. Permanent real effects can be obtained only at the cost of ever 
accelerating inflation93 . 
With the assumption of rational expectations, there is little or no Phillips curve 
trade-off left between inflation and unemployment, since agents are able to perfectly 
predict any systematic policy action. Only unsystematic policies (surprise inflation) 
are able to deliver short-term effects, but are speedier adjusted to and incur high 
costs in terms of increased volatility and uncertainty. 
That said, although moderate inflation may be able to stimulate economic 
performance temporarily, ongoing high rates of inflation repel that property94. This 
can be explained with the observation that under high and accelerating inflation the 
likelihood of unanticipated monetary policy stimuli gets very small, as individuals 
92 See Heymann (2000), p. 176. 
93 See Cagan (1989b), p. 203. 
94 See Bernholz (2003), p. 102. 
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become "immune" to the possibility of real effects from monetary policy95. High 
inflation destroys money's functions to such a degree that central economic 
institutions lose their effectiveness. There is no doubt that high inflation economies 
perform less well than they would under macroeconomic stability. Still, it has to be 
qualified in which ways they perform less well. 
The causation chain between inflation and real growth generally focuses on 
relative prices and lost efficiency: rising inflation increases inflation variability, and 
hence uncertainty. Rising inflation variability increases relative price variability, 
which distorts signals for producers and consumers alike. Relative price variation 
creates additional uncertainty. The interpretation of shifts in prices or demand - the 
basis for decision making - becomes guesswork, as nominal factors become 
indiscernible from real ones. To the extent that such guesses are wrong, 
fluctuations in real economic activity and an overall efficiency loss occur. 
While it is empirically proven that real growth variability increases with inflation, 
the effect of inflation on the long-run growth rate remains unclear. Does high and 
variable inflation only reduce the level of factor use or might it even induce the 
economy to take a long-term path of slower growth because the potential factor 
supply itself is reduced? As far as highly uncertain real returns increase the 
reluctance to invest (or to supply one's work force), both the physical and the 
human capital stock and thus potential long-term growth may indeed be reduced. 
Possible expectations of future capital losses and/or confiscations may deter 
investment or re-direct it into more labour-intensive, though less productive, sectors 
(such as services), both of which entails a long-term decline in income and 
productivity96 . Put into the Phillips curve context, a fall in the factor supply may even 
lead to an inflation-unemployment trade-off sloping upwards in the long run, so that 
the same inflation rate now incorporates lower economic activity and higher long-
term unemployment than before97. 
However, the relationship between inflation and long-run growth is difficult to 
prove, not least because it is difficult to separate the effects of high inflation on 
economic performance from other factors, such as other growth-inhibiting policies or 
external shocks, which usually are involved as well. Therefore, the microeconomic 
approach, i.e. the examination of the consequences of inflation for the behaviour of 
95 See Siklos (1995), p. 24. 
96 See Hopenhayn/Neumeyer (2003). 
97 See Logue/Sweeney (1981), p. 500. 
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the public and private sector, feeds the analysis of the growth-inhibiting effects of 
high inflation. 
The above considerations on the forming of expectations in mind, several ways 
of how high and variable inflation affects the economic performance become 
stringent. First, an incoherent collective state of expectations, reflected in differing 
real interest rates used in individual calculations of intertemporal resource 
allocation, leads to an inefficient allocation of capital in general. Second, the 
preference of short-term contracts and the ensuing disappearance of long-term 
finance markets make the financing of investment difficult if impossible, at least 
inefficient, with the result of worsening investment yields and reduced investment 
activity. Third, and perhaps more damaging and lasting than one is generally aware, 
a general "politicising" of the economy is observed, i.e. human resources are 
misdirected in a way which additionally reduces economic efficiency. In a highly 
inflationary and erratic environment, traditional skills in production, quality control, 
marketing, or distribution lose their relative value against qualities that enable an 
individual to better cope with the instable monetary environment98 : the ability to 
predict monetary policy actions and to hedge against them becomes the most 
important human skill. The criteria for personal success change, and people such as 
financial experts, accountants, lawyers, and, above all, people with political 
connections get more valuable. Political interaction via pressure groups replaces the 
more productive ways of private co-operation99 . 
Figure 18 shows the extreme volatility of Argentine GDP during the 1980s, with 
oscillations between -7.6 and +7.9 percent annual growth (both extremes reached in 
successive years), and a strong drift into the negative in the years up to 1989. 
Investment activity declined to a degree that did not suffice to maintain the existing 
capital stock, so that, as a consequence of high real interest rates, lacking demand, 
and increased importance of speculative financial activities, in fact a process of de-
investment took place, boding ill for the country's long-term perspectives 100. 
Unemployment grew over the decade from little more than two to 7.4 percent in 
1990 (see Figure 19). The rate of underemployed persons was estimated to be at 
around the same proportion. 
98 Indeed, banks and financial intermediaries have an incentive to expand their services and 
offer new money substitutes. The "physical" size of the banking sector tends to grow in high 
inflation. 
99 See Heymann/Leijonhufvud (1995), p. 54. 
100 SeeWohlmann (1998), p.119. 
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Argentina's dismal economic performance gets perhaps most palpable in 
comparison with the region's performance, as depicted in Figure 20: with the 
exception of the agricultural sector, hitherto the country's growth engine which 
managed to grow, albeit meagrely, over the decade, the economy shrank while the 
rest of Latin America grew. 
Figure 18: Inflation and GDP Growth 1980-1990 
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Figure 19: Unemployment in Argentina 1980-1990 
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Source: Worldbank, 2003 World Development Indicators. 
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Figure 20: Output Growth in Regional Comparison 1980-1990 
Output Growth 1~1990 
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Source: Worldbank, 2003 World Development Indicators. 
2.2.5.10 External Trade 
O .Argentina 
• Lain Arrerica & 
Caribbean 
The effects of high and erratic inflation on trade are mixed. As pointed out, the 
real exchange rate tends to move towards undervaluation as a result from high and 
erratic inflation. This should work to discourage imports and boost exports. In 
addition, both the decline in domestic demand caused by high inflation and the 
increased incentive to earn foreign currency affect export levels positively 101 . 
In Argentina, after the collapse of the Tablita in 1981, earlier attempts to reduce 
trade barriers reverted into an increase in protectionism, resulting in a complex 
import-discouraging system of tariffs, administrative controls, and special 
treatments. In the second half of the 1980s, following an agreement with the World 
Bank, tariffs were eased somewhat, their structure modified (with a maximum import 
tariff of 40%), and quantitative restrictions reduced102 (moreover, various 
commercial agreements were signed with Brazil, which paved the way for the later 
signing of the MERCOSUR treaty 103). This is visible in imports declining during the 
first half, and recovering somewhat in the second half of the 1980s, but ending up 
101 See Pastor/Wise (1999), p. 496. 
102 See Heymann (2000), p. 59. 
103 Between 1964 and 1969, 24 bilateral protocols were signed by Argentina and Brazil which 
regulated different areas of trade integration. In 1990, the existing bilateral agreements were 
systematised and intensified, and Paraguay and Uruguay joined the talks, which brought about the 
MERCOSUR founding treaty between the four members in early 1991. Chile and Bolivia have 
joined MERCOSUR as associated members. 
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much lower than in the beginning decade (see Figure 21 ). Exports as well as the 
overall trade balance improved significantly since 1987 which mirrors the limited 
recovery of the terms of trade during these years, after they had worsened 
massively during the first half of the 1980s (see figure 22). 
Figure 21: Foreign Trade 1980-1990 
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Source: Oficina de la CEPAL en Buenos Aires, on basis of data from MECON. 
Figure 22: Foreign Trade Prices (1986=100) 
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(2) The indices correspond to the Paasche formula, i.e. they include not only the effects of price variations but also changes in the 
composition of trade flows. 
Source: Oficina de la CEPAL en Buenos Aires, on basis of data from INDEC and other sources. 
Jutta Maute - 978-3-631-75447-4
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 04:44:44AM
via free access
71 
2.2.5.11 Distributional Effects of High Inflation 
It has been previously stated that the incidence of the inflation tax is clearly 
regressive. Although people on average forcedly become financially more 
sophisticated in high inflation economies - at least they will be informed in detail 
about current monthly, weekly or even daily inflation rates, as well as about the 
development of different index components - the capability to minimise the 
exposition to the inflation tax differs significantly between the poor and the more 
well-to-do. Typically, the strategies to reduce real money balances for average 
households are restricted to building up inventories of consumer goods on paydays. 
Contrary to the poor, the better-off own things such as cars and freezers, or credit 
cards, which better enable them to avoid the holding of unwanted cash balances, or 
to realise more or less randomly occurring "bargains". Moreover, they have the 
possibility to place the rest of their received earnings either in short-term deposits or 
to transfer them into foreign currency, both options often being barred for lower 
income people by minimum size requirements. The striving to spend all money early 
in the payment period entails a reduction of precautionary balances and the risks 
associated with it. Then, unforeseen medical expenses, for example, may hit poor 
households badly and necessitate big cuts in consumption afterwards. 
It has been pointed out that wage indexing tends to favour lower income groups 
as opposed to higher wage earners, whose contracts have to be renegotiated. This 
may be true for moderate inflations (where, however, indexing often is not 
practised), and would indeed incorporate a redistribution of income towards low 
wage earners in the long run 104 . However, as has been shown, with lasting and 
accelerating inflation, economic performance and employment is damaged in a way 
that claiming advantages for the working class from high inflation seems cynical, 
especially if one keeps in mind the uneven incidence of the inflation tax described 
above. 
The distribution of wealth is affected by high inflation in a way that holders of 
nominal financial assets with fixed nominal returns lose much of their fortune, 
whereas debtors gain as the real value of their debt melts down quickly. The first 
group usually comprises private households who see their savings and life 
insurances vanish, whereas the second group is made up mostly of enterprises and 
the government. Owners of real capital - real estate and shares - also suffer losses 
104 This is sometimes used as an argument to regard anti-inflation policies as hurting the 
working class. 
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due to its reduced revenue potential, but to a far lesser degree than owners of 
nominal capital. As a consequence, inflation generally works to redistribute wealth in 
a way that hurts the middle class - with the ensuing potentially dangerous social 
and political consequences 105. 
Figure 23 summarises the losses in real income for different Argentine 
population groups. Clearly, the poorest fifth of the population suffered most from 
high inflation, being left in 1989 with 25% percent of the real incomes they had 
disposed of in 1980. The top quintile's real incomes suffered least, ending up at 
60% of their 1980 level. 
Figure 23: Real Incomes by Population Groups, 1980=100 
Year Poorest Second Middle Fourth IQQ Total 
Quintile Quintile Quintile Quintile Quintile 
1980 100 100 100 100 100 100 
1986 89 94 89 95 86 91 
1989 25 37 40 48 60 49 
Source: Pagina 12, cited after The Economist 
Considering the distribution of wages among the employed, the picture gets 
even more accentuated: while the poorest 30 percent lost 13 percent in their wage 
share, the richest ten percent gained 23 percent since the mid-seventies until 
1991 107. 
These numbers embody Argentina's striking development from one of the most 
"equal" Latin American countries to one of the most unequal: owing to its 
abundance in resources, its demographic structure (composed overwhelmingly by 
immigrated Europeans, and only few indigenous populations), as well as its Peronist 
past of pronounced social welfare, the Argentine society had been one of the most 
"equal" by Latin American standards until the mid-seventies. While the continuingly 
worsening distribution since that time is generally attributed mainly to structural 
changes, such as massive government interventions in wage negotiations (most 
105 See Bernholz (2003), pp. 107ff. 
106 See N.N. (1994), p. 14. 
107 See Waisgrais (2003), p. 7. 
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accentuated during the military regime, but also practised later in the eighties)108, 
there is no doubt that high inflation contributed to this development. 
Accordingly, the most common measure of income distribution, the Gini index, 
shows a rise in income inequality among Argentine households from 0.416 in 1980 
to 0.437 in 1990109. In October 1989, more than 45% percent of people living in the 
Gran Buenos Aires area lived below the poverty line 110• 
2.2.6 From High to Hyperinflation 
As already noted, the demarcation line between high and hyperinflation is, by 
convention, drawn at the numerical limit of 50% monthly inflation. It has also been 
said that high inflations can persist for long while any economy, once caught in 
hyperinflation, is bound to collapse within short. The course of events that 
eventually triggers an inflationary economy's transition into hyperinflation is not easy 
to establish, and certainly cannot be generalised. But the above characterisations of 
high inflation economies deliver some central aspects. 
The state of a high inflation economy can be described as excessively sensitive: 
time horizons over which people are prepared to commit themselves have 
shortened to a few days, and prices are changed with such frequency that 
inflationary impulses are spread very quickly. Uncertainty and nervousness 
concerning economic and political developments dominate everyday life. In such an 
idiosyncratic state, single unforeseen, often political, events are able to push the 
economy over the verge 111 • But the developments set in motion by high inflation 
may at some point well deliver the trigger on their own. E.g., once backward-looking 
indexing becomes unacceptable for wage earners and is replaced by forward-
looking arrangements, one very important anchor that kept the economy off the 
shores of hyperinflation is given up, and one of the few remaining links between 
past and current prices is lost. 
In Argentina, the double outbreak of hyperinflation in May to August 1989 and 
December 1989 to March 1990 was clearly connected with the collapse of two 
108 They included anything from state fixing of wages, minimum wage freezes, the suspension 
of trade union activities and the right to strike, to the abolition of collective bargaining. See 
Waisgrais (2003), p. 14. 
109 See Altimir/Beccaria (2000a), p. 432. 
110 See Heymann/Kosacoff (2000), pp. 32f. 
111 For instance, in the case of German hyperinflation, it was the assassination of Rathenau in 
1922 that led to hyperinflation within short. 
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stabilisation attempts. "Plan Primavera" was given up after 8 months in early 1989. 
"Plan BB", introduced in July 1989, was even more short lived, and from mid-
December hyperinflation was back again. In both cases, the inflation rate jumped 
from single-digit monthly figures to more than 50% within a few weeks. 
While most of the setting in which both bouts of hyperinflation occurred is 
identical, there is one major difference. The degree of financial adaptation to 
hyperinflation, and especially the degree of dollarisation, increased during and after 
the first hyperinflation of mid-1989. The second bout of hyperinflation therefore met 
a better prepared public with more alternative monetary assets in place. It can be 
argued that this is the cause why monthly inflation reached 200 percent during the 
first, but "only" 100 percent during the second hyperinflation: the rate of inflation 
required to induce people to hold less money was reduced by the process of 
financial adaptation and/or dollarisation 112 . 
The depiction of hyperinflation differs from that of high inflation mainly in the 
degree of extremity. Plans have to be recalculated from day to day, even from hour 
to hour. The simplest transaction, like selling a product, becomes highly risky. 
These risks are reflected in ever higher mark-ups on production or restocking costs 
(with massive discounts offered for payment in foreign currency), or, on the limit, in 
the refusal to trade at all. Widespread shortages arise spontaneously, owing to the 
excessively delicate state of expectations of market participants. 
Dollarisation gets ever more widespread and eventually dominates almost all 
markets - except retail markets for non-durable goods, which usually continue to be 
fed out of wages or government transfers paid in domestic currency. The exchange 
rate becomes the common reference for price setting, although being itself highly 
volatile113 . Money demand falls drastically; in addition, unpredictable monetary 
policy injections, incoherent expectations and highly variable transaction volumes 
render money demand extremely volatile, which feeds back on goods and exchange 
112 See Sturzenegger (1994). 
113 Heymann/Leijonhufvud describe practices that emerged during Argentina's hyperinflation in 
inter-company relations. Mostly, goods were ordered without knowledge of the price, the latter 
being communicated only upon delivery. Another method was to determine the price as the 
equivalent of the Dollar price in domestic money at the moment when the contract was agreed 
upon; the buyer paid an amount calculated on the basis of the exchange rate prevailing at the 
moment of payment, and the seller recalculated the price using the exchange rate at the time of 
crediting the bill, so that, finally, the buyer issued a second cheque for the difference between the 
amount paid and the final price. See Heymann/Leijonhufvud (1995), p. 107. 
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markets. Nominal, real, and relative prices fluctuate widely all over the economy. 
Trade and consumer credit disappear completely, and so do the incentives to 
supply goods or effort to the markets. Real activity declines sharply, and 
unemployment rises. The operation of the state itself becomes impossible, as all 
sources of government finance peter out. Once caught in hyperinflation, there is no 
"soft" way back, and any stabilisation attempt has to work instantaneously and 
rigorously. 
2.3 Options for Stabilisation in the beginning 1990s 
2.3.1 Political Feasibility of Reforms 
"Each case history [of high and hyperinflations] is a story of repeated attempts 
to cut the deficit. But in most cases it is as if a succession of failed attempts is 
necessary before a coalition can finally be formed to put into place a realistic 
stabilisation package. The commonly shared recognition that systematic taxation is 
collectively preferable to continued inflation does not by itself produce agreement on 
the concrete steps that could stabilise the public finances."114 
The situation of an economy caught in hyperinflation offers no gradual way back 
to stability. The public has lost any confidence in the domestic money, inflation rates 
have reached exorbitant levels, and it does not matter any longer whether inflation 
expectations miss the actual developments by umpteen points since domestic 
money is nearly completely substituted by stable money even in cash transactions. 
The real stock of domestic money has fallen drastically, and inflation tax revenues 
dwindled to a negligible level. Other government revenues continue to fall as well 
due to the Tanzi effect and decreasing economic performance. At the same time, 
government expenditures have to rise to grant transfers to the increasing hoards of 
unemployed. The government is in danger of losing its authority. 
In this situation, the economic conditions eventually make drastic reform efforts 
not only inevitable but also politically feasible. Since all other measures to revive the 
faltering economy now would immediately vaporise without effect, the proposal of a 
monetary reform will finally be able to gain majorities 115. 
The case of Argentina, however, proved to be quite peculiar in this respect. 
Clearly, the second-to-last failed stabilisation attempt and the culmination of 
114 Heymann/Leijonhufvud (1995), p. 71. 
115 See Bernholz (2003), p. 163. 
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decades of monetary instability into hyperinflation dominated the presidential 
election campaigns of 1989 and led to a clear victory of Carlos Menem 116, who 
amidst food riots and hyperinflation took over the presidency five months early, in 
July of that year (when monthly inflation soared to 197 percent). However, in his 
campaign, he had publicly promised to pursue the purest of Peronism (which never 
had lost its popularity and had gained support among the working class the more 
high inflation had disadvantaged them), vowing to increase wages and to re-open 
bankrupt factories 117. At the same time, he had sought the support of business and 
the middle class with his strategically vague promises to fight inflation 118. However, 
Menem, soon after his election, removed the Peronist robe and turned to the free-
market approach of his defeated competitor, adopting a rigid orthodox stabilisation 
plan with the currency board as its cornerstone. 
2.3.2 Shape of Reforms Ending Hyperinflation 
The measures necessary to end hyperinflation have to tackle its main causes 
and some of its detrimental effects. Crucial are a stop in money creation to finance 
budget deficits, the restoration of confidence in the national money, and the re-
establishment of the real stock of national money. Given the difficulty of this task 
under the conditions of hyperinflation, and its extreme dependence upon the 
programme's credibility, it seems inevitable that the basic monetary and political 
institutions be exchanged and a new, credible, monetary and fiscal regime installed. 
Still, any programme, credible and well-defined though it may be, cannot 
predetermine the stabilisation process in every respect but has to remain as flexible 
as to allow for adequate responses to unforeseen developments, e.g. with respect 
to the speed of adaptation of the public's inflation expectations. Thus, policymakers 
face a trade-off between strong commitments to gain credibility, on the one hand, 
and a certain necessary, but potentially trust-reducing, "room for manoeuvre", on 
the other. In addition, while there is a more or less standard menu of measures that 
constitute the necessary conditions for successful stabilisation, the set of actions 
that complements them remains to a large extent historically contingent, i.e., for 
each specific case a combination and sequence of steps has to be found that grants 
116 This was the first time in Argentina's history that a democratically elected president from 
one political party took over from a democratically elected president from another political party. 
117 See Jonas (2002), p. 8. 
118 See Pastor/Wise (1999), p. 479. 
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enough credibility as well as political and social acceptance 119. Thus, there is no 
standard stabilisation programme with a built-in guarantee for success. 
2.3.2.1 Monetary and Fiscal Reform 
As mentioned, there are two key points of reforms that are necessary to end 
hyperinflations. First, an independent monetary authority has to be created, with a 
legally or constitutionally limited amount of credit allowed to be granted to the 
government. Second, the real stock of money has to be increased back to its normal 
level. 
Achieving an increase of the real money stock via a fall in the price level at a 
constant nominal money stock would entail a severe recession and further 
employment losses. As this seems politically and socially unfeasible, the other road 
should to be taken: an adequate growth in the nominal money stock at constant, or 
very slowly rising, prices. Not surprisingly, putting the brake on prices forms the 
most difficult part: inflationary expectations have to be removed as far and quickly 
as possible, which can be achieved only when the reform is credible 120 . 
To gain credibility, in most cases a set of new institutions is necessary, including 
a new government overseeing the reforms, a new central bank under new 
leadership, and (possibly) a new currency unit. In other words, new policy, fiscal, 
and monetary regimes have to be installed and function as institutional safeguards 
of the reforms 121 . Moulding these institutional changes in laws or include them into 
the constitution enforces their credibility. 
119 See Heymann/Leijonhufvud (1995), p. 112. 
120 Vegh argues that credibility is easier to obtain for hyperinflation stabilisation than when 
trying to stabilise lower, chronic, inflation economies. First, in hyperinflations, budget deficits and 
the government's need for seigniorage get more engraved in people's minds as the main motor of 
inflation than is the case during lasting, albeit high, inflations. Therefore, they are more easily 
convinced that a fiscal reform at the centre of a stabilisation programme is sufficient to halt inflation. 
Second, the sheer extremity of the situation and the obviousness that it cannot go on deliver an 
inherently higher degree of credibility to any stabilisation effort in hyperinflations - more than during 
chronic inflations where people have learned to live with the situation. See Vegh (1995), pp. 62f. 
121 Bernholz (2003) stresses that these institutional safeguards can, from an historical 
perspective, not be unconditionally qualified as necessary ingredients of successful currency 
reforms, since there are rare cases of reforms that succeeded without these. Nevertheless, those 
reforms suffered from lower credibility. Accordingly, real interest rates remained relatively high after 
the reforms, which damaged economic recovery and resulted in a retarded defeat of inflation. See 
Bernholz (2003), pp. 166ff. 
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In addition to these institutional safeguards, some accompanying measures 
may be necessary to make the reform feasible or more acceptable in economic, 
political, or social terms. Although, over time, the recovering money demand will 
start to offset the loss of inflation tax, and real tax revenues will rise due to the Tanzi 
effect in reverse, the government will initially remain cash constrained. To bring 
down the interest burden, domestic and/or foreign debt may need reduction, e.g. via 
temporary moratoria on capital or interest payments (but with an eye on maintaining 
future creditworthiness), or via renegotiation of debts or reparations. If obtainable, a 
foreign bridging loan may cover interim balance of payments and budget deficits. 
The privatisation of public companies can relieve budgetary pressures and, if 
carried through sensibly, offer additional gains, such as enhanced industrial 
competition and effectiveness, as well as political support for the government 
through the demonstration of its commitment to more market-oriented policies. 
Finally, social acceptance of the reforms can be increased by partly redressing the 
uneven distribution effects of high inflation, notably by revaluing private long-term 
credits that lost their real value during inflation 122. Existing exchange controls and 
protectionist obstacles should be gradually removed in order to restore confidence 
in the competitiveness of the (new) national currency. 
Obviously, initial disinflation has to be consolidated into lasting stabilisation, 
which is why these mentioned one-shot measures are not sufficient to restore 
confidence but have to be followed by comprehensive fiscal reforms that restore 
viable public finances. 
2.3.2.2 External Anchor: Fixing the Exchange Rate 
The necessary monetary and fiscal reform can be strengthened by the adoption 
of a fixed exchange rate regime. A fixed exchange rate to a stable anchor currency 
may add to, or even replace, the creation of an independent central bank - in the 
latter case by introducing a currency board regime. 
122 The uneven distribution effects of disinflation itself may also need redressing. A possibility 
is to enforce schedules that depreciate all payments contracted before disinflation on the basis of 
high inflation expectations, and hence undo unwanted revaluations of real debts caused by sudden 
disinflation (this was done, e.g., during the Argentine "Austral" programme in 1985). In the wake of 
hyperinflation, however, longer-term contracts based on explicit inflation rates are virtually absent, 
so that these redistribution effects do not occur (this being one reason why the stabilisation costs 
are comparatively lower for hyperinflation than for moderate or chronic inflation economies). See 
Heymann/Leijonhufvud (1995), p. 123. 
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For a hyperinflation economy, adopting an external anchor is clearly superior to 
the alternative of an internal anchor, such as a monetary or inflation target. First, the 
high degree of dollarisation in a hyperinflation economy, where virtually all prices 
are indexed to, or quoted in, Dollars, means that stabilising the exchange rate is 
tantamount to stabilising the price level123. The exchange rate thus provides a much 
more direct and immediate link to prices than any monetary target, and as close a 
link as an inflation target. Second, given the higher transparency of an exchange 
rate target, and hence the higher potential immediate reputation costs of deviating 
from it, anchoring the national currency to a stable foreign currency will always be 
furnished with potentially more inherent credibility than a monetary growth, but also 
a direct inflation, target. Of course, this potential has to be exploited by institutionally 
safeguarding that the government cannot change the rate at its discretion, or create 
devaluation pressures by continuing to monetise budget deficits. In contrast, a 
simple self-commitment of the government to a certain monetary growth or inflation 
rate while floating (purely or managed) the exchange rate will comparatively lack 
confidence and thus prevent inflation expectations from declining quickly. The 
restoration of the real money stock will therefore be, at least temporarily, hindered 
by both ongoing inflation and the restricted rise in the nominal money stock which 
challenges the whole stabilisation effort. 
This finding seems to be confirmed empirically: all of the most successful 
currency reforms following hyperinflations in history included fixed exchange rates 
to stable currencies or gold parities, whereas most of the least successful reforms 
did not124 . 
Clearly, the adoption of a fixed exchange rate, like any tight monetary rule, 
entails renounced flexibility and hence potentially higher costs incurred in the case 
of shocks which cannot be encountered by the discretionary use of monetary policy 
instruments. These costs are, at least in the medium term (until the necessary 
reputation of the authorities has been built up and can step in to allow for an easing 
of the rules), unavoidable and form perhaps the worst long-term legacy of high and 
hyperinflation 125. 
123 See Vegh (1995), p. 44. 
124 See Bernholz (2003), p. 187. 
125 See Heymann/Leijonhufvud (1995), p. 121. 
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2.3.3 Argentina's Choice 
Argentina's decades-long history of high inflation (which was shared by most of 
the rest of Latin America during the 1970s and 1980s) represented an extreme 
legacy for the designers of reform in 1990. Whereas most of Argentina's neighbours 
sooner or later had managed to stabilise their economies (Chile in 1978, Bolivia in 
1985, Mexico in 1987126), Argentina had only seen one failing reform after the other. 
Thus, whatever the shape of the announced reform, it would inescapably have to 
cope with a very low probability of success attached to it in the minds of the public. 
Thus, even defenders of exchange rate flexibility conceded that Argentina, with this 
legacy and the extreme credibility problem associated with it, had no other option 
left than resorting to a fully institutionalised mechanism of money issue 127 . 
The new government under Carlos Menem, having taken over in summer 1989 
and, first of all, having to cope with the failure of another sloppy stabilisation attempt 
(Plan BB), rightly felt that the answer to the ensuing second bout of hyperinflation in 
1990 needed to be final. Political survival now could only be brought about by 
seizing the most credible and lasting stabilisation option possible. Tying the own 
hands by strict monetary and fiscal rules seemed the only alternative left should the 
country be prevented from sinking completely into chaos 128 . 
In January, 1991, the man to accomplish this, Domingo Cavallo, was appointed 
as economics minister. The "father of Convertibility", as he was later dubbed, soon 
launched the CBA. It entered into force on April 151, 1991, and established the ratio 
10,000 Australes = 1 US-Dollar as the legally fixed exchange rate. Though the 
Banco Central de la Republica Argentina kept its name and formal status as a 
central bank, its executives were replaced and its powers massively restricted, in 
effect reducing its functions almost completely to those of a currency board: issuing 
domestic currency against foreign exchange. Money creation other than in 
exchange for existing Dollar reserves was ruled out by law. Finally, on January 1•1, 
1992, the Austral was replaced by a new currency unit, the Peso, at the ratio 10,000 
Austral= 1 Peso, thereby establishing the simple and popular Peso-Dollar parity 129 . 
126 See e.g. Vegh (1995), p. 40. 
127 See Dornbusch/GoldfajnNaldes (1995), p. 263. 
128 See e.g. Pastor/Wise (1999), p. 485. 
129 The legal and institutional configuration of the CBA will be described in detail in section 4. 
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Thus, although undertaken in various steps, the Argentine reform included all 
possible institutional cornerstones 130. The crucial element of these was the choice of 
the strictest possible anchoring of the national currency, the adoption of the CBA. 
Without anticipating the detailed analysis and interpretation of Argentina's 
economic performance following the stabilisation via currency board (see section 4), 
some central features characterising its success shall be mentioned here. Annual 
inflation rates decreased to 84 percent in 1991, to 17 .5 percent in 1992, and to 7.4 
percent in 1993, only to decline in the following years to less than one percent. The 
real stock of national money rose from its minimum in February 1990 of 15 percent 
of its "normal" level to 41 percent in mid-1992 and 44 percent in March 1993131 . The 
still comparatively low level of the real money stock two years after the reforms, with 
inflation rates as low as the country had not experienced since more than a decade, 
reflects the fact that the high degree of currency substitution built up during the 
years of high and hyperinflation got reversed only to a limited degree. This is, on the 
one hand, probably due to an initial mistrust in the reforms, but is, on the other 
hand, also a consequence of the almost unrestricted acceptance of Dollars 
throughout the economy, as well as of the handy 1:1 exchange rate. The latter 
argument is strengthened by the fact that real interest rates were relatively low in 
the early 1990s, i.e. confidence in the reforms cannot have been as persistently low 
as to drive interest rates up 132. 
The output costs of stabilisation itself seem to have been small. Positive output 
growth resumed in 1991, with real GDP growing by 10.6 percent in that year, and 
with continuing strong growth in the following years, averaging 5.8 percent between 
1991 and 1998133 . This corresponds with the often observed fact regarding the 
130 Of course, the fact that the institutional changes were not introduced at a stroke retarded 
the defeat of inflation in Argentina. This is the reason why Bernholz (2003) counts Argentina to the 
group of "less successful currency reforms": it missed the defined criterion for the group of "most 
successful reforms" - annual inflation below 25 percent in the year after the reforms - for the year 
1991, but met it in 1992. See Bemholz (2003), p. 186. 
131 Bernholz (2003) defines the normal real stock of money as "its size in the year before the 
inflation began or when it had been very moderate", see Bernholz (2003), p. 75. It has to remain 
open exactly which level he defined as "normal" for the Argentine case. 
132 The active rate applied on discount of documents for 30 days was 22.4 percent in 1993, 
which results in a real rate of 15.4 percent for that year. See Heymann (2000), p. 176. 
133 See Heymann (2000), p. 103. 
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stabilisation of hyperinflations, namely that output costs are small relative to the 
costs that are incurred when stopping lower inflations 134. 
In accordance with this finding, Argentina' unemployment rate did not rise in the 
immediate follow-up of stabilisation. Unemployment in the Gran Buenos Aires Area 
declined from 7.3 percent in 1990 to 5.8 percent in 1991, then rose slightly to a level 
still lower than during hyperinflation (6.7 percent in 1992), and kept on growing only 
in the following years. This retarded rise cannot be ascribed to stabilisation itself, 
but was mainly the effect of corresponding reforms, which included the opening of 
the economy as well as a massive privatisation programme that lay off the massive 
proportion of unproductive employment in the public sector, built up since the days 
of Peron. 
134 Vegh demonstrates this with a simple model of a fully credible exchange rate-based 
stabilisation programme, and gives proof by examining historical cases. The reason for output costs 
being virtually zero in the case of a fully credible exchange rate-based stabilisation programme, in 
his model, is that, in a hyperinflation economy, everyone acts in a forward-looking manner, i.e. 
credibly changed conditions are immediately reflected in prices, with the effect that inflation is 
reduced abruptly at no real cost. See Vegh (1995), pp. 43 ff. Ireland to some extent supplements 
this by stressing the role of fixed costs of price adjustments: high and hyperinflation stabilisation 
requires initial big changes of nominal prices - big enough to outweigh fixed costs of price 
adjustments. Hence, sticky prices pose no obstacle to immediate hyperinflation stabilisation - in 
contrast to low inflation stabilisation, where fixed costs prevent agents to immediately reflect small 
steps of disinflation in their prices, and so are responsible for real costs of disinflation. See Ireland 
(1997), as well as the comments delivered by Sargent (1997) and Blanchard (1997). 
Jutta Maute - 978-3-631-75447-4
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 04:44:44AM
via free access
3 Stabilisation via Currency Board 
The costs of following a sensible monetary rule are the price to pay 
for the bad reputation that stems from a past of broken trust 
and for the future economic development that regaining credibility 
will eventually bring about.135 
3.1 The Currency Board Idea 
3.1.1 The Term 
83 
It is important to be aware that the term "currency board"136 originally describes 
the institution in the place (but not with all the tasks) of a central bank. A currency 
board in this narrow sense is nothing more than a monetary authority that issues 
money, keeps reserves, and on demand exchanges domestic currency against 
reserves at a fixed rate. The naming originates from the early days of currency 
boards when they were introduced as such institutions in British colonies in the 19th 
century, mostly established without any formal legal protection, and mainly relying 
on a long tradition of financial rectitude 137. 
In the course of history and with the evolution of monetary theory, the institution 
has lent its name to the monetary constitution of a country with a currency board. In 
this wider sense, a currency board comprises the legal framework of the monetary 
system as well as the body implementing it. The discussion of a currency board in 
this sense extends to a discussion of a whole economic system138. To make this 
perception more clear-cut, some authors use terms like "currency board system" or 
"currency board arrangement" for this wider meaning of the term. This treatise uses 
the term currency board in both senses, i.e. as the institution's as well as the 
monetary constitution's name, according to the context of discussion. 
135 Zarazaga (1995b), p. 21. 
136 The correct German translation would be "Wahrungsausschuss", "Wahrungsrat", or 
"Wahrungsamt", although the English term is used nearly exclusively even in German literature. For 
Argentines, in contrast, the term "currency board" generally sounds unfamiliar; their currency board 
was generally referred to as "la Convertibilidad" (from the name of the corresponding law "Ley de 
Convertibilidad"), simply meaning "convertibility". 
137 See Hanke/Schuler (2000), p. 44. 
138 See Fuhrmann (1999), p. 86. 
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Also, some authors distinguish between currency boards which in all details 
follow the orthodox design (then called "currency boards") and currency boards that 
deviate from the orthodox concept in one or several respects, i.e. have somewhat 
modified rules (called "currency board-like systems", or "quasi-currency boards")139. 
Since most present and all "modern" (i.e. introduced in the second half of the 20th 
century) currency boards include at least some modifications as compared with the 
"pure" design 140, this distinction shall not be made here, i.e. the term currency board 
shall comprise both orthodox and modified currency boards. With the chosen 
terminology, this treatise sticks to the most widespread use in economic literature as 
well as political discussion. 
3.1.2 The Concept 
A currency board can be defined as a special case of a rules-based monetary 
system 141 . Like every rules-based system, it is designed to avoid losses incurred by 
discretionary decision-making, and to gain from enhanced credibility through rules-
governed policies. A currency board's main feature is the nominal anchor in the 
form of a legally fixed exchange rate, which ties the domestic currency to a reserve 
currency142 . This nominal anchor plays a pivotal role in the design not only of the 
monetary constitution, but also of the fiscal and structural disposition of a currency 
board country. With a fixed nominal anchor, a country undergoes severe self-
restrictions in the use of policy tools. 
The rule governing the system is very simple: the monetary authority (the 
currency board) is allowed to issue domestic currency only against reserves, at the 
139 See Hanke/Schuler (2000), p. 46, and Zarazaga (1995b), pp. 16-7. 
140 The only orthodox currency boards still in operation are those of the Falklands, the Cayman 
Islands, and Gibraltar. As Delmas and Zarazaga state, today no independent country operates an 
orthodox currency board. See Dolmas/Zararaga (1995a), p. 1. 
141 Recommendable literature about currency boards in general: Baliiio/Enoch (1997), Bennett 
(1994), Enoch/Gulde (1997), Enoch/Gulde (1998), Freytag (1998), Fuhrmann (1999), 
Fuhrmann/Richert (1995), Ghosh/Gulde/Wolf (1998), Gulde/Kahkonen/Keller (2000), Hanke (2000), 
Hanke/Schuler (2000), Humpage/Mclntire (1995), O.V. (1997), Roubini (1998), Schuler (1992), 
Schuler (1998), Walters (1989), Williamson (1995), Zarazaga (1995a and c). 
142 The nominal anchor could also consist of two reserve currencies (as will be discussed for 
dual currency boards), or a basket of currencies, or even include a peg to a reserve currency with 
some variability (e.g. a pre-announced crawl), as Williamson (1995) states. These options have 
until now stayed purely theoretical, and the notion of a nominal anchor for a currency board has 
generally always implied a fixed peg to one reserve currency. 
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fixed exchange rate. These reserves may consist of a foreign currency or of other 
external reserve assets. The reserves requirement implies that the domestic 
monetary base (notes and coins in circulation) always is 100% backed by reserves. 
Increases in the monetary base can occur exclusively via corresponding increases 
in foreign reserves. Being subject to this rule, the monetary authority is deprived of 
some of the most important traditional central bank functions such as monetary 
regulation and lender of last resort activity. Furthermore, in tying money issue to 
existing reserves, deficit financing via the printing press is excluded, which is why 
fiscal policy in a currency board country is subject to hard budget constraints. 
The main motivation for the adoption of a currency board is to produce price 
stability, especially in developing countries with long histories of inflation and 
devaluation, and in economies transforming from centrally planned to market 
economies, both of which typically face the need to adopt strong institutional 
constraints on their ability to inflate143. As the essence in the combat of inflation is 
credibility of policy measures, a currency board is designed to bring about a 
maximum of credibility of monetary policy. A stable currency will bring about lower 
interest rates: inflation as well as interest rates in a currency board country are 
supposed to approach the levels prevailing in the reserve currency country. Further 
effects of the choice of an exchange rate-based nominal anchor emanate from the 
requirement to earn reserves, hence to open up the economy and to strive for 
export-led growth. This in turn provides stimuli for fiscal, financial, and structural 
reforms 144 . 
Although a currency board is based on a very simple and transparent rule, a 
variety of different elements can govern its design. Indeed, pure currency boards in 
reality rarely existed; most countries have modified "orthodox" design elements in 
order to reflect local necessities or to gain a limited degree of flexibility. E.g., in 
many currency boards the minimum reserves are allowed to be less than 100% 
(thereby allowing for limited credit against monetary liabilities), whereas others 
prefer to keep backing at above 100% (in order to gain some flexibility and reserves 
for limited lender of last resort operations). While bringing about some flexibility in 
monetary policy, such modifications generally bear a risk to the currency board's 
143 This is the motivation for modern currency boards. The background of the introduction of 
colonial currency boards is different, as will be sketched later. 
144 See Fuhrmann/Richert (1995), p. 1039. 
Jutta Maute - 978-3-631-75447-4
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 04:44:44AM
via free access
86 
sustainability because they introduce discretionary power and therefore potentially 
reduce its credibility. 
These considerations illustrate the central conflict inherent in the currency board 
idea which lies in the trade-off between credibility and flexibility of the system. This 
conflict regularly shapes discussions about costs and benefits of currency boards, in 
theory as well as in practice. A related source of dispute is the question of whether 
and when to view a currency board as a merely transitional or as a longer-term 
arrangement. Although possible exit options may be considered before setting up a 
currency board, their explicit pre-determination (via escape clauses) might again 
risk an undermining of its credibility from the beginning. 
3.1.3 Currency Board vs. Other Fixed Exchange Rate Arrangements 
A currency board is a special type of a fixed exchange rate arrangement. On the 
spectre of possible exchange rate regimes, which extends from the one extreme of 
freely floating exchange rates to the other extreme of definitely fixed exchange rates 
under a monetary union, the currency board is located between the less strict 
regime of fixed exchange rates (exchange rate pegged by commitment to an anchor 
currency, i.e. reversible at any time), and the stricter regime of official dollarisation 
(predominant or exclusive use of a foreign currency as legal tender) 145. Hence, short 
to official dollarisation, a currency board is the most extreme option of exchange 
rate pegging a single country can choose 146 . 
Official dollarisation 147 is the closest relative to the currency board as it implies 
the same motivation and principle of importing the anchor's stability, and requires 
the same disciplined macroeconomic and structural policies. Accordingly, the 
strengths and weaknesses of dollarisation equal those of a currency board, with the 
main difference being the higher degree of irreversibility of the former. The gains of 
dollarisation in terms of transparency, credibility, monetary stabilisation, and 
145 See Mussa et al. (2000). 
146 Participation in a monetary union requires bi- or multilateral agreement. 
147 Unofficial dollarisation prevails when residents extensively use a foreign currency (in most 
cases the US-Dollar) alongside or instead of the domestic currency, and/or hold foreign currency 
notes or bank deposits to protect against high inflation in the domestic currency. Official 
dollarisation occurs when a government adopts a foreign currency as the predominant or exclusive 
legal tender. 
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impetus for fiscal discipline therefore are supposed to exceed those of a currency 
board 148 . 
Although a currency board also has much in common with a regime of 
conventionally fixed exchange rates, the distinction between the two (besides the 
wider discussion of fixed vs. floating exchange rate regimes, which shall not be 
extended here 149) is directly relevant for the understanding of the motivation and the 
rationale of a currency board. As with the relation between dollarisation and 
currency board, the main advantage of a currency board over a system of purely 
fixed exchange rates is its higher implicit credibility 150. This is mainly the effect of the 
high legal and procedural obstacles (often equalling the requirements for 
constitutional changes) in the way of modification or abolishment of the system, 
built-in to signal the high degree of self-commitment of the government151 . With 
purely fixed exchange rates, in contrast, changing the exchange rate is a simple 
administrative matter, and expectations of such a change can by themselves bring 
about the expected change. 
The legally fixed and publicised self-restriction in the use of monetary policy 
tools, mainly the exclusion of unbacked money issue, precludes fiscal policy relying 
on the monetisation of budget deficits, and thus requires sound fiscal policy. Time 
inconsistency and credibility problems of discretionary and/or commitment-bound 
policies, though not completely extinguishable by a currency board, are reduced as 
compared to a system of conventionally fixed exchange rates. The unwritten law of 
a currency board is, however, that the subordination of monetary and fiscal policy to 
the preservation of the fixed parity requires the acceptance of its costs, e.g. of 
prolonged periods of high interest rates, recession and deflation. 
However, even constitutions can be changed, and credibility depends as much 
on rules and institutions as on attitudes. The simple self-commitment to a fixed 
exchange rate of one government may be as credible (or even more credible) as the 
148 The two main shortcomings of dollarisation as opposed to a currency board are that it 
requires the sacrifice of a country's own money, hence of a symbol of national sovereignty, as well 
as of any seigniorage income, as far as no bilateral agreement with the anchor country to share 
seigniorage income is sought. See Alesina/Barro (2001 ), p. 383, for some thoughts on possible 
compensation schemes between anchor and dollarised country. 
149 For a brief discussion of fixed vs. floating exchange rates see e.g. Hanke/Schuler (2000), 
pp. 67-8. 
150 See Alesina/Barro (2001), p. 382. 
151 See Eichengreen (1996), p. 238. 
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legal exchange rate fixed by another, not complying, government under a currency 
board scheme. Credibility of behaviour has to add to the credibility of rules. Thus, 
even for an established and stable currency board, a trade-off between rules and 
discretion similar to that of a conventional central bank may arise, e.g. in the 
question of the use of excess reserves 152. 
3.1.4 Currency Board vs. Central Bank 
Typically, a currency board operates in place of a central bank 153 . Like the latter, 
it is a government-owned body separate from the ministry of finance, and has the 
monopoly of issuing notes and coins. A currency board, however, does not have the 
high degree of discretionary power a typical central bank today has. The powers 
and functions of both institutions differ fundamentally. The stylised T-accounts of 
both institutions illustrate this. 
In its orthodox form, a currency board issues base money (cash, i.e. notes and 
coins denominated in domestic currency) solely in return for the reserve currency at 
the fixed exchange rate. Its balance sheet comprises on the liability side the amount 
of base money issued, and the net worth, i.e. reserves exceeding the amount of 
issued money154. 
Sometimes, (unorthodox) currency boards also accept deposits of commercial 
banks or issue securities, both of which are subject to the same foreign reserve 
requirements as its notes and coins. In this case, the liabilities also comprise those 
deposits 155 . 
The asset side of a currency board consists solely of reserve currency holdings. 
These reserve holdings are directly related to the balance of payments position of 
the country, as reserves are acquired through current account surpluses and/or net 
capital inflows. Since money issue is tied one-to-one to the foreign reserves 
152 See Zarazaga (1995b), pp. 19-20 
153 A currency board can also operate as a parallel issuer alongside an existing central bank, 
although such cases have been rare and do not exist today. See Schuler (1998), p. 1. 
154 This difference (the net worth of a currency board) is usually maintained in a certain 
proportion in order to guard against the risk of a decrease in the market value of the assets. As the 
reserves of a currency board are legally required to be highly secure and liquid, this margin does 
not have to be high. In most cases, where the net worth exceeds 5 to 10 percent of the money 
issue, it has to be transferred to the government by law. See Williamson (1995), p. 3. 
155 The addition of deposits and securities does not significantly change the analysis if they are 
interchangeable for their holders and subject to the uniform foreign reserve requirement. See 
Hanke/Schuler (2000), pp. 7 and 43. 
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position, the monetary base varies with the variations in the balance of payments: a 
balance of payments surplus leads to an increase in the foreign reserves position 
and subsequently, other things equal, to an increase in the base money (and via the 
money multiplier, the money stock)156. Conversely, a shrinking money base is the 
consequence of a balance of payments deficit157. 
Figure 24: Balance Sheet of a Currency Board 
Assets Liabilities 
Liquid reserve currency assets Notes and coins 
(Deposits of commercial banks) 
Net worth 
In the long run, monetary growth in the currency board country approximates 
the monetary growth rate of the reserve currency country, as can be illustrated with 
the simplifying notion that, for a currency board country to acquire reserves, the 
reserve currency country has to issue more money than its public wishes to hold. 
This effectuates decreasing interest rates and rising prices in the reserve currency 
country, which in turn creates arbitrage opportunities and leads to a capital account 
deficit in the reserve currency country. This deficit mirrors a capital account surplus 
in the currency board country, which causes its money supply to rise. This 
adjustment process is completely automatic and includes no discretionary action by 
the currency board. 
The balance sheet of a typical central bank differs from a currency board's 
balance sheet in two main points. First, on the liability side, there are always notes 
and coins as well as deposits of commercial banks, the sum of both constituting the 
monetary base, MO. Again, the net worth of a central bank balances the difference 
between assets and liabilities. 
On the assets side, a central bank holds liquid reserve currency assets, needed 
to manage the exchange rate, be it pegged or floating. Unlike a currency board, it is 
156 Hence, money supply under a currency board works in the same way as it does under a 
gold (or gold exchange) standard in which the central bank does not sterilise movements in 
reserves. 
157 Note that a currency board country does not have to maintain current account surpluses to 
expand the money stock. Net capital inflows may more than compensate for a current account 
deficit and allow for monetary expansion as well. 
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typically not required to hold a fixed ratio of foreign reserves to liabilities 158 . More 
important, besides those foreign reserves, a central bank also holds domestic 
assets. These domestic assets consist above all of government debt, but may also 
comprise commercial bank or even state industry debt. As in the case of foreign 
reserves, a central bank normally buys domestic assets against money, i.e. 
increases in the monetary base. It may in this way finance fiscal deficits through 
money creation. It may also buy domestic assets to prevent the monetary base from 
shrinking, e.g. when it has to sell foreign assets to support the exchange rate, i.e. it 
can sterilise unwanted contractionary effects on the monetary base 159. 
Figure 25: Balance Sheet of a Central Bank 
Assets Liabilities 
Liquid reserve currency assets Notes and coins 
Domestic assets Deposits of commercial banks 
Net worth 
As pointed out, a currency board has no discretion in monetary policy: it sells 
and buys foreign currency against domestic money according to the needs of the 
private sector, i.e. it acts completely passively. A central bank, in contrast, has the 
discretionary power to change the monetary base not only through foreign 
exchange transactions but also through the purchase or sale of domestic assets. It 
has also the power to change the exchange rate, to alter the foreign reserves ratio, 
or the regulations for commercial banks, powers that are inexistent for a currency 
board. 
The discretionary power of a central bank includes lender of last resort activities 
to bail out banks in stress and so prevent, or mitigate, financial crises. Such lender 
of last resort activity is largely precluded for a currency board (or at least limited to a 
degree that is made possible by excess reserves earmarked for this purpose). This 
158 There may be binding minimum ratios, but a central bank may hold any ratio in excess of 
these. 
159 As Humpage/Mclntire point out, this power to sterilise may be an advantage in the case of 
temporary balance of payments imbalances. If, however, the underlying causes of a balance of 
payments deficit are of structural and long-term nature, sterilisation can worsen capital outflows, 
nourish speculations of devaluation, and aggravate the situation. In such cases, the discretionary 
power of a central bank provides no advantage over the rule-bound currency board. See 
Humpage/Mclntire (1995), p. 5. 
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limitation makes a sound banking system a significantly more vital interest under a 
currency board than under a central bank. 
A currency board relies on a legally or even constitutionally fixed exchange rate. 
Central banks may operate under pegged or floating exchange rates, with pegged 
exchange rates typically not defined by law, and being subject to alterations at the 
will of the central bank or government. 
A typical currency board does not regulate commercial banks. In most cases, it 
is the ministry of finance or a separate regulating office that passes banking 
regulations. Central banks, in contrast, often regulate commercial banks. The most 
basic form of regulation is the imposition of reserve requirements, according to 
which commercial banks are required to hold reserves in certain proportions of their 
liabilities at the central bank. Such reserve requirements are not imposed on banks 
under an orthodox currency board. Since the currency board does not guarantee 
the convertibility of bank deposits into notes and coins, commercial banks 
themselves are, in the absence of reserve requirements, responsible for holding 
enough notes and coins to be able to satisfy their depositors' conversion 
requests 160. 
A currency board receives interest from its assets (reserves invested in highly 
liquid and secure foreign currency assets), but it does not pay interest on its 
liabilities (notes and coins issued). This interest income represents the currency 
board's gross profit (gross seigniorage). The deduction of the expenses of issuing 
notes and coins and of maintaining them in circulation generates the currency 
board's net profit (or net seigniorage)161 . A central bank earns seigniorage from 
interest surpluses as well; they stem both from foreign and domestic assets. 
However, the most important source of seigniorage for a central bank may be 
inflation, caused by discretionary increases in the money supply162 . As already 
pointed out, a currency board cannot create inflation, which is why this source of 
seigniorage is inexistent for an orthodox currency board. 
Since a currency board is a very simple institution with very few and closely 
circumscribed functions, its activities are transparent and easy to monitor. A central 
bank, in contrast, has discretion in its activities and is by itself a market participant 
160 Put in the terms of monetary aggregates, under a currency board, MO is backed 100% by 
foreign reserves, whereas broader measures of money supply, such as M1, M2, and M3, are not. 
161 See Hanke/Schuler (2000), pp. 61-2. 
162 For a concise definition of the so called "inflation tax" earned by a central bank see Roubini 
(1998), pp. 11-13. 
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and speculating institution, which is why its actions often are opaque or even 
sometimes need secrecy to be successful. 
The rule-bound and transparent nature of a currency board makes it a politically 
sterile institution, whereas a central bank is, or may be, prone to political pressure, 
even if formally independent. The rules and transparency of a currency board give it 
a high degree of institutional credibility, which a central bank has not. The credibility 
of a central bank can at best be built up over years and decades through self-
commitment and conduct, but there is no built-in credibility to begin with. 
3.1.5 Excursus: Doctrinal History and the Currency Board Idea 
A review of the main characteristics of the century-old debate over competing 
monetary theories and their opposing policy advices delivers valuable insights for 
the understanding of the ideological background of the currency board idea. 
Much of the history of monetary theory reflects the struggle between the 
opposing mercantilist and classical camps. They lent their respective arguments to 
the views the Anti-Bullionist and Bullionist, later the Banking and Currency School 
adherents brought forward in the 19th century. Since then, depending on the 
economic problems prevailing at a time, the two camps have alternated in 
dominating the discussion. When unemployment was seen as the main problem, 
mercantilists with their prescription of cheap money to stimulate real activity tended 
to prevail, whereas classicals with their view of inflation as a purely monetary 
phenomenon were dominant in times when price stability was the main concern. 
Even today, mercantilist and classical views continue to compete for the more 
accurate explanation of the function of money and corresponding policy advices. 
This paragraph will summarise the basic elements of this debate, focussing on 
the standpoints of mercantilists and classicals, and extending them to the famous 
English Banking-Currency controversy of the nineteenth century. While the debate 
continued and appeared in new editions in the twentieth century under Keynesian 
vs. monetarist flags, the early controversies already include the central aspects that 
are relevant for the understanding of the theoretical background of the currency 
board idea and of its supposed benefits as well as its drawbacks. It will become 
Jutta Maute - 978-3-631-75447-4
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 04:44:44AM
via free access
93 
clear that the paradigm behind the currency board idea is directly derived from 
classical quantity views of money 163 . 
3.1.5.1 Doctrinal Positions: Mercantilist vs. Classical Views 
The mercantilists' views take their origin in the pre-classical era of the 16th to 
18th century 164 . Two outstanding proponents were John Stewart Law and Sir James 
Steuart. Their main argument was that a nation's wealth was constituted by its stock 
of precious metals. Countries without natural resources of precious metals (mainly 
gold) would have to accumulate their wealth through foreign trade. Accordingly, the 
mercantilist policy prescription included protectionist policies in order to achieve a 
permanent trade balance surplus matched by corresponding inflows of specie from 
abroad165. This prescription was based on an anti-quantity theory of money which 
held that (1) money stimulates trade, (2) price level and inflation are determined by 
real cost-push forces, (3) the interest rate is a purely monetary variable, determined 
solely by supply and demand of money and indicating the degree of scarcity of 
money, (4) cash not used for trade purposes is absorbed in idle hoards, (5) the 
money stock is endogenous, i.e. prices and real activity determine the amount 
and/or velocity of circulating money, so that the money stock passively adapts to the 
needs of trade, (6) overissue of money is impossible when money is backed by the 
nominal value of real property (land or commercial papers), and (7) discretion is 
superior to rules in the conduct of monetary policy. 
Contrary to the mercantilists' proposition of wealth, classicals held that the 
wealth of a country consisted of its productive resources such as land, labour, and 
capital, as well as in the efficiency of their use. Both Adam Smith and David Ricardo 
stated that an optimal allocation of resources was best achieved via free trade 
rather than via mercantilist protectionism, thereby realising comparative advantages 
resulting from specialisation and division of labour. Classical monetary theory held 
that trade balance surpluses could not be permanent, as a country's additional 
specie would raise domestic prices, thus diminishing exports and stimulating 
imports until trade balance equilibrium would be restored (David Hume called this 
the "price-specie-flow-mechanism"). Similarly, according to the classical view, 
163 Indeed, the first proposal in the 20th century to install a "modern" currency board was made 
by John Maynard Keynes, then a Ricardian, who in 1918 designed a currency board with a sterling-
backed rouble for war-ridden and inflation-plagued North Russia. See Hanke (2000), p. 52. 
164 For an overview over the mercantilist vs. classical debate, see Humphrey (1998). 
165 See Spahn (2001 ), pp. 63-8. 
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scarcity of money could not exist, since a country's trade could be driven with any 
quantity of money, on the ground that prices ultimately adjust proportionately to any 
change in the money stock. 
Cost-push theories of inflation were rejected, as price increases were 
exclusively seen as resulting from increases in the money stock. Any rise of factor 
costs, e.g. of wages, would make labour-intensive goods more expensive, thereby 
reducing expenses for capital-intensive goods, which would lead to a cheapening of 
the latter. In the classical view, cost-pushes lead to a change in relative prices 
rather than to general inflation. 
The mercantilist "money stimulates trade-doctrine" was shown by the classicals 
to be valid at best in the short run. Changes in the money stock in their view could 
initially affect output and employment because of the stickiness of prices (prices fail 
to adjust immediately due to imperfect information of price-setters) and because of 
distribution effects (additional money is initially concentrated in few hands and 
disperses only gradually). Eventually, however, prices would adjust fully to the new 
money stock and output would return to its initial level, so that, in the long run, 
money would be neutral. 
Discretion in monetary policy was deemed to be destabilising: classicals 
doubted the knowledge and motivation of policy authorities. They advocated rules in 
order to stabilise real activity and to facilitate automatic adjustment mechanisms. 
One such rule was the gold standard: with a fixed currency price of gold and an 
assumed fairly steady gold price of goods, money prices of goods could be 
stabilised, and money could reliably function as unit of account and medium of 
exchange, rather than providing a source of financial crisis, as the mercantilist 
prescription would do in the classical view. 
The mercantilist fear of deficient aggregate demand was, in classicals' eyes, 
unfounded. They argued that the act of production itself included the remuneration 
of factors, and thus the creation of the incomes necessary to buy the products off 
the markets. Factor incomes would either be spent or saved, with saving, via its 
translation into investment, eventually also leading to spending. In this way, each 
supply would create its own demand166 . Permanent underemployment of resources 
could not occur in their view. 
Classicals saw the interest rate as a real magnitude determined by productivity 
rather than as a merely monetary phenomenon. Accordingly, monetary control could 
166 This is Jean Baptiste Say's "law of markets". 
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not permanently influence the "natural" rate of interest. An increase of money supply 
could initially depress the loan rate of interest, but, as prices started rising, loan 
demand would also rise, which eventually would lead to higher interest rates again. 
Finally, classicals argued that John Law's recommendation of a nominal 
backing of money through a linkage to the nominal value of real assets would 
render prices indeterminate, as random shocks raising prices of the assets would 
lead to monetary expansion, which itself could bid up asset prices again, and so on. 
Price stability in their view required a different principle of monetary limitation. 
Figure 26 summarises the key points of discussion in the mercantilist vs. 
classical debate that constituted the base of the famous Banking-Currency 
controversy. 
Figure 26: Mercantilist vs. Classical Doctrines 
Mercantilists Classicals 
Source of wealth Precious metals Productive resources 
Prescription to achieve Protectionism in order to Free trade in order to 
wealth achieve permanent trade achieve optimal allocation 
balance surpluses of resources 
Nature of money Money stimulates trade Money is neutral 
Determinants of prices Real cost-push forces Stock of money 
Nature of the interest rate Purely monetary Real magnitude, not 
magnitude, influenced by susceptible to monetary 
changes in the supply of changes 
money 
Excessive money Absorbed in idle hoards, Causing prices to rise 
not causing inflation proportionately 
Determination of the Endogenous (causality Exogenous (causality 
money stock running from prices and running from the 
economic activity to exogenously set money 
money: "reverse stock to prices) 
causality") 
Overissue of money Impossible ("real bills Possible, leading to price-
doctrine") level increases 
Monetary policy Discretion Rules 
prescription 
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3.1.5.2 The Bullionist and Banking-Currency Controversies 
The Early 19th Century Bullionist Controversy 
The Bullionist controversy emerged in the early 19th century focussing on the 
question of whether paper money should be convertible into gold on demand. This 
debate later led to the so-called Banking-Currency School controversy of the 1840s, 
which again laid the ground for a debate over the nature of money that in many 
ways is still continuing today. 
In the United Kingdom of the 18th century, private banks issued banknotes 
which circulated as money167. These notes included a claim on gold bullion held by 
the bank. The conversion of paper money to gold was granted at any time since 
banks issued notes on the basis of gold reserves they actually held in their vaults. 
At the end of the 18th century, a major bank run occurred in Britain following 
rumours of the landing of French troops on English soil. Customers hurried to their 
banks and demanded conversion of their notes into gold bullion. The British 
government subsequently averted a major banking crisis by allowing banks to 
suspend convertibility temporarily. Since convertibility was not restored 
immediately 168 , banks continued issuing notes without respecting their convertibility 
into gold. 
These events triggered an intellectual debate among lawyers, bankers, and 
statesmen over the question of whether convertibility into gold should be maintained 
or not. The "Bullionist" group demanded convertibility whereas the "Anti-Bullionists" 
argued for the maintenance of the prevailing status of suspension. 
The Bullionists 169 argued with the temptation for banks to "overissue" notes 
without the duty to grant convertibility. This would lead to an excess supply of 
money, hence to a cheapening of money and to inflation. The Anti-Bullionists' 
argument was based on the mercantilist "real bills doctrine" which stated that 
banknotes were issued by banks against merchants' bills of exchange, i.e., 
according to the "needs of trade" 170. Provided that the repayment of these bills was 
secure, there could be no excess issue of banknotes since they merely 
accommodated real transactions. Even if excess issue should happen, excessive 
167 For a detailed historical description and analysis of the Bullionist Controversy, see Laidler 
(1989), Davies (2002), pp. 293 ff, as well as Spahn (2001 ), pp. 69-83. 
168 Convertibility remained suspended from 1797 to 1821. 
169 Famous Bullionists were Henry Thornton, John Wheatley, and David Ricardo. 
170 Leading Anti-Bullionists were Richard Torrens, Bosanquet, and James Mill. 
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banknotes would eventually return to the banks in exchange for deposits or gold or 
in the repayment of loans, as the so-called "reflux principle" brought forward by the 
Anti-Bullionists held. Thus, inflation could never be the result of any excess issue 171 . 
History first seemed to support the Bullionists: the early 1800s saw a period of 
inflation, peaking in 1814. Anti-Bullionists saw in it the result of government 
purchases during the Napoleonic wars. The Bullionists argued for a resumption of 
convertibility, which was eventually restored in 1821. However, during 1815 to 1830, 
a prolonged period of deflation was recorded in the wake of the end of the 
Napoleonic wars. Thus, historical evidence was far from clearly supporting one of 
the views. 
The 1840s Banking-Currency Controversy 
The restoring of convertibility in 1821 had raised the question on whether the 
note issue of the convertible gold-standard currency required further regulation to 
prevent overissue. The predecessors of the Currency School, the Bullionists, had 
argued that such control was not necessary. Overissue would lead to domestic price 
increases, making British goods more expensive, which in turn would lead to 
increased conversion into gold in order to buy the relatively cheaper foreign goods. 
The ensuing drain on gold would force banks to restrict their issue, causing the 
money stock to contract and prices to fall to the initial level, and eventually give halt 
to the gold drain. Bullionists saw convertibility as its own guarantor. 
However, history seemed to contradict this position: several monetary crises in 
the 1820s and 1830s had shown that the classical adjustment mechanism was far 
from self-correcting. Pure convertibility still had left banks with discretion in the 
trade-off between safety and profits since they faced no minimum reserve ratio. This 
had led to continued note issue in spite of concomitant gold outflows and to 
subsequent violent contractions sending monetary shocks throughout the 
economy 172 . 
The Currency School proponents 173 therefore concluded that banks' discretion 
in the note issue should be removed. Their proposal was to require a one-for-one 
change in issue with the change in gold reserves, and thereby to realise the 
"principle of metallic fluctuation" for a mixed (paper and coin) currency. Overissue, 
171 See Laidler (1989), p. 64. 
172 See Davies (2002), p. 312. 
173 They included Lord Overstone, James R. McCulloch, Thomas Joplin, Samuel M. Longfield, 
and former Anti-Bullionist Richard Torrens. 
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which via the balance of payments mechanism and the gold drain could threaten 
convertibility and create procyclical fluctuations, in their eyes could be prevented 
with this rule. 
The debate seemed to be brought to an end by the Banking Act of 1844 which 
installed a fractional convertibility: for a fixed amount (equalling the amount of 
circulating money), one third of the value had to be covered by gold, whereas new 
issues of banknotes had to be 100% covered by gold174. The act also installed a 
monopoly of note issue, and split the Bank of England into a note-issuing Issue 
Department and a deposit-taking Banking Department175. The gold reserve 
requirement intended overexpansion to be corrected automatically, instantaneously 
and smoothly. It embodied the direct policy application of the classical price-specie-
flow-mechanism. 
The Currency School supported the act as it limited the amount of note issue, 
and thus in their opinion prevented inflation. Proponents of the Banking School176 
argued against it. Their arguments reflected those previously brought forward by the 
Anti-Bullionists 177 . 
In the aftermath of the 1844 Banking Act, convertibility had to be suspended 
three times 178, lending some credibility to the Banking School's arguments. 
However, gold parity to note issue was generally maintained until World War I. 
Findings with Hindsight 
The Banking-Currency School debate and the ensuing historical experience in 
retrospect revealed several findings. First, the Currency School's prescription of a 
control of the volume of notes and coins failed insofar as it did not include the 
control of deposits, which formed a growing part of the circulating medium179 . 
174 The amount of 14 billion pounds, equalling two thirds of the estimated money in circulation, 
was regarded as the "hard core" of circulation that would probably never return to the banking 
system, and was not subject to the convertibility requirement. Apart from this unbacked amount, 
any note issue had to be fully backed by gold reserves. See Schuler (1992), pp. 10-1. 
175 See Spahn (2001 ), pp. 80-3. 
176 Famous Banking School adherents were Thomas Tooke, John Fullarton, and the young 
John Stuart Mill. 
177 A third, mostly neglected, group of participants in the debate was the Free Banking School, 
which favoured a system of free competition of banks including in the field of note issue, and which 
accordingly denied the need (and usefulness) of a central bank. See Schwartz (1989), pp. 44-46. 
178 In 1847, 1857, and 1866. 
179 See e.g. Spahn (2001 ), p. 84, and Schuler (1992), p. 11. 
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Therefore, since there was no reserve requirement for deposits, even after 1844, 
banks possessed significant room for discretionary control over deposits. Second, 
Currency School proponents refused to recognise the necessity of lender of last 
resort rescue in coping with financial panics. By the end of the nineteenth century it 
was widely accepted that liberal lending was the best way to deal with internal 
drains, which were caused by panic-led demand for gold and Bank of England 
notes 180 . 
On the other hand, the Banking School's real bills doctrine, which claimed that 
note issue tied to loan demand for productive purposes would prevent inflation, 
always suffered from not being able to close its open front: the sequence of rising 
production prices, correspondingly rising loan demand and note issue to finance the 
same level of real transactions was indefinite - inflation justified the monetary 
expansion necessary to sustain it. The real bills criterion failed to limit the quantity of 
money in existence 181 . 
3.1.5.3 The Currency Board and Classical Monetary Theory 
The above outline of the century-old debate identifies the currency board idea 
as a clearly classical one 182. With the currency board's main targets of disinflation 
and stabilisation, pursued via self-restriction in monetary (and, effectively, fiscal) 
policy, its location within the doctrinal spectre is evident. Although direct reference 
to the Currency School's ideas was rare in the official documents setting up early 
colonial currency boards, the historical analysis of the debates surrounding them 
leaves no doubt about their intellectual origins 183. 
It is telling to review the fate of the currency board idea since its origins, as it 
goes in parallel with the history of economic thought, and with the development of 
political powers implementing it. Up to the 1950s, industrialised nations by and large 
kept to the gold standard, and imposed ideologically corresponding monetary 
constitutions, currency boards, on their colonies. Growing independence of colonial 
territories, the stress, and eventual abandonment of the Bretton Woods system, and 
180 The Bank of England accepted the doctrine of the lender of last resort in 1890, following the 
Baring Brothers crisis. See Schuler (1992), p. 12, and Spahn (2001 ), p. 86. 
181 See Schwartz (1989), p. 43. 
182 This is also made clear by Sir John Hicks: ,,On strict Ricardian principles, there should have 
been no need for central banks. A currency board, working on a rule, should have been enough." 
Hicks (1967), pp. 167-8. 
183 See Schuler (1992), pp. 8-12. 
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the surge of Keynesian thought, all played major roles in the decline of the currency 
board idea since the 1950s. The ensuing decades-long inflation and deficit spending 
experience of industrialised and developing countries alike triggered the surge of 
classical monetary theory and the primacy of price stability in the 1980s. Classical 
monetary theory has since largely set the tone in monetary policy in industrialised 
as well as developing countries. The financial experience of countries that had 
departed from currency boards without being able to install credible alternative 
monetary policies, however, proved to be dismal184 . This experience, complemented 
by the breakdown of the Soviet bloc and the huge transformation task its economies 
faced, prepared the ground for a renaissance of the currency board idea in the 
1990s, which, despite the near-catastrophic collapse of Argentina's currency board 
in early 2002, still seems to be lasting. 
3.1.5.4 From Colonial to Present-Day Currency Boards 
Rationale of Colonial Currency Boards 
Currency boards were first established, and got most widespread, in British 
colonies in the 19th century. While a currency board had been proposed for the 
Province of Canada as soon as in 1841 185, the first currency board to be introduced 
was that of Mauritius, in 1849. The design of the currency boards was implicitly 
based on the ideas of the Currency School. According to one contemporary, 
currency boards were meant to "unite the 'advantages of cheapness and 
convenience which belongs to a paper currency' with the 'steadiness and uniformity 
of value, of a metallic currency, ... [thus, they] ought to be so regulated that the 
amount in circulation should vary according to the laws which govern the latter'."186 
Before the establishment of currency boards, notes and coins of the imperial 
power were used in the colonies, where they served as a stable means of exchange 
and as a store of value. These were in most cases issued locally187, by chartered 
184 Walters ascribes their degeneration to a large part to the abolishment of currency boards: 
"It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the financial instability brought in train by the abrogation of 
the currency board system has played a considerable role in this process." Walters (1989), p. 110. 
185 See Schuler (1992), p. 14. 
186 Earl Grey, British Secretary of State for the Colonies, cited after Gunasekera (1962). See 
Balilio/Enoch (1997), p. 2. 
187 Walters assumes that Bank of England notes were issued exclusively in Britain, with the 
consequence that the risk of loss or destruction of notes in the colonies and the complications of 
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colonial or imperial banks, which were granted the right to issue Bank of England 
notes. However, their note issue was limited by legal restrictions in the maximum 
amount and in the denomination of notes. This caused frequent (and artificial) note 
shortages in some colonies. Economic theory and government policy of the time 
regarded those restrictions as necessary, and were opposed to unrestricted issue 
for fear of inflation. Regulated, monopolistic issue by a monetary authority, the 
currency board, seemed to provide the solution 188. 
Hence, the main motivation for the establishment of currency boards was to 
give the colonies a monetary framework that provided stability of currency, and that 
took account of the colonies' monetary needs by easing trade-related money 
transfers between imperial power and colonies 189. Moreover, with currency boards, 
the colonies were given a certain degree of independence by granting them their 
own, locally issued, currency, as well as the source of income from seigniorage, 
which was obtained by investing reserves in interest-bearing, secure, and 
sufficiently liquid assets. 
Early currency boards differed from later currency boards in several respects. 
Initially, British currency boards redeemed their notes in gold or silver coins only. 
The West African currency board, introduced in 1913, was the first to redeem in 
pound sterling, and with this became the prototype for later (also non-British) 
currency boards, all of which adopted the sterling (or other currency) exchange 
standard190. Another difference between earlier and later currency boards refers to 
the type of assets allowed as reserves. Most early currency boards were allowed to 
invest in foreign, i.e. imperial or other non-colonial, government securities, but not in 
securities of their own colony. Later, currency boards were typically allowed to hold 
replacing worn notes delivered a major argument for the establishment of currency boards. See 
Walters (1989), pp.109-10. 
188 See Schuler (1992), pp. 13-4. 
189 E.g., a money transfer from the colonial power (Britain) to the colony basically works as 
follows: the payer in Britain deposits reserve currency notes with the Bank of England, which again 
deposits them with the currency board in the colony. The currency board changes the notes into the 
local currency at the fixed parity and pays them out to the payee (or the payee's branch bank). This 
transaction causes the money supply in the colony to expand by the transferred amount. A 
payment from the colony to Britain works in reverse, causing the colonial money supply to shrink. 
190 See Schuler (1992), p. 18. 
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local securities up to a certain degree, which meant a deviation from the strict 
currency board design towards more central bank-like options 191 . 
Currency Boards Since 1849 
Shortly after the introduction of the first colonial currency board on Mauritius in 
1849, the New Zealand currency board was established in 1850, followed in the late 
19th and early 20th century by many Asian, African, and Middle Eastern currency 
boards 192 . Besides in almost all British colonies all over the world, currency boards 
also operated in Argentina (1902), the Philippines (1903), then a US colony, and 
Panama (1904). Later non-British currency boards include North Russia (1918)193 , 
Danzig (1923), Ireland (1928), Somalia (1950), Libya (1950), Sudan (1957), North 
Yemen (1964), and Swaziland (1974). In French colonies, systems similar to 
currency boards were put in place (the so-called "lnstituts d'Emission"), notably in 
the still existing CFA-Zone, which consists of West and Central African countries in 
a currency union, with the CFA-franc linked to the French franc. 
The currency board system reached its greatest extent in the 1950s. By then, 
currency boards operated in approximately 50 countries, most of them (former) 
British colonies, among them the economically important territories of Hong Kong 
and Singapore, as well as New Zealand. After the 1950s, the currency board 
system experienced a swift decline. By 1974, it had shrunk to 10 countries, again 
nearly all existing or former British colonies. The reason for this decline was that 
most territories with currency boards, after having gained independence, quickly 
sought to underline their independence by creating their own sovereign currency 
and installing central banks. This trend was also fed by the conviction, prevailing 
among economists and politicians at the time, that monetary arrangements with 
central banking better fit a country's economic, and especially development, needs 
and were superior to the currency board system, which then was perceived as 
rather antiquated 194. In the period between 1974 and the 1990s, the only newly 
191 See Schuler (1992), pp. 35-6. 
192 Schuler (1992) gives a comprehensive study of the history of currency boards, also 
containing a complete list of currency boards (excluding currency boards established after 1990), 
pp. 107-12. 
193 Interestingly, this currency board was instigated by John Maynard Keynes, and installed by 
the British Treasury. See Williamson (1995), p. 5. 
194 At the time, currency boards were even regarded by some as manipulative colonialist or 
nee-imperialist monetary mechanisms. See Walters (1989), p. 111. 
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established currency board was that of Hong Kong, installed in 1983 and still 
operating today 195. 
The 1990s, finally, saw a renaissance of the currency board idea. This revival 
was closely related to the acknowledged quality of currency boards (or, for that 
matter, any monetary regime based on an external anchor196) to bring about 
currency stability. Currency boards were no longer seen as monetary constitutions 
adequate for dependent economies, but were rather perceived as a means to 
provide stability for countries that suffered major structural and political breaks, as 
well as for developing countries with long records of political and economic 
instability. The breakdown of the Soviet Union and the emergence of a number of 
new market economies in Eastern Europe, as well as the independence of post-war 
Ex-Yugoslavian countries, yielded constellations in which the currency board idea 
gained new attraction. 
Among the transforming countries of the former Soviet block, Estonia introduced 
its currency board in 1992 (backed by the German mark, now the Euro), Lithuania 
followed in 1994 (first backed by the US-Dollar, since 2002 by the Euro), and 
Bulgaria in 1997 (German mark, now Euro). Bosnia and Herzegovina introduced 
their new currency, linked to the German mark, now Euro, under a system 
resembling a currency board in 1998. 
Among the inflation-plagued developing countries, Argentina was the sole to 
introduce its (latest197) currency board in 1991, with the objective to stop 
hyperinflation. This is the only recent case of a currency board that had to be 
abandoned under stress, in early 2002. Some other Latin American countries 
recently chose a similar, if stricter, path through outright dollarisation (as did 
Ecuador, in 1999, and El Salvador, in 2001 ). 
Today, currency boards are operating on the Bermudas, the Cayman Islands, 
the Falkland Islands, in Gibraltar, on the Faroe Islands, in Brunei Darussalam, 
Djibouti, Estonia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, and Hong Kong. Systems resembling currency 
boards are operating in the Eastern Caribbean, the CFA-Zone, in Singapore, Latvia, 
and Bosnia-Herzegovina198. Recommendations to introduce currency boards have 
195 Hong Kong had given up its second currency board, which dated from 1945, in 1974. 
196 See Bordo/Jonung (2001 ), p. 266. 
197 In Argentina, currency boards had already been operating from 1902 to 1914, and from 
1927 to 1929. 
198 See Hanke/Schuler (2000), pp. 41-2. 
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been made, during the 1990s, for countries such as Mexico (after the 1995 crisis), 
Peru, Brazil, and Russia. 
3.2 The Specifics and Functioning of a Currency Board 
3.2.1 Constitutional Elements of a Currency Board 
3.2.1.1 Anchor Currency 
The choice of the anchor currency should be guided by several considerations. 
First, the anchor currency should be selected among stable currencies with deep 
and developed financial markets that offer a broad range of international financial 
instruments. The anchor currency therefore should be one of the few large 
international reserve currencies 199, which include the Dollar and the Euro (with the 
yen being a further, but recently questioned candidate). A long record of low 
inflation, high credibility, full convertibility, and low real interest rates are the 
qualities that make them likely to continue their good performance. With the choice 
of a stable anchor currency, the currency board country strives to import the stability 
of the chosen reserve currency. 
Within this set of possible anchor currencies, the most important criteria relate to 
the question of which reserve currency is best able to shelter the currency board 
country from real shocks inside and outside the currency area. This is a crucial 
question, since the currency board country is deprived of monetary policy options to 
deal with such shocks and therefore has to minimise these risks as far as possible. 
The best choice of anchor currency is given when (1) as many countries as 
possible, whose enterprises compete with those of the currency board country, 
share the peg to the reserve currency, i.e. form a single currency area with the 
reserve currency, when (2) a high proportion of the external trade of the currency 
board country takes place with the reserve currency country, and when (3) the 
production patterns of the currency board country differ significantly from those of 
the reserve currency country. As Freytag (1998)200 shows, within these three 
criteria, the requirement of a high proportion of bilateral trade with the reserve 
199 Few currency boards have chosen other than one of the international reserve currencies. 
This happened mostly for historical reasons, e.g. in the case of Brunei which is pegged to the 
Singapore Dollar. See Enoch/Gulde (1997), p. 4. 
200 See Freytag (1998), pp. 5-11. 
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currency country seems to be the least indispensable, i.e. if it is not met, the 
damage caused by real shocks is smaller than if another of the three is not met2°1. 
Expected future shifts in trade patterns should be taken into consideration as 
well when choosing an anchor currency2°2. While a basket of reserve currencies 
might best reflect the trade patterns of a country and might provide a better shelter 
against external shocks, its disadvantages in terms of minor transparency and 
higher obstacles to credibility as well as higher transaction and management costs 
make it rarely seem a preferable option for a currency board country203• 
Finally, the domestic acceptance of the reserve currency may also provide an 
argument for the choice of the anchor currency. An economy already penetrated by 
a parallel currency that is highly valued among market participants might decide to 
choose this currency as its anchor even if trade patterns would predict a different 
anchor currency. Such a constellation could again provide a case where the missing 
criterion of strong trade connections with the reserve currency country would not 
provide a sufficient argument against the choice of an anchor currency that 
otherwise meets the above criteria. 
The implications of the choice of reserve currency for the reserve country are 
also worthwhile considering. If the reserve currency has already been in wide use in 
the currency board country, the demand for it will probably decrease with the 
successful introduction of the currency board since people now can safely change 
their reserves into domestic currency. At the same time, the demand of commercial 
banks might rise as a consequence of reserve requirements or intensified capital 
flows, so that the net effect may be unclear. However, most currency board 
countries are small in economic terms, while the typical reserve currency economies 
201 Suppose for this purpose a positive productivity shock in the reserve currency country with 
a subsequent appreciation of the reserve currency. Worst would be the effects for the currency 
board country if production patterns in the currency board country did not differ much from those in 
the reserve currency country, but the criteria of strong trade connections with the reserve currency 
country and a large currency area pegged to the reserve currency were given: a large part of 
external trade of the currency board country would suffer. If, however, the criterion of strong trade 
connections with the reserve currency country were missing, but the other two were given, the 
pressure of such an external shock would be significantly smaller (also smaller than under the third 
possible constellation, a large currency area missing) since only small parts of the currency board 
country's exports would be affected by the appreciation. See Freytag (1998), pp. 10-1. 
202 See Rose/van Wincoop (2001 ), p. 388. 
203 See Williamson (1995), p. 24. 
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are big and their currencies in global use, so that the initial monetary effect of a 
currency board on the reserve e;urrency country usually will be small204 . 
3.2.1.2 Fixed Exchange Rate 
The determination of the exchange rate is an important as well as difficult issue. 
Doubtlessly, the "appropriate" exchange rate is ideally identical with the exchange 
rate determined by market forces205 . However, an undervalued exchange rate (as 
compared to the appropriate exchange rate) potentially entails several advantages: 
(1) The amount of foreign exchange needed to provide full backing of the monetary 
base is reduced, and (2) a built-in "cushion" of undervaluation can be designed to 
compensate ex ante for an expected real exchange rate appreciation during the 
initial phase of the currency board, and so to protect the currency board from a 
preventable overvalued exchange rate from the beginning. (3) Finally, an 
undervalued exchange rate may facilitate exports (although the question of a 
competitive exchange rate is seldom an issue in a country adopting a currency 
board with the typically preceding accelerating inflation and devaluation cycles206 . 
On the contrary, the consideration that too expensive imports might hamper a 
modernisation of the economy might again speak against an undervalued exchange 
rate207). 
An appreciation of the real exchange rate in the early phase of a currency board 
is likely to occur because of four facts. (1) A certain degree of inflation inertia will 
persist during the first months after introduction of a currency board, produced by 
lags in the adaptation of expectations of market participants and by structural 
rigidities (e.g. backward-looking indexation clauses, or overlapping contracts)208 . (2) 
Concomitant measures at the time of fixing the exchange rate, such as price 
liberalisations, may produce price effects and prevent inflation from immediately 
approaching the level prevailing in the reserve currency country. (3) Growth in the 
currency board country may be higher than in the reserve currency country, which 
204 See Hanke/Schuler (2000), p. 55. 
205 Where the market rate is not clearly detectable, e.g. because of restricted foreign exchange 
markets, a brief period of unrestricted floating of the domestic currency may precede the 
determination of the exchange rate in order to have an indication for the unrestricted market rate. 
206 See Bennett (1994), p. 190. 
207 See Hanke/Schuler (2000), p. 49. 
208 See Williamson (1995), p. 21. 
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causes demand for labour, goods, and services, and hence their prices, to rise. (4) 
Net inflows of capital may increase demand and create inflationary pressure209 . 
However, there are drawbacks of the tempting option to fix the exchange rate at 
an undervalued level. The most important is that, by commencing the currency 
board with an over-depreciated exchange rate, the credibility of the arrangement 
might be reduced from the start. The choice of a parity significantly below the 
prevailing exchange rate therefore bears the risk of giving an impulse to domestic 
inflation, which by itself would re-establish the previous real exchange rate. 
Full foreign exchange backing can be obtained not only through the choice of a 
depreciated exchange rate, but also through a variation in the definition of reserves 
used210 , as well as in the definition of currency board liabilities to be backed211 . 
Hence, for a country lacking reserves, the choice of the exchange rate most likely 
involves a trade-off between a per se highly credible full covering of a broad set of 
domestic liabilities through a narrow set of reserves (with the concomitant, 
potentially credibility-reducing high degree of devaluation), and a less credible wider 
definition of reserves to back a narrower definition of liabilities (which necessitates a 
smaller devaluation)212 . The decision of whether and to which degree excess 
reserves for limited lender of last resort operations should be held from the 
beginning is closely connected and basically faces the same credibility conflict213. 
One way to achieve the necessary foreign exchange backing may be to allow for 
international reserves being gradually built up, or even to borrow the missing 
reserves through a medium or long term foreign loan. With strong underlying 
policies, the commitment to build up full reserve cover over time may be credible 
enough to grant sustainability of the regime. 
A country adopting a currency board has to bear in mind that each detail 
deviating from the orthodox architecture of the currency board bears a potential to 
diminish its credibility and to evoke speculative attacks, so that costs and benefits 
have to be carefully weighed. This is especially true for such an obvious and 
transparent issue as the degree of reserve backing. While some economists 
209 See Freytag (1998), pp. 4-5. 
21° Foreign exchange reserves can be specified net or gross, and can include or exclude long 
term debt. 
211 They may include solely currency in circulation or (in the case of an unorthodox currency 
board) also deposits at the currency board. 
212 See Enoch/Gulde (1998), p. 5. 
213 See Bennett (1994), p. 201. 
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completely reject the adoption of an (even only slightly) undervalued exchange 
rate21 4. it is certainly prudent to say that the degree of initial overdepreciation in 
setting the parity should be tightly limited in order to achieve maximum credibility 
while allowing for a small margin of inflationary inertia, but addressing structural 
problems as far as possible directly, instead of indirectly via the exchange rate 
choice. 
3.2.1.3 Full Convertibility 
A currency's function as a medium of exchange depends on its convertibility. 
There are different degrees of convertibility: (1) Cash convertibility means the ability 
of a currency to exchange bank deposits for notes and cash on demand, (2) 
commodity convertibility is the ability of a currency to buy domestic goods and 
services, and (3) foreign exchange convertibility comprises the unrestricted ability of 
a currency to buy foreign goods and services, including foreign currencies. 
A currency with all three types of convertibility has full convertibility. Most 
currencies of developed countries are fully convertible, while most developing 
countries have currencies with restricted convertibility. The most typical restrictions 
of foreign exchange convertibility refer to capital account transactions (the purchase 
of foreign financial assets), whereas current account transactions (the purchase of 
foreign goods and services) are generally less restricted. The arguments for capital 
controls originate in fears of capital flight or, on the contrary, of massive foreign 
investment (which increases domestic prices of nontraded goods and reduces the 
competitiveness of domestic exporters), and in the fear of moral hazard for domestic 
banks and industries that rely on a bail-out by the government through devaluation 
in the case of unsustainable capital burdens through foreign debt215. 
Full convertibility is a constitutional element of a currency board because it is 
the precondition for the creation of a complete substitutability between local and 
anchor currency, for the reduction of country and currency risk premia, and hence 
for the successful import of stability216. To underline its commitment to full 
convertibility, a currency board should keep its exchange window open for anyone, 
including the public, and not impose any minimum or maximum exchange amounts. 
It should demonstrate that it stands ready under all circumstances to exchange 
currency board notes into the reserve currency. The currency board should not 
214 See Hanke/Schuler (2000), p. 49. 
215 See Hanke/Schuler (2000), pp. 21-2. 
216 See Fuhrmann/Richert (1995), p. 1035. 
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charge commission fees for the exchange, and keep trading spreads at zero or 
minimal, in order to minimise barriers to capital movements and arbitrage, and to 
keep the link to the reserve currency as close as possible217 . 
Note that unlimited convertibility does not mean that a currency board is 
responsible for the conversion of deposits denominated in local currency into 
currency board notes and coins, nor for their conversion into the reserve 
currency218. This is the responsibility of banks. The currency board itself is only 
concerned with the convertibility of the notes and coins it issues. 
While in some cases an immediate establishment of full convertibility (including 
full capital account convertibility) may be possible, other cases may require a more 
gradualist approach. This may be necessary when the banking sector is very fragile, 
and when revealed illiquidities and insolvencies of banks under the rigid system of a 
currency board might trigger bank runs. The purchase of domestic currency might 
then be restricted to the use for current account transactions, and it might be 
required that foreign exchange earnings be kept in the country219. In such cases, the 
process of adjustment to monetary disequilibria has to work over trade volumes and 
current account effects, an adjustment that is less smooth and rapid than over 
capital flows. In the course of stabilisation and strengthening of the financial sector, 
ongoing liberalisation of capital transactions will be facilitated in order to allow for a 
closer adaptation to the lower reserve country interest rates and for a maximum 
degree of substitutability between local and anchor currency220 . 
3.2.1.4 Conduct of Monetary Policy 
In its purest form, a currency board not only refrains from those components of 
monetary policy that imply discretionary elements, such as open market and lender 
of last resort operations, but also from any form of regulation or supervision of the 
financial sector. An orthodox currency board leaves financial institutions completely 
on their own, relying on the disciplining effect of the knowledge that there is no 
lender of last resort221 . The currency board's credibility is based on the commitment 
to a completely passive conduct, and on the limitation of its responsibility to the 
provision of a fully backed money base. 
217 See Hanke/Schuler (2000), pp. 58-9, as opposed to Enoch/Gulde (1997), pp. 21-3. 
218 See Caprio et al. (1996), p. 630. 
219 See Bennett (1994), p. 202. 
220 See Enoch/Gulde (1997), pp. 25-6. 
221 See Eichengreen (2001 b ), p. 269. 
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However, the central role of foreign reserves makes a currency board country 
particularly vulnerable to external shocks. As it is deprived of active policy 
instruments to cope with such shocks, it is widely undisputed that a currency board 
should enact prudential regulations, which above all aim at structural and systemic 
characteristics of the banking system in order to make it as robust as possible and 
to reduce the need for situational support222 . Reserve requirements and capital 
adequacy rules223 are among the most undisputed elements of financial sector 
regulation. Additional prudential regulations may concern interest rate and liquidity 
risks, aiming at mismatches in the maturity structure of banks' assets and 
liabilities224. Of course, a strong banking supervision, proper accounting standards, 
and stringent disclosure requirements are preconditions for the enforcement of such 
regulations225. 
That said, although conflicting with a currency board's basic principle of limited 
discretion and even more clearly deviating from the "orthodox" currency board 
design, a certain capacity to deliver lender of last resort support might nevertheless 
be prudential in order to retain the ability to avert incipient banking crises, and to 
contain their possibly contagious effects, especially under conditions of uncertainty 
or large external shocks. Such lender of last resort capacity can, as long as it is 
funded by excess reserves set aside for this purpose, and follows specified rules, 
strengthen confidence in the domestic banking system and as a consequence lower 
intermediation spreads, without exposing the system too much to the imminent 
problems of reduced credibility and moral hazard226. 
222 For transparency, credibility, and organisational reasons, a division of the institution 
currency board is advisable: a currency department then solely undertakes the tasks of exchanging 
domestic against reserve currency and holding the reserves, whereas a banking department is 
responsible for the monetary policy issues. See Fuhrmann/Richert (1995), p. 1038. 
223 Capital adequacy ratios are recommended to be fixed well above the Basie standard of 8 
percent, and probably even above the 12 percent discussed for banks in emerging markets, given 
the greater riskiness of banking in developing economies and the higher need for self-reliance in 
currency board countries. See Enoch/Gulde (1997), pp. 13-4. 
224 See Balino/Enoch (1997), p. 21. 
225 Banking supervision should ideally be transferred to an independent agency. Where the 
currency board itself undertakes banking supervision, it should credibly demonstrate that currency 
board rules will not be circumvented in case of banking sector difficulties. See Enoch/Gulde (1998), 
p. 7. 
226 See Balino/Enoch (1997), p. 20. 
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Control of Private Money Creation 
A completely exogenous money supply and inflation rate would imply the 
absence of private sector money creation, as would be the case with a reserve 
requirement for commercial banks at 100%227 . However, the 100% reserve 
requirement does not extend to commercial banks, and private money creation 
works under a currency board as in any two-tier banking system. Reserve to deposit 
ratios of commercial banks (the fraction of deposits held as reserves) as well as the 
currency-deposit ratio of the public (the fraction of deposits the public desires to 
hold in currency) are the determinants of the money multiplier, i.e. of the degree to 
which changes in the money base (which, under a currency board, mirror foreign 
reserve changes) translate into money stock changes in the economy228 . 
An orthodox currency board does not influence the money supply by imposing 
reserve ratios or by regulating commercial banks, but leaves its determination 
completely to market forces229 . However, private money creation can be a source of 
instability: with a high money multiplier, capital inflows may translate into 
unacceptably high rises in domestic credit, capital outflows into sharp contractions 
of the money stock. Though the responsiveness of the money supply is a central 
principle in the currency board idea, a currency board may wish to dampen the 
expansionary as well as contractionary effects of foreign reserve movements by 
imposing minimum reserve requirements. Thus, on the macroeconomic level, 
reserve requirements can serve to control inflationary pressures, to reduce 
adaptation costs of the domestic economy, and so to enhance the currency board's 
sustainability. On the microeconomic level, they can help strengthen the financial 
sector by ensuring it holds sufficient reserves to meet liquidity demands of its 
customers, and by establishing additional liquidity buffers that may be needed to 
smooth out interest rate volatility or limit the risk of settlement failures. For a typical 
central bank, minimum reserve requirements are also an important instrument of 
discretionary control of the money supply: rises and reductions in the reserve 
requirements serve as brakes or accelerators for money growth. While this latter 
function sharply contrasts with the concept of a currency board, the setting of 
227 See Fuhrmann (1999), p. 95. 
228 See Walters (1989), pp. 111-2. 
229 For a detailed description of money supply under a currency board see e.g. Hanke/Schuler 
(2000), pp. 26-39, Humpage/Owen (1995), pp. 3-5, or Zarazaga (1995a), pp. 1-2. 
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minimum reserve requirements, with the aim to keep the money multiplier adequate 
and constant230 , is largely regarded as a prudential issue even for a currency board. 
If, as pointed out above, a currency board accepts the need for a certain lender 
of last resort capacity, the interest earned on foreign reserves held by the currency 
board to back banks' (unremunerated) reserves can be used to build up excess 
reserves earmarked for this purpose. Moreover, a currency board may wish some 
degree of discretion by keeping the option to adjust reserve ratios on an ad hoc 
basis in case of liquidity crises231 . Again, the conditions of such adjustment should 
be transparent and well-defined ex ante in order to maximise the currency board's 
credibility. 
However, the requirement for banks to hold high and unremunerated reserves 
with the currency board reduces their profitability, and so may put the banking 
sector's soundness at risk. Liquidity requirements, while serving the same macro 
and microeconomic purposes, may offer an alternative, especially when there is a 
risk of systemic liquidity crises232 . Allowed to hold the required fraction of liabilities 
as liquid reserves within the banking system, banks can earn interest on their 
reserves, which strengthens their profitability. Liquidity requirements can be fine-
tuned in a way that some of the liquidity risk that otherwise would imply externalities 
can be internalised: higher liquidity requirements can be imposed on liabilities that 
have short maturities, are volatile, or are close substitutes for foreign assets. A 
further advantage over reserve requirements is that banks can be allowed to deposit 
their liquidity reserves abroad. Thus, they can be given broad responsibility for the 
management and use of their liquidity reserves, which is likely to contain moral 
hazard more than with reserve requirements, and therefore may limit the need for 
discretionary central bank intervention233 . 
230 A typical phenomenon during stabilisation or transformation processes is the increase of 
non-cash payments and a reduction of the currency-deposit ratio of the public. Higher reserve 
requirements for banks can prevent increases in the money multiplier with the potentially 
destabilising effects. See Fuhrmann/Richert (1995), p. 1038. 
231 See Baliiio/Enoch (1997), p. 20. 
232 See Baliiio/Enoch (1997), p. 23. 
233 In addition, systemic stability can be enhanced via the imposition of an autonomous deposit 
insurance fund with limited coverage, funded by the banks themselves. Moral hazard can be limited 
by making insurance premia dependent on the riskiness of each bank's portfolio. See 
Hanke/Schuler (2000), p. 66. 
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Clearing and Day-to-Day Monetary Operations 
As pointed out, the design of a pure currency board does not include any 
engagement in operations with the financial sector other than the exchange of 
foreign reserves against domestic currency. As this implies a complete loss of 
control over interest rates, a country with an orthodox currency board has to rely on 
a functioning financial sector that is able to provide for a proper and timely allocation 
of liquidity and a smooth adaptation to interest movements. In the absence of a 
strong and sophisticated financial sector, it may again be justifiable to deviate from 
the orthodox principle in the design of payment systems and monetary 
arrangements in a way that allows coping with the limitations imposed by the 
currency board while sticking to its commitment to refrain from discretionary 
action234 . 
For example, allowing banks to hold their settlement accounts with the 
monetary authority and granting their unconditional convertibility at the official 
exchange rate facilitates a smooth handling of liquidity fluctuations. To facilitate the 
provision of fully backed liquidity for commercial banks, the currency board may use 
foreign exchange swaps, which facilitate short-term capital flows and promote 
interest rate arbitrage235 . 
More conflicting with an orthodox currency board design are provisions of 
standing liquidity facilities (e.g. a Lombard window) or conventional open market 
operations. While they can be used to facilitate settlements, meet daily changing 
liquidity requirements, and promote the adaptation of domestic interest rates to 
changes in foreign interest rates, the implied room for discretion potentially can 
undermine a currency board's credibility. It is important that such facilities are not 
used to gain control over the level of interest rates, since this would interfere with 
the mechanism through which banks equilibrate the distribution of monetary assets 
and liabilities. Accordingly, such operations have to be limited in scope and clearly 
defined. 
Lender of Last Resort Function 
As already pointed out, a pure currency board does not include any room for 
lender of last resort operations. In signalling that the maintenance of the fixed 
234 See Bennett (1994), p. 199-200. 
235 While this intention does basically not contradict a pure currency board's objective, there is 
some risk that swaps may be used to postpone necessary policy actions, hence that they offer 
some discretionary leeway. See Baliiio/Enoch (1997), p. 20. 
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exchange rate is the overriding goal, the abstinence from intervention is an 
important determinant of the credibility of a currency board. It is thought to promote 
the soundness of the banking system by enforcing market discipline, limiting moral 
hazard, and inducing banks to limit their risk exposure. 
It is, however, impossible to obtain a complete reduction of banks' risk to failure. 
This is especially true where the banking system is (still) weak or where it is 
exposed to adverse external shocks. The risk is that a financial crisis undermines 
the currency board's political backbone and finally leads to its collapse. Most 
currency boards, therefore, hold a limited "safety margin" of excess reserves, kept 
aside for interventions in accordance with the currency board rules in order to gain 
some flexibility236. 
Unlike with other features of a currency board, the trade-off between credibility 
and flexibility does not seem so obvious for the lender of last resort issue. As long 
as sufficient reserves are available, some flexibility can, on the one hand, 
strengthen confidence in the domestic banking sector, add credibility to the currency 
board, and enhance its sustainability. On the other hand, it may limit its 
transparency, which might work against its credibility again. It might signal investors 
that the stability of the domestic banking system is deemed a goal superior to the 
maintenance of the exchange rate, which might evoke capital flight237 . The exposure 
to moral hazard, a problem inherent in any constellation where economic agents 
can expect to be bailed-out in case of liquidity problems, is a further danger. It 
cannot be completely excluded238 , as even under a credible currency board it can 
be rationally expected that in the case of a systemic crisis authorities will eventually 
rescue banks in order to limit the damage and to prevent a collapse of the currency 
board. 
These challenges for a currency board's sustainability can be limited to the 
degree that the excess reserves held for this purpose are strictly confined, and rules 
for their use are transparent and clearly defined. Besides the general need for 
proper prudential regulations and supervisory arrangements designed to reduce the 
236 Given a sound financial sector, the foreign exchange set aside for lender of last resort 
support can also originate from a common pool of commercial bank funds. Other possibilities to 
ensure the availability of funds in case of need are mutual support agreements with monetary 
authorities of other countries, or lines of credit with foreign banks, guaranteed by the currency 
board on behalf of domestic banks. See Baliiio/Enoch (1997), p. 23. 
237 See Eichengreen (1996), p. 239. 
238 See Dolmas/Zarazaga (1996), p. 2. 
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need of lender of last resort operations in the first place, even these operations 
should rather address systemic problems in the banking system than bail-out single 
insolvent banks239 . 
Another possibility is to transfer the lender of last resort function to the 
government, or even leave it to world capital markets240 . Again, as with the currency 
board itself engaging in limited lender of last resort activities, the government will be 
able to deliver such support only to the extent that it disposes of foreign reserves, 
ideally accumulated over time through profit transfers from the currency board, or 
granted from external creditors. The advantage of such a constellation may be that 
the strict separation of the lender of last resort function from the currency board may 
increase the credibility of the arrangement241 . 
A further and potentially very important factor limiting the need of lender of last 
resort operations is a high proportion of branches of foreign-owned banks within the 
domestic banking sector242 . Branches of foreign banks generally face an elastic 
supply of reserve currency from their parent. Moreover, branching generally 
encourages diversification within the banking sector and the development of 
interbank lending markets. Thus, an open and minimally regulated banking sector 
reduces the likelihood of banking crises and the need for lender of last resort 
assistance243 . 
3.2.1.5 Conduct of Fiscal Policy 
As pointed out, a pure currency board issues money solely on the base of 
foreign reserves, and does not hold domestic assets. This means that any form of 
government financing through the monetary authority is precluded. As any fixed 
exchange rate regime, a currency board has to rely on the support of fiscal policy. 
Given the main motivation of a currency board to stop inflation, beforehand typically 
created through extensive central bank financing of the government, this restriction 
239 See Bennett (1994), p. 201. 
240 See Dornbusch (2001 ), p. 239. 
241 See Humpage/Mclntire (1995), pp. 8-9, and Hanke/Schuler (2000), p. 65. 
242 A currency board, by largely eliminating exchange rate risk, is supposed to generally 
encourage branch banking, especially with large, global banks headquartered in the reserve 
country. 
243 See Humpage/Mclntire (1995), p. 8. 
Jutta Maute - 978-3-631-75447-4
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 04:44:44AM
via free access
116 
represents a cut that is elementary for the establishment of a currency board's 
credibility244 . 
Before the adoption of a currency board, governments typically faced soft 
budget constraints, i.e. were able to obtain funding through fresh money printed by 
de facto dependent central banks. Now they have to do without the previously 
earned inflation tax to finance fiscal deficits and instead have to rely on "open" 
sources of tax income245 . This means that they are forced to consolidate budgets 
via tax increases and/or spending cuts, or to attract funds from domestic or 
international borrowers246 . When relying on domestic sources of finance, e.g. loans 
from commercial banks, governments have to keep their borrowing requirements 
sufficiently low so as not to crowd out banks' lending to the private sector. Thus, a 
credible currency board makes governments (supposed they regard the costs of 
default as prohibitive) face the need to keep public borrowing requirements at or 
near zero, i.e. it imposes hard budget constraints247 . 
If, as in most countries, fiscal policy is not concentrated upon a single 
centralised authority, then municipal, provincial, and central fiscal authorities have to 
agree on a common consolidation policy, which risks to be exposed to political 
dispute. Currency boards therefore might work better in countries where the fisc is 
centralised, or at least effective co-ordination mechanisms among the different fiscal 
levels are in place248 . 
Again, modern currency boards sometimes make modest compromises with 
respect to the budget constraint, and allow a certain proportion of backing assets to 
be held in government debt denominated in the reserve currency. Although the 
credibility of the fixed exchange rate depends on the assets used to back it being 
external, limited and sufficiently small proportions of government debt, denominated 
in terms of the reserve currency, may stay without harm to the currency board's 
credibility249 . 
Another problem to solve is how both day-to-day liquidity management and 
longer-term management of government debt, typically previously done by the 
244 See Enoch/Gulde (1998), p. 6. 
245 See Roubini (1998), p. 14. 
246 However, a credible currency board is able to compensate for the loss of inflation tax by 
lower interest rates and reduced debt service costs. See Dornbusch (2001 ), p. 239. 
247 See Hanke/Schuler (2000), p. 13. 
248 See Eichengreen (2001b), p. 272. 
249 See Bennett (1994), p. 198. 
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monetary authority250 , should be organised under a currency board. It seems clear 
that the purest and most transparent solution is not to allow the currency board to 
hold government deposits, but to pass government accounts as well as their 
management to commercial banks. If a currency board chooses to keep 
government deposits, possibly because the domestic banking sector is not (yet) 
able to undertake the related tasks, it should do so only under the conditions that 
government deposits are fully backed by foreign reserve holdings, that there are no 
overdraft provisions, and that interest is paid only if covered by the currency board's 
own interest income on reserve assets251 . 
The question of how to handle stocks of outstanding government debt is closely 
related. The most conformable solution for a currency board would be to balance 
public budgets before its introduction, or to sell government debt to the market and 
stop buying new debt252 . Open market operations related to government debt, such 
as the issue and marketing of treasury bills, should be passed to the fiscal 
authorities253. It is then their responsibility to balance the maturity structure of 
government securities, and to keep the securities markets sufficiently liquid, a task 
that is all the more important when government securities are an important fraction 
of the banking system. 
With monetary and exchange rate policy severely restricted under a currency 
board, the conduct of fiscal policy is crucial for the success and sustainability of a 
currency board. Fiscal policy in this context may take over some of the tasks 
normally ascribed to monetary and/or exchange rate management, as, for instance, 
the dampening of business cycles (though boosting cycles has to be subject to 
budgetary limits). During incipient debt crises, fiscal policy can help restore 
confidence by reducing structural deficits. Fiscal surpluses can reduce the country's 
dependence on foreign savings and build up its international reserves position254 . 
250 Typical central banks hold and manage government deposits and provide overdraft 
provisions. However, movements in government deposits are associated with reserve changes that 
compromise the currency board. 
251 See Enoch/Gulde (1997), pp. 14-6. 
252 Where the currency board itself is divided into a banking and a currency department, the 
government debt can also be booked to the banking department in order to let the currency 
department operate as a pure currency board. 
253 Where organisational problems (e.g. staff qualification) exist, the currency board can also 
take over these functions passively, i.e. on a strict "fee for service" basis for the government. 
254 See Baliiio/Enoch (1997), p. 18. 
Jutta Maute - 978-3-631-75447-4
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 04:44:44AM
via free access
118 
3.2.1.6 Institutional Preconditions 
The core of a currency board's credibility, as opposed to the credibility of a 
merely fixed exchange rate, is the legal and institutional anchoring of the 
arrangement, meant to erect high obstacles to any change. A maximum degree of 
credibility is obtained by including the currency board into the country's constitution, 
or by requiring a parliamentary supermajority to reverse the arrangement. On this 
basis, a currency board law defines the new monetary regime. This law can be very 
simple and short255 . It has to define the exchange rate and the reserves, the 
structure as well as the activities (and their limitation) of the monetary authority. 
Especially, it has to settle the currency board's relation to the government256 . 
Finally, it has to rule that a well-defined set of statistics is published regularly, in 
order to establish a maximum of transparency. 
The legal fixing of the exchange rate with the self-commitment of the monetary 
authority to sell foreign exchange at the defined rate is an important, but not 
sufficient precondition for the credibility and sustainability of a currency board: laws 
and even constitutions can always be changed when the political impetus exists. 
Nevertheless, the design of the legal setting can play an integral role in determining 
the degree of credibility. Especially, credible rules defining the behaviour in 
situations of distress or of adverse external developments can add substantially to 
the credibility of a currency board257. 
Despite its simplicity, the setting up and enacting of the legal framework 
requires time and comprehensive information of the political decision makers, and, 
to be credible, broad and unequivocal support of a large political majority. 
One of the biggest obstacles towards making a currency board credible is doubt 
about the soundness of the banking system. Therefore, along with the reduction of 
monetary policy functions of the currency board, especially its lender of last resort 
function, commercial banks have to be prepared for the new regime in order to 
255 Hanke and Schuler recommend a very detailed and rigid currency board design and give a 
corresponding model for a currency board law. See Hanke/Schuler (2000), pp. 58-64 and 73-6. 
256 E.g., to demonstrate the currency board's sterility against government influence, it can be 
incorporated and required to hold its reserves abroad (e.g. in the reserve country, or another "safe 
haven" country), or be required to include a majority of foreign board members. 
257 E.g., Hanke and Schuler propose a rule according to which prolonged periods of strong 
deflation or inflation in the reserve country, both in degree and duration exceeding clearly defined 
ranges, force the currency board to either revalue or choose a new reserve currency. See 
Hanke/Schuler (2000), pp. 63-4. 
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make them as sound as possible, and to enable them for interbank markets that 
now have to function without permanent central bank intervention. As pointed out 
above, comprehensive prudential regulations as well as banking and stock market 
supervision, accounting standards, disclosure requirements, bankruptcy laws, and 
the payments system belong to the most important issues to be revised and 
strengthened. Where there is no realistic prospect for banks to comply with the new 
standards, the supervisory authority should be prepared to close them down. 
Privatising state-owned banks and allowing foreign banks to open branches in the 
country increases competition and efficiency, and reduces the need for lender of 
last resort activity, since branches of foreign parents generally will be granted 
liquidity assistance from abroad258 . 
Further institutional conditions, though not directly related with the 
establishment of the new monetary constitution, arise from the interdependencies 
between the monetary and the real sectors of the economy, and typically require 
broad structural reforms. Most important, with a fixed exchange rate, the adaptation 
to real shocks has to occur via changes in prices and wages rather than via 
changes in the exchange rate259 . Sustainability of a currency board therefore 
requires goods and labour markets that are flexible enough to absorb the effects of, 
say, an outflow of reserves that causes the money stock to decrease, interest rates 
to rise, and output and employment to shrink, through price and wage decreases, in 
order to re-establish internal and external balance260 . 
Besides a broad deregulation of prices and wages, trade liberalisation is 
necessary to strengthen market forces and optimise factor allocation. Since state-
owned enterprises can no longer rely on the soft budget constraints they previously 
enjoyed, their privatisation not only brings about their market-oriented realignment, 
but also contributes to restore government budgets261 . The promotion of capital and 
know-how imports is a prerequisite for the development of key industries in 
developing or transforming economies. 
Generally, the rigid external anchor imposed by a currency board necessitates a 
streamlining of the real sector towards an internationally competitive and export-
258 See Enoch/Gulde (1997), pp. 12-3. 
259 See e.g. Broda (2001 ), p. 377, who examines the empirical evidence for the potential of the 
exchange rate regime to buffer real shocks. 
260 See Gulde/Kiihkonen/Keller (2000), pp. 5-6. 
261 See Hanke/Schuler (2000), p. 13. 
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oriented economy, hence an economic alignment that requires a broad social 
consensus262 . 
3.2.2 Strengths and Weaknesses of a Currency Board 
3.2.2.1 Strengths of a Currency Board 
Simplicity and Transparency 
One major advantage over a central bank is a currency board's simplicity and 
transparency. As the currency board's conduct is reduced by a simple rule to quasi-
mechanical behaviour, its function and motivation are easy to understand even for 
the broad public. Given an adequate information policy, its behaviour is completely 
verifiable and predictable. The straightness of the arrangement is directly tangible 
for the whole population, especially when the reserve currency already is in broad 
use as a parallel currency before the currency board's introduction, since foreign 
exchange transactions are simplified and freed from restrictions that typically 
prevailed before. In addition, the currency board's simplicity is underlined by the 
reduced need for staff and bookkeeping within the currency board. 
Even where a currency board deviates from an orthodox design, and engages 
in certain regulatory, open market, or lender of last resort activities (as described 
above), its operations are clearly defined and limited in scope, thus easy to 
monitor263 . This eliminates uncertainty and creates a calculable monetary 
framework for economic activity. 
Credibility 
A currency board's main objective is the installation of credible disinflation 
policies. The credibility of stabilisation policies decides over their success and 
sustainability. 
With inflation being to a great part the result of economic agents' inflation 
expectations, typically shaped by past experiences of lax fiscal policy, 
accommodative monetary policy, and failed stabilisation attempts, the adoption of a 
currency board, by almost instantaneously eliminating the scope for inflationary 
policies, can quickly restore policy credibility and provide clear signals for the 
revision of expectations. The main determinant of this kind of credibility is the 
262 See Fuhrmann/Richert (1995), pp. 1038-9. 
263 See Balino/Enoch (1997), p. 6. 
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severe self-restriction of the government and the preparedness to surrender 
flexibility for the sake of credibility264 . 
For countries lacking a well-established track record of price stability, less strict 
ways towards building up credibility, e.g. through the self-commitment of an 
autonomous central bank, are very time-consuming and often doomed to fall victim 
to speculative attacks265 . 
Currency Stability 
Apart from official dollarisation, a currency board establishes the closest link of 
the domestic currency to an external anchor. It introduces a high degree of 
substitutability between anchor and domestic currency, or, put differently, it imports 
the reserve currency's stability. 
The convergence of domestic towards reserve country inflation rates is the 
result of the built-in automatic monetary adjustment mechanism of a currency board: 
a higher price level in the currency board country leads to a balance of payments 
deficit, reserve outflows and a shrinking monetary base, which causes a rise in 
interest rates that exerts a correcting deflationary pressure, which again improves 
the balance of payments266 . Inflation differentials between anchor and domestic 
currency widely disappear, or, where they persist to limited degrees, reflect real 
rather than purely monetary developments (e.g. higher growth rates in the currency 
board than in the reserve currency country). 
In the same way, nominal wage growth approaches the respective wage growth 
rates in the reserve country, plus an allowance for productivity gains. Real wages in 
a currency board country therefore can increase quickly when productivity 
increases267 . 
Interest Rate Convergence 
Along with currency stabilisation, one of the main benefits of a currency board is 
that it promotes the convergence of domestic interest rates to reserve currency 
264 See Eichengreen (1996), p. 239. 
265 The experience of the Mexican Peso crisis in 1995 is an example of how coherent policy 
measures, though initially able to produce good results, were not enough to constitute a lasting 
credible monetary policy reputation. See Humpage/Owen (1995), p. 2. 
266 This is the famous price-specie-flow-mechanism first described by David Hume. 
267 See Hanke/Schuler (2000), p. 38. 
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levels268 . This is, like the convergence of inflation rates, a direct consequence of the 
automatic monetary adjustment mechanism, according to which a supposed flight 
into the reserve currency will cause the domestic monetary base to shrink and 
domestic interest rates to rise until a level is reached where holding local currency 
becomes again attractive. Remaining risk premia demanded for holding domestic 
currency reflect the state of confidence in the stability of the domestic currency's 
purchasing power. They are supposed to decrease with successful stabilisation269 . 
Risk premia are composed of country and currency risk. Currency risk can be 
described as the probability of exchange rate realignment. It can be measured as 
the differential between interest rates granted in the currency board country for 
domestic as opposed to reserve currency deposits. Country risk, in contrast, reflects 
the political, legal, and/or economic risks prevailing in a country. It can be assessed 
comparing the interest rates of reserve currency deposits (or, as well, reserve 
currency money market rates) in the currency board country with those in the 
reserve country270 . Currency and country risk cannot be completely separated: the 
higher the currency risk (i.e. the risk that the exchange rate is changed), the higher 
the perceived country risk, as economic and political conditions of the currency 
board country would be severely affected by a change in the exchange rate. 
Similarly, a higher country risk (e.g. because of rising banking sector problems, or 
following external shocks) will immediately spill over to a higher currency risk by 
adding pressure to the currency. Therefore, for instance, as long as there is an 
institutional possibility that the currency board could be changed, or that banks may 
get illiquid, a certain risk premium will always remain, even if a currency board is 
doing well271 . 
Bank rates, particularly long-term lending rates, in the currency board country 
often remain significantly above respective rates in the reserve currency country. 
This is to be explained mainly with higher domestic credit risk, different lending 
policies, lacks in transparency, and possibly unsound banks. Over time however, in 
the course of stabilisation and institutional reforms, risk premia should decline 
substantially. 
268 See Dornbusch (2001 ). p. 240. 
269 See Fuhrmann (1999), p. 92. 
270 See Balino/Enoch (1997), pp. 32-4. 
271 See Bennett (1994), p. 206. 
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Besides the beneficial effects of lower interest rates on domestic investment 
and public households, interest rates converging to international levels due to 
reduced exchange rate uncertainty and the perception of· orderly monetary 
conditions help promote international trade and access to international capital 
markets, and so facilitate international integration that is a prerequisite for a 
currency board country's growth. 
Compared to conventionally fixed pegs, these benefits seem to be clearer, 
because the adoption of a currency board implies that the government is generally 
more inclined to strengthen policies overall, which results not only in lower interest 
rates demanded by investors but also in smaller interest rate changes (and 
concomitant costs for the economy) necessary to adjust to changes in monetary 
conditions272 . 
Financial Intermediation 
The credibility of a currency board is supposed to strengthen the financial sector 
and stimulate financial intermediation and remonetisation of the economy, 
measurable in increasing ratios of broad money to GDP, growth rates of credit to 
the private sector, and ratios of deposits to broad money. 
This is mainly the result of three effects, the first resulting from the abstinence of 
the monetary authority to provide a financial safety net and from the concomitant 
reduction of moral hazard for banks that cannot any longer rely on being bailed out 
by the authorities via devaluation of the domestic currency. This works to induce 
them to more responsible risk taking in liquidity, currency, and maturity terms. The 
absence of a central liquidity provider also stimulates and intensifies interbank 
lending273 . 
Second, a credible currency board leads to a lengthening of agents' horizons274, 
and hence to a return of domestic and international long-term lending to domestic 
banks and firms, which previously had been discouraged by the prevailing currency 
risk. Financial and real sectors get more liquid, and currency risks resulting from 
domestic currency assets and foreign currency liabilities in banks' and firms' 
balance sheets are covered by the exchange rate commitment. Similarly, maturity 
mismatches arising from long-term investments that under the previous conditions 
272 See Baliiio/Enoch (1997), p. 9. 
273 The question of whether a strong financial sector is an effect or a precondition of a credible 
currency board will be addressed below. 
274 See Dornbusch (2001 ), p. 240. 
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of distrust and exchange rate uncertainty had to be forcibly financed by short-term 
loans, are reduced when currency risk is eliminated275 . 
Finally, ameliorating economic and financial conditions work to attract 
international banks to open up business in the currency board country, leading to 
enhanced competition, a more efficient financial sector, and real credit growth. In 
short, a currency board, by eliminating exchange rate uncertainty, is expected to 
encourage the development of a sophisticated financial sector that serves the needs 
of a growing and diversifying local economy striving to intensify its integration into 
the world economy. 
3.2.2.2 Weaknesses of a Currency Board 
Not surprisingly, the weaknesses of a currency board are the flip side of its 
strengths. Notably, the fixed parity can become an obstacle to adequately respond 
to large exchange rate misalignments. Similarly, the rigid backing rule makes the 
financial system vulnerable in case of crises. Operational simplicity in central 
banking rules out important and otherwise possibly beneficial central bank functions. 
Finally, by preventing the government from lending from the currency board, an 
immediate fiscal consolidation is required that may be difficult to realise. 
Nominal Exchange Rate Rigidity and Exchange Rate Misalignments 
One of the biggest threats arising for the sustainability of a currency board is the 
danger of a growing misalignment of the real exchange rate276 . A post stabilisation 
boom, as often experienced after successful stabilisation, may lead to a positive 
growth rate differential between currency board and reserve currency country. As a 
consequence, price levels in the currency board country, although approaching 
reserve country levels, often remain well above reserve (or trading partner) country 
levels due to higher demand for goods and services, which leads to decreasing 
competitiveness277 . Other factors contributing to inflation differentials over the 
reserve country level can be increased productivity due to the opening up of the 
economy278 , or high capital inflows due to the newly perceived macroeconomic 
275 See Eichengreen (2001 b), p. 269-71. 
276 See Roubini (1998), p. 5-8. 
277 Especially prices of nontraded goods, being in inelastic supply, often rise faster than in the 
reserve currency country. 
278 This is true for the so-called productivity bias that results from differential productivity 
growth within an open economy. With fixed nominal exchange rates, realised productivity gains in 
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stability of the country. Also, an initial undervaluation of the exchange rate, while 
partly chosen to provide room for inflation inertia, may by itself contribute to initial 
inflation279 . An appreciation of the real exchange rate (defined as the quotient of 
nominal exchange rate and price level) is the result. 
While exchange rate misalignments are a problem for most exchange rate 
based stabilisation programmes, they are a more serious concern for currency 
boards as the option of adjustment of the nominal exchange rate, i.e. devaluation, is 
barred. The correction of a misalignment therefore has to occur via the adjustment 
process through the balance of payments: a deterioration of the balance of 
payments (in the current and/or the capital account), a shrinking monetary base, 
and price and wage deflation280. Where prices and wages are sticky, the adjustment 
effectuates prolonged periods of tight liquidity and high unemployment, which may 
challenge the sustainability of the currency board. 
Nominal exchange rate rigidity also makes a currency board country more 
vulnerable to external shocks or to an instable reserve currency. E.g., with 
incongruent business cycles prevailing in the two countries, changes in monetary 
conditions in the reserve currency country may lead to situations where interest 
rates of the reserve currency country are too high or too low for the current 
economic situation in the currency board country. The currency board then, in 
effect, has procyclical effects: imported interest rates that are too low for a booming 
currency board country can aggravate already prevailing inflationary pressures, too 
high interest rates intensify a monetary and real contraction281 . When the value of 
the reserve currency changes in relation to the currencies of other trading partners, 
similar costs are incurred: a weakening reserve currency then results in a 
depreciation of the currency board currency vis-a-vis its other trading partners and 
hence in an inflationary bias, and vice versa in the case of an appreciation of the 
reserve currency. As pointed out above, the design of a currency board, and 
especially the choice of the anchor currency, decides to a great extent over the 
exposedness to external shocks. 
the tradable sector translate into wage increases, which are transmitted to the nontradable sector. If 
productivity growth in the nontradable sector is less, this leads to increasing prices for nontradables 
and to inflation, which, if productivity growth in the reserve country is less, exceeds inflation in the 
reserve country. See Hanke/Schuler (2000), pp. 38-9. 
279 See Williamson (1995), p. 22. 
280 See Enoch/Gulde (1998), p. 2. 
281 See Williamson (1995), pp. 24-5. 
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Financial Fragility in the Absence of a Lender of Last Resort 
Compared to conventionally fixed exchange rates, the financial system has the 
overall preconditions to be less fragile under a currency board: sufficient foreign 
reserves have to be maintained to ensure convertibility, and bank runs motivated by 
expectations of exchange rate realignments are discouraged. Although this reduces 
the probability of bank runs, their occurrence is still possible. If one does occur, a 
currency board is more vulnerable than a system with central banking, since it is 
largely deprived of instruments to deal with crises (namely of lender of last resort 
functions)282 . Comparatively small disruptions in the financial sector can spread fast 
and even lead to a national financial panic when the knowledge about the absence 
of any lender of last resort assistance accelerates bank runs283. 
A currency board grants full convertibility for notes and coins, but not for 
deposits. Therefore, although banks may keep sufficient reserves to meet "normal" 
conversion demands, a bank run (i.e. a sudden increase in the currency-deposit 
ratio of the public) may make them unable to honour requests for deposit 
withdrawals. Selling liquid domestic assets may help single banks, but do nothing to 
solve systemic crises, as it leaves the overall reserves base unchanged. While 
increasing interest rates offer a short-term solution, over time they damage 
confidence in the sustainability of the currency board284. 
Improperly managed public debt is another source of instability. If large 
proportions of public debt are outstanding in the short term, this may lead to 
speculative attacks exposing the government to a debt crisis even if the levels of 
public indebtedness are sustainable. In turn, when government securities form an 
important part of banks' liquidity, such a debt crisis may also trigger a banking crisis. 
As becomes evident, in the absence of a lender of last resort, a currency 
board's fragility in case of financial crises increases with high capital mobility, a 
weak (or weakly supervised) banking sector, the dominance of local banks without 
access to foreign funds, and weaknesses in the structure of public debt. 
282 See Roubini (1998), p. 2-3. 
283 SeeZarazaga (1995b), pp.17-8. 
284 Empirically, persisting and high interest rate differentials to reserve currency levels, 
especially for long-term deposits and loans, generally reflect prevailing expectations of ban king 
crises or a collapse of the currency board. See Baliiio/Enoch (1997), p. 15. 
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Loss of Other Central Bank Functions 
Besides being restricted in its function to deal with financial crises, a pure 
currency board also refrains from other central bank functions, such as day-to-day 
monetary management and the settlement of payments. 
A currency board is designed to leave liquidity adjustment to capital flows and 
interest rate arbitrage within the financial sector. However, unless financial markets 
are highly developed, market imperfections, transaction costs, and credit risk 
account for high volatility and intermediation spreads, which penalise capital flows 
and hamper arbitrage. Consequently, though capital account transactions may be 
fully liberalised and interest rates may generally follow international movements, 
capital flows may be unable to fully arbitrage interest rates with sufficient speed. 
Ensuing short-term liquidity mismatches then negatively affect financial and 
exchange markets, subject the economy to unnecessary fluctuations, and possibly 
undermine the currency board's credibility. This is why most modern currency 
boards do engage in day-to-day monetary operations to smooth out adjustment to 
short-term liquidity imbalances. 
Similarly, under a pure currency board, clearing and settlement services are 
provided by the private sector. Then, settlement failures are possible, especially 
when the currency board provides no lender of last resort assistance. Again, 
deviating from the orthodox design and allowing banks to settle in the books of the 
currency board reduces this risk285 . 
Constraints on Fiscal Policy 
Currency boards are expected to promote, but cannot guarantee, fiscal 
discipline286 . Central bank financing precluded, fiscal deficits can still be (typically to 
a much larger degree than before) financed via debt issue on domestic and 
international capital markets, or through payment arrears. While all fixed exchange 
rate arrangements require sound public finances, a currency board is especially 
vulnerable in the case of fiscal indiscipline287 . 
With a currency board, substantial fiscal deficits, if financed by foreign capital, 
exert inflationary pressures on the economy, as the inflow of reserves increases the 
monetary base. Even if financed domestically, by crowding out private financing 
285 See Baliiio/Enoch (1997), p.17. 
286 See Roubini (1998), p. 15. 
287 See Williamson (1995), p. 16. 
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needs and driving them towards international markets, fiscal deficits have an 
inflationary impact and lead to an appreciation of the real exchange rate. They can 
thus compromise the currency board's sustainability, and even lead to its 
abandonment in case of a debt crisis. As a currency board does not engage in 
accommodating treasury bill markets, short-term fluctuations in treasury cash flows 
may occur and create additional stress for public finances288 . 
In the worst case, where governments cease to accept their financial 
subordination to the monetary regime, there is a possibility that they might "raid" the 
currency board in one form or another, e.g. by demonetising the currency board 
currency and issuing an own parallel currency. Therefore, although a currency 
board is able to reinforce an existing political commitment to fiscal discipline, it is 
jeopardised when such commitment is fading289 . 
3.2.3 Considerations for Adopting a Currency Board 
3.2.3.1 When is a Currency Board an Appropriate Choice? 
As Fuhrmann (1999) notes, there is no theory that would predict under which 
circumstances and preconditions the introduction of a currency board is an optimal 
strategy290 . In this context, most economists refer to a number of criteria that stem 
from the theory of optimal currency areas, supplemented by some arguments that 
take account of the special application of a currency board as a stabilisation vehicle. 
(1) Only small and open economies benefit from an external nominal anchor. 
For an open economy (i.e. one with a high proportion of imports and exports to 
GDP), exchange rate uncertainty induces greater costs than for a closed economy, 
and fixing the exchange rate will to a greater extent imply a fixing of the price level. 
Since small economies tend to be more open, both criteria are intertwined291 . 
Therefore, the argument holds, for small economies with the typical low degree of 
diversification, the best strategy is to choose fixed exchange rates in order to adapt 
to international price structures and maximise the advantages that arise from the 
288 See Baliiio/Enoch (1997), p. 18. 
289 See Williamson (1995), pp. 28-9. 
290 See Fuhrmann (1999), p. 86. 
291 Note that the criterion of country size is to be understood in economic, not geographical 
terms. E.g., Hong Kong, though geographically tiny, has to be regarded as a large "country" 
whereas Argentina, though geographically big, is a comparatively small economy in terms of GDP. 
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international division of labour92 . Consequently, only small economies should adopt 
a currency board. (2) When shocks tend to hit the pegging and the pegged-to 
country symmetrically, the real costs caused by the adjustment process with fixed 
exchange rates are minimised for the pegging country, whereas a higher probability 
for asymmetrical shocks would rather be an argument for flexible exchange rates293 . 
(3) High factor, especially labour, mobility between the pegging and the pegged-to 
country is desirable for a country with fixed exchange rates as it facilitates the 
adjustment process and contributes to price level equilibration294 . (4) If there are 
aspirations of a country to integrate into a common trade area (or to prepare to join 
a currency area), a currency board with its highly credible fixed exchange rate may 
ease such integration more than strategies with central banks and simply pegged 
exchange rates. (5) Lacking central banking experience of a country delivers a 
further argument for a currency board because of its simplicity of operation as well 
as the high degree of credibility of its strictly rule-bound activities. (6) Finally, for a 
country with a record of credibility-lacking monetary policy, of high and persistent 
inflation, of currency crises, and of high risk premia required by international 
investors, a currency board, with its high credibility and almost instant anti-
inflationary impetus, can provide an effective cure295 . 
An additional criterion in this context may be the existence of a "natural" anchor 
currency, i.e. of a major reserve currency that fulfils the requirements of a suitable 
anchor. At the margin, the lack of such a natural candidate to peg to may provide 
the decisive argument against a currency board296 . 
The consideration of the suitability of a currency board for a country extends to 
an evaluation of the expected advantages and disadvantages of a currency board 
292 See Fuhrmann/Richert (1995), p. 1036. 
293 An additional consideration in this context refers to the assumption that a currency board 
(or a common currency) increases economic integration between the countries and so works to 
synchronise shocks and cycles, thereby increasing its advantageousness. See Alesina/Barro 
(2001 ), p. 383. A possible counterargument is that when countries get more integrated, they tend to 
become more specialised in production, with greater specialisation reducing the correlation of 
business cycles over time, thereby rendering a monetary union less attractive in the long run. 
Empirical evidence, however, points at specialisation occurring primarily as intra-industry 
specialisation, which tends to increase the symmetry of shock exposure within a monetary union. 
See Alexander/van Furstenberg (2000), p. 214. 
294 See Williamson (1995), p. 23. 
295 See Baliiio/Enoch (1997), p. 6. 
296 See Williamson (1995), p. 24. 
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for the specific case. Some shortcomings in the starting position of a currency board 
country can certainly be addressed by precautionary measures, e.g. by allowing for 
a limited lender of last resort capacity, or by promoting the entrance of foreign banks 
into the financial sector in order to partly compensate for a still weak banking sector. 
Other risks are potentially harder to address such as the dangers related with 
substantial and lasting real appreciation that may translate into long-term risks 
difficult to assess in terms of growth, income, and employment. 
Therefore, even if a country clearly appeared to be a candidate for a currency 
board, just adopting one would be far from automatically providing stability. The 
advantages of a currency board materialise only when supported by the described 
sustainable structural and macroeconomic, especially fiscal, policies. Indeed, 
adversaries of the currency board idea argue that stability can be achieved by the 
very disciplined policies without the need to establish a currency board in most 
countries, given a sufficient time horizon297 . 
However, and this is an argument that even currency board opponents 
concede, a currency board can deliver stability quickly, and in this respect is 
superior to a central bank that has to build up its own credibility over an extended 
period. Put differently, for transformation economies without any track record of 
credibility, and for confidence-lacking high-inflation economies, the present value of 
a currency board's benefits is higher than that of a central bank's, with a central 
bank solution facing higher "sunk costs" and barriers to entry than a currency 
board298 . All the more so for a hyperinflation country that is already looking back on 
several failed stabilisation attempts (such as Argentina was in the late 1980s): here 
the complete erosion of credibility can arguably provide an all-or-nothing situation 
where the adoption of a currency board seems to be the only chance to break the 
ever-accelerating cycle of inflation and depreciation299. 
In such a case, with the ills to cure so large, the potential remedy may justify 
very high costs even if the country is not in every respect an optimal candidate for a 
currency board. The challenge for such a country then will be to reap the currency 
board's short-term benefits without putting at risk the country's long-term position by 
not taking account of the currency board's potential dangers. Explicitly trying to re-
direct trade flows in order to improve the anchor's long-term suitability, or else 
297 See e.g. Roubini (1998), p. 16. 
298 See Fuhrmann/Richert (1995), p. 1038. 
299 See e.g. Williamson (1995) p. 34, or Zarazaga (1995b), p. 22. 
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planning a timely exit after successful stabilisation, belong to the possible 
alternatives to confront these risks. 
3.2.3.2 Implementation of a Currency Board 
Although it is undisputable that the success of a currency board depends on 
strong supporting policies, the extent to which they are indispensable at the time of 
a currency board's introduction is subject to discussion. The statement that strong 
macroeconomic policies, a strong banking system, and flexible labour and goods 
markets are prerequisites for a sustainable currency board is unquestionable as 
such. On the other hand, it is exactly these qualities a country aspires to obtain via 
the adoption of a currency board300. There is some general evidence that a hard 
peg by itself is able to boost financial sector, fiscal, and labour market reform301 . 
Therefore, earmarking these reforms as being indispensable preconditions to be 
fulfilled by a country that is only beginning to solve its severe problems of 
transformation or hyperinflation seems problematic at least. 
A certain qualification can be made insofar as, among the prerequisites for a 
sustainable currency board, some are clearly indispensable for the start, whereas 
others that primarily aim at protection against potential shocks can be left for 
implementation (or improvement) when the currency board is already in place. The 
first, indispensable, category doubtlessly comprises a sufficient level of reserves to 
grant the conversion commitment, a sound fiscal policy stance, and a satisfactorily 
robust banking system. In contrast, efforts such as installing an efficient banking 
supervision or making labour laws more flexible can (but should rapidly) be made 
after the installation of the currency board302. 
Clearly, the risk is that, with the experience of a possible initial stabilisation 
boom following the currency board's introduction, politically queasy reforms, such as 
revising labour laws, are postponed or carried through half-heartedly. Neglecting 
these reforms can contribute to substantial exchange rate misalignments and to 
high real costs, including rising unemployment, which again can put the currency 
board under social and political pressure. The necessary political and social 
consensus for these reforms is easiest to obtain at the start of the currency board, 
300 See Eichengreen (2001b), p. 269. 
301 Eichengreen addresses this issue for the regime of official dollarisation. He finds that the 
case for dollarisation accelerating financial market and fiscal reform is strong, whereas its effect on 
labour market reform remains ambiguous. See Eichengreen (2001b). 
302 See Balirio/Enoch (1997), pp. 18-9. 
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when the pains of the previous regime are still felt and the preparedness to agree 
on hurting measures is biggest. This at least should provide the decisive argument 
for carrying out all, and especially the politically tricky, reforms as quickly as 
possible. 
This leads to the consideration of two principal alternatives for the 
implementation of a currency board. The first is to introduce the new monetary 
regime in a kind of shock therapy, with the "shock" manifested in a sudden fixing of 
the exchange rate without a previous period of floating against the reserve currency. 
As pointed about above, the main problem is to find evidence for the "appropriate" 
exchange rate in terms of market conformity. The exchange rate therefore can only 
reflect an estimate that, if far from the imminent market rate, may not be accepted 
by the markets and induce potentially harmful capital movements. If the introduction 
of a currency board goes in parallel with a currency reform, the exchange rate of the 
new in relation to the old currency has to be set simultaneously, which implies 
similar problems303. 
The alternative to a shock therapy is a gradualist approach, which implies the 
announcement to introduce the currency board at a later date while allowing the 
currency to float freely against the reserve currency during the interim period. The 
advantage of this approach is that markets are expected to deliver an unequivocal 
notion of the appropriate exchange rate. For high inflation economies with a record 
of failed stabilisation policies, however, the problem will be to furnish the 
announcement with a maximum degree of credibility, in order not to evoke 
expectations of just another policy announcement that later will be abused for 
surprise inflation by the government. An announcement lacking credibility (because 
not immediately translated into visible action) would doom the preparation of the 
currency board's introduction and lead to capital flight and continuing devaluation of 
the domestic currency304 . 
Further limitations to the gradualist approach arise from the problems of timing 
and sequencing of different reform elements. For instance, with the usually high 
proportion of administered prices in both transformation and high inflation 
economies, the revelation of the "appropriate" exchange rate is limited to the extent 
303 An overvaluation of the old currency in relation to the new one can create a monetary 
surplus that may challenge reserves and negatively influence distribution. A strategy of parallel 
currencies, with old and new currency floating against each other over a limited period, can 
moderate distribution conflicts. See Fuhrmann/Richert (1995), p. 1036. 
304 See Fuhrmann/Richert (1995), p. 1039. 
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that sovereign price fixing is not eliminated prior to the floating period. Price 
structures then are not yet adapted to the new regime, and the market equilibrium 
exchange rate does not equal the level that also would incorporate system 
conformity. Similar issues apply for fiscal reforms that require higher taxes and 
hence lead to a higher price level. Both price liberalisation and fiscal consolidation 
should ideally be in place before the floating period in order to reap its advantages 
in terms of an appropriate exchange rate. Both, however, require credibility, which 
may be challenged with a gradualist approach in high-inflation countries. 
Therefore, gradualist approaches may be a more viable choice for 
transformation than for high inflation economies. As pointed out, the central 
advantage of a currency board is its immediate effectiveness, an advantage which 
for high inflation countries may only be obtainable by opting for some sort of shock 
therapy305 . 
3.2.4 Duration and Termination of a Currency Board 
Colonial currency boards functioned adequately over long periods. However, in 
terms of motivation, environment, and functioning conditions, they are not fully 
comparable to present-day currency boards. The long-term character of currency 
boards that survived from colonial times generally is not doubted even today. 
Currency boards introduced during the last two decades of the 20th century offer a 
mixed picture. Hong Kong's currency board is generally viewed as a permanent 
arrangement, as, for many, was also Argentina's, whereas Estonia and Lithuania 
seem to provide examples of currency boards implicitly designed to govern a limited 
period of transition, in order to prepare their economies for an eventual membership 
in the European Monetary Union. 
This paragraph tries to qualify under which conditions a currency board can be 
viewed as a transitional or a permanent arrangement, and addresses the related 
question of when and how to exit from a currency board. 
3.2.4.1 Currency Board: Permanent or Transitional Arrangement? 
Currency boards can be viewed and implemented as permanent arrangements 
when a currency board allows realising trade and other benefits for a country that 
belongs to a common currency area. Likewise, when a country experiences 
persistent high inflation and real appreciation of its currency, and/or is systematically 
305 See Fuhrmann (1999), p. 94. 
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exposed to speculative attacks, a currency board can, and should, be designed and 
presented as a long-term arrangement. 
In contrast, a currency board can be perceived as a transitional arrangement 
when a country experiences a transformation process from one economic regime to 
another, e.g. from socialist to market economy. Similarly, when a country faces a 
political regime change intending to stop deficiencies such as hyperinflation, money 
press funding of fiscal deficits, political promiscuity306 , or when a country faces other 
major institutional changes (e.g. the installation of a newly independent monetary 
authority that is still lacking a record of credibility), a currency board can be 
designed and perceived as an interim arrangement. In such cases, a currency 
board is expected to promote credibility and stability until a switch to a different 
monetary or exchange rate regime becomes feasible307 . 
Depending on the initial motivation for the installation of a currency board, 
therefore, the decision for, and timing of, an exit has to be chosen according to 
different criteria. If the currency board was introduced primarily as a transitional 
arrangement intended to give time and stability during the building-up of institutional 
conditions for a functioning central bank, or for the joining of a monetary union, then 
the degree to which those functions are brought into effect decides about the timing 
of an exit. The abandonment of the currency board then is a desired development. 
Currency boards introduced to gain monetary credibility are different from the 
above insofar as the time for an exit is determined by the degree of credibility 
assumed to prevail after the termination of the currency board. Strong policies over 
a prolonged period of time are required to build up credibility. This implies also to 
endure potential exchange rate misalignments, which carry substantial risk for the 
sustainability of a currency board. Especially in cases where a currency is 
overvalued, the currency board is prone to speculative attacks as well as to internal 
political pressures, which, if turning extreme, can not only make the currency board 
appear unsustainable, but also render the choice of the best time for an eventually 
unavoidable exit difficult. The optimal exit point then would have to be gauged 
according to the achieved building-up of credibility over time on the one hand, and 
to internal and external pressures on the other hand, and would have to be viewed 
as an optimisation and the result of a trade-off. 
306 See Williamson (1995), p. 34. 
307 See Baliiio/Enoch (1997), p. 24. 
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3.2.4.2 Exit Options 
Typically, in the initial phase after the successful installation of a currency 
board, the public usually perceives that it would be irrational for the authorities to 
abandon the arrangement early. Over time, however, the weaknesses owed to the 
inflexibility of the arrangement become more visible and hurting, possibly evoking 
doubts about the sustainability of the currency board308. 
If at the same time the justification of the currency board as a vehicle to promote 
credibility is losing weight because confidence in the government has grown and 
institutional conditions have improved, this may deliver an argument for a gradual 
relaxation of the rules ("growing-out of the currency board") and an eventual exit 
from the currency board309. This would then be viewed as the natural and desired 
development of a transitional process during which credibility is built up, institutions 
are installed, and financial markets are developed. If, in addition, external conditions 
are favourable, a country is able to abandon the currency board out of a position of 
strength, i.e. to realise a so-called soft exit310 . 
If, in contrast, the weaknesses of the currency board are felt, while the currency 
board's expected achievements do not materialise, possibly because institutional, 
structural, and fiscal reforms have been delayed or ineffective, and confidence in 
the government is declining, the risk that the currency board eventually has to be 
abandoned under stress is substantial. Unfavourable external developments, such 
308 As Zarazaga points out, maybe the biggest risk to a currency board's sustainability can be 
circumscribed by the time inconsistency problem, inherent in all kinds of policy rules. Since 
currency boards, especially in the long run, are almost certainly subject to pressure some time (be 
it caused by external shocks or by internal developments, such as price and wage deflation, or 
rising unemployment), it becomes at some point attractive for policymakers to abandon the chosen 
policy rule, arguing that the present situation is different from the original and therefore justifies a 
deviation. The perceived time inconsistency of monetary policy rules, here of the currency board 
rule, reduces credibility and hence the effectiveness of the very policy rule. See Zarazaga (1995b). 
309 See Williamson (1995), p. 35. 
310 A textbook example for a gradual exit is Ireland, which in the 60s and 70s gradually relaxed 
the currency board rules that, since 1927, had tied the Irish pound to the pound sterling. Other 
examples for an exit out of a position of strength, though not gradual, are given by Singapore and 
Malaysia in 1973. See Baliiio/Enoch (1997), pp. 26-7. 
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as an appreciating anchor currency or a sharp decline in capital inflows, may add to 
the stress and force the country to opt for a hard exit311 . 
The theoretical options to exit from the fixed exchange rate comprise its 
replacement by a different (depreciated or appreciated) fixed exchange rate, by a 
fixed exchange rate pegged to a different anchor, or by a (freely or managed) 
floating exchange rate. While the move to a float inevitably comprises a complete 
exit from the currency board and a change to some form of central banking, 
changes resulting in a modified fixed exchange rate regime can be compatible both 
with the introduction of a central banking system or with a continuation of the 
currency board under a modified rule (also treated as "exit" for this purpose). 
As will be argued, any possible termination or modification of a currency board 
should be based on rules defined ex ante, i.e. on escape clauses built in at the time 
of its implementation. 
Built-in Escape Clauses 
Considering possible exits from a currency board, the only means to avoid the 
perception of a breach of policy commitment is the provision of ex ante built-in 
escape clauses. Although the discussion of rules versus discretion in monetary 
policy seems to reveal that contingent rules (i.e. rules with some flexibility) are 
superior to non-contingent rules312 , this cannot unconditionally apply to currency 
boards since their essence is that they fully rely on rules to build up credibility 
(instead of on a reputation of credible behaviour)313 . 
Escape clauses that offer room for genuine discretion of the currency board (i.e. 
that leave possible actions or escape cases vaguely or not defined) are doubtlessly 
harmful to its credibility and introduce the stability risks associated with simple 
311 All of Argentina's three currency boards (1902-14, 1927-29, 1991-2002) had to be given up 
under stress, with external shocks triggering the exits of 1914 and 1929. See Baliiio/Enoch (1997), 
p. 26. 
312 See Zarazaga (1995b), p. 20. 
313 The case of the gold standard may illustrate this. Although the gold standard appears to 
have been a non-contingent rule, in reality it had implicit escape clauses: the temporary 
suspensions of convertibility of the pound Sterling into gold during wars and financial crises can be 
viewed as applications of an inherent escape clause. However, the use of such discretionary 
leeway did no harm to the Bank of England as it could rely on an excellent reputation. See 
Zarazaga (1995a), p. 3. 
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pegged exchange rates314 . Such escape clauses can at best be envisaged for very 
extreme (and clearly discernible) situations such as national emergency. 
Escape clauses, however, that clearly pre-define actions and the constellations 
under which they are allowed, are different from the above, in that they do not open 
discretionary leeway. Whether even such well-defined built-in escape clauses 
undermine a currency board's credibility from the beginning, or, on the contrary, 
entail an increase in credibility in reducing uncertainty about a currency board's 
behaviour remains disputed. 
The main argument against such escape clauses relates to the criteria that are 
meant to trigger pre-defined actions (e.g. inflation or exchange rate limits exceeded 
by the reserve currency). Such trigger points, when approached, bear the potential 
to cause capital flows that render the escape case more probable than would 
otherwise be the case315. Thus, as opponents of escape clauses argue, the mere 
existence of (even well-defined) escape clauses can by itself trigger speculative 
capital flows and lead to a termination of the currency board, which possibly might 
have survived without escape clause316. 
Advocates of escape clauses retort that it is uncertainty that feeds speculation. 
If uncertainty is removed in the sense that the behaviour of the currency board is 
rule-bound not only within but also beyond pre-defined ranges (e.g. of reserve 
currency appreciation/depreciation or inflation/deflation), there is no room left for 
speculation. The development of the reserve currency then is the only thing that 
remains uncertain, and speculative capital flows remain limited, as they do not 
attack the currency board's commitment317 . Apart from that, the effect of speculative 
capital flows on the development of the reserve currency (usually a major 
international reserve currency) will be small at best, so that self-fulfilling prophecies 
are unlikely to arise from any escape clause included in the currency board law of a 
usually small economy. 
314 See Fuhrmann (1999), p. 103. 
315 Consider, for instance, an escape clause that allows the currency board to devalue as soon 
as the reserve currency exceeds a pre-defined appreciation threshold against another major 
currency. Any appreciation bringing the reserve currency near the trigger point would render the 
escape case more likely, which from a certain point would lead speculators to sell currency board 
currency and buy reserve currency, thereby increasing the likelihood of the escape case. 
316 See Baliiio/Enoch (1997), p. 28. 
317 See Hanke/Schuler (2000), p. 64. 
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Therefore, in order not to put achieved credibility at risk when the currency 
board faces extreme situations, and with a view to the credibility of potential future 
monetary regimes, it is certainly better to stick to well-defined rules, known in 
advance to the public, to govern an exit from the existing currency board rule, than 
to behave in improvised ways318 . 
Depreciation 
For a currency under pressure through inflation and real appreciation, with no 
alleviation to be expected in the medium term, an early exit from the currency board 
may limit the degree of overvaluation and of the connected real losses. However, an 
exit followed by substantial depreciation is certain to undermine the credibility of 
policymakers unless it can be clearly justified by major external shocks. 
The main problem with depreciation is that, if anticipated or announced, it 
induces capital flight, as the public tries to convert domestic assets into the reserve 
currency and to transfer them abroad. The resulting domestic interest rate increases 
can cause banks to break down, and the perceived risk can by itself cause bank 
runs and exacerbate the situation. 
Alleviating, if politically questionable, measures can consist in temporarily 
suspending convertibility of deposits, or in a forced conversion of all deposits into 
the reserve currency at the pre-depreciation exchange rate. These measures 
however are likely to further damage policymakers' credibility. 
A pre-announced downward crawling peg may provide a possible solution. It 
may limit the credibility loss caused by breaking the exchange rate rule, although it 
does not provide an insurance against losing control of the situation in terms of a 
devaluation-inflation-spiral. 
Appreciation 
An exit followed by a substantial appreciation does not carry penalties similar to 
those of an exit followed by depreciation. The change of law carries no adverse 
effects, as the central objective of the law, the maintenance of the currency's value, 
is not violated. The legal hurdles imposed by the currency board are meant to 
318 During the 1995 tequila crisis and thereafter, the different performance of Mexico (which 
returned to floating and discretion) and Argentina (which stuck to the currency board law and 
confined crisis management to the pre-defined options) can be viewed as offering a backing for this 
finding. See Zarazaga (1995b), pp. 20-22. 
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prevent surprise devaluations, and as such can be overcome without damage in the 
case of appreciation. 
A soft exit with the goal of appreciation of the domestic currency will probably 
become public well before the respective legal change. This will attract capital 
inflows, which potentially can undermine the appreciation strategy, as foreign 
reserves may cease to provide full backing of the expanded monetary base at the 
intended new exchange rate. In any event, an appreciation increases the value of 
the currency board's liabilities in relation to its assets, which causes losses for the 
currency board. 
Again, a controlled and gradual upward crawl of the currency can be introduced 
to mitigate these problems by gradually allowing domestic interest rates to decrease 
and to keep capital inflows at bay319 . 
Switch to a Floating Exchange Rate 
The switch to a floating exchange rate regime is most appropriate when the 
domestic currency is undervalued, especially when the pressure to appreciate is not 
too big. The switch to a float can be taken in steps, so as to allow the exchange rate 
to float initially within a band that can be widened gradually or be defined as a 
crawling band. 
In cases of strong depreciation pressure, however, the switch to a float is 
unequally more dangerous, as it bears the risk of loss of the nominal anchor and of 
accelerating devaluation and inflation. 
Switch in the Peg 
Another exit option consists in the change of the anchor currency. In changing 
to a reserve currency that is expected to depreciate vis-a-vis the main trading 
partners' currencies, a currency board can realise (provided these expectations 
materialise) a desired real effective depreciation of its currency (and vice versa for 
the case of a desired real effective appreciation)320 . Destabilising capital flows can 
largely be prevented when the switch occurs at the relevant market cross exchange 
rates at the time of its implementation. However, the structure of domestic interest 
319 See Balino/Enoch (1997), p. 25. 
320 See the proposal of a dual currency board, described in the next paragraph, where peg 
switches are intended ex ante to occur automatically as soon as a cross exchange rate defined by 
the currency board is reached. The pre-determination of peg switches makes them seem like a 
special kind of built-in escape clause, under avoidance of possibly destabilising effects. 
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rates will change with the new anchor currency, which is likely to bear some real 
costs, and possibly have an adverse impact on capital flows. These costs have to 
be weighed against the expected future benefits in terms of avoided real exchange 
rate misalignments. The reliance on mere expectations of nominal exchange rate 
movements, however, makes this strategy quite risky. 
3.2.5 Dual Currency Boards: An Extended Proposal for Currency Stability 
One interesting extension to the currency board idea deserves special attention: 
the proposal of so-called dual currency boards, brought forward by S.E. Oppers321 . 
It shall be briefly sketched here in order to show how some of the drawbacks of the 
currency board idea can - so far only in theory- be avoided. 
The idea is derived from the ancient experience with the gold and silver-based 
bimetallic monetary system, which dominated monetary constitutions from the 
Renaissance until the 19th century {when it was replaced by the gold standard). 
Under bimetallism, gold and silver competed for dominance with the effect that, 
according to Gresham's Law, "bad money" drove out "good money" and so 
prevailed as the circulating medium. While the system of competing specie was 
sometimes condemned as fundamentally unstable, the quality of the system to bring 
about quick and automatic changes in the peg constitutes the main advantage for 
the dual currency board. 
The idea underlying the dual currency board idea is to extend the promise of 
convertibility to a second reserve currency, with the convertibility guarantee always 
subject to the availability of the respective currency in the reserves of the currency 
board. If one of the reserve currencies is not available, convertibility of the domestic 
currency into the other reserve currency is guaranteed. A shortage of the currency 
board of one of the reserve currencies is not to be seen as weakening the currency 
board's credibility, but, on the contrary, reflects the stabilising mechanism of the 
dual currency board as will be described with the following example. 
Assume a country's currency is convertible by law into either one Dollar or one 
Euro. The rates of 1 unit of domestic currency per 1 Dollar or 1 Euro are the official 
"currency board rates". Total reserves can consist of one or both of the reserve 
currencies and always provide full coverage for domestic notes in circulation, valued 
at the currency board rates. At all times, conversion into one of the reserve 
currencies is guaranteed at the currency board rates. The currency board's activities 
321 See Oppers (2000). 
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include nothing that exceeds "orthodox" currency board activities: it only buys and 
sells both reserve currencies at the defined currency board rates upon demand and 
thus behaves completely passive. This frame yields a mechanism that Oppers 
illustrates with the help of the empirical development of the Dollar and Euro 
exchange rates during 1999 and 2000. 
In January 1999, the market exchange rate of the Euro was 1.17 US-Dollars. 
With the defined currency board rates of 1 Euro = 1 Dollar = 1 unit of domestic 
currency, the Euro is undervalued in the domestic monetary system, which is why 
the currency board cannot hold or retain any Euros: they would quickly be bought by 
arbitrageurs at the currency board rate and profitably sold at the market rate. The 
reserves of the currency board therefore solely consist of Dollars, thus making the 
convertibility guarantee operational with respect to the Dollar only. The domestic 
currency is effectively pegged to the Dollar. 
The Dollar's appreciation during 1999 stays without effect as long as the Dollar-
Euro parity is not reached. However, when the market exchange rate of 1 Euro 
declines to below 1 Dollar (as happened in early 2000), it gets profitable for 
arbitrageurs to buy Dollars from the currency board, sell them in the exchange 
market at the market rate against Euros and sell those Euros to the currency board 
against domestic currency, so realising a riskless profit. As long as arbitrage 
processes are taking place, the deviation of the market exchange rate from parity 
will remain small as the currency board continues to sell Dollars. During this 
process, the mechanism enhances exchange rate stability in the region of the 
defined parity. 
When Dollar reserves are sold, however, and the reserves of the currency 
board solely consist of Euros, the change of anchor currency has taken place and 
the domestic currency is effectively pegged to the Euro. It is important to stress that 
this switch in the peg is purely the effect of the dual convertibility guarantee and of 
rationally acting currency traders. It happens completely automatically and without 
intervention of any authority. Also, the currency board does not incur any loss as a 
result of the switch, since its reserves are always valued in domestic currency at the 
currency board rates322 . 
322 It can be argued that the currency board forgoes capital gains by leaving arbitrage 
opportunities to private traders, but there is no reason why the currency board should not realise 
those gains itself as soon as the respective cross exchange rate is crossed. 
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The beneficial effect of this switch is that the domestic currency is always 
pegged to the relatively more depreciated currency - in the same way as 
Gresham's law predicts that "cheap" reserves drive out "expensive" reserves. The 
crucial relation is the one between the Dollar-Euro market exchange rate, on the 
one hand, and their currency board rate, on the other. This relation indicates which 
of the reserve currencies is "relatively more depreciated" in the currency board 
country and, therefore, which is the effective peg. 
This mechanism invalidates one of the main arguments against currency 
boards. The much-feared real overvaluation of the domestic currency as a result of 
an appreciating reserve currency, with its detrimental effects on the real economy, is 
avoided by making sure that the domestic currency is always pegged to the 
relatively more depreciated of two reserve currencies323. With respect to the criteria 
for the choice of reserve currency, this advantage of the dual currency board over 
the traditional form becomes prominent: with ever more diversified trade patterns, 
the choice of more than one reserve currency can better mirror existing trade 
patterns. If, as in the above example, foreign trade of the currency board country is 
split approximately evenly between the Euro area and the United States, the choice 
of the Euro and the Dollar as reserve currencies provides a better insurance against 
imported appreciation and loss of international competitiveness than would be the 
case with a single reserve currency. 
Possible concerns about inflationary impacts of always pegging to the relatively 
more depreciated currency can be largely neglected, as long as the choice of 
reserve currencies has been made out of a set of stable currencies. It has to be 
borne in mind that the description of a currency as the "relatively more depreciated" 
one does not mean that it is constantly depreciating. On the contrary, if the cross 
rate implicit in the peg is near the point where it reflects something like long-term 
purchasing power parity, and if both reserve countries follow similar anti-inflationary 
323 As Oppers notes, the idea can theoretically also be extended to three or more reserve 
currencies, as well as to a basket of reserve currencies. While, in this way, existing trade patterns 
could be reflected even better and the real exchange rate could be kept more stable, the lack of 
transparency and rising transaction costs (as well as more likely re-weightings over time) render 
such options less desirable. 
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policies, the reserve currency cross rate will oscillate around the currency board 
cross rate, and the opposite effects tend to cancel out over time324 . 
The effects of a dual currency board on interest rates are governed by the fact 
that a switch of peg also effectuates a switch of interest rate connectivity. As Oppers 
shows, the relatively more depreciated (hence the reserve) currency will always 
have a higher interest rate than the relatively less depreciated currency. This is the 
result of the implicit structure of the convertibility guarantee (which, in fact, 
incorporates "call options" for the reserve currency325). Nevertheless, a dual 
currency board country's interest rates need not be higher than they would be with a 
"simple" currency board regime, as the risk premium on the domestic currency 
should be lower with a dual currency board, reflecting the relatively lower risk of real 
overvaluation and ensuing credibility loss. 
As becomes clear, the choice of the currency board cross rate is central 
because it decides over the probable timing and frequency of peg switches. It 
should optimally be set at an "equilibrium" rate, at which neither of the reserve 
currencies is significantly over- or undervalued vis-a-vis the other and, implicitly, vis-
a-vis the domestic currency. Additional considerations could lead to the decision to 
define the currency board rate at a level at which the domestic currency would 
probably be pegged most of the time to one of the two reserve currencies. In this 
way, a switch in peg could still avoid the worst degrees of overvaluation, while, apart 
from that, the domestic economy could stay with the (preferred) peg throughout 
acceptable movements in valuation326 . Equally, the currency board rates could be 
realigned at any time, e.g. by adapting one of the conversion rates to long-term real 
exchange rate developments, in order to correct relations which have initially been 
set at unfavourable levels. 
As mentioned above, ongoing arbitrage processes during the switch in peg 
enhance exchange rate stability in the region of the currency board cross rate327 . 
324 Oppers has substantiated this assumption with empirical evidence for a hypothetical dual 
currency board with the Dollar and the Euro as reserve currencies in the period from 1979 to 2000. 
See pp. 8 and 20. 
325 See Oppers (2000), p. 9. 
326 Such a strategy could be envisaged for "dollarised" countries, i.e. where the economy is 
already significantly penetrated by one of the reserve currencies. See Oppers (2000), pp. 9-10. 
327 This is brought about not only by the arbitrage processes themselves (a directly stabilising 
effect) but also by the anticipation of rational investors who expect them when the market cross rate 
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While the global exchange rate stabilising influence of one single dual currency 
board should not be overestimated, the possibility of various countries establishing 
dual currency boards reveals further potentials: in pooling their reserves, co-
ordinated dual currency boards (setting currency board rates at identical or slightly 
different implicit cross rates) could contribute significantly to global currency 
stability328 . 
Thus, the dual currency board idea provides an appealing way to avoid one of 
the most important weaknesses of an orthodox currency board. Significant and 
lasting real overvaluation of the domestic currency and the connected economic 
costs can be largely prevented through a simple and transparent extension of the 
currency board rule, the addition of an alternative reserve currency. In addition to 
the beneficial effects on the local economy, obtained by completely market-conform 
and non-interventionist mechanisms, a dual currency board exerts a stabilising 
effect on exchange rates, which even could be maximised when several countries 
adopted and co-ordinated the system. Against the argument that the system could 
be considered more complicated and hence less credible than a traditional currency 
board stands the historical experience with bimetallism which shows that its 
functioning can be well understood by the public and provide stability over long 
periods. 
approaches the currency board rate, and behave accordingly (indirect effect). See Oppers (2000), 
pp. 10-1. 
328 Again, there is an encouraging historical parallel with bimetallism. See Oppers (2000), p. 
12. 
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4 The Argentine Currency Board Arrangement 
Argentina has a story to tell the world: a story which is about the 
importance of fiscal discipline, of structural change, and of monetary 
policy rigorously maintained.329 
4.1 Features and Implementation of the Argentine CBA 
4.1.1 The Legal Fixing 
4. 1. 1. 1 The Convertibility Law 
145 
On March 27'h, 1991, Argentina's legislative announced the Convertibility law, to 
be enforced on April 1 "1. 1991. 
This very short and concise law decrees a fixed exchange rate between the 
domestic currency, then the Austral, and the US-Dollar (10,000 Australes to equal 
one US-Dollar) and ties the emission of the former to the amount of available central 
bank reserves: article 4 states that free gold and foreign exchange reserves held by 
the BCRA be equal to 100% of the monetary base. Article 6 defines the monetary 
base as money in circulation plus demand deposits held by financial institutions with 
the BCRA. While the BCRA is committed to sell foreign exchange at the defined 
parity (art. 2), it is not required to buy them at the fixed exchange rate (art. 3). The 
whole of existing inflation adaptation mechanisms, namely all kinds of indexation, 
whether legally or privately contracted, are declared invalid and enforced to end 
before April 1"1, 1991 330. Article 12 states that the "post April 1st" Austral is to be 
regarded as a new currency, and that it can be given a new denomination and 
numerical expression at a later point of time. This provision was implemented nine 
months later, when 10,000 Australes were replaced by one Peso on January 1"1, 
1992. 
329 The IMF Managing Director Michel Camdessus during a press conference held at the IMF 
Annual Meetings on October 1st, 1998. See IMF Independent Evaluation Office (2004 ), p.12. 
330 See Republica Argentina (1991 ), Articles 7 to 10. Outstanding payments covering periods 
before April 1st, including periodical payments, are allowed to be inflation adapted up to a maximum 
of 12 percent annually - until April 1st, date from which all contracts, new and existing ones, are 
legislated to exist and continue as nominal contracts. 
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4.1.1.2 The New Central Bank Law 
As a supplement to, and substantiation of, the Convertibility law, the central 
bank law ("carta organica") was modified in September 1992 to define some 
important details of the Argentine CBA. 
Besides obliging the BCRA to "develop a monetary and financial policy directed 
to safeguard the functions of money as store of value, unit of account, and means of 
payment", the central bank law states that it "will not be subject to orders, 
indications, or instructions from the national executive power"331 , i.e. it decrees the 
BCRA's formal independence. The law provides for a standing central bank 
president and directory, appointed for the duration of 6 years by the national 
executive (i.e. the Argentine president) with consent of the Senate. This article 
intends to grant steady central bank governance and make the removal of the 
central bank president difficult332 . 
Among the operations allowed for the BCRA are the exclusive issue of notes 
and coins, limited short-term rediscount and repurchase operations with financial 
institutions, the trade on bond, foreign exchange, and international credit markets, 
as well as the (interest free) acceptance of domestic and foreign currency deposits. 
The law expressly forbids, inter alia, the granting or guaranteeing of credit to the 
national government as well as to private banks, provinces, or municipalities. 
However, the BCRA is allowed to buy negotiable titles issued by the treasury, 
valued at market prices, which are allowed to form part of the reserves backing of 
the monetary base, within two limits: their nominal value to grow by not more than 
10% annually, and never to constitute more than a third of the reserves333 . Profits 
are to be used to build up a reserve fund up to a limit of 50 percent of the bank's 
capital, before they are to be transferred to the government334. Besides, the BCRA 
is entitled to perform its traditional (remuneration free) task as the government's 
331 Republica Argentina (1992), art. 3, own translation. 
332 See Republica Argentina (1992), article 7. It did not prevent, however, the later removal of 
central bank president Pedro Pou in the midst of crisis in April 2001 (over alleged money laundering 
charges, but obviously amid disagreements with the government). 
333 See Republica Argentina (1992), articles 17 to 20, 30, and 33. Article 60 further confines 
the allowed proportion of government bonds to 20% of the reserves base during the first 6 years, 
i.e. the term of the first central bank directory. In addition, it states that after that period, the limit of 
33% may be reached only transitorily (up to 90 days), and only in cases of liquidity needs within the 
financial system, or of losses in the market value of the respective titles. 
334 See Republica Argentina (1992), article 38. 
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sole financial agent to manage the whole of its banking and financing operations335. 
As an instrument to control monetary aggregates and the functioning of financial 
markets, the BCRA is entitled to impose reserve requirements upon financial 
institutions. Finally, regulations to publish monetary and financial statistics and to 
exercise the full range of banking supervision tasks complete this law. 
4.1.2 Assessment of the Argentine CBA's Configuration 
4.1.2.1 Orthodox and Non-Orthodox Elements 
The above laws clearly show that Argentina's CBA cannot be qualified as an 
orthodox currency board. The existing Argentine central bank continues to carry out 
most of its previous activities as a monetary authority. The conversion function 
(which exhaustingly characterises an orthodox currency board) here constitutes only 
one function among many other, typical central bank, functions (the discount 
window, trading on financial markets, acceptance of deposits, imposition of reserve 
requirements, banking supervision, acting as a financial agent for the government). 
Several particular features stand out in differentiating the Argentine CBA from 
the orthodox concept. First, the provision that up to a third of the reserves backing 
of the monetary base may be constituted by domestic government bonds represents 
a substantial deviation from the ideal and, if exploited, a potentially jeopardising 
element to the currency board's credibility. Second, the potential asymmetry in 
exchange rates for central bank purchases and sales allows de facto for a 
revaluation of the domestic currency336 (which is however in accord with the stability 
oriented spirit of the law). Third, the acceptance of bank deposits also represents a 
deviation from the orthodox idea, but again that does not hurt since these deposits 
form part of the monetary base and are backed as such. Fourth, the BCRA 
regulates the banking and financial system via reserve requirements and money 
market operations, which incorporates the power to control the overall money 
supply. Here, as is the case with the "less than hundred percent" backing of the 
money base, considerable room is left for discretion. 
Still, the very fundamental features of the legal frame sketched above absorb 
much of these potential credibility shortcomings. These are, first and most 
important, the legal provision of the central bank's independence. Second, the fixing 
of the nominal exchange rate by law, which implies that any change in the nominal 
335 See Republica Argentina (1992), articles 21 to 26. 
336 See Balino/Enoch (1997), p. 4. 
Jutta Maute - 978-3-631-75447-4
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 04:44:44AM
via free access
148 
exchange rate would require the full legislative procedure and approval by 
Congress, i.e. would face significant hurdles. Third, the backing rule, which, 
although deviating from the 100 percent ideal, by itself signifies a strong 
commitment to the maintenance of the fixed parity. Fourth, the provisions to restrict 
the central bank's financing of budget deficits, which incorporate a drastic break with 
habits practised over decades. Fifth, the sudden prohibition of any indexation, 
meant to minimise inflation inertia. Sixth, the liberalisation of foreign exchange 
markets337 . Finally, the stop of interest payments on the financial sector's required 
reserves, which previously always had been a source of quasi-fiscal deficits (as they 
were not compensated by corresponding interest earnings) and, in effect, 
subsidised credits to the private sector338 . 
In sum, the legal conception of the Argentine CBA provided a drastic change in 
the conditions for monetary and fiscal policy. It erected in Argentina hitherto unseen 
rigid rules that implied a near-to-maximum of "tying hands". At the same time, it 
allowed for limited flexibility within those rules to keep a near-to-minimum space for 
"free hands". As it turned out during the following decade, the discretionary space 
the CBA left for monetary policy was used in an overtly responsible manner339 , so 
that it proved to be highly beneficial in contributing to a credible monetary 
constitution that eliminated inflation and generated beneficial conditions for 
investment, growth, and structural reform. Yet, as indicated before, the monetary 
constitution is only one, albeit central, element of a broader policy package to be 
embedded in. 
4. 1. 2. 2 The Choice of the Anchor and the Rate 
It is often held that Argentina did wrong in choosing the US-Dollar as the anchor 
currency. Its trade pattern at the time of doing so gives this opinion every 
justification: the biggest share in Argentina's trade of 1990 was with the EU, where 
roughly 30 percent of its exports went (imports from the EU: 26%). The second 
destination of Argentina's exports were MERCOSUR countries (15%, imports 
21.5%)340 , while the US occupied only the third place with an export share of barely 
337 In fact, foreign exchange controls had already been abolished in late 1989. 
338 See Kiguel (1999), pp. 8-9 
339 See Heymann (2000), p. 51. 
340 The treaty that established the MERCOSUR (Mercado Comun del Sur), to be launched in 
January 1995, was signed on the very day the Convertibility law was announced, on March 27th , 
1991. 
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14 percent (imports 21.5%). Therefore, to judge from existing trade patterns, there 
was no such thing as an immediate "natural candidate" among the world's potential 
anchor currencies. The anchor with most justification in this respect would have 
been the Deutsche Mark (to which most European currencies were pegged), and 
later the Euro. Nor can the argument be brought forward that the choice of anchor 
currency would have anticipated future shifts in trade patterns in favour of the US: 
exports to the United States subsequently declined, to hover around 10 percent and 
less over years. The only argument in favour of the US-Dollar that could be derived 
from the trade structure was that Brazil, the single most important trading partner, 
itself at the time had pegged its currency to the Dollar. 
Yet, the argument which by far overrode any reflection on trade patterns was 
that of the existing pervasive dollarisation of the Argentine economy. As depicted in 
section 2, the US-Dollar had taken over nearly all of the domestic currency's 
functions, and left only the most basic consumer transactions to the Austral. The 
express recognition of the US-Dollar as a legal tender in a sense mainly ratified 
what was reality, shaped by years and decades of high and hyperinflation. Hence, in 
capitalising on the profound trust and familiarity that economic agents brought forth 
towards the US-Dollar, the choice of the US-Dollar as anchor made complete 
sense. It certainly helped overcome the massive handicap of initial lack of 
confidence which any plan would have had to deal with in the light of the precarious 
past. 
The exact rate of exchange, besides providing an even and handy relation, was 
slightly higher than the free market exchange rate at the moment of the 
Convertibility law's enactment341 . This had the advantage to allow for some initial 
inflationary inertia. At that rate, the BCRA's foreign exchange reserves of 6.2 billion 
US-Dollars342 comfortably backed the monetary base which amounted to 4.9 billion 
in April and averaged 5.75 billion over the year 1991 343. 
4.1.2.3 Suboptimal Currency Area 
As pointed out, the urgent stabilisation necessity was the main motivation for 
the choice of the CBA, and the high degree of prevailing dollarisation the reason for 
341 See Canavese (2001), p. 7f. 
342 For the year 1991. See IMF Independent Evaluation Office (2004), p. 10. 
343 Source: Oficina de la CEPAL en Buenos Aires. These reserves were the result of a 
comfortable external trade surplus accumulated during 1990, when imports had been extremely 
low. See Heymann (2000), p. 50. 
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the choice of the anchor currency. Though these choices may enjoy every 
justification with respect to Argentina's peculiar situation of the time, this does not 
absolve from considering their medium term viability. Going through the checklist of 
the criteria for optimal currency areas, or hard pegs, delivers some important 
qualifications as to the economic medium-term appropriateness of the CBA. 
On the positive side, Argentina's record of chronically credibility-lacking 
monetary policy, of high inflation and recurring currency crises, spoke strongly in 
favour of the choice of a CBA. If aspirations to move eventually towards official 
dollarisation played a role in the choice of the monetary and exchange rate regime, 
this was a strong argument for the CBA as well. 
However, Argentina's real characteristics clearly did not support a hard peg to 
the US-Dollar. First, while Argentina was, in terms of economic size, a small 
country, it did not qualify as an open one. Its share of trade in output was, with 
around 16 percent of GDP344, small. As a consequence, the adjustment to external 
shocks required a correspondingly higher change in the real exchange rate. 
Consequently, the real costs Argentina would have to incur in adjusting to shocks 
could be expected to be substantially higher with the Dollar-peg than with flexible 
exchange rates. Second, Argentina and the US were quite diverse in their economic 
and trade structures, and linked by comparatively little, especially intra-industry345 , 
trade. Thus, the two countries' business cycles were anything but closely correlated, 
and the probability of shocks hitting them asymmetrically was high346. In addition, 
Argentina's exports consisted mainly of homogeneous primary products, and as 
such were especially exposed to frequent global shocks. 
The choice of the Argentine CBA in 1991 doubtlessly included economic and 
political time preference, understandable in the light of the desperate situation of the 
344 See IMF Independent Evaluation Office (2004), p. 15. 
345 The share of intra-industry trade in total trade between two countries can be viewed as an 
indicator of their economic integration, as it reflects the degree of similarity between their productive 
structures. 
346 In the light of both the geographical distance between Argentina and the dominant position 
of Mexico in the US' trade relations with Latin America, as well as the limited initial trade links 
between Argentina and the US, there was also little reason to expect, in the medium to longer term, 
substantially rising economic integration, and thus growing synchronisation of shocks and business 
cycles. Nor can factor mobility between the two countries be described as high, or growing, despite 
some cyclical emigration of Argentine manpower and, even more, capital, to the US, and some FOi 
of US companies, predominantly in the financial sector, in Argentina; the biggest chunks of FOi in 
the Argentine industrial sector originated from European countries. 
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country. With the hard exchange rate peg, but real characteristics that did not 
support it, the policy challenge for Argentina was now, on the one hand, to support 
the peg (via a firm commitment to it, via responsible fiscal policies, via a 
strengthening of the financial sector), and, on the other hand, to compensate for the 
loss of exchange rate flexibility by enabling the economy to adequately adjust to 
shocks, and thus to reduce the costs caused by the adverse real characteristics (via 
an increase in the flexibility of its markets, especially labour markets, and 
institutions)347 . The following paragraphs will give a chronological documentation of 
both the relevant policy actions and the development of the CBA, in order to prepare 
the ground for the evaluation and assessment in section 5. 
4.2 The Stabilisation Track during the 1990s 
4.2.1 The Early 1990s' Economic Reforms 
Partly preceding, but mostly paralleling and succeeding the monetary and 
currency reform, institutional reforms in many other areas complemented the "Ley 
de Convertibilidad" to make the Argentine economy fit into the new monetary frame 
it imposed348• The whole of economic reform that encompassed the CBA was 
generally referred to as "Plan Convertibilidad". It was supported by the IMF with a 
Stand-by Arrangement approved in 1991 and extended in 1992. 
4.2.1.1 Further Reforms Shaping the Monetary Frame 
As soon as in 1989, banks had been legally obliged to repay deposits in the 
currency in which they were constituted. Also in 1989, faced with the impossibility to 
roll over its domestic currency debt, and in the light of the Austral's diminishing 
relevance and the rising Dollar demand, the government had taken several 
important measures to prepare the ground for the CBA. These included, first, the 
complete abolishment of exchange controls. Second, all Austral-denominated bonds 
and term deposits in the banking system had been converted by decree on January 
1•1, 1990, into 10-year US-Dollar denominated government bonds (the so-called 
BONEX) at LIBOR349, with the intention to eliminate the large quasi-fiscal deficits of 
the central bank that arose from exorbitant Austral interest rates to be paid as 
347 See Andrade/Falcao SilvafTrautwein (2005), p. 67. 
348 For an examination of the interdependence between macroeconomic policy and structural 
reform, see also Begg (2002). 
349 See IMF Independent Evaluation Office (2004), p. 79. 
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remuneration for reserve requirements. Moreover, the government had empowered 
the central bank to accumulate foreign exchange reserves resulting from a large 
trade surplus due to extremely low imports350. 
4.2.1.2 Brady Restructuring 
The initial step towards a more sustainable fiscal stance was to tackle the still 
unresolved debt crisis that had been dragging on since the early 1980s. Like many 
other emerging economies at the time, Argentina, in 1992, undertook a restructuring 
of its public debt with international commercial banks under the Brady Plan. Within 
that scheme, creditor banks swapped government bonds against bonds with longer 
maturities (up to 30 years) which incorporated discounts in interest or principal, 
these bonds being worth in total about 25 billion US-Dollars351 . The principal and 
interest of the new bonds were securitised by US Treasury bonds, themselves 
financed by the international financial organisations. The Brady Plan included the 
commitment of debtor countries to implement far-ranging reforms towards market 
liberalisation (which, however, in Argentina, as in many other debtor countries, were 
being adopted independently from the Brady Plan)352. Its successful completion was 
seen as a precondition for Argentina to regain access to voluntary financing on 
international capital markets. 
4.2.1.3 Tax Reforms 
Other urgent fiscal measures included a general tax overhaul which had to 
tackle inefficient and highly distortionary taxes, myriads of exemptions and 
loopholes, as well as widespread tax evasion, and had to do without the previous 
main source of income, the inflation tax. 
The "Ley de Emergencia Econ6mica", legislated by the new government in late 
1989, started public finance reforms. One of the first measures was, in 1990, to 
broaden the tax base for the most important tax source, the VAT, to include most 
goods and, especially, services, which had previously been exempt. In 1992, the 
base was broadened again to capture financial, insurance, and freight services. The 
VAT rate (after having been initially reduced from 15 to 13 percent in 1989) was 
350 See Heymann (2000), p. 50. 
351 See Heymann (2000), p. 54. 
352 For a short description and critical assessment of the Brady Plan see, e.g., Vasquez 
(1996). 
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increased several times, to 18 percent in steps until mid-1991, and (as an 
adjustment measure following the Tequila Crisis) to 21 percent in March 1995. 
Taxes on profits and capital were modified as well. First, the tax rate on capital 
gains was reduced, and the tax levied on corporate net assets eliminated. Then, in 
1991, a new tax on private person's assets was introduced. In 1992, the tax on 
corporate profits was increased from 20 to 30 percent, and to 35 percent in 1998, 
when it was, following the concept of a "renta mundial", also applied on profits 
generated abroad. With the same tax reform in 1998, corporate loans got taxed (in 
order to make financing by proper resources more attractive). The tax on corporate 
net assets was re-installed (to be settled with the profit tax). 
Penalties for tax evasion were increased, and the collection system underwent 
a concentration process, as a result of which national taxes, as well as customs, 
were to be collected by a single agency, that disposed of an increased number of 
staff and innovated technical equipment and procedures. Tax compliance did 
improve somewhat, but not overwhelmingly: compliance of the nationally collected 
VAT, for instance, estimated at 34 percent in 1989, rose to 55 percent in 1994353. 
4.2.1.4 Federal Fiscal Relations 
The relation between national and provincial public finances has since decades 
been a source of political and fiscal hardship354. Starting from a constitutionally very 
limited fiscal power of the federal government355, the "Ley de Coparticipaci6n 
353 Neighbouring countries have much higher compliance rates: 80 and 70 percent respectively 
in Chile and Uruguay. See Saiegh/Tommasi (1999), p. 182. 
354 The Federal Republic of Argentina consists of 23 provinces and the autonomous district of 
the city of Buenos Aires. The federal government is responsible for the collection of most taxes 
which are then allocated between the federal government and the provinces. The allocation 
scheme is referred to as "Coparticipaci6n Federal de lmpuestos" (or "coparticipaci6n" in short). It 
was introduced in 1935 and has since been repeatedly modified, to evolve into a highly complex 
system which, as is undoubted, is highly inefficient as well as extremely rigid. For an excellent 
analysis of coparticipaci6n see Saiegh/Tommasi (1999). They identify a myriad of perverse 
incentives and inefficiencies in what has been dubbed the "Coparticipation Labyrinth". 
355 Originally, the national government's sovereignty only included the imposition of customs 
duties and, in exceptional cases, temporary direct contributions. Taxes like the VAT, therefore, 
formally were imposed by provincial jurisdictions and administered by the national government on 
behalf of the provinces. With the constitutional reform of 1994, the national government received 
the right to impose indirect taxes in concurring legislation with the provinces. The 1994 constitution 
also ordained that the coparticipaci6n be newly defined by law until the end of 1996 - prescription 
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Federal de lmpuestos", in its current form of 1988, regulates the sources and 
transfer of revenue and obligations between the federal and provincial governments. 
Since 1988, it has been prolonged and modified several times following repeated 
negotiations. According to this law, taxes subject to "coparticipaci6n", including VAT, 
taxes on profit, and special sales taxes, are attributed different distribution 
coefficients, with the effect that the federal government is assigned 57 percent of 
their total, and 42 percent go to the provinces (one percent being set aside "to 
finance unforeseen crises in the provinces")356 . In 1991, agreements between the 
federal government and each of the provinces were negotiated to manage mutual 
debt relations, which concerned the control of hydrocarbon extraction and provincial 
bank's debt with the national government. 
In 1992, the responsibility for many services in health care, education, and 
social security was transferred to the provinces, to be financed by funds delivered 
by corresponding shifts in revenue participation. 
Also, the use of so-called "precoparticipaciones" was intensified. This construct 
means that parts of the shared tax revenues are deducted before the sharing 
mechanisms take hold, and used for other purposes. An important case of 
"precoparticipaci6n" was agreed in 1992, when the federal government received the 
right to withhold 15 percent of the shared funds pool for the financing of social 
security deficits. 
Special provincial duties such as stamp taxes, taxes on sales and on energy for 
industrial use were reduced, while the federal government cut back non-wage 
labour costs, both in the attempt to lower production costs357 . 
In an attempt to reduce the scope of discretionary action by the federal 
government, the latter guaranteed a fixed minimum sum of the shared funds pool to 
be transferred to the provinces within the primary distribution (the fixed sum 
corresponds to roughly 90 percent of the pool)358. The introduction of these 
guaranteed fixed sum transfers to the provinces increased the coparticipation 
scheme's rigidity and hence its inefficiency; while the guaranteed minimum posed 
that has not been implemented to date. See Article 75 and sixth "disposici6n transitoria" of the 1994 
Constitution. 
356 See Saieghffommasi (1999), p. 176. 
357 See Heymann (2000), pp. 70f. 
358 "Primary distribution" refers to the distribution between the federal government and the 
provinces as a group, whereas the "secondary distribution" defines the allocation of these funds 
among the provinces. 
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no problem in the context of expanding tax revenues (expectation, of course, it was 
based upon), it had to be fatal during recessions. 
While other fiscal reforms following the CBA's introduction can be qualified as 
generally improving the fiscal stance, no such judgement can be made for 
Argentina's federal fiscal relations. The modifications taken in the early 90s did not 
do anything to improve fiscal health as they did not tackle the many shortcomings of 
the system which can be subsumed under a few key words such as "common pool" 
and "moral hazard" problems, "perverse incentives", and "multiple inefficiencies". 
To illustrate this, suffice some of the most conspicuous traits: under the 
coparticipaci6n scheme, provinces have incentives to overexploit the common pool 
of nationally collected taxes, to reduce their own provincial taxing efforts, and to rely 
on being bailed out by the national government. Moreover, they are induced to 
behave procyclically (as, e.g., in the case when, in a restrictive fiscal effort of the 
national government, the latter raises taxes: as a consequence, provincial tax 
allocations and thus their incentives to expand spending increase, and national 
policies in effect are being counteracted). For the federal government, non-shared 
taxes acquire greater weight relative to shared taxes (because they don't have to be 
shared), even if they are less efficient. National fiscal corrections are biased towards 
spending cuts (or even tariffs on trade) rather than tax rises (which often have to be 
shared). Provincial governments have little incentive to make efforts to increase tax 
compliance. They do have incentives to oppose the decentralisation of (and the 
responsibility for) taxes from the national government to the provinces. Within the 
highly complex and politicised system of coparticipation, most provincial 
governmental energy is directed towards lobbying for selfish redistribution359 . 
4.2.1.5 Privatisation and Deregulation 
The "Ley de Reforma del Estado" was one of the first acts of the Menem 
government in the second half of 1989. It intended to substantially reduce the scope 
of the public sector and set off a massive programme to sell inefficient and 
subsidised state industries or grant concessions to the private sector360. At the time 
of the enactment of the CBA, the majority of interests in two major state enterprises, 
ENTEL (telecommunications) and Aerolineas Argentinas (airways), had already 
359 See SaieghfTommasi (1999). 
360 The privatisation debate focuses on the non-financial sector. The financial sector was 
initially not included in the privatisation programme. Privatisations of, mainly provincial, banks were, 
to the overwhelming part, undertaken after 1995, as a response to the Tequila crisis. 
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been sold. In the following years, a broad variety of state owned enterprises and 
assets were privatised, including road, train, and harbour concessions, postal 
services, hotels, banks, insurances, public utilities such as water and electricity, and 
steel and petrochemical firms. Apart from the big sales named above, further 
important sales concerned YPF (petrochemicals; between 1991 and 1993), 
EDENOR, and EDESUR (electricity; between 1992 and 1993)361 . According to 
estimations, in 1997, a quarter of sales and two thirds of profits of Argentina's top 
hundred companies were realised by firms privatised since 1990362 . 
The privatisation programme followed various objectives. First, there was the 
fiscal motivation. Besides the direct revenue effect from sales and the cancellation 
of debt, state transfers and subsidies to the respective industries were reduced or 
eliminated363. Second, privatisations intended to secure investment and the efficient 
proliferation of public goods and services via contractual obligations. Third, their 
signalling function as a visible, strong commitment to the general political direction 
was an important motive as well. It has been argued that the fiscal and the political 
motivation dominated the first generation of privatisations, when buyers were 
offered highly advantageous terms under the budgetary pressure to generate 
immediate revenues364 , and that more emphasis was given to microeconomic 
aspects only in later years365. 
Between 1990 and 1998, revenues of privatisations amounted to approximately 
24 billion US-Dollars, whereof 90 percent were realised during 1990 to 1993, which 
reflects the enormous initial speed the privatisation programme was brought forward 
with. In 1991 and 1992, the proceeds from privatisation equalled around 1 percent 
of GDP (or 10 percent of tax receipts). From the fiscal point of view, therefore, the 
privatisation programme has to be viewed as very successful. 
361 For a detailed account of privatised entities see Heymann (2000), pp. 145 ff. 
362 See Heymann (2000), p. 58. 
363 Of around 400 state-owned enterprises, which together accounted for seven percent of 
GDP, the thirteen largest recorded combined losses of four billion US-Dollars in 1989, which also 
illustrates the extremely low productivity in the public sector. See Pastor/Wise (1999), p. 487. 
364 Purchase prices were often agreed to be partially paid in government bonds, taken at face 
value, at a time when they were worth only a fraction of that in the markets. So, nominally high 
prices actually incorporated sales at sometimes far below realistic values. See Heymann (2000), p. 
55. 
365 For a microeconomic analysis of the privatisation process, see Galiani et al. (2003). 
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From the microeconomic perspective, however, the design of the privatisation 
programme and its regulatory framework deserves mixed credentials at best. In 
most areas, the quality of public services improved after their privatisation, starting 
of course from a generally dismal level. Following their privatisation, the respective 
industries generally showed remarkable dynamics and even outpaced GDP growth 
during much of the 1990s, benefiting not only from economic growth but also from 
significant unsatisfied demand prior to privatisation. Investment activity increased 
significantly as a result of privatisation (by as much as 350 percent between 1990 
and 1998 in the privatised industries, as estimated by Galiani et al. 366 ). The 
development of utility tariffs was heterogeneous (e.g., electricity prices decreased 
somewhat, while gas and telecommunications got substantially more expensive). 
Overall, however, it can be said that the strong efficiency gains recorded in the 
privatised industries did not translate into correspondingly lower prices. Moreover, a 
general bias in the development of tariffs was an increasing differentiation according 
to consumed quantities, which tended to favour big, industrial customers at the 
expense of households, and thus incorporated a substantial cross-subsidy from final 
consumers to the producing sector367 . 
The most salient effect of the privatisation programme, however, was its 
contribution to rising unemployment. Staff reductions, or changes in its composition 
with respect to age and skills, were the consequence of most privatisations. 
Estimations suggest that total employment in the privatised industries was reduced 
by around 40 percent368, while productivity in the privatised industries rose by an 
estimated 46 percent on average. The rising productivity, however, was also the 
result of production increases369. 
Generally, most contracts with privatised utilities were deficient in some way or 
another. Many of them had to be renegotiated subsequently. Also, in several 
366 See Galiani et al. (2003), p. 40. 
367 See Heymann (2000), p. 58. However, Ennis/Pinto (2002) find that the privatisation process 
produced only limited changes in inequality, as to judge from changes in relative prices, changes in 
access, as well as qualitative and quantitative changes in employment. See Ennis/Pinto (2002), p. 
46. 
368 See Galiani et al. (2003), p. 18. They also point out that this number is likely to 
underestimate the true employment effect of privatisation, as staff was already reduced in the 
immediate pre-privatisation period in many instances. 
369 A further, often omitted, side effect of especially the water and sewerage sector's 
privatisation is its positive impact on sanitary conditions: the privatisation of water provision is 
estimated to have reduced child mortality rates by 5 percent. See Galiani et al. (2003), p. 31. 
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instances, private contractors failed to fulfil their contractual obligations in terms of 
committed investment, which often stayed without sanction. It has been argued that 
the implementation of the public utilities' regulation was very problematic both in 
terms of selection of the best offer in the auction and of consumer protection370 . 
4.2.1.6 Financial Sector Reform 
As pointed out, the CBA reduced the central bank's lender of last resort-
capacities to a minimum. The fiscal constraint meant that the central bank could not 
further bear the losses of the banking sector, as had been done throughout the 
1980s via implicit deposit insurance and repeated bail-outs371 . This entailed the 
necessity of a strong private financial sector and a consequently reduced probability 
of crises that would require such stand-by. Banking regulations aimed at ensuring 
the safety of individual banks and of the banking system, and at increasing 
competition between banks. 
Beginning in September 1991, capital requirements, previously inexistent, were 
implemented at an initial rate of 3 percent of assets, to be gradually increased to 
reach 11.5 percent in January 1995, thus surmounting the Basie standards 
recommended for industrial countries. At the same time, reserve requirements were 
set at very high levels to reach 43 percent on average on checking and savings 
deposits and 3 percent on time deposits372 . Rules for risk diversification and the 
provision of loan-loss reserves were toughened. The existing voluntary deposit 
insurance scheme was abolished, partly in order to reduce moral hazard, but also 
because it was inefficient and suffered from low participation373 . 
As the new monetary and banking regime implied a significant change in the 
risk-sharing rules governing depositors' relations with their banks, the former were 
in fact obliged to monitor the latter themselves. To enable depositors to do so, the 
central bank started, in 1993, a policy of larger information disclosure, forcing banks 
to publish detailed accounts and statements on asset quality on a monthly basis374 . 
370 See Artana/Navajas/Urbiztondo (1998), p. 46. 
371 Total losses to the central bank arising from such bail-outs amounted to 14.6 billion US-
Dollars throughout the 1980s. See Schumacher (2000), p. 260. 
372 See Pou (2000), p. 14. 
373 It has been argued that its small volume, as well as the fear that a bank's decision to 
subscribe could carry a negative signal about its situation, reduced incentives to participate. See 
Heymann (2000), p. 52. 
374 See Schumacher (2000), p. 260. 
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Further regulations aimed at creating a free market environment in the financial 
sector and at promoting competition. Restrictions on the entry of foreign banks and 
on the opening of new branches of domestic banks were removed, and the 
domestic financial sector's restructuring and streamlining via mergers and 
acquisitions was facilitated375 . 
4.2.1.7 Social Security Reform 
Due to demographic changes, but also to the low proportion of workers paying 
social security contributions376, the public pay-as-you-go pension system 
experienced increasing financial pressures. The relation of contributors to 
beneficiaries had fallen from five in the 1950s to two in the early 80s, and went on to 
decrease to 1.3 in the mid-1990s. During the 1980s, pensions had been partly 
financed by employers' and employees' contributions377 , and partly by direct 
transfers from the treasury and from energy and telecommunication sales 
effectuated by state industries. As the latter source was eliminated with the 
privatisation process, parts of VAT and profit tax were assigned to that purpose. 
However, in the early 90s, the government failed to meet its pension obligations and 
was massively sued, whereupon it decreed the partial payment of pensions in 
special 10-year government bonds378 . Besides the financial difficulties, the public 
pension system was also criticised for unequal treatment of different groups of 
contributors, as well as for lack of transparency and reliability. 
The congressional discussions of a major reform to introduce a capitalisation 
scheme started in 1992; after its legal enactment in 1993, the new system was to 
start in mid-1994. It was, as a result of political resistance resulting in a 
compromise, designed as a mixed system where the state kept a role in the 
provisioning of pensions. Active employees could choose the new capitalisation 
scheme and transfer their contributions to a pension fund, or remain in the old public 
pension system, which, however, was to be gradually phased out. At the same time, 
375 See Kiguel (1999), p. 12. 
376 In 1995, less than half of the total employed paid contributions to the national pensions 
system. This was for the biggest part due to the high proportion of informal employment, but also to 
the existence of some provincial pension schemes. 
377 Employers' contribution was 7.5 percent of the salary in 1984, and was gradually increased 
up to 16 percent in 1991. 
378 These were the so-called .BOCONes", issued on basis of the "consolidation law" of August 
1991, and denominated optionally in Australes, later Pesos, or in Dollars. 
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rules for access to the public pension system were tightened379 , the minimum 
pension age increased in steps from 62 (57) to reach 65 (60) years for men 
(women) until 2001, and social security payroll taxes were reduced. 
The reform was designed to gain younger employees for the capitalisation 
scheme, and in this respect was quite successful. However, the expectation that a 
system where individual contributions accumulated to deliver one's individual 
pension would increase the number of contributors did not materialise: in 1996, only 
half of those who had opted for the capitalisation system did actually pay 
contributions. So, the reform did not succeed in raising the proportion of formal 
employment and in improving the contributions situation380 . 
A beneficial side-effect of the social security reform was the boost it gave to the 
development of local capital markets, as pension funds started to advertise for 
contributions and to seek diversified investment opportunities. 
The fiscal cost of the transition to the new social security system consisted of an 
immediate transfer of funds from the public sector to the pension funds (mirroring 
the contributions employees changing to the new system had already paid into the 
old system}, of smaller contribution revenues due to the reduced payroll taxes, and, 
in addition, of the takeover of the obligations of some of the bankrupt provincial 
systems by the federal government381 . On the positive side stood a long-term 
reduction of public pension obligations, the calculation of the latter being subject to 
considerable uncertainty382 . Within the first half of the 1990s, national expenditures 
for social provision rose by two points to six percent of GDP, constituting a peak 
since the 70s and by far the biggest chunk within total social expenditures383 . The 
fiscal imbalance created by the social security reform has been estimated to worsen 
379 E.g., the minimum number of contribution years was increased to 20, the number of years 
upon which final pension levels are computed raised from 3 to 10, and requirements for invalidity 
pensions were tightened. 
380 See Heymann (2000), pp. 71ff. 
381 See IMF Independent Evaluation Office (2004), p. 34. 
382 In 1997, transfers from the public system to the pension funds equalled 1.1 percent of GDP, 
thus constituting most of the federal budget deficit. At the same time, most of these transfers were 
invested in Argentine government bonds. 
383 See Heymann (2000), pp. 76f. 
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gradually, with an annual overall federal fiscal revenue gap of 2.7 percent of GDP 
on average since 1994384 . 
It can be argued that the social security reform, with the pertinent increase in 
fiscal deficits, simply made explicit the debt already implicit in the existing system, 
which markets were willing to finance. In the general perception of markets and the 
public, however, the visible immediate fiscal burden from the transition was taken at 
face value and not, as was hoped by politicians, discounted by the expected long-
term relief385. Accordingly, capital markets did not price in the expected long-term 
relief for the social security system, and so added to the costs of the reform386 . 
Although the pension reform was generally appreciated as one of the most 
important reforms in the 1990s, its pertinent budgetary implications proved to 
develop into a major source of diverging assessments of Argentina's fiscal situation. 
4.2.1.8 Labour Market Reforms 
Labour market issues initially did not stand at the centre of the Convertibility 
Plan's agenda - they gained more importance only in 1993/94, after an unexpected 
rise in unemployment figures. The labour market reforms of the early 90s treated 
the issues of temporary contracts and the related social security costs, of dismissal 
regulations, and of non-wage labour costs in general, the latter being comparatively 
high in Argentina387 . 
In late 1991, without altering traditional employment relations, new temporary 
contracting variants with reduced non-wage burdens for employers (in terms of 
obstacles to dismissal, payment of indemnities, or social security contributions) 
were introduced and promoted388 . These new variants were much debated (as to 
their effectiveness in creating jobs, but also their social impacts in terms of higher 
384 See IMF Independent Evaluation Office (2004 ), p. 34. For 2001, the revenue gap in the 
social security system has been estimated at as much as 3.8 percent of GDP. 
385 Opinion expressed by Roque Fernandez in an interview conducted by the author in Buenos 
Aires in November 2004. 
386 "However, the evidence suggests that in emerging markets one cannot assume that the 
financing of the transition cost is guaranteed simply because the actuarial balance has improved 
with reform." Arlana/Lopez Murphy/Navajas (2003), p. 84. 
387 For the beginning 90s, Argentina's total non-wage labour costs in relation to gross salaries 
fared worst in regional comparison, with 64 percent (Peru: 61, Brazil: 58, Mexico: 47, Chile: 45). 
See Altimir/Beccaria (2000b), p. 351. 
388 These included, e.g., programmes for previously unemployed persons, for start-up 
enterprises, and for the training of young employees. 
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risks for employees). They gained significant acceptance only in the second half of 
the decade389 . 
Also in 1991, an unemployment insurance scheme (previously inexistent) was 
introduced, financed by a payroll tax to be paid by employers. However, it failed to 
procure significant coverage among the unemployed (seldom above six percent of 
the total of unemployed) as the formal requirements to be eligible for compensation 
payments in case of unemployment were quite strict390 . Further measures taken in 
this context were a tightening of indemnity claims following working accidents or 
diseases, and a move towards more flexible working time and vacation 
regulations391 . 
In 1993, a rebate on social security contributions, varying between 30 and 80 
percent according to region, was decreed, to benefit the manufacturing, primary, 
construction, tourism, and R&D sectors. After some interim reductions, the original 
rebates were reinstalled in 1996 and extended to all economic activities392 . 
Moreover, various cash transfer programmes for the unemployed (on paper 
requiring participation in community or other projects) were initiated between 1993 
and 1996, but they failed to gain significance393 . In 1995, the probation period was 
lengthened (from three to six months) and several of the respective regulations 
were relaxed394 . 
4.2.1.9 Trade Liberalisation 
Comprehensive trade liberalisation was an indispensable prerequisite for the 
CBA, but for the relatively closed and still scarcely diversified economy which 
389 Their limited success has been attributed to the stipulated restrictions in their use, 
especially the requirement for union consent. See Marshall (2004), p. 17. 
390 Previous dismissal from a formal sector job without just cause and a minimum contribution 
period of one year are among the eligibility criteria. Employees in construction, agriculture, 
household services, and public administration are not eligible. If eligible, the unemployed receive a 
payment linked to their latest wage, with a threshold of three quarters of, and a ceiling of 1.5 times, 
the current minimum wage, for a period of four to twelve months. See Marshall (2004), p. 27. 
391 See Heymann (2000), pp. 79ff. 
392 See Marshall (2004), p.13 . 
393 "They were repeatedly used spuriously to benefit the political clientele, and often 
announced to avoid the emergence of conflict, or at electoral limes, but then not implemented or 
rapidly discontinued." Marshall (2004), p. 42. 
394 For probation periods, the requirement to pre-announce dismissal was lifted, and they were 
exempted from the payment of pension contributions. 
Jutta Maute - 978-3-631-75447-4
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 04:44:44AM
via free access
163 
Argentina was at the beginning of the nineties there was no easy and quick way to 
get there. After all, with the exchange rate fixed, active trade and tax policies 
remained as the central instruments to influence the terms of trade and to 
strengthen the exporting and import competing industries. Both devices were 
relatively extensively used in the 1990s. The overall progress made towards trade 
liberalisation was substantial, above all in the reduction of import tariffs, which was, 
for the largest part, implemented unilaterally. 
The new government had begun in late 1989 to intensify the trade liberalisation 
attempts that originated in the second half of the 1980s. The maximum import tariff 
was reduced from 40 to 30 percent (the average rate being 17 percent), and 
administrative controls were reduced. As an enormous simplification of the highly 
complex regime built up during the 1980s, in April 1991, imports were classified in 
four categories and charged according to the degree of value added (from primary 
goods and machinery with zero tariff to high value durable consumer goods, such 
as electronics, charged with 35 percent). It was later modified to decrease the 
dispersion between the categories, but not to reduce tariff levels. Quantitative 
restrictions were eliminated, with the notable exception of the automobile sector 
which continued to receive special treatment395. 
In 1992, the maximum overall tariff was reduced to 22 percent, and import 
categories again modified. A variety of anti-dumping measures, introduced in 1993 
(concerning textiles, ironware, paper, and chemicals), and preferential treatments of 
industrial and agrarian inputs were enacted as a response to strongly rising imports, 
in order to support import-competing industries. 
These unilateral measures were taken in addition to broader liberalisation 
agreements that had been already settled in the late eighties, multilaterally on the 
one hand within the Uruguay round, and bilaterally with Brazil on the other hand. 
Out of the latter initiative, the creation of the MERCOSUR customs union 
developed, which added an important dimension to Argentina's trade liberalisation 
strategy396 . In April 1991, Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay signed the 
founding treaty, according to which intra zone trade barriers were to be reduced 
gradually. In 1994, the structure of a common external tariff (however with extensive 
395 Here, import quotas were auctioned, with the successful bidders being allowed to import 
cars and car parts at a preferential tariff of two percent, in quantities that equalled their planned car 
exports. Individuals purchasing imported cars from these suppliers, however, were charged a tariff 
of 22 percent. 
396 See Sanguinetti/Pantano/Posadas (2002), pp. 3ff. 
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lists of exceptions for each country, and with several industries enjoying special 
treatment, as e.g. ironware, sugar, and automobiles) was agreed upon, and 
MERCOSUR entered into force in January 1995. 
On the export side, nearly all charges on sales abroad were removed. From 
1991 onwards, an export surcharge of 6 percent was left only for some oleaginous 
products. In 1991, an export subsidising scheme according to which exporters of 
"non-traditional products" received reimbursements on their VAT-payments was re-
established (after having been abolished for fiscal reasons the year before). Such 
reimbursements were increased in 1992 (they ranged from two to 20 percent), after 
the real exchange rate's appreciation following inertial domestic inflation had 
encumbered exporters' situation397. The weighted average of these reimbursements 
rose from 3.3 to 6.3 percent of total export value. After the implementation of 
MERCOSUR, these measures were kept for extra zone, but progressively reduced 
for intra zone exports. 
Argentina's tariff structures were continuously modified, and kept a considerable 
degree of complexity, but overall tariff levels decreased steadily. By April 1995, the 
average import tariff was half of what it had been in October 1989398 , and dispersion 
between tariffs was reduced. In 1997, import tariffs on extra zone trade averaged 14 
percent, with a standard deviation of 7 percent399 . Thus, the trade policies within the 
Convertibility Plan brought a substantial change with respect to import diversification 
and volumes, as well as to competitive pressures exerted on domestic production. 
Imports as a proportion of GDP rose from 6 to around 20 percent until 1997, with 
the largest increases in the chemical and mechanical engineering sectors. Imports 
from Brazil multiplied by a factor nine between 1990 and 1997, while Brazil's 
importance as an export destination grew from 11 to 31 percent of total exports 
within the same period400 . 
4.2.2 The Early 1990s' Economic Performance: 1991-1994 
4.2.2.1 Monetary and Financial Development 
Doubtlessly, the CBA was highly successful in restoring stable monetary 
conditions. Within three months, it managed to bring monthly inflation down from 27 
397 In effect, this scheme was a fiscal devaluation. See Pastor/Wise (1999), p. 496. 
398 See Pastor/Wise (1999), p. 486. 
399 See Heymann (2000), p. 61. 
400 Source: Oficina de la CEPAL en Buenos Aires, on data from INDEC. 
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percent (February 1991) to 2.8 percent (May 1991). The annual rate (average CPI 
growth 1990: 1,344 percent) reached single-digit levels in summer 1993 (1993: 7.4 
percent), only to decrease further to near zero (and at times even into light deflation) 
and to remain low until the end of the CBA. As a result of the elimination of inflation, 
trust in the Peso and thus the demand for real Peso balances recovered, and the 
economy experienced a quick re-monetisation. M3 as a proportion of GDP, after 
having reached an all time low of five percent in 1990, rebounded to 10 percent in 
1992, and steadily increased during the decade to reach more than 20 percent in 
1997. An important characteristic of this re-monetisation was the massive growth in 
US-Dollar time deposits, while checking accounts, held mostly for transaction 
purposes, were held in Pesos401 . Total (Peso and Dollar) deposits rose by 450 
percent between April 1991 and November 1994402 . 
Another indicator that the CBA enjoyed remarkable credibility right from the start 
is the rapid convergence of Argentine towards US interest rates. Mainly deposit 
rates and short term lending rates (such as money market and intercompany market 
rates) fell very quickly after the CBA was introduced, while long-term lending rates, 
reflecting also the conditions of the domestic banking system, were slower to 
converge towards US rates. The development of both currency and country risk, as 
measured by the differentials of Argentine Peso deposit rates and Argentine US-
Dollar deposit rates over the US certificates of deposit rates respectively, was 
impressive. Measured this way, currency risk fell from roughly 50 percent in early 
1991 to five percent in early 1993, and to one percent in early 1994, while country 
risk was valued even less than currency risk during most of the early 90s403 . The 
high reserve requirements, imposed on the banking system mainly as a prudential 
provision, had the beneficial effect of keeping the money multiplier relatively low and 
dampening not only the expansionary effects of the strong capital inflows but also 
real activity and real exchange rate appreciation. 
In November 1992, however, a minor run on the Peso occurred, interpreted 
unanimously as a kind of initial credibility test for the CBA which it passed as the 
government stuck to its rules404 . It was small and transitory enough to affect only 
401 See Kiguel (1999), p. 15. 
402 See Schumacher (2000), p. 261. 
403 See Balino/Enoch (1997), pp. 32f. 
404 See Pastor/Wise (1999), p. 497. 
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monetary variables. Interest rate spreads experienced temporary surges, but quickly 
returned to their previous levels. 
4.2.2.2 Economic Activity 
Equally impressive was the resumption of growth in economic activity once a 
stable monetary frame was established. Real GDP grew by 10.5 percent in 1991 
and continued to grow fast in the following years, to average 8.2 percent in the 
years between 1991 and 1994405 . This growth was created on the one hand by 
strongly growing investments, with increases by around 30 percent in the first two 
years after the CBA's introduction and somewhat slower growth thereafter. On the 
other hand, consumption grew in the first two years by well above 10 percent, and 
by above five percent until 1994. 
The boom was accompanied by a deterioration in the current account, reflecting 
the increased demand for imports of goods and services, as well as strongly rising 
inflows of financial and physical capital. Imports of goods and services grew by 
nearly 70 and 60 percent in 1991 and 1992 respectively, and by 30 and 11 percent 
in the following years406 . Exports were slower to recover; in 1991, there was still a 
slight reduction, and only since 1993 did exports grow markedly (by 8.5 and 17.8 
percent in 1993 and 1994407 ). This can be explained partly with a sort of "crowding 
out" of exports by strongly rising domestic demand, and partly with the fact that, 
despite the immediate price stabilisation, Argentina's inflation continued to be higher 
than that of its trading partners until 1994, which resulted in a substantial real 
appreciation. Its effects on exports, however, were mitigated by productivity gains, 
the elimination of most export taxes, as well as some export subsidies. 
As indicated, the massive increases in consumption and investment were 
financed to a large extent by foreign capital, attracted by lucrative privatisation offers 
and deregulation in many markets, as well as by low international interest rates. Net 
foreign capital flows into the country reached over 32 billion US-Dollars between 
1992 and 1994, and about ten percent of GDP in 1994408 . However, the current 
account deficit did not reach exorbitant levels: starting from 0.2 percent of GDP in 
405 Between 1991 and 1994, Argentina recorded the second fastest growth in Latin America 
(after Chile). 
406 Imports of consumer and capital goods grew strongly, at the expense of intermediate 
goods. See Pastor/Wise (1999), p. 483. 
407 See IMF Independent Evaluation Office (2004), p. 10. 
408 See Jonas (2002), p. 9. 
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1991, it reached 3.4 and 4.3 percent in 1993 and 1994 respectively, before being 
reduced again during the Tequila crisis. 
4.2.2.3 Fiscal Development 
The fiscal development of the early 90s stood in sharp contrast to anything 
Argentina had experienced since decades. Having averaged around five percent of 
GDP during the 1980s, the overall fiscal deficit fell to 0.4 percent in 1992 and 
reached a small surplus (0.1 percent) in 1993. 1994 saw a still moderate deficit of 
1.4 percent which, as an effect of the Tequila crisis as well as the pension reform's 
additional fiscal burden, broadened to 3.2 percent in 1995409. Accordingly, with the 
exception of 1995, the primary balance was positive during the early 90s. 
On the income side, some of the reforms put into place in the early 90s 
effectuated a reduction in public revenues (such as the modifications of foreign 
trade regulations that reduced tariff income, and the pension reform, that diverted 
social security contributions to the pension funds), while other reforms exerted an 
improving influence on the budget. These were, primarily, privatisations which, apart 
from generating extraordinary revenues, gradually eliminated the financing needs 
for public enterprises (in 1990 still having required around three percent of GDP) 
and the tax reforms, which increased tax rates and bases in the context of the 
expanding economy. 
The budgetary improvement was not achieved by reductions of public 
expenditures. Indeed, these rose from 14.8 percent of GDP on average during the 
1980s to 17.2 percent during 1991-98, reflecting, above all, increases in social 
expenditure and in transfers to the provinces. Expenditures were dented mainly by 
lower interest payments for the largely dollarised public debt. 
Although the fiscal improvement was significant, it did not (except for 1993) 
amount to produce budget surpluses in times of a booming economy. As a result, 
public debt, after an initial decline from around 35 to 28 percent between 1991 and 
1992, rose in the following years to nearly 37 percent in 1995 (to be reduced only 
temporarily during the second expansionary phase in 1997)410 . 
409 With the quasi-fiscal deficits of the central bank having fallen apart, the overall fiscal deficit 
was composed of the annual financing needs of the federal government and those of the provinces 
(averaging 1.0 and 0. 7 percent of GDP respectively during 1991-98). See Heymann (2000), p. 63f. 
410 See IMF Independent Evaluation Office (2004), p. 24. 
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4.2.2.4 Unemployment and Income Distribution 
The strong economic growth translated into slightly higher employment only 
initially. As early as in late 1992, the unemployment rate started to increase, from 
around seven to twelve percent in 1994, only to rise further strongly during the 
Tequila crisis and to reach more than 18 percent in May 1995. These levels were 
highly problematic given Argentina's history of very low unemployment, and, above 
all, the economic boom they accompanied. Never since did the unemployment rate 
decline back to pre-1994 levels: with the beginning 90s, a new era of high structural 
unemployment had emerged. Strikingly, the expansionary cycle between 1990 and 
94 scored a rise in GDP by 35 percent, a rise in employment by only eight, and a 
rise in unemployment by 105 percent411 . 
The very low employment elasticity of the early 90s412 is the result of several 
factors. First, large fractions of both labour and capital resources were lying idle as 
a consequence of the 1980s, so that idle capacities were utilised before new 
demand for labour emerged413 . Second, the important structural reforms such as 
trade liberalisation, privatisation, and deregulation, brought with them a relative 
cheapening of the production factor capital against labour, and hence a reduced 
labour demand for productive purposes. Third, the strongly recovering investment 
not only updated the country's obsolete capital stock but also introduced labour-
saving technologies, bringing about important productivity increases: labour 
productivity rose in certain manufacturing sectors by 15 percent annually between 
1991 and 94, and on average (excluding the primary sector) by 7.9 percent414 . 
Thus, a relative increase in activities intensive in the use of capital, imported 
goods, and natural resources stood against a relative decline in labour intensive 
processes. As a consequence, the already existing commercial pattern of 
overwhelmingly exporting low value-added primary products, favoured by the widely 
411 See Waisgrais (2003), p. 28. 
412 Employment elasticity here means the relation employment/product, i.e. the change in 
employment a change in output brings about. As such, it is reciprocal to labour productivity. 
Employment elasticity was slightly above 0.2 for Argentina in the period 1991-4, indicating that a 
ten percent rise in GDP generated a rise in employment by around two percent. 
413 The existence of idle labour capacities after periods of recession is evidence of labour 
market regulations that make dismissals costly enough to avoid them even in bad times. 
414 E.g., textile and confections: +15.2%, metal and machinery: +15.1 %, construction: +13.1 %. 
See Altimir/Beccaria (2000b), p. 414. 
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undifferentiated progress in trade liberalisation, was intensified415 . A process of de-
industrialisation in labour intensive, import-competing sectors was the flip-side of 
this development. Labour intensive industries recording employment growth were 
those not exposed to international competition, such as tourism, financial services, 
and transport416 . Mismatches between the skills supplies set free in the course of 
such de-industrialisation and the skills demanded by expanding sectors are a further 
factor explaining low employment elasticities. 
In addition, an important increase in labour market participation added to the 
rise in unemployment. This was mainly due to women entering labour markets, 
above all in the district of Buenos Aires (where female participation increased from 
28 to 33 percent between 1991 and 1995)417 . Thus, the low employment elasticities 
of the early nineties made the strong economic growth fail to absorb the increase in 
the economically active population418 . 
Not surprisingly, the rising unemployment contributed to a worsening distribution 
of income among private households and among the economically active 
population, continuing a trend that had been persisting since the 1970s419. Another 
important reason for rising inequality in the early nineties is the widening gap 
between labour productivity and wage development: real wages show negligible 
growth at best in times of soaring productivity, so that the profits of rising 
productivity largely benefited capital rather than labour420. In addition, in the early 
1990s, all households experienced deteriorating "terms of exchange" with other 
economic agents, to the degree that, due to the pertaining inflationary inertia, the 
CPI rose by more (by 30 percent) than the total of prices implicit in GDP, mirroring 
415 Low value-added exports of natural resources (agricultural and energy products) rose from 
25 percent of total exports in 1989 to 34 percent in 1994 - a development boding ill for the long-
term perspectives of a country needing to industrialise to keep more value-added in the country and 
obtain more diversified production and trade patterns. See Pastor/Wise (1999), p. 486. 
416 See Frenkel/Gonzalez Rozada (1999), p. 54. 
417 See Altimir/Beccaria (2000b), p. 405. This is part of a global trend since the 1960s, and, for 
the case of Argentina, largely also driven by the desire of women to supplement low household 
incomes. At the same time, an increasing female participation rate mirrors the changes in the 
economy's structure, from industry to services. See Waisgrais (2003), p. 25. 
418 See Waisgrais (2003), p. 28. 
419 The Gini coefficient for private households in the Gran Buenos Aires area, excluding 
households with zero income, rose from 0.416 in 1980 to 0.430 in 1991 and to 0.433 in 1994. See 
Altimir/Beccaria (2000a), p. 432, and Gonzalez Rozada/Menendez (2002). 
420 See Waisgrais (2003), p. 31. 
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the relative rise in non-tradables' prices. Also, income distribution among the 
employed failed to improve, despite the strong economic recovery421 . 
As for the functional income distribution, an initial slight rise of the share of 
wages in total factor income (from 35 to 38 percent between 1991 and 93) is 
explained mainly by rising labour costs in the first years of Convertibility. This trend 
was reversed after 1993, and the wage share went to decline under levels of 1991 
in 1995422 . 
Hence, the labour market reforms of the early 90s had, if any, very little effect 
on unemployment, and certainly none on income distribution423 . This is partly 
because, as already mentioned, the need to adopt deeper labour market reforms 
was acknowledged only later in the decade, and partly because early measures 
(such as the modified labour contracts) were not, or only later, accepted to a 
substantial degree throughout the economy. 
4.2.3 Coping with the Tequila Crisis: 1995 
4.2.3.1 The Tequila Effect 
On December 20th , 1994, Mexico devalued its currency, giving in to intense 
pressure in the foreign exchange market424 . This triggered the biggest crisis and 
challenge to the Argentine CBA during the 1990s. 
Shunning Mexico, international investors became increasingly suspicious of 
other Latin American economies as well, and very much so of Argentina which was 
similarly dependent on foreign funds and had a fixed exchange rate as well. This 
made them doubt whether it would soon be forced to follow suit and abandon its 
CBA. The upcoming presidential elections of May 1995 reinforced this uncertainty. 
Shortly after the Mexican devaluation, a small Argentine wholesale bank with a 
large exposure to Mexican assets got insolvent, which proved to be the trigger for 
the crisis invading Argentina. Suddenly, Argentine banks were denied foreign funds 
421 See Altimir/Beccaria (2000a), p. 494. 
422 See Altimir/Beccaria (2000a), pp. 476f. 
423 See Fanelli/Gonzalez Rozada (1998), p. 33. 
424 It was forced to do so (ending an era of fixed exchange rate that had lasted since 1987) 
after political and social unrest, as well as rising US interest rates, made foreign investors doubt 
about its economy's health. The withdrawal of their funds made Mexico's large current account 
deficit increasingly difficult to finance. 
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and faced liquidity problems, forcing them to call in loans, which negatively affected 
investment and growth. 
In parallel to a massive outflow of international capital, a panicky flight from the 
domestic banking system unfolded. Argentine depositors, worried about the safety 
of their bank deposits, started to withdraw them, thus putting further pressure on the 
banks. Deposits were withdrawn in a speed and magnitude nearly unrivalled in 
history: between December 1994 and March 1995 (the most severe crisis months), 
the banking system lost 18 percent of its deposits425 . Large parts of deposits 
withdrawn left the country. International reserves fell by 33 percent (or 6 billion US-
Dollars) during those four months. 
The crises' repercussions on the real economy were serious. Real GDP shrank 
by 2.8 percent in 1995 as a result of a drop of investment (by 13 percent) and of 
private consumption (by 4 percent). Unemployment skyrocketed to reach more than 
18 percent in May 1995, and the proportion of households living below the poverty 
line increased from 13 to 17 percent during that year426 . The current account 
improved by more than two percentage points (to a deficit of two percent of GDP) as 
exports grew strongly while imports fell by around five percent427 . 
The crisis started to recede by mid-March, as a result of the government's active 
crisis management with the objective to defend the fixed exchange rate, and with 
assistance from the IMF which extended the existing arrangement in that month. 
Nevertheless, the decline in deposits stopped only after president Menem's re-
election on May 14th , 1995, which renewed confidence in the domestic currency. 
The financial system's exhibited fragility, still considerable despite the strengthening 
measures taken in the years before, prompted the central bank to fully utilise the 
frame offered by the Convertibility law (in terms of approaching the lower limits of 
the backing rule and lowering reserve requirements), with the result that the crisis 
was eventually successfully managed, the CBA preserved, and the banking system 
thereupon equipped with further strengthening regulations. The following 
paragraphs focus on the characterisation of the crisis, its management, and on the 
measures taken subsequently to prepare for similar future events. 
425 In the Great Depression in the US, 35 percent of deposits were withdrawn, however over a 
period of four years. See Kiguel (1999), p. 17. 
426 See Jonas (2002), p. 10. 
427 See IMF Independent Evaluation Office (2004), p. 10. 
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4.2.3.2 Currency and Bank Run 
The structure and development of deposit withdrawals shows that the crisis was 
not only a currency run but also extended to a bank run. Withdrawals did not occur 
uniformly across banks, nor did they only affect Peso-denominated deposits. 
Depositors evidently were aware of the impact of the currency run on individual 
banks' solvency: first, they selectively withdrew deposits from "bad" banks and re-
deposited them in "good" (predominantly foreign and large domestic) banks, often 
dollarising their Peso-deposits at the same time428 . So, initially, only a few domestic 
wholesale banks with large operations in government bonds were affected by 
deposit outflows. Only later, as contagion within the financial sector took hold, did 
withdrawals spread to larger chunks and finally the whole of the banking system, 
including foreign, public, and large private banks. 
Thus, the severity of the crisis cannot be explained exclusively with doubts 
about the sustainability of the exchange rate. Very clearly, additional factors were 
the limited lender of last resort capacity of the central bank (excess reserves 
amounted to only four percent of total deposits before the crisis), the lack of deposit 
insurance, as well as the fears that the government could react once more with a 
forced deposit restructuring, as had happened only five years ago with the Plan 
BONEX (which had inflicted heavy losses for depositors)429 . 
The outflow of deposits exerted severe liquidity pressures on the banking 
system, while the central bank lost much of its international reserves (they fell by 
one third during Tequila) and was forced to defend the Peso parity by allowing 
interest rates to rise (short term interest rates exceeded 60 percent at the climax of 
the crisis), which further crippled banks' solvency and liquidity. The crisis made 
clear that the central bank's limited lender of last resort capacity had to be 
substituted by both the provision of systemic liquidity and strengthened regulation 
and supervision. The first issue had to be addressed in the midst of crisis, while the 
second was tackled after its retreat. 
4.2.3.3 Managing the Crisis 
The central bank's first reaction to the run was to lower reserve requirements on 
bank deposits in order to alleviate banks' liquidity strains430 . In January 1995, Peso 
428 See Schumacher (2000). 
429 See Kiguel (1999). p. 21. 
430 Between late December and late January, reserve requirements for checking and savings 
accounts, held both in Pesos and US-Dollars. were reduced in steps from 43 to 30 percent, and for 
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deposits of commercial banks held with the central bank were automatically 
converted to US-Dollars, thus signalling support to the CBA and increasing Dollar 
liquidity of the financial sector. 
A revision of the central bank law, put on the way in the midst of crisis, in 
February 1995, stood at the centre of crisis management. It included various 
liquidity securing provisions. First, the creation of a new system of mandatory and 
privately financed deposit insurance was decreed (it was put into effect only a few 
weeks later), meant to enhance depositor confidence in the banking system and to 
protect small depositors. Under this scheme, 20,000 (later 30,000) US-Dollars per 
depositor had to be insured, with the effect that 75 percent of depositors (although 
only 25 percent of deposits) were covered431 . Moreover, the law modified the central 
bank law in a way that, under extraordinary circumstances, rediscount and 
repurchase operations with financial institutions were allowed to be extended, so 
that the volume of such assistance was limited only by the reserves legally required 
to back the monetary base (i.e. 80 percent of the monetary base during the first 
central bank directory's term)432 . At the same time, the central bank was given 
substantial power to restructure and to liquidate troubled banks, again with the 
objective to defend depositors433 . Notably, the creation of two trust funds was 
decreed which intended to facilitate the necessary structural changes in the banking 
sector. One was founded to help in the privatisation of provincial banks, the other to 
help restructure or merge troubled private banks. Finally, the central bank enlarged 
its potential lender of last resort funds by opening contingent repo facilities with 13 
private international banks, to be triggered at its discretion in case of need434 . 
time deposits from three to one percent. In the following months, reserve requirements were again 
raised slightly, to 33 and two percent respectively. See Ganapolsky/Schmukler (1998), p. 5. 
431 See Canavese (2001 ), p. 10. 
432 See Republica Argentina (1995), articles 1 and 2. Some authors claim that, in effect, the 
rules of Convertibility were bent. See e.g. Pastor/Wise (1999), p. 484. However, nominally, the 
frames given by the Convertibility and central bank laws were maintained, and it is majority opinion 
that Convertibility in its core remained untouched. 
433 See Republica Argentina (1995), article 3. It allowed the central bank to split troubled 
institutions into a "good" and a "bad" bank, the first to be sold and the second to be liquidated. See 
Pou (2000), p. 14. 
434 This facility gave the central bank the option, in the event of a crisis, to sell Argentine public 
bonds denominated in US-Dollars and receive the proceeds in Dollars, thus enabling it to expand 
domestic money while using the borrowed reserves to back the monetary base, as provided for by 
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All of the provisions of the new legal frame were put into practice. The central 
bank's "hard" international reserves were allowed to melt down to the legal minimum 
of 80 percent required to back the monetary base. The central bank temporarily 
suspended the operations of 15 domestic financial institutions. During the crisis, out 
of a total of 137 private financial institutions, nine failed and 30 were either acquired 
or merged with another bank435 . 
4.2.3.4 Financial Sector Reforms in the Wake of Tequila 
Once the worst of the crisis was over, further banking regulations were enacted 
which aimed at better allowing markets to discipline financial institutions. Banking 
supervision introduced the so-called CAMEL system, by which it rated financial 
institutions, as well as a system that combines different sources of evaluation 
(called BASIC)436 , both ratings to be published and made available to each 
depositor upon request. Another, quite remarkable, rule to expose banks to market 
discipline was incorporated in the requirement for banks to issue subordinated debt, 
corresponding to two percent of their deposits. The market pricing of this debt was 
expected to provide valuable information about a bank's risk for depositors as well 
as regulators437 . Intervals of banks' inspections were shortened. Also, a 
differentiation of capital requirements was introduced, whereby several risk 
dimensions were attributed to bank assets, namely counterparty risk, interest rate 
risk, and market risk438 . 
A further important step was to replace reserve requirements by liquidity 
requirements, in August 1995, with the objective to make sure financial institutions 
had sufficient resources to confront possible deposit withdrawals. The new liquidity 
requirements applied to all bank liabilities (not just deposits), were differentiated 
according to their residual time to maturity, and remunerated. Four fifths of the 
the Convertibility law. It comprised six, and was later extended to 7.1 billion US-Dollars. See Kiguel 
(1999), p. 28. 
435 See Schumacher (2000), p. 262. 
436 See Caprio (1998). CAMEL stands for capital, asset quality, management, earnings, and 
liquidity. Each aspect is rated separately, with the total rating of the bank resulting from the average 
- a system most central banks use to rate banks. BASIC stands for bonds, external auditing, 
supervision, information, and credit rating. 
437 See Kiguel (1999), p. 28. 
438 The inclusion of the indicator "interest rate" (higher interest rate implies higher loan risk) is 
remarkable; introducing the logic of risk premia in the banking supervision context is not 
international standard. 
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required liquidity was allowed to be held in safe and liquid international assets, with 
the remaining fifth to be channelled through the central bank. Average liquidity 
requirements amounted to 16 percent, and were increased over time to 20 
percent439 . 
The central bank's active liquidity management as well as the decisive actions 
in its supervising function limited the detrimental effects of the crisis on the banking 
system as a whole and contributed to dampen its transmission to the real 
economy440 . While deposits fell by a total of 8.5 billion Pesos, total credit fell by just 
1.1 billion Pesos (thereof credit losses to the private sector of 400 million). In the 
end, total credit, which had grown by over 23 percent in 1994, fell by 0.8 percent in 
1995441 . Only one percent of depositors eventually lost funds, amounting to 0.28 
percent of total deposits442 . 
After the implementation of the new liquidity requirements, and with the 
contingent credit lines of the central bank, systemic liquidity of the financial sector 
covered as much as 30 percent of total deposits, a proportion considered adequate 
to face future deposit outflows (and which would in any case have been sufficient to 
overcome Tequila)443 . There is a broad consensus that the liquidity instruments and 
prudential banking regulations emerging from the Tequila crisis did much to 
moderate the impact of the external shocks that were to follow444 . 
4.2.3.5 Fiscal Adjustment Following Tequila 
In addition to strengthening the financial sector, further measures were 
necessary to better cope with similar future crises which could undermine 
confidence in the CBA. These concerned the fiscal sphere and included the 
intensification of fiscal adjustment and the improvement of debt management. 
439 Moreover, also in the wake of Tequila, Argentina's scattered and inefficient payment 
system was reformed to introduce a modern real-time gross settlement system, operated by the 
central bank, and three automated clearing houses. See Pou (2000), p. 15. 
440 According to Kiguel (1999), around three quarters of deposit losses were financed by 
liquidity instruments of the central bank (such as rediscounts, reduced reserve requirements, repos, 
and foreign credit lines). See Kiguel (1999), p. 22. 
441 See Schumacher (2000), p. 262. 
442 See Canavese (2001 ), p. 10. 
443 See Kiguel (1999), p. 28. 
444 In an IMF report on transparency practices, Argentina·s monetary and financial policy as 
well as banking supervision receive substantial praise. See IMF Staff Team (1999), pp. 7ft. 
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Besides the immediate fiscal adjustment need evoked by the crisis, the 
necessity of further fiscal improvements arose from the impact of some of the 
reforms undertaken on public finances, such as, for the largest part, the pension 
reform which accounted for a revenue loss of three billion Dollars annually. Other 
reforms, such as the reduction in labour taxes and the absorption of provincial social 
security systems, as well as higher scheduled interest payments (that stemmed 
from old non-interest bearing debt, the "BOCONes", on which now interest started to 
be paid), added to the fiscal burden, with the mentioned positions accounting for 
additional five billion Dollars to be financed annually. 
The immediate fiscal response to Tequila consisted mainly of a rise in the VAT 
rate by three percentage points, to 21 percent, in March 1995445 . Later, in 1996, a 
fifth of the tax on combustibles was dedicated to prop up the ailing public pensions 
system. Finally, in 1998, on the background of high unemployment, the federal 
government introduced a tax reform to further lower labour taxes (not 
"coparticipated" with the provinces), but raised some other taxes (shared with the 
provinces )446 . 
However, as the additional burdens mentioned above accounted for much of the 
actual fiscal deficits of the years following Tequila, those adjustment efforts failed to 
tackle these (more or less) "exceptional" expenditures447 . 
With respect to financial management, the government focused after 1995 on 
lengthening the maturity structure of its bonds as well as on better synchronising 
bond sales and financing needs in order to prevent liquidity squeezes and 
emergency sales in turbulent times, and generally to reduce the vulnerability arising 
from potential refinancing risks448 . As a result, the proportion of short term debt was 
reduced to around three percent of total debt, with the average maturity of 
government debt rising to around eight years in 1998449. 
445 This increase was initially limited to one year, and exempt from ,,coparticipaci6n". However, 
it continued to persist and was later included into the provincial transfer scheme. See Heymann 
(2000), p. 67. 
446 The federal government compensated the inflicted revenue losses by negotiating further 
"precoparticipaciones" with the provinces. See Saiegh/Tommasi (1999), pp. 188f. 
447 Many authors argue that, without these .exceptional" items, Argentina's budget would have 
been neutral or even in surplus in some years, which, however, in their view, was not correctly 
honoured by markets in the late 90s. 
448 See Heymann (2000), p. 54. 
449 See Kiguel (1999), p. 26. 
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4.2.4 The Second Expansionary Phase after Tequila: 1996-1998 
The quick economic recovery from Tequila was widely seen as proof of the 
Convertibility regime's robustness and added massively to its popularity. Favourable 
external conditions such as the US-Dollar's relative weakness, as well as tariff 
reductions within MERCOSUR, facilitated a quick resumption of strong export-led 
growth. Argentina soon was a major beneficiary of strong capital flows to emerging 
economies again. Its development became widely viewed as a success story and a 
model for other emerging economies450 . Again, it received support from the IMF with 
a new Stand-by Arrangement approved in April 1996. 
As indicated, the financial sector recovered remarkably quickly from the severe 
crisis: the pre-Tequila level of deposits held in banks was reached again as early as 
in the first quarter of 1996 (45 billion Dollars), and mounted to 65 billion in late 
1997451 . Annual real GDP grew by 5.5, by 8.1, and by 3.8 percent between 1996 
and 1998. Exports continued to contribute much to growth: they grew by 13.6 and 9 
percent in 1996 and 1997, to be reduced, under deteriorating world market 
conditions, to a growth of 0.7 percent in 1998. Private consumption was again 
another driving force, recovering from its 1995 slump (when it had contracted by 4 
percent) with growth rates around eight percent in the following two years, and with 
2.5 percent in 1998. Likewise, real fixed investment saw its late 1990s peak in 1997 
with a growth of nearly 18 percent. Inflation was now down at virtually zero (the CPI 
grew between 0.1 and 0.7 percent in 1996 to 98), at a time when rising foreign 
currency reserves automatically created more relaxed monetary conditions with 
declining interest rates and expanding credit. 
However, strong domestic demand induced imports to grow much faster than 
exports (by 24 percent in 1997), causing a reversal of the current account's 
previous, Tequila-induced, improvement: it steadily deteriorated from a deficit of two 
percent in 1995 to 4.9 percent in 1998, willingly financed by international capital 
markets. Correspondingly, external debt continued its growth trend, uninterrupted 
since 1992 (from 28 percent then to 47.5 percent in 1998 as a percentage of GDP). 
450 The enthusiasm in and outside the country was such that, in October 1998, president 
Menem was invited to the annual meetings with the IMF Managing Director where "the experience 
of Argentina in recent years" was characterised as "exemplary". See IMF Independent Evaluation 
Office (2004), p. 12. 
451 See Canavese (2001 ), p. 10. 
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As to fiscal performance after 1995, 1996 was the second year when even the 
government's primary balance was negative (by 0.7 percent of GDP), and slight 
primary surpluses (of 0.3 and 0.5 percent) were reached in 1997 and 1998. Overall, 
the consolidated452 budget deficit was reduced from the Tequila level by around one 
percent until 1997, to 2.1 percent in both 1997 and 1998. Public debt interrupted its 
upward trend (since 1992) only temporarily in 1997, to reach 40.9 percent of GDP in 
1998 (thus crossing the forty percent-mark which, by some, is deemed the limit for 
sustainability in developing economies)453 . 
Unlike the first expansionary phase of the early 1990s, the boom following 
Tequila was accompanied by considerable reductions in unemployment. After the 
1995 peak of 18 percent, the open unemployment rate declined during the following 
years to reach 13.2 percent in 1998 (although this level was still nearly double that 
of the beginning decade). While during 1991-94, employment had grown by a 
meagre average of 0.8 percent annually, between 1995 and 1997 it did so by 3.9 
percent. Employment elasticity was much higher now than before Tequila454 , thanks 
partly to strong growth in sectors with relatively low potential for productivity 
increases, such as services and construction, but partly also to the effects of labour 
market reforms: the reduction in non-wage labour costs and the increase in flexibility 
in labour contracts added to the better employment periormance455 . 
452 The consolidated public sector includes national, provincial, and municipal levels. 
453 See IMF Independent Evaluation Office (2004), p. 10. 
454 Waisgrais (2003), p. 28, calculates employment elasticities of -1.61 for the 1980s, 0.23 for 
the period 1991-4, and 0.63 for 1995-8. This observation has led many to the assumption that the 
low employment elasticity of the early nineties was mainly of transitory nature, reflecting the 
restructuring of production in a sort of one-time technological catching-up. However, there were 
also reasons, such as ongoing concentration and rationalisation processes, to suggest that the 
higher post-Tequila employment elasticity would not stay that high either. See Altimir/Beccaria 
(2000b), p. 420. 
455 However, these reforms' effectiveness should not be overestimated given the high 
proportion of unregistered labour in employment growth (estimated at well over 40 percent between 
1996 and 97; but parts of jobs classified as "unregistered" were again results of the new legislation 
exempting some employments during the probation period from social security contributions, which 
led to their classification as "unregistered" - a problem of inadequate statistics). It has been 
estimated that active labour market policies have resulted in the creation of around 52,000 jobs, 
corresponding to about 10 percent of total employment growth. See Altimir/Beccaria (2000b), pp. 
383ft. 
Jutta Maute - 978-3-631-75447-4
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 04:44:44AM
via free access
179 
The labour market's relaxation, however, did not extend to reversing the trend of 
a steadily worsening income distribution. The Gini coefficient for private households 
in the Gran Buenos Aires area, excluding households with zero income, continued 
to rise from 0.433 in 1994 to 0.446 in 1997456 . This is mainly considered the 
consequence of an increasing differentiation of employment by qualification, and 
thus of income by education, resulting in a polarisation in the labour market. This is 
to large parts attributable to a massive fall in employment within the manufacturing 
sectors as a result of the economy's commercial opening and its entering into a new 
phase of technological progress: the share of employment in the industrial sector fell 
from nearly 30 percent in the late eighties to a mere 20.9 percent in the late 
nineties457 . 
4.2.5 The Late 1990s' Recession: 1999-2001 
4.2.5.1 The Asian, Russian, and Brazilian Crises 
Within 15 months, a series of three financial crises hit the world, and most 
severely its emerging economies. The series started with the East Asian crisis, 
triggered by South Korea's devaluation on October 22nd, 1997, which hit the whole 
region with a largely unexpected severity. South Korea and Thailand, hitherto 
deemed creditworthy, approached the verge of default, and most East Asian 
currencies plummeted quickly. As international investors lost their appetite for 
emerging markets in general, the crisis started to spread beyond South East Asia. 
Only after large financial assistance was granted by multilateral organisations, 
under the lead of the IMF, did the crisis recede. 
Ten months later, on August 1?1h, 1998, Russia declared a moratorium on its 
Rouble debt. The repercussions of the Russian default were much more serious for 
the world economy as a whole, as they not only spread quickly through emerging 
markets, but went well beyond, hitting also the financial systems of industrial 
countries to the degree that they were exposed to emerging market debt. The 
episode saw the failure of many hedge funds, as well as the spectacular rescue of 
Long Term Capital Management by the New York Fed. 
Finally, on January 13th, 1999, Brazil floated its currency which had been under 
attack since the Russian default. It fell in early 1999 by 70 percent, from 1 .2 to 2 
456 See Altimir/Beccaria (2000a), p. 432. 
457 See Waisgrais (2003), p. 24. The respective employment shares in services rose from 33.4 
to 38.2 percent in that period, in the construction sector from 4.5 to 5 percent. 
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Reais per Dollar. Despite widespread fears, the Brazilian devaluation did not bring 
about major contagion among emerging economies and was relatively quickly under 
control, with turbulences receding after a few months. 
From the emerging markets' perspective, the Russian crisis was by far the 
worst. Judged by the development of the EMBl458 , the spreads observed during the 
second half of 1998 (around 1,700 basis points) were the only to get near those 
recorded during Tequila (almost 1,900); the immediate effects of the Asian and 
Brazilian crises were considerably minor. For Argentina, the picture is similar; 
spreads of its government bonds over US treasuries took a largely parallel 
development. 
Argentina's financial sector withstood these crises largely unaffected. Banks 
seemed to have gained in actual and perceived robustness, as to judge from the 
development of deposits (they increased by 15 percent during the Asian, and 
remained stable or increased modestly at the time of the Russian and Brazilian 
crises respectively). Equally, the development of domestic interest rates (they never 
exceeded 15 percent) and foreign exchange reserves (they stayed stable or 
continued to increase) show that even the Russian default did not get into the region 
of triggering a bank or currency run. The fixed exchange rate and its sustainability 
did not seem to be questioned, which was generally attributed to the improvements 
achieved in the areas of public debt, its amortisation structures, and the banking 
system459 . 
However, beyond its immediate effects, the Russian crisis marked a turning 
point for Argentina and the end of the second expansionary phase of the nineties, 
as lasting higher international interest rates increased the debt service, and 
withering capital imports (the so-called "sudden stop" in capital flows) dried out the 
country's sources of liquidity. 
4.2.5.2 More Adverse External Shocks 
While Argentina's economic indicators took a turn for the worse in the wake of 
the Russian default (from the fourth quarter of 1998), this event was, as indicated 
above, by far not the sole culprit for the long downturn that was to follow. A series of 
further external shocks added to these crises, and they hit primarily Argentina's 
exports. 
458 Emerging Market Bond Index, which measures spreads of emerging market bonds over US 
treasuries, as published by J.P. Morgan. 
459 See Kiguel (1999), p. 32f. 
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These were, first, the weakening global economy which brought about a terms 
of trade shock for Argentina, as international prices for most of Argentina's export 
commodities, such as petroleum, soy beans, wheat, corn, and beef plummeted460 . 
As a result, Argentina's terms of trade deteriorated in 1998 by 5.1 and in 1999 by 
8.4 percent461 . Second, as mentioned above, the recession of and devaluation in 
neighbouring Brazil made the most important trading partner (accounting for 30 
percent of exports) fall apart and turn into a competitor dominating many sectors 
(although the much-feared scenario of cheap Brazilian imports inundating Argentina 
did not materialise)462 . Third, the appreciating US-Dollar increasingly disadvantaged 
Argentina's exports to the Euro area (the second biggest export destination after 
Brazil) as well as, in competition with non-Dollar origins, those to the United States 
(Argentina's third biggest export market). 
4.2.5.3 Recession cum Deflation 
Being pegged to the US-Dollar now turned out increasingly counterproductive, 
as the imported tight monetary conditions meant high real interest rates that choked 
credit and investment in Argentina. The growing misalignment of the exchange rate 
impeded Argentina's export sector. Falling capital inflows and eroding international 
competitiveness resulted in reduced investment and economic activity. Real GDP 
fell by three percent in the second half of 1998, and thus cut the otherwise strong 
growth of 1998 to a total of 3.8 percent. It continued to fall by 3.4 percent in 1999, 
although increased government spending in the run-up to the presidential elections 
in 1999 temporarily improved economic activity in the second half of that year463 . 
GDP shrank by 0.8 percent in 2000, to deteriorate to a negative growth of 4.4 
percent in 2001 464 . 
460 Petroleum and non-fuel commodities' prices plummeted, by 32 and 16 percent respectively, 
during 1998. Prices for oilseeds declined by around 25 percent between 1998 and 2000, beef 
prices fell by over 16 percent in the first half of 1999 alone, 
<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/1999/01 /0599ch2 .pdf>. 
461 See IMF Independent Evaluation Office (2004), p. 10. 
462 See Nunnenkamp (1999), p. 9. 
463 See Powell (2002), p. 4. The reduction of world interest rates in the second half of 1999, 
itself the result of European governments striving to meet the Maastricht criteria in the run-up to the 
Euro's introduction, also helped facilitate an interim recovery through recovering capital flows to 
Argentina, as yield-seeking investors were attracted by new issues of Argentine high-yield 
government bonds denominated in Euros. See Dominguez/Tesar (2004), p. 10. 
464 See IMF Independent Evaluation Office (2004), p. 10. 
Jutta Maute - 978-3-631-75447-4
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 04:44:44AM
via free access
182 
The recession and fall in domestic demand did not produce a significant 
improvement of the current account, and international capital shied away from 
financing it. As the option of nominal adjustment to external imbalance, i.e. of 
devaluation, was barred by the CBA, adjustment had to occur "the hard way", i.e. 
over a shrinking monetary base and price and wage deflation. So, what seemed 
unthinkable for decades in Argentina now happened: prices started to fall in 1999 
and continued to do so until the end of the CBA. The CPI shrank by 1.8, 0.7, and 
1.5 percent respectively during those three years. Despite decreasing prices, 
however, real wages continued the downward trend they had initiated after the first 
expansionary phase of the early nineties. Thus, nominal wages fell faster than 
prices, defying the perception of downward rigidity of nominal wages. In addition, 
falling prices and wages increased the real value of domestic debt. 
During the late nineties' recession, overall employment elasticity was reduced 
against its previously higher levels to near zero (i.e. employment did not fall with 
output), but this was mainly due to the effects of some employment programmes 
introduced from 2000. However, employment elasticity remained high in the 
manufacturing sector, partly due to institutional changes that facilitated dismissals 
for economic reasons, so that the crisis entailed increasing unemployment there465 . 
Overall unemployment rose from its post-Tequila low of 12.9 percent in 1998 to 17.4 
percent in 2001. 
4.2.5.4 Real Appreciation of the Peso 
Price and wage deflation caused the desired, however limited, real depreciation 
of the Peso against the US-Dollar466 . But, as other currencies were nominally 
depreciating against the Dollar, Argentina's real effective exchange rate (i.e. the 
exchange rate against the basket of currencies that reflects trade patterns) 
continued to appreciate. Argentina's real effective exchange rate appreciated 
between 1998 and 2001 by more than 8 percent, and by 4 percent in 1999 alone467 . 
The assessment whether, and by how much, the Peso was overvalued when 
the country entered recession, i.e. by how much it deviated at that time from its 
equilibrium exchange rate in real terms, was and still is a disputed issue. 
465 See Marshall (2004 ), pp. 22ff. 
466 Consumer prices fell by 1.3 percent on average between 1999 and 2001, while producer 
prices began to decline earlier (in 1997) and continued to do so much faster, by 4.5 percent in 
average during 1998 and 2001. See Schuler/Hanke (2002), p. 4. 
467 See IMF Independent Evaluation Office (2004), p. 10. 
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Estimations depend on how far productivity improvements are judged to have made 
up for the nominal effective appreciation against its trading partners' currencies 
during the 1990s. A judgement from the experienced trade performance is difficult 
because the effects of numerous liberalisation efforts of the 90s interfere with 
exchange rate effects468 . 
So, estimations of the degree of overvaluation differed widely, and many of 
them ascribed the Peso only moderate overvaluation during 1999, or none at all469 . 
In early 2000, published estimations of the Peso's real overvaluation against the 
US-Dollar ranged from a mere seven to more than 20 percent. To judge from 
estimations based on purchasing power parity, it seems that, at the turn 1999/2000, 
the Peso was indeed not that much overvalued470 . There seems to be a consensus, 
however, that in the course of 2000 and 2001, with worsening economic and 
financial conditions in Argentina and a further weakening Euro against the US-
Dollar, the real Peso exchange rate acquired a major misalignment471 . 
4.2.5.5 Fiscal Atrophy 
In the run-up to the presidential elections of 1999, the peculiar situation 
prevailed that the candidate from the incumbent Peronist party, Duhalde472 , publicly 
took into consideration the abolishment of the CBA and debt restructuring. In 
contrast, the opposition candidate from the Alianza, de la Rua, committed himself to 
maintaining the CBA. Besides reflecting discontent with the Menem administration 
accused of corruption, which de la Rua promised to fight, his clear victory was also 
proof of the CBA's far-reaching popularity473 . 
468 See IMF Independent Evaluation Office (2004), p. 23. 
469 See Schuler/Hanke (2002), p. 11. 
470 Judgement made by Roque Fernandez, who sided with estimations of an overvaluation of 
around 7 percent, in an interview conducted by the author in Buenos Aires in November 2004. The 
famous "Big Mac Index", published by the Economist, and, to be sure, a mosaic piece only, 
calculated a real overvaluation against the Dollar of less than five percent in January, 2000, and of 
zero in April that year. See www.economist.com. 
471 The topic will be addressed in more detail in section 5. 
472 Duhalde has been a fierce opponent of his fellow party member Menem whose repeated 
attempts to gain political support for a constitutional reform allowing for a third presidential term 
failed in early 1999, but left the Peronist party deeply divided. 
473 Nevertheless, the Alianza government encountered much suspicion from the private sector, 
because the coalition partner FREPASO seemed not to share much of the Radical's positions, and, 
moreover, the coalition had no majority in congress. 
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Maintaining the Peso-Dollar parity required tight fiscal policies in order to restore 
confidence and appease capital markets. Restrictive budgets, however, fit ill with 
the prevailing recession, high unemployment, and rising poverty. The new 
government's priority was to get the fiscal stance back on track, while largely 
accepting the negative growth effects of fiscal restriction. This strategy was based 
on the expectation that fiscal discipline would regain access to cheaper and more 
abundant international finance, and that the rewards in terms of investment and 
growth would compensate for the contractive effects of fiscal restriction (and, 
ideally, that external conditions, such as the Dollar exchange rate and world market 
prices for primary goods, would improve in time to help pull the economy out of 
recession)474 . Hence, everything depended on getting interest rates down. 
Four measures were taken by the new government in the year 2000 to make up 
for dwindling tax revenues. These included a "Law of Fiscal Responsibility" that 
decreed, from January 2000, a gradual reduction in the federal deficit to reach zero 
in 2003, mainly via an increase in tax rates on incomes, personal net assets, and 
certain consumer goods (dubbed "el impuestazo"), as well as a ceiling imposed on 
federal revenues to be shared with the provinces475 . Finally, in the attempt to reduce 
the budget deficit to appease capital markets, Argentina negotiated support from the 
IMF who granted a new Stand-by Arrangement amounting to seven billion US-
Dollars (which later, in early 2001, was augmented, with other official and private 
sources, to a total of 39 billion US-Dollars476 , and then dubbed "el blindaje", or 
"armour"), as growth was expected to pick up later in the year and in 2001. 
Initially, there were some encouraging results. The consolidated public deficit, at 
4.2 percent in 1999, was reduced to 3.6 percent in 2000, year in which the GDP 
contraction decelerated to 0.8 percent (although a positive growth rate of 
approximately two percent had been expected). However, Argentina's access to 
international markets deteriorated again in the second half of 2000, and the 
government decided to draw a first tranche of the IMF's credit line in December 
2000, which, with the "blindaje", was nearly doubled a month later. External 
474 See Jonas (2002), p. 13. 
475 See Pou (2000), p. 15. This ceiling tried to tackle the problem that the federal government 
was biased to cut expenditures in order to obtain a required fiscal improvement, as alternative tax 
increases only had to be "shared away" with the provinces. 
476 The package comprised 14 billion US-Dollars from the IMF, 5 billion from the Inter-
American Development Bank, 1 billion from the government of Spain, and the rest from the private 
sector, on a market-based and voluntary approach. 
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conditions deteriorated further, with the Dollar again starting to rise against the Euro 
in early 2001, and the world economy sliding deeper into recession. The economy 
shrank faster again, and the consolidated public debt reached vexing 6.2 percent in 
2001. Even the consolidated primary budget turned out negative in 1999 and 2001 
(-1.4 percent in the latter year). 
The usual Argentine pattern of the federal balance ending up better than the 
consolidated, i.e. the balance including provincial budgets, continued to persist, but 
the difference widened to a maximum of 2.4 percent of GDP in 2001, when, without 
the provinces, the federal deficit alone amounted to "only" 3.8 percent of GDP. 
Thus, the still existent structural shortcomings of the coparticipation scheme477 , 
above all the built-in incentives of provincial governments to spend generously while 
not having to stand up to their debt, strained the fiscal situation the more the 
economic situation deteriorated. In addition, owing to the only half-hearted reforms 
the years before, tax collection was still inefficient and evasion high, and interest 
obligations on public debt kept growing (in 2000, they reached 15 percent of total 
public spending)478 . 
Accordingly, public debt as a percentage of GDP took off to reach more than 50 
and 62 percent in 2000 and 2001 respectively479 . As mentioned above, certain off-
budget liabilities, such as the court-ordered payments of past pension benefits 
(averaging over two percent of GDP during 1993-99), added to the business cycle 
effects on public sector debt. Some characteristics of total federal government debt 
as of mid-2001 are that, on total, it was 90 percent above the level of 1994; 
approximately two thirds of it was owed to external creditors. As to its denomination, 
70 percent were denominated in Dollars, 20 percent in Euros, 5 percent in Yen, and 
only 4 percent in Pesos480 . 
4.2.5.6 Limited Financial Sector Robustness 
During 1999 and 2000, the Argentine financial sector proved remarkably sturdy. 
It was undisputed that it was now better positioned to master external shocks than 
before 1995. As a result of the strengthening banking regulations following the 
477 Attempts to re-negotiate coparticipation continued to fail time and again. 
478 See Jonas (2002), p. 13. 
479 See IMF Independent Evaluation Office (2004), p. 10. 
480 See Schuler/Hanke (2002), p. 3. 
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Tequila crisis, as well as of mergers and closures of weak banks481 , the system was 
now generally well equipped with capital as well as liquidity-protecting regulations 
and devices. Moreover, to judge from the fact that in many cases banks exceeded 
minimum liquidity requirements substantially, it seems that they generally took over 
liquidity responsibility themselves and relied less on the limited bail-out capacities of 
the central bank, and hence, that moral hazard was reduced482 . With the exception 
of a new anti-bubble rule for mortgage loans, introduced as a reaction to the Asian 
crisis in 1998483 , no changes were made in the financial sphere until events started 
to accelerate in spring 2001. 
By 1999, monetisation had advanced such that M3 surpassed 30 percent of 
GDP, reflecting the advanced size of the financial system484 . Notably, despite the 
significant rises in country risk premia during the Asian, Russian, and Brazilian 
crises, the fall in asset prices, and the prolonged recession, the banking system did 
not register shrinking deposits for a surprisingly long time. While the high degree of 
dollarisation certainly also contributed to keeping depositors calm for a long time, 
the strengthening, Tequila-induced, reforms as well as the higher prevalence of 
foreign-owned banks made the financial sector seem firm. 
Yet, with deteriorating public accounts, the probability of default increased, and 
so did the awareness that banks, left with batches of then worthless government 
bonds in their balance sheets, in the case of a public default would follow the 
government into insolvency. So, finally, when confidence in the Dollar peg was 
shaken by a series of heterodox policy measures in early 2001, a first, albeit limited, 
bout of deposit withdrawals set in, with the banking system losing about three billion 
Pesos, or four percent of total deposits, within a few days485 . 
481 Between 1991 and 1999, the number of banks shrank from 167 (35 of them public) to 119 
(16 public). Further 16 government-owned banks, as well as the national mortgage bank, were 
privatised. See Pou (2000), p. 15. 
482 Of course, the flip side of the more active liquidity policies of banks was an increased 
reluctance to lend to the private sector and, correspondingly, a bigger share of bond holdings in 
their balance sheets. See Caprio et al. (1996), p. 629. 
483 It increased capital requirements for new mortgages as soon as a defined real estate price 
index surpassed a certain threshold. 
484 To be sure, the financial sector was still small by international standards, but it compared 
highly favourably with the state it was in after the era of high inflation. 
485 See IMF Independent Evaluation Office (2004), p. 47. 
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4.2.5.7 Further Labour Market Reforms 
After long political battles between the ruling Peronist party and the opposing 
Alianza486 , a new labour market reform was proposed in 1998. The plan included 
further gradual reductions in non-wage labour costs, but failed to reduce the 
predominance of collective bargaining. Also, with the consent of trade unions and 
against entrepreneurial resistance, some of the non-traditional contracting variants 
created in 1991 were to be eliminated (the rationale behind this move being to gain 
union support and workers' votes for the presidential elections in late 1999), and the 
probation period shortened to one month487 . At the same time, the regime for 
indemnity payments after dismissals was planned to be modified (reducing 
indemnities for those dismissed after short periods of service)488 . The reform code 
failed to pass Congress and was postponed until after the elections of 1999. 
In May 2000, a labour code reform was finally agreed (after continued urging by 
the IMF). It fixed the minimum probation period at three months (extendible to six 
months via collective bargaining, and to twelve months in the case of small 
companies), limited the automatic extension of collective bargaining agreements 
and of decentralised collective bargaining, and restricted the use of probation 
contracts, while offering incentives (in terms of reduced social security contributions 
and wage subsidies, differentiated according to social status, sex, and age of the 
employed) for replacing probation contracts by permanent employments489. 
As a result of these reforms, labour markets were increasingly characterised by 
flexible, short-term, and precarious contractual arrangements490 , the latter 
understood as not complying with labour and social security regulations. The share 
of temporary employment more than doubled between 1996 and 1998 (from 8 to 17 
486 The Alianza was created in 1997 as a coalition of the centrist Radical ("Union Civica 
Radical") and the centre-left FREPASO ("Frente Pais Solidario", founded in 1994) parties, to 
confront the Peronists' lock on power. 
487 The probation period was planned to be freed from pension contributions. It should be 
allowed to be lengthened to six months via collective bargaining. 
488 While dismissal costs of junior employees were planned to be reduced substantially, the 
costs of dismissals due to economic reasons were to be raised in relation to those of unfair 
dismissals (from one half to two thirds of the latter). See Marshall (2004 ), p. 14. 
489 This labour reform was starkly combated by labour unions, and answered by several 
national strikes. In its wake, vice president Carlos Alvarez resigned in protest over allegations that 
the government had paid bribes to senators to get the labour reform approved. 
490 See Altimir/Beccaria (2000b), p. 392. 
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percent), but decreased following the 1998 reforms to some five percent491 . In 
contrast to what had been expected by the reforms, they did not succeed in 
reducing non-registered employment: while, in the early 90s, employment "en 
negro" (i.e. not registered with the social security system) had been about 25 
percent of total wage employment, it rose to 31 percent after 1997, and, after the 
elimination of special temporary contracts in 1998, to about 33 percent (in the 
private sector alone to around 40 percent) at the beginning 2000s492 . Thus, 
unregistered employment continued to rise largely without visible connection to 
changes in regulations or costs on the one hand, or to economic activity on the 
other. 
In sum, the whole of labour market reforms and interventions of the 1990s left 
the country in the early 2000s with employment regulations that were not decisively 
different from those that had prevailed before these reforms. Essentially, only 
reduced dismissal costs for workers with less seniority, the option to extend 
probation contracts beyond three months, and, in general, more freedom to change 
regulations through collective bargaining remained. Probably the most important 
achievement was the reduction of non-wage labour costs, for the most part obtained 
in the first half of the decade. It left the country with non-wage costs for permanent 
contracts of around 47 percent of hourly wages at the end of the decade (as 
opposed to 65 percent in 1991 )493 . 
4.2.6 The Run Up to the Collapse: 2001 
4.2.6.1 Meddling with the CBA 
During 2000, the hopes of an economic revival triggered by fiscal rectitude had 
eroded. The country was trapped in a vicious circle that ran from recession to 
dwindling tax revenues, worsening fiscal deficits, deteriorating fiscal sustainability, 
higher risk premia494 , higher interest rates, and reduced investment feeding back on 
491 See Marshall (2004), pp. 17f. 
492 Few labour inspectors, negligible control of compliance, and low penalties facilitated this 
development. See Marshall (2004), p. 21. 
493 See Marshall (2004), p. 14. 
494 The messy collapse of Turkey's crawling peg exchange rate in February 2001 was reflected 
in an increase in spreads for the Argentine sovereign, though the deteriorating fiscal situation, as 
well as the political discord about fiscal consolidation, contributed most to the surge in spreads, 
from around 650 to 850 points in February and to over 1,000 points in the following weeks. See 
Mussa (2002), p. 22. 
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economic activity. With the increasingly fragile state of the governing coalition, a 
second, politically determined, vicious circle developed and aggravated the 
economic one, in a way that political quarrels over the fiscal adjustment further 
increased country risk premia, as markets increasingly doubted the ability of 
Argentine politics to bring forth fiscal sustainability495 . 
After the resignation of the minister of economy in March 2001 496 , his 
successor, Ricardo Lopez Murphy, proposed a plan of immediate cuts in public 
sector expenditure, but failed to convince his own party of their necessity and was 
forced to resign after only two weeks in office. 
De la Rua appointed no lesser than Domingo Cavallo, the "father of 
Convertibility", as his successor. Within the frame of granted "emergency powers", 
in spring 2001, he initiated a series of mainly heterodox measures which intended to 
directly revive the ailing economy. Most of these measures worked in effect to 
weaken the CBA, and were increasingly perceived as delaying its end at best497 . In 
addition, they suffered from a crumbling governing coalition whose left-wing 
member, FREPASO, abandoned the commitment to the CBA. 
Mr Cavallo's first major action, in April of that year, was to announce a 
modification of the Convertibility law, such that the US-Dollar was to be replaced as 
an exchange rate anchor by an equally weighted basket of the Euro and the US-
Dollar, to be put into force from the time both currencies reached parity498 . While 
intending to make the CBA more flexible and to increase trade competitiveness499 , 
this announcement, and its final political approval in June, proved to cause major 
harm to the CBA's credibility, as the markets' interpretation was that, if this 
modification of the CBA could be made so swiftly, other changes, such as 
devaluation, could follow with the same ease. Spreads on government bonds at that 
time exceeded 1,000 basis points. 
495 See Powell (2002), p. 8. 
496 The reasons for the resignation of Jose Luis Machinea, who had negotiated the "blindaje", 
remain opaque. His abdication certainly did not help foster confidence in the country's recovery. 
497 "Cavallo's economic principles were ( ... ] as fluid as the assets in a well managed bank. 
This fact, combined with his hyperactivity, was a deadly cocktail." Hanke (2002), p. 2. 
498 Mr Cavallo had proposed this move towards a basket peg already in 1998. See interview 
<http://www.pbs.org/wqbh/commandingheights/shared/minitextlo/int domingocavallo.html>. Parity 
between the Euro and the US-Dollar, however, was not reached until July 2002. 
499 The Brazilian Real would have been a key currency to include in a peg that intended to 
increase Argentina's international competitiveness. 
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Also weakening the CBA, though less publicly perceptible, was a decree which 
allowed pressed banks to meet their liquidity requirements with government bonds 
up to a maximum of two billion Dollars. Also, a financial transactions tax was 
introduced. The forced resignation of the well-respected central bank governor, 
Pedro Pou, who opposed any weakening of the CBA, in late April, was a further 
blow to confidence in the CBA500 . 
Moreover, in the face of increasing rollover risks, given reluctant domestic credit 
markets, a voluntary, market-based restructuring scheme for government debt held 
by Argentines, the so-called "mega canje" (mega swap), was carried through and 
completed by June 2001. With this swap, government bonds maturing between 
2001 and 2005, worth about 30 billion US-Dollars in face value (including 8 billion 
held externally), were exchanged against bonds with longer maturities. As a result, 
the average maturity of Argentina's public sector debt was lengthened from 7.5 to 
8.2 years, and interest obligations were reduced by 1. 7 billion US-Dollars until 2005. 
However, yields had to be high enough (between 14 and 16 percent) to entice 
bondholders to accept the offer, so that short-term reductions in interest payments 
were bought at much higher future obligations501 . To judge from the development of 
risk spreads, markets appreciated the improvement of immediate liquidity, but 
moderately enough to suggest limited enthusiasm502 . 
Under the heading "Plan de Competitividad", a package of protectionist policies 
was implemented in June, 2001, including tax and trade measures in favour of 
exporters. The most important feature of this package was the introduction of a dual 
exchange rate. It was realised via a fiscal compensation mechanism (called "factor 
de convergencia") which mimicked the hypothetic exchange rate on the basis of the 
Euro-Dollar peg as long as it was not yet in force. Accordingly, exporters were paid 
500 Mr Pou not only objected looser "monetary policy" but also the introduction of the Euro into 
the peg, and preferred a move towards dollarisation rather than more flexibility. He was removed of 
office after a legally dubious procedure, as a result of which a congressional committee charged 
him of "misconduct" and recommended his removal to the President. With his removal, the central 
bank's independence was removed as well. See Powell (2002), p. 12. 
501 Interest rates at this level were not consistent with growth expectations and debt 
sustainability calculations. "By pursuing and accepting a debt swap on such onerous terms, the 
Argentine government was effectively declaring that it shared the market's assessment that 
sovereign default was virtually inevitable. Thus, the debt swap on these terms is property viewed as 
an act of desperation by a debtor who is prepared to promise almost anything in the longer term for 
relatively modest debt service relief in the nearer term." Mussa (2002), p. 24. 
502 See Powell (2002), p. 13. 
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a subsidy, while importers were charged a duty. With this measure, in effect, a 
devaluation of the Peso of about eight percent503 was undertaken by fiscal means, 
in order to stimulate exports, discourage imports, and thus to reduce the needs for 
external finance. This measure was received very unfavourably by the markets, as it 
put at risk the already strained relation with the IMF. 
So, in July, presumably to appease the IMF, the "Plan Deficit Gero" (zero deficit 
plan) was announced and made law, by which the federal government (but not the 
provinces) was prescribed drastic across-the-board cuts in expenditures with the 
goal to balance the federal budget from August on. Expenditure cuts were decreed 
such as to equal available revenues. They included a 13 percent salary and pension 
cut for all public sector employees (of the federal government only)504. Although the 
wage cut was justifiable in the sense that private sector nominal wages had been 
falling as well during the recession505 , it caused social and political unrest. Markets 
reacted very negatively to the zero deficit plan, with risk spreads climbing to 1,600 
basis points506. Despite the cuts, the weakening economy made budget revenues 
fall faster than government spending. The announcement of the zero deficit plan in 
effect triggered a bank run, as mostly institutional investors and larger private 
depositors started to withdraw deposits. 
After some tense weeks with falling bank deposits, risk spreads approaching 
1,700 basis points, and negotiations with the IMF, a second augmentation of IMF 
assistance (to SDR 17 billion, equalling about 22 billion US-Dollars) was negotiated 
in August507. The agreement was only moderately successful in persuading 
investors that the crisis was one of liquidity and not of solvency, and in pushing 
interest rates down: the bank run came to a halt and spreads went down, although 
only to 1,400 basis points. 
503 See Calvo/lzquierdofTalvi (2003), p. 46. 
504 This cut was later (in August 2002) declared unconstitutional by the supreme court. 
505 See Jonas (2002), p. 16. Apart from that, federal employees were generally paid much 
more than private sector employees (45 percent more, comparing the average wages of federal 
and private sector employees for the year 1998). See IMF Independent Evaluation Office (2004), p. 
27. 
506 The unexpectedly negative market reaction has been explained by either the perception 
that the zero deficit plan was not credible, that it did not include a big enough adjustment, or that it 
was perceived to reveal a situation much worse than expected, with the implicit admission that 
private sector funding was not expected any more. See Powell (2002), p. 15. 
507 The conditions included a renewed attempt to reform federal fiscal relations, and 
preparations for a voluntary swap programme for foreign debt. 
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Yet, the deposit losses already incurred (over 10% of total deposits), as well as 
the still very high risk spreads, caused a credit crunch that hit a private sector 
already deprived of access to international capital markets. With the suffering 
economy, fiscal revenues continued to fall short of any targets, and of course of the 
"deficit cero". A new debt restructuring that had to include foreign investors, i.e. 
default, was increasingly perceived as unavoidable508 . 
Messy politics added to the increasing uncertainty. The ruling Alianza coalition 
was in disarray over the fiscal austerity measures, as well as over Convertibility, 
which was proposed to be abandoned by the left-wing member FREPASO in 
September. After the Lower and Upper House elections in October 2001, which 
gave the Peronist Party a majority in both houses, the coalition finally broke. 
The announcement and implementation of another policy package on 
November 1st included a two-phase debt exchange for both local and international 
bondholders (called "orderly" instead of "voluntary"), further "competitiveness plans", 
VAT reductions on debit card payments, temporary rebates on employees' social 
security contributions, a corporate debt restructuring scheme, as well as an amnesty 
for accrued interest and penalty payments on outstanding tax obligations509 . 
Although phase I of the debt exchange, aimed at domestic creditors510 , was 
completed by November 30, risk spreads reached 3,000 basis points. As bond 
prices fell, it got ever more widely realised what a default on sovereign debt would 
mean for heavily exposed domestic banks' balance sheets, and in turn, what failing 
banks would mean for the government's solvency position. A directive by which the 
508 Interestingly, despite IMF pressure to do so, the authorities did not seriously consider 
drawing on the contingent repo lines negotiated with a consortium of private banks after Tequila, for 
several reasons: first, parts of the government securities that had been agreed to collateralise these 
credits had been retired from the markets as a result of the previous debt exchange so that the 
potential credit line was in effect reduced to a fraction of the negotiated value; second, it was feared 
that drawing on these lines would alarm investors; and third, the expected reaction of the potential 
creditor banks of throwing other government securities on the markets would have made bond 
prices collapse. See Eichengreen (2001a), p. 26. 
509 See DominguezfTesar (2004), p. 25. 
510 It included the exchange of old government debt for guaranteed loans to the federal 
government at lower interest rates and longer maturities, collateralised by revenue from the 
financial transactions tax. Phase II was meant to be directed at international creditors, but never 
came to be realised. See IMF Independent Evaluation Office (2004), p. 56. 
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central bank effectively capped interest rates paid on deposits511 eventually 
triggered a full-scale run in the financial system. Within three days, 3.6 billion Pesos 
were withdrawn, bringing the cumulative decline to 15 billion, or 20 percent of total 
deposits since the beginning of the year. 
So, on December 2nd , in an effort to confront intensifying deposit withdrawals 
and capital flight, the government enacted far-reaching interferences in banking and 
foreign exchange transactions, such as a ban on granting loans in Pesos (and a 
forced conversion of existing Peso loans into Dollars), restrictions in transferring 
Dollars abroad, as well as a decree by which deposit withdrawals in cash were 
limited to 250 Dollars per week for each individual bank account (the so-called 
"corralito")512 . In a desperate step a few days later, the government forced pension 
funds to buy government bonds. 
Financial markets were appeased neither by the government's activism, nor by 
the IMF's financial support513. Argentina completely lost market access as the 
spreads on its bonds continued to rise, to exceed 5,000 basis points towards that 
year's end. Finally, with Argentina continuously failing to comply with the fiscal 
targets agreed, the IMF decided in early December not to clear a disbursement 
scheduled for that month. 
4.2.6.2 Emission of Quasi-Monies 
As neither the IMF's financial assistance nor various demand-stimulating 
measures were successful in restoring investors' confidence, the liquidity-pressed 
federal government resorted to printing small-denomination bonds, the so-called 
"Lecops" ("letras de cancelaci6n de obligaciones provinciales"), with which it paid its 
tax obligations to the provinces. Many provinces followed suit and issued their own 
provincial bonds, such as e.g. the "Patac6n" of Buenos Aires province, or the 
511 On November 23rd , a 100 percent liquidity requirement was imposed on deposits paying an 
interest rate higher than one percentage point above the average of all local banks. See IMF 
Independent Evaluation Office (2004), p. 61. 
512 After a sudden increase in the number of new bank accounts, the government quickly 
changed the decree to limit deposit withdrawals per person rather than per account. - Payments 
with cheques, credit and debit cards, and electronic payment were left unrestricted. Deposits could 
be exchanged against federal bonds (BODENs) with different maturities. See Dominguez/Tesar 
(2004 ), pp. 14 and 26. - "Corralito" means "little fence", alluding to a corral where cattle are herded 
into in order to transport them to the abattoir. 
513 Most of the described measures were introduced by the Argentine authorities without prior 
consultation with the IMF. See IMF Independent Evaluation Office (2004), p. 61. 
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"Lecor" of Cordoba, to pay wages, pensions, and unemployment grants514 . These 
quasi-monies were accepted for tax payments and went to be broadly accepted also 
for every-day consumer transactions. The amounts issued rose quickly during the 
second half of 2001, to exceed 24 percent of total Pesos in circulation in 
December515 . 
4.2.6.3 Social and Political Overflow, and the End of the CBA 
After three years of recession and severe wage cuts, the deposit freeze was just 
what confiscation-experienced Argentines needed to lose patience. The corralito 
deeply outraged Argentine depositors, and especially the middle classes, who took 
to the streets and staged the so-called "cacerolazos"516 , to join the more serious 
demonstrations, riots, and lootings going on in the streets of Buenos Aires. 
After the IMF's decision, on December 51\ to withhold a scheduled loan 
instalment of 1.24 billion US-Dollars because of Argentina's fiscal non-compliance, 
the authorities announced that payments on foreign debt could no longer be 
guaranteed. A national strike was called in protest against the corralito and pension 
payments delays, and a series of demonstrations against the government's 
economic policies followed. Violent social unrest unloaded. The state of emergency 
was declared, as well as the closing of banks for several days. The president 
resigned, on December 20th , after the riots had cost human lives517 . The country 
sunk into chaos, with the following twelve days seeing four new presidents in 
office518 . 
On December 23rd , 2001, the then president Rodriguez Saa declared default on 
Argentina's federal and provincial external debt (worth 81 billion US-Dollars in face 
value). While sticking to Convertibility, he announced the creation of a new, parallel 
514 The issue of these parallel currencies generated real seigniorage revenue for the federal 
and provincial governments. See Roubini (2001), p. 15. 
515 See Dominguez/Tesar (2004), p. 12. 
516 "Cacerolazo" refers to the noisy beating of casserole pans in an otherwise peaceful 
demonstration. 
517 Over twenty demonstrators died in the riots. 
518 After Fernando de la Rua's resignation, in accordance with the constitution, the president of 
the Senate, Ramon Puerta, became interim president. Adolfo Rodriguez Saa was elected president 
by the legislative assembly on December 23'a, only to resign seven days later. Eduardo Camano, 
head of the lower house, became the new interim president (as Ramon Puerta had resigned as 
senate president). He was replaced when the legislative assembly elected Eduardo Duhalde on 
January 1 ", 2002. 
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and inconvertible, fiat currency, the "Argentino"519 , as well as a new job creation 
programme. He left the "corralito" untouched, announcement which set off new 
street riots on December 29th . His resignation was forced on December 30th by 
Peronist provincial governors not agreeing with his emergency measures. Finally, 
on January 3rd , 2002, the new president, Eduardo Duhalde, announced the end of 
the CBA (to introduce a dual foreign exchange regime), and thus put an end to more 
than ten years of guaranteed one-to-one convertibility between the Peso and the 
US-Dollar. 
4.2. 7 A Sketch of the Post-Collapse 
Convertibility was replaced by a dual exchange rate regime, by which the Peso 
was devalued to the relation 1.4 Pesos to 1 Dollar for foreign trade transactions, and 
floated for all other transactions. In February, the exchange rate was unified, and 
asymmetric pesification of bank balance sheets was decreed: all debts up to 
100,000 Dollars were converted to Pesos at 1: 1, while larger loans and deposits 
were converted at the "official" exchange rate of 1.4 Pesos to the Dollar. Creditors 
were decreed to be compensated for the devaluation costs from the revenues of a 
new tax on oil. Capital and bank account controls, including the "corralito", were 
stuck to and intensified (the "corralito" was finally abolished after one year, on 
December 2nd , 2002). Though banks were formally compensated with special 
government bonds (the so-called BODENs), asymmetric pesification commanded 
the financial sector into bankruptcy. In March, the pesification of government debt 
issued under Argentine law was decreed520 . 
During the first weeks of 2002, the Peso market exchange rate jumped to reach 
its peak in late march at 4 Pesos in the Dollar. It later stabilised to 3 Pesos per 
Dollar and was kept there since then. However, the pass-through on inflation stayed 
moderate, thanks to idle capacities and low wage pressure, with prices rising by 40 
percent in 2002. A complete credit crunch, diving consumption (minus 13 percent) 
and investment (minus 36 percent), soaring unemployment (it reached 25 percent in 
519 The "Argentino" was intended to act as a "consumption currency", officially to replace the 
variety of quasi-monies that were circulating in the economy, but probably rather another short-
circuit attempt for printing-press financed spending. It did not rise above the announcement level. 
See Krugman (2001b). 
520 See IMF Independent Evaluation Office (2004), p. 100. 
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the second half of 2002521 ), and a fall of GDP by 11 percent marked the year 2002, 
with the result that per capita income by that time was 22 percent below its 1998 
level. Real wages fell by 30 percent in that year, and 56 percent of the Argentines 
were counted as living below the official poverty line522. 
Economy minister Roberto Lavagna, brought in by Duhalde (and kept by his 
successor Kirchner523), is widely credited for having engineered the following swift 
recovery, which started in the second half of 2002 and brought strong growth (plus 
8.7 percent) with low inflation (4 percent) in 2003 that continued to approach the 
1998 GDP level again in 2005. Inflation, however, has risen with the tightening 
capacity constraints, to surpass 10 percent in late 2005. 
The devalued Peso entailed a dramatic shift in relative prices in favour of 
tradables, thus stimulating exports and import substitution. Exports rose by 15 
percent in 2003524, imports decreased, foreign reserves grew, and the current 
account moved into surplus - helped, of course, by soaring world market prices for 
farm products and the weakening Dollar. 
The relative cheapening of labour reduced unemployment fast (to around 11 
percent in 2005, or 13 percent including those receiving welfare payments), but 
also, besides the severe credit restriction, helped discourage investment in capital 
intensive sectors. The investment drought has been especially severe in the 
infrastructure and energy sectors, where tariffs have been pesified and frozen in 
early 2002, pushing the privatised utilities into default on their dollar debt. Looming 
energy shortages, endangering growth, are the result of the investment standstill. 
Absent domestic and foreign credit, and precluded the money printing option, 
public and private saving remained as the only sources of finance. The fiscal 
situation has vastly improved (with primary budget surpluses of over 3 percent 
annually), thanks above all to the stop in servicing debt (except the debt owed to the 
IMF and other multilateral institutions, "guaranteed" debt, and the bank 
521 The official number is 21 percent, but does not include those receiving minimum income 
payments under a new welfare programme ("jefes y jefas de hogar desocupados") which supports 
unemployed heads of households with a monthly stipend (150 Pesos as of late 2004). The 
programme is widely perceived as being manipulated by local political bosses who are suspected 
of handing out the money in exchange for political support. See e.g. N.N. (2004), p. 7. 
522 See Gerchunoff/Aguirre (2004 ). 
523 Though Kirchner has sacked him in November 2005. 
524 However, only half of export growth reflected changes in volume, and half was due to 
higher prices. 
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compensation bonds) and new taxes on exports and on financial transactions. 
Despite fears of capital flight and re-dollarisation, a slight rise in Peso savings 
occurred, albeit deposited only short-term. Thus, a slow stabilisation of bank's 
liabilities has been taking place, though their assets side is still crunched, with credit 
amounting to only 8 percent of GDP in 2004 (compared to 22 percent in 2000), all of 
it short-term525 . 
The debt restructuring, finally completed in early 2005, imposed a 65 percent 
haircut to international creditors' titles, reflecting cuts in principal, lengthenings of 
maturity, and reductions in interest. This restructuring was without precedent in 
terms of the harshness with which the government confronted creditors, the size of 
the haircut and total debt write-down achieved (almost 70 billion US-Dollars out of 
more than 100 billion outstanding), the number of bondholders having not signed up 
(holding together 26 percent of the defaulted bonds, or 25 billion US-Dollars in 
value), the dispersion of titles (152 bonds), creditors (over 500,000), currencies 
(six), and jurisdictions (eight) involved, and also in being carried through without IMF 
involvement. 
Important areas have remained untackled as yet, among them the 
recapitalisation of the agonal banking system (only a few banks have closed their 
doors), the reforms necessary to rationalise the tax system and the federal 
redistribution scheme, the overdue re-negotiation of tariffs with most foreign-owned 
privatised utilities, and the promotion of capacity maintaining and increasing 
investment in infrastructure and the tradables sector. Uncertainty about the future 
macroeconomic course, repeatedly fed by the populist and left-leaning rhetoric of 
President Kirchner, is also standing in the way of badly needed bigger investment. 
The benefits of the recovery seem, once again, not to trickle down equally, and 
poverty is still rampant: though unemployment has come down, nearly 40 percent 
are still living below the poverty line, and seventy per cent of the employed earn less 
than the minimum required to cover an average family's food expenses526. All of this 
is boding ill for the long-term prospects of the country. 
525 See BIS Review 62/2004, <http://www.bis.org/review/r041028c.pdf>. 
526 See http://web.amnesty.org/report2005/arg-summary-eng. 
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5 What Went Wrong? 
Pointing to convertibility or dollarisation as basic explanations of the 
crisis, in order to downplay structural problems in fiscal institutions, 
overlooks the fact that they were precisely chosen after decades of fiscal 
mismanagement.527 
5.1 The Main Suspects 
199 
After the CBA's collapse at the turn of the year 2001, obituaries mushroomed. A 
multitude of factors was made responsible for Argentina's latest crisis, factors of 
external or internal origin, solely or jointly in a variety of combinations. Many of them 
had been the subjects of ever-repeated warnings since the CBA's inception. 
Fiscal imbalances as well as the overvalued real exchange rate, clearly inter-
related as they are, figure most prominently among the culprits. These 
predispositions made the country extremely vulnerable to external shocks. 
Accordingly, the "sudden stop" hypothesis has gained some prominence; an 
approach focussing on adverse policy constellations within MERCOSUR sheds 
further light on the issue. Important co-factors of the crisis are, undoubtedly, various 
institutional deficiencies, tackled little or not at all during the 1990s, as well as 
political economy in a country that, for many, seemed improbable to bring forth 
durably coherent politics, given its track record. Other blames extend beyond the 
country's sole responsibilities, and point at international financial organisations, in 
their vanguard the IMF, as having helped bring about the unfortunate outcome. In 
the same vein, the liberal policy recommendations labelled "Washington 
Consensus" find themselves made responsible for the disastrous outcome. Finally, 
the much-repeated argument that the CBA itself contained the conditions of its own 
inevitable destruction has to be addressed. 
5.1.1 Fiscal Imbalance 
The foremost explanation for the CBA's fall relates to large and persistent fiscal 
deficits. As has been shown, Convertibility made fiscal policy extremely important, 
as it was, due to the reserve backing rule which constrained monetary policy, the 
only tool of macroeconomic management. This required budgets balanced over the 
business cycle, but in any case levels of public debt low enough to maintain 
527 Lopez Murphy/Artana/Navajas (2003), p. 23. 
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borrowing capacities that would be large enough to allow for sufficient deficit 
financing during downturns and for lender of last resort assistance in case of 
banking crises. Moreover, credibility of the Dollar parity required the government's 
unquestioned capacity to borrow in Dollars, itself again dependent on fiscal 
solvency, in order to guarantee unrestricted convertibility. 
As has been shown, fiscal deficits persisted, and were massively financed by 
borrowing on domestic and, increasingly, international capital markets528 . Though 
Argentina's debt management was quite sophisticated (it avoided excessive 
dependence on short term or floating interest rate debt and sought to discharge it 
from the dominance of Dollar denominated debt529), the rapid growth in public 
indebtedness resulted in serious rollover problems when the external shocks of the 
late 90s pushed the country into recession and encumbered access to capital 
markets. However, the core of fiscal problems was widely, and for too long, seen as 
lying in the flow variable, the budget deficit. Only after a lengthening row of failed 
attempts to redress the fiscal deficit did it become undeniable that the problem was 
much harder to come by, as it had developed into a stock problem: total debt was 
far too high to be sustainable under other than very favourable conditions. 
Thus, fiscal profligacy seems to stand at the centre of Argentina's crisis, giving 
perfect credit to traditional, fundamentals oriented, crisis explanations. Both the flow 
and stock determinants of debt sustainability will be dealt with in what follows. 
5.1.1.1 Persistent Budget Deficits 
The federal primary balance averaged, over the period 1992-2001, 0.73 percent 
of GDP. It was in deficit once (in 1996) and usually, with the exception of the early 
90s, amounted to a surplus of less than one percent. Including the provinces, the 
record deteriorates, with an average of 0.03 percent, and four years of negative 
528 Despite the growth in domestic financial markets (Argentina started with very small 
domestic markets in 1991, due partly to Argentina's low savings rate of hardly 15 percent of GDP), 
domestic sources (mostly banks and pension funds) amounted, in late 2000, to only roughly half of 
the financing, with the rest stemming from external sources. 90 percent of total public debt was 
foreign currency denominated. By late 2000, Argentina was the largest emerging-market borrower 
on international capital markets (accounting for a fifth of the entire asset class). See IMF 
Independent Evaluation Office (2004), p. 86, and Mussa (2002), p. 15. 
529 During much of 1999 and early 2000, Argentina issued Euro bonds, taking advantage from 
the decline in European interest rates, induced by the advent of the Euro, and serving the 
preferences of yield seeking investors. 
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primary balances (1995/96, 1999, and 2001)530 . Interest payments averaged 2.8 
percent of GDP during 1991-2001 531 . The resulting overall fiscal balance was 
negative, both with and without the provinces, throughout the whole period, with the 
single exception of the year 1993. Argentina entered the recession of the late 1990s 
with an overall fiscal deficit of 2.1 percent of GDP in 1998 (1.3 percent excluding the 
provinces), which, taken at face value, does not seem too worrying. However, 
several facts have to be taken into account to judge these deficits adequately. 
First, a simple exercise in summing-up reveals that the accumulated budget 
deficits do not correspond, as one would reasonably expect, with the rise in public 
debt. Taking the period between 1993 and 1998 (which largely excludes the initial 
stabilisation boom, but still incorporates, despite the Tequila interruption, strong 
average growth with virtual zero inflation), the difference between the two amounts 
to more or less one percent of GDP532 . The explanation for this difference is that a 
substantial portion of public debt incorporated borrowings to finance off-budget-
liabilities (such as the court-ordered payments of past obligations to pensioners, to 
government suppliers, and to provincial governments)533 . Budget deficits therefore 
never represented a complete measure of fiscal performance. The debt to GDP 
ratio rose by around 12 percent during six years - six years in which growth would 
have been strong enough to allow for a constant ratio of indebtedness. 
Second, the comparatively favourable official deficit figures included two major 
sources of non-recurring relief. One was the Brady restructuring of 1993 which 
incorporated a significant upfront relief in interest payments against a back-loading 
of payments due in later years. So, the 1993 fiscal surplus was aided by proceeds 
from the Brady bond restructuring entering the books of that year534 . The other 
boost was given by non-recurring privatisation receipts, amounting to around 24 
billion Dollars until 1998535 . 
530 See IMF Independent Evaluation Office (2004), p. 10. 
531 See Lopez Murphy/Artana/Navajas (2003), p. 24. 
532 On basis of the data given by the IMF Independent Evaluation Office (2004), the difference 
amounts to 1.3 percent of GDP. Mussa (2002) uses slightly different numbers and arrives at 0.6 
percent. See Mussa (2002), p. 8. 
533 Mussa (2002) reckons that, without the off-budget-liabilities, the strong GDP growth (by 26 
percent in nominal terms between 1993 and 1998) should have made the debt to GDP ratio result 
seven percent below the sum of declared yearly deficits. See Mussa (2002), p. 8. 
534 See Mussa (2002), p. 8. 
535 See Heymann (2000), p. 55. 
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On the other hand, the extraordinary burden on the public budget arising from 
the social security reform of 1994, i.e. the upfront transfer of funds from the public to 
the private pension scheme (equalling about one percent of GDP in the years 
following the reform), although promising long-term relief, worsened the short-term 
fiscal situation. Yet, it should have been possible to neutralise this effect with the 
extraordinary receipts and back-loaded obligations sketched above. 
Thus, looking behind the mere numbers of seemingly modest fiscal deficits, the 
fiscal performance of the nineties clearly does not look like the reflection of 
disciplined fiscal policies. What is more, such record obviously defies the notion of 
the CBA disciplining fiscal policy, as well as of privatisations helping restore fiscal 
balance. Tellingly, as soon as 1994, one of the early expansionary years (with 5.8 
percent GDP growth), Argentina missed, for the first time in a lengthy row, a fiscal 
target set by the IMF536 . 
5.1.1.2 Total Indebtedness 
Total public sector debt was less than 30 percent of GDP in 1992, and reached 
41 percent in late 1998, to rise faster during the following recession years. The 
absolute level of indebtedness, however, was not perceived as worrying until well 
into 2000, when the debt to GDP ratio surpassed 50 percent. From an industrial 
country's perspective, and to judge from the Maastricht criteria, such ratios might 
seem not alarming. Yet for Argentina, the case has to be judged differently for 
several reasons. 
First, emerging market economies, with the typically low degree of trade 
diversification, are in general far more susceptible to real external shocks than 
industrialised countries, even more so when they have fixed exchange rates and 
lack the option to devalue. Such susceptibility requires much lower debt levels ex 
ante, so as to dispose of a broader margin of debt sustainability in the light of a 
more volatile GDP. 
Second, a country which, like Argentina, depends on foreign capital to finance 
its current account deficit needs to insure not only against a cut-off of market access 
in case of deteriorating fundamentals, but also against changes in general market 
sentiment due to contagion537 . The only insurance against the latter risk is 
536 This stayed without consequences only because of Mexico's devaluation a few days later, 
which necessitated fresh assistance. 
537 See IMF Independent Evaluation Office (2004), p. 26. 
Jutta Maute - 978-3-631-75447-4
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 04:44:44AM
via free access
203 
creditworthiness to a degree that expectations of default never emerge, and never 
become self-fulfilling. 
Third, Argentina's both public and private sector debt were for the largest part 
denominated in foreign currency and contracted with creditors abroad. This 
required, for the public sector, enough fiscal revenues available as well as the 
maintenance of convertibility (so that one Peso of these revenues was always 
convertible into one Dollar to service debt), and, for the private sector, enough 
foreign exchange earned out of exports to service the debt. While industrial 
countries raise tax revenues of 40 to 50 percent of GDP, Argentina's tax raising 
capacity rarely exceeded 20 percent of GDP. As, due to Argentina's peculiar federal 
fiscal relations, most of the tax receipts were sucked into the coparticipation 
scheme, only a small proportion of these tax revenues was available for debt 
service. As for the private sector, by 1998, the ratio of total external foreign currency 
debt to export earnings in foreign currency was 500 percent. Such ratios necessarily 
imply a high risk of an external financing crisis538. 
Fourth, beyond any static measure of indebtedness, debt dynamics over time 
should have given enough reason for concern. As already noted, the strongly 
growing indebtedness over years of generally strong economic growth is clear proof 
of a deficient fiscal performance539. 
After Argentina's collapse, efforts were made to develop tools to identify 
benchmarks for sustainable debt-to-GDP ratios for developing countries, both for 
public debt and for total external debt. The IMF arrived, in 2003, at a 40 percent 
threshold for Argentina's external debt to GDP with the CBA, at which point the 
probability for a crisis was estimated at 15-20 percent. Such diagnostics, if in place, 
would have rung alarm in 1998 the latest (factual external debt surpassed 50 
percent of GDP in 1999 and would have required, depending on projections, a 
536 Eichengreen/Hausmann/Panizza (2003) depict currency mismatches as a consequence of 
two distinguished phenomena responsible for developing countries' financing difficulties: "original 
sin" and "debt intolerance", the first comprising problems arising externally, through realities on 
international capital markets (especially the impossibility for a country to place debt in local 
currency), and the latter describing internal problems such as weak institutions and unreliable 
policies. 
539 An analysis of the dynamics of debt towards unsustainability is undertaken in the paragraph 
dedicated to the sudden stop thesis below. 
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turnaround of up to 2.5 percent of GDP in the non-interest current account 
balance)540. 
Reinhart et al. argue that Argentina, with its five defaults since 1820, had 
developed higher debt intolerance through the accumulation of payment difficulties 
over time. With this level of debt intolerance, acquired before the 1990s already, 
they estimate a threshold where markets start ascribing the country a risk of default 
at a total debt to GDP ratio of only 25 to 30 percent (the 30 percent mark was 
surpassed since 1993)541 . Consistent with that view is Argentina's estimated 
"revenue-equivalent debt-to-GDP Maastricht target" of 30 percent542 . In late 2000, 
the factual public debt to GDP ratio of 47.6 percent would, according to 
retrospective IMF estimations, have required a primary surplus of 1.6 percent, while 
the actual balance was in deficit by 0.5 percent543 . 
5.1.2 Overvalued Exchange Rate 
The second common view of the single most important cause of the CBA's end 
is the growing real exchange rate misalignment, developing as a result of the Peso 
appreciating significantly against the Dollar in real terms, first, between 1991 and 
1993, and, second, from 1998 onwards. In between, the real exchange rate showed 
smaller movements, showing both phases of mild depreciation (above all in 1994 
and 1995) and of slight appreciation. 
5.1.2.1 Real Appreciation before 1998 
The Peso's real appreciation of the early 1990s can be explained as the result 
of several factors. First, as a legacy from the high inflation years during the 1980s, 
the Argentine currency started, in 1991, with a value significantly below its long-term 
equilibrium level, so that the post-stabilisation appreciation partly reflected an 
overdue correction. One estimate is that, while the Peso appreciated in real terms 
by about 50 percent in the early 90s with respect to its 1980s average (admittedly a 
doubtful benchmark, but at least giving a clue), half of this appreciation represented 
a catch-up of the previous undervaluation, so that "only" 25 percent of the Peso's 
540 The external debt to GDP ratio jumped to over 140 percent in 2002, displaying the Peso's 
previous degree of overvaluation. See IMF Independent Evaluation Office (2004), p. 88. 
541 See Reinhart/Rogoff/Savastano (2003). 
542 See Guidotti (2004), p. 17. 
543 See IMF Independent Evaluation Office (2004), ibid. 
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appreciation originated in the 1990s544 . Second, in the aftermath of hyperinflation, 
price movements took time to stabilise. While inflation inertia was, to a limited 
degree, calculated into the choice of the exchange rate fixed in 1991, it was well 
known and accepted that disinflation would create additional real appreciation of the 
currency. It took until 1994 for Argentine inflation to fall to international levels, and 
much of the rise in the real value of the currency occurred until that time. Third, in 
addition to the real appreciation of the early 1990s, the US-Dollar started, in 1995, 
to continuously revalue against the European currencies (and later the Euro) which 
meant that the Peso likewise revalued against the currencies of Argentina's trading 
partners545 . 
Pastor/Wise undertook, in 1999, an estimation of the Peso's equilibrium 
exchange rate, via regression of the real exchange rate since 1960. They found that 
its equilibrium value rose over time, which justifies the view of the Peso's real 
appreciation partly as a long-term and sustainable trend546 . Nevertheless, they find 
that, in 1993, the Peso was already about 25 percent above its estimated 
equilibrium value, though this gap was narrowing somewhat due to subsequent real 
depreciation via low (and even negative) inflation towards the end of the decade547 . 
5.1.2.2 The Real Exchange Rate after 1998 
Inescapably, the order of magnitude of a real exchange rate misalignment is a 
controversial issue, due to the impossibility to exactly detect the equilibrium (or 
"fair'') value of an exchange rate at any point of time546 . Hence, it is disputed 
544 See Pastor/Wise (1999), pp. 480 and 496, as well as Dominguez/Tesar (2003), p. 12. 
545 The US-Dollar's surge lasted from August 1995 to February 2002, during which period the 
US-Dollar appreciated by 34 percent. See Joint Economic Committee (2005), p. 2. 
546 See Pastor/Wise (1999), p. 498. It is, however, questionable to conjecture a stable trend in 
equilibrium values, given the highly volatile economic development in the period considered. 
547 "If we generously assume that: (a) zero inflation continues, (b) international inflation stays 
at around 3%, and (c) the equilibrium currency value continues to drift upward, then the actual real 
exchange rate will arrive within 5% of its equilibrium value by the end of 2001." Pastor/Wise (1999), 
p. 498. 
546 There are three theoretical concepts to gauge the "fair" or equilibrium value of a currency. 
These are, first, the notion of purchasing power parity (PPP) which holds that, in the long run, 
exchange rates should equalise the prices of a common basket of tradable goods and services in 
any two countries, but which itself is reduced in its operability by its inherent long-term perspective. 
Second, the concept of the fundamental equilibrium exchange rate (FEER) holds that the fair 
currency value would be consistent with external (current account) and internal balance (full 
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whether, and to which extent, the Peso was overvalued before the series of external 
shocks hit Argentina from 1998 onwards. 
The most evident operational criteria from which to gauge the approximate 
position of the equilibrium exchange rate are, on the one hand, the current account 
balance (a deficit would argue, prima facie, for an overvalued real exchange rate), 
and on the other, the development of foreign exchange reserves (declining reserves 
would suggest overvaluation). The current account aspect, especially the strong rise 
in imports, might support the notion of a real overvaluation of the Peso during the 
whole of the 1990s, both in relation to the main trading partners and to the US. 
However, evident counterarguments are, first, the equally (if less than imports) 
rising exports (which, granted, are difficult to interpret, given the low initial base, the 
trade liberalisation efforts, and the impact on trade flows of MERCOSUR), second, 
the notion that trade does not have to be perfectly balanced to be "fair", and, third 
and probably more important, that the deficits might mainly have reflected 
differences in national savings and investment rates: given the low domestic 
savings rate (less than 15 percent of GDP during the 1990s on average549), the 
investment growth, primarily of the early 1990s, was largely financed out of vigorous 
capital inflows, themselves validating the exchange rate550 . As to the international 
reserves criterion, these were built up strongly to back the currency and to 
remonetise the economy, so that they can be referred to as a symptom of 
overvaluation only from late 2000, when they ended their strong and almost 
uninterrupted rise during the 1990s. 
A further important argument as to why the real appreciation of the Peso might 
be judged as more of a natural and potentially beneficial process is the rapid 
productivity growth. This is supported by calculations which find the real Peso-Dollar 
employment with low inflation), but again, this concept is not an operable guide. Third, the idea of 
the behavioural equilibrium exchange rate (BEER) examines which economic variables (such as 
productivity growth or budget balances relative to other countries, or net foreign assets} have 
determined the exchange rate in the past and compares them with current values of these variables 
and the current exchange rate, assuming stable relationships. While, e.g., Argentina's strong 
productivity growth in the early 1990s can be argued to take the edge of much of overvaluation 
concerns, its overall turbulent past disqualifies any such serious analysis from the start. 
549 Argentines thus saved nearly 1 0 percent of GDP less than emerging economies on 
average. See IMF Independent Evaluation Office (2004), p. 86. 
550 Both FOi and portfolio investment showed sound term structures, so that the suspicion of a 
prevalence of short-term, easy-exit, positions of investment which would reflect doubts about 
exchange rate sustainability does not hold. See Pastor/Wise (1999), p. 481. 
Jutta Maute - 978-3-631-75447-4
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 04:44:44AM
via free access
207 
exchange rate based on unit labour costs depreciating by almost 50 percent 
between 1991 and 1998551 . 
Thus, it is far from clear whether, or to which degree, the Peso's real 
appreciation up to 1998 was an equilibrium phenomenon, reflecting a necessary 
and positive course of events, or rather was the result of the fixed exchange rate 
(i.e. of economic parameters inconsistent with the hard peg). Accordingly, views on 
the Peso's overvaluation in 1998, when the series of external shocks started to hit 
the country, vary widely. Estimations ranged, in 1999, from zero {held, 
understandably, by government officials) to about 25 percent. In early 2000 (the 
period before economic and financial conditions worsened further, and before the 
Euro further weakened against the Dollar), the Peso's overvaluation was still 
gauged highly differently by economic researchers, ranging from a mere seven to 
over twenty percent552 . 
5.1.3 Sudden Stop 
The sudden stop interpretation of the CBA's collapse focuses on the unforeseen 
standstill of capital inflows, provoked by the Russian crisis in August 1998, and its 
detrimental effects on an economy with the peculiar characteristics of Argentina553 . 
The sudden stop came, in its severity, to most as a surprise, as the speed and 
extent of contagion was hitherto unseen, and as it also hit countries that had little or 
no economic relations to Russia - such as Argentina. Thus, the crisis did not fit well 
with traditional explanations of financial crises, which is why it led to an intensified 
focussing on capital market behaviour as an autonomous trigger of crisis554 . 
Besides having been unexpected, the sudden stop also failed to meet 
expectations that it would stay, as the Tequila crisis had been, only short-term, and 
that markets would recover quickly. Tellingly, the spreads on Argentine government 
551 See IMF Independent Evaluation Office (2004), p. 20. 
552 See IMF Independent Evaluation Office (2004), p. 23. 
553 This paragraph draws mainly from Calvo/lzquierdo/Talvi (2003). 
554 The most important arguments are derived from the assumption of asymmetric information: 
given the relatively high fixed costs of obtaining information about a country to invest in, only the 
largest investors will be able to specialise and to be well informed. The remaining, less informed, 
investors in the market tend to observe the informed leaders' market transactions to the minute, in 
order to derive from these a directive for their own behaviour. Seeing a presumably informed 
investor selling assets, but not being able to deduct his motives with certainty, can lead to 
supersensitive behaviour of other investors, and a spreading of asset sales through the market on 
the grounds of reasons possibly not related to the country's fundamentals. 
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bonds over US treasuries remained lower than average emerging markets' spreads 
until August 2000, which can be interpreted as capital markets considering 
Argentina's fiscal situation sustainable until then. The provision of multilateral 
institutions' (IMF) financing during that time obviously made up for the missing 
private capital flows and their negative impact on the economy and government 
finances. Hence the conjecture that, would the shock have been less long-lived, 
default could have been avoided555 . However, the capital stop's persistence and the 
subsequent adaptation of expectations about Argentina's fiscal solvency worked to 
render the fiscal situation unsustainable. 
The following calculations depict the magnitude of derogation of fiscal 
sustainability after the sudden stop. While it can be argued that, in the absence of 
the sudden stop, Argentina's fiscal position was not unsustainable in 1998, there is 
no doubt that it was highly vulnerable to real exchange rate swings. 
5.1.3.1 Leveraged Argentina 
The large and unexpected withdrawal of international capital from the current 
account and the corresponding rise in interest rates met a country with the three 
well-known fatal characteristics of relative closedness, high public and private 
indebtedness, and high liability dollarisation. Being closed meant that the share of 
exported tradable goods in total output was small in relation to the domestic 
absorption of tradables (i.e. of imports or exportable goods of domestic origin), and 
that, · consequently, a high proportion of domestic absorption (consumption and 
investment) had to be financed by capital imports (rather than by export 
revenues)556 . High liability dollarisation, on the other hand, implied large currency 
mismatches in the public as well as the private non-tradables sector (Dollar debts to 
be serviced out of Peso incomes). These mismatches in both output and debt 
composition potentialised the sudden stop's devastating effects. 
The sudden stop withdrew the current account deficit's financing. With the 
exchange rate fixed, the corresponding improvement of the current account had to 
occur via a fall in the domestic absorption of tradables. This fall required a fall in the 
prices of non-tradable relative to tradable goods, i.e. domestic deflation, or, put 
555 See Calvo/lzquierdofTalvi (2003), p. 35. 
556 Put differently, the more closed an economy, i.e. the smaller the share of tradables in 
domestic production in relation to the domestic absorption of tradables, the higher is the country 
leveraged towards the exterior, i.e. the higher are the domestic adjustment needs following external 
shocks. 
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differently, an increase (depreciation) in the real exchange rate. The more closed an 
economy, the higher the real exchange rate adjustment required to compensate for 
the withering capital inflows. 
Calvo/lzquierdo/Talvi (2003)557 quantify Argentina's economic characteristics 
and the effects of the sudden stop. According to their computation of an "un-
leveraged absorption coefficient", Argentina ranked, in 1998, comparatively low 
within a group of Latin American economies, signifying that its absorption was 
higher leveraged, i.e. its economy significantly more closed, than, say, that of its 
neighbour Chile. From this they derive the required real exchange rate depreciation 
to bring the current account to balance: it would have been 46 percent. As it turned 
out, according to their calculations, Argentina's real exchange rate depreciated by 
only 14 percent between 1998 and 2001, which accordingly did not suffice to close 
the current account gap. 
5.1.3.2 Debt Sustainability 
Taking high liability dollarisation into the picture, it gets clear that Argentina's 
debt composition added to its unfavourable output composition to aggravate the 
consequences of the sudden stop. Thus, besides the immediate recessionary 
impact of the required rise in the real exchange rate, its effects on debt sustainability 
were detrimental. 
Debt sustainability requires a minimum primary surplus to service a constant 
debt to GDP ratio. The debt to GDP ratio is determined by debt (Peso debt, and 
Dollar debt times the real exchange rate) and output (output of non-tradables, and 
of tradables times the real exchange rate). When, as in the case of Argentina, 
domestic output is dominated by non-tradables, while total debt is dominated by 
Dollar debt, the real depreciation necessary to restore external balance has to be 
comparatively large, and thus breaks through heavily on the debt component: the 
revaluation effects of the real exchange rate depreciation undermine debt 
sustainability. 
Calvo/lzquierdo/Talvi (2003) quantify Argentina's "public sector debt mismatch 
measure" for the year 1998, and find that its value was one of the lowest in Latin 
America558 , and very close to zero, i.e. close to the worst case where a real 
557 See Calvo/lzquierdofTalvi (2003), pp. 15ff. 
558 Calvo/lzquierdofTalvi (2003) calculate Argentina's ,.public sector debt mismatch measure" 
at 0.01, the worst (together with Ecuador) of the sample of Latin American countries, compared 
with the highest sample measure of 0.45 for Chile. See Calvo/lzquierdofTalvi (2003), p. 22. 
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exchange rate depreciation fully hits upon debt sustainability. With this mismatch, 
under the (unrealistically optimistic) assumption of both constant interest rates and 
GDP growth, the required 46 percent rise in the real exchange rate would lead to a 
revaluation of debt such, that Argentina's debt to GDP ratio would jump from 36.5 
(the observed value of 1998) to 49.7 percent, increasing the primary surplus 
required for debt sustainability by 0.7 percent of GDP to 1.6 percent. 
Allowing for the more realistic conditions of increased interest rates and slower 
GDP growth, as well as for the inclusion of those contingent liabilities which reflect 
the fiscal cost expected to be incurred by the government eventually bailing out the 
financial sector, the post sudden stop-debt to GDP ratio approaches 59 percent, so 
that the required primary surplus rises to 3.6 percent of GDP (from an observed 
primary surplus of 0.9 percent in 1998), itself requiring, e.g., a 13.5 percent cut in 
total expenditures, or, alternatively, a debt reduction by 75 percent559. 
5.1.3.3 The Sudden Stop in the Region 
A comparison of the different outcomes of the sudden stop within Latin America 
sheds further light on Argentina·s unfavourable predispositions. 
Figure 27: Capital Flows to Latin America between 1998 and 2001 (% of GDP) 
11/1998 111/2001 
Total Capital Flows 5.6 1.6 
Non-FDI Capital 2.0 -0.9 
Flows 
FDI 3.6 2.5 
Includes: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Venezuela. 





Figure 27 reflects the dimension of the reversal in capital flows for the biggest 
Latin American economies between the 2nd quarter of 1998 and the 3rd quarter of 
2001. This sample of countries experienced an improvement in their consolidated 
current account from a deficit of almost five to one percent of their cumulative GDP 
during the same period. 
559 Interest rates were chosen at 200 basis points above the 1998 average, and GDP was 
assumed to slow down by one percent Contingent liabilities were estimated at 19 billion US-
Dollars. See Calvo/lzquierdo/Talvi (2003), pp. 27 and 31. 
560 See Calvo/lzquierdo/Talvi (2003), p. 11. 
Jutta Maute - 978-3-631-75447-4
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 04:44:44AM
via free access
211 
Argentina and its biggest neighbours, Brazil and Chile, confronted the sudden 
stop quite differently. Chile had a higher share of tradables in GDP and a lower 
share of Dollar denominated debt in total debt. Consequently, it required a smaller 
real exchange rate adjustment (32 percent) to close its current account gap, and the 
debt revaluation effects were smaller (its public sector debt mismatch measure 
being much higher - see figure 28). Effectively, between 1998 and 2001, Chile's 
currency depreciated by 45 percent in real terms (as opposed to Argentina's 14 
percent), and its debt to GDP ratio remained largely constant. 
In fact, Chile closed its current account gap (which amounted to nearly 19 
percent of its imports in 1998) completely within one year. Besides import 
reductions, a production shift towards exports (induced by the real exchange rate 
depreciation) contributed to closing the current account gap: as figure 28 shows, the 
change in exports relative to the current account change was positive both until 
1999 and for the period until 2001. In contrast, Argentina's comparatively small 
increase in the real exchange rate delivered no similar incentive to shift production, 
and exports collapsed in 1999, helping further deteriorate the current account. 
Brazil provides another contrasting example. It started from a worse position in 
two respects: its economy was even more closed than Argentina's (its un-leveraged 
absorption coefficient was 0.56), and its debt to GDP ratio already very high at 51 
percent. However, its public debt was to a far smaller degree dollarised than 
Argentina's, which compensated for the unfavourably high absorption of tradables. 
Two other factors contributed to Brazil's more favourable development. First, the 
devaluation of the Real in January 1999 made investments in Brazil highly 
attractive, which obviously managed to quickly overcome international investors' 
general caution (FDI flows increased by 80 percent between 1998 and 2001 ), and 
second, Brazil undertook a severe fiscal adjustment in 1999, resulting in a strongly 
increased primary surplus and improved debt sustainability. 
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Figure 28: The Sudden Stop in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile 
Current Account 
Current Account Balance 1998 (% of GDP) 
Current Account Balance 1999 (% of GDP) 
Current Account Balance 2001 (% of GDP) 
Current Account Change between 1998 and 1999 
(% of 1998 imports) 
Current Account Change between 1998 and 2001 
(% of 1998 imports) 
Exports Change / Current Account Change 
between 1998 and 1999 (%) 
Exports Change / Current Account Change 
between 1998 and 2001 (%) 
Exports Change between 1998 and 1999 (%) 
Exports Change between 1998 and 2001 (%) 
Public Sector 
Debt to GDP Ratio 1998 (%) 
Primary Surplus 1998 (% of GDP) 
Primary Surplus 1999 (% of GDP) 
Primary Surplus 2001 (% of GDP) 
Debt Sustainability Measures 
Un-leveraged Absorption Coefficient 
Required Real Exchange Rate Depreciation 
(to close the current account gap, in %) 
Observed Real Exchange Rate Depreciation 
between 1998 and 2001 




































Sources: Calvo/lzquierdofTalvi (2003); World Economic Outlook (IMF), April 2002; Economist 
Intelligence Unit. 
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5.1.4 Shock Exacerbation within MERCOSUR 
In the debate of the reasons for Argentina's collapse, the focus on 
MERCOSUR, and especially on policy interdependencies within the common trade 
area, is highly relevant561 . 
It might seem that the exchange rate systems of the most important 
MERCOSUR members, Argentina and Brazil - at least until Brazil's devaluation in 
early 1999 - were conducive to the integration of their economies and trade: in July 
1994, Brazil, after several less than successful stabilisation attempts, had pegged 
its new currency, the Real, to the Dollar at a 1 :1 exchange rate. Thus, the Argentine 
Peso and the Brazilian Real were, via the parallel Dollar peg, effectively pegged to 
each other. Such monetary integration should, as one would expect from the theory 
of optimal currency areas, and especially the argument of economic integration 
being endogenous to monetary integration, foster economic integration between the 
two countries, i.e. within MERCOSUR562 . 
However, though the fixed exchange rate required that the money supply in 
both countries be kept in line with Dollar reserves, there was still scope for 
differences in the monetary policies of both countries, as the Real exchange rate 
was allowed to move within a target band. This opened the possibility for the 
Brazilian central bank to sterilise reserve shocks, in order to not let them pass 
through to the domestic money supply. That this scope for different monetary 
policies actually mattered can be shown empirically: monetary base and foreign 
reserves moved nearly completely in parallel in Argentina, mirroring the strict 
currency board rule, while the Brazilian monetary base was only to a small degree 
dependent on the development of Dollar reserves563. In other words, Brazil, despite 
its fixed exchange rate regime, pursued an independent monetary policy within its 
561 This paragraph draws largely from Andrade/Falcao Silva/Trautwein (2005). 
562 For the purpose of this analysis, Argentina and Brazil are taken as equivalent with 
MERCOSUR, while the two other members, Paraguay and Uruguay, are ignored. This is because, 
together, Argentina and Brazil represent the bulk of MERCOSUR: both their combined GNP and 
population figures account for more than 96 percent of the respective MERCOSUR totals. The 
shares in total MERCOSUR GNP are 70.8 and 26.5 percent for Brazil and Argentina, respectively. 
79 percent of the total MERCOSUR population are Brazilian nationals, and 17.3 percent are 
Argentines. 
563 Andrade/Falcao Silva/Trautwein calculate a cointegration vector, which describes the 
relationship between monetary base and reserves between 1991 and 2001, of 0.915 for Argentina 
and of 0.186 for Brazil. See Andrade/Falcao Silva/Trautwein (2005), p. 68. 
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scope for sterilisation of reserves changes (and continued to do so after its move to 
floating the Real) while Argentina closely followed the currency board rule. 
It can be shown that these differences in monetary policies mattered with 
respect to the efficacy of economic policies in both countries, on the one hand, and 
to the transmission of common external shocks, on the other564 . Since Argentina's 
economy is only roughly a third of its neighbour in size, Brazilian policies generally 
could be expected to have a bigger impact on Argentina than vice versa. As to the 
particular effects of policies and external shocks, the Mundell-Fleming framework565 
is adequate to highlight the implications for both the period between 1994 and 1998, 
when both countries had fixed exchange rates, and the period between 1999 and 
2001, after Brazil had moved to floating. 
5.1.4.1 1994-1998: Fixed Here, Fixed plus Sterilisation There 
In the described fixed-fixed-scenario of the years between 1994 and 1998, the 
Mundell-Fleming analysis yields the following effects of macroeconomic policies and 
external shocks on Argentina: 
First, Argentina is positively affected by expansionary monetary policies in 
Brazil, insofar as they lower equilibrium interest rates and increase equilibrium 
income levels in both countries. Second, Argentina is negatively affected by 
Brazilian expansionary fiscal policies, since, while Brazil's higher demand for 
exports from Argentina increases also the income of the latter, this effect is 
outweighed by interest rate-induced capital flows from Argentina to Brazil, which are 
sterilised by the latter, so that the Brazilian restrictive monetary antidote again 
reflects negatively back to Argentina, in the end raising Argentina's equilibrium 
interest rate and lowering its equilibrium income. Third, Argentina's fiscal policies 
(monetary policies are precluded) experience an amplification through Brazilian 
sterilisation: an Argentine fiscal expansion leads to higher, income-induced, demand 
for imports of goods and services from Brazil, as well as to higher, interest rate-
induced, capital imports from Brazil. Brazil sterilises its reserve outflows through 
expansive open-market operations, which in turn reinforce the expansionary effect 
of Argentina's fiscal policies, delivering a process that ends when, due to continuing 
capital imports from Brazil, Argentina's interest rate reaches its original equilibrium 
level. 
564 See also Mussa et al. (2000), p. 51f. 
565 For a concise summary of the Mundell-Fleming model, see e.g. 
<http://cepa.newschool.edu/heUessays/keynes/international.htm>. 
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The third of the described policy interactions within MERCOSUR is highly 
relevant for the understanding Argentina's fiscal performance during the years 1994 
to 1998. According to this analysis, Argentine fiscal expansion did not crowd out 
private investment, since the equilibrium interest rate level remained unchanged 
due to the Brazilian sterilisation policy566 . Fiscal policy, the only remaining macro 
policy tool for Argentina, was thus, as both theoretical analysis and empirical 
evidence suggest, highly effective because it was boosted by its neighbour's 
monetary policy567 . 
For common external shocks, the analysis yields a mitigating effect of Brazil's 
sterilisation policy on both countries. For the case of symmetric negative reserve 
shocks (like, e.g., the Tequila crisis), Brazilian sterilisation of its reserve outflows to 
the rest of the world works, first, to lower Brazilian interest rates and induce 
arbitrage capital movements towards Argentina, and second, to keep up Brazilian 
income and demand for imports from Argentina. Of course, there are limits to 
sterilisation, which did materialise in the wake of the Asian and Russian crisis, when 
reserve outflows in Brazil reached levels which the Brazilian central bank could no 
longer neutralise. Brazil's move to floating and inflation targeting changed the 
described policy interdependencies profoundly. 
5. 1.4. 2 1999-2001: Fixed Here, Floating plus Sterilisation There 
For the new constellation (CBA in Argentina and floating exchange rate in 
Brazil), the analysis yields a drastic exacerbation of the impacts of external shocks 
on Argentina, as follows: 
A common negative reserve shock in both countries now leads to a devaluation 
of the Brazilian currency. This reduces Brazilian demand for imports from Argentina, 
and increases Argentine demand for imports from Brazil. Thus, the Argentine 
economy is hit twice: first by the reserve shock itself (representing, in the Mundell-
Fleming framework, a left-shift of the LM curve), and second, by Brazil's 
depreciation (which induces a left-shift of the IS curve). Possible sterilisation in 
Brazil now changes little, as a sterilisation-induced interest rate differential 
commands arbitrage capital from Brazil to Argentina (thus correcting the LM curve 
again a bit to the right), but thereby also works to further depreciate the Brazilian 
currency (and so to command the IS curve further to the left). The degree of the 
566 Andrade/Falcao SilvafTrautwein (2005) give empirical evidence, using filter analysis and a 
structural VAR model. 
567 Of course, the same would have been true for the case of fiscal restriction. 
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negative reaction on goods markets (left-shift of the IS curve) depends on the 
degree to which Brazil sterilises the reserve shock. 
5.1.4.3 Exposed within MERCOSUR 
As has been shown, even before 1999, monetary policies of Argentina and 
Brazil were different enough to be responsible for various asymmetries in the 
absorption of internal and external shocks. Moreover, while the "fixed / fixed plus 
sterilisation" constellation before 1999 favoured the effects of monetary expansion 
in Brazil and fiscal expansion in Argentina, and mitigated the effects of negative 
external shocks in both countries, this was a double-edged sword: the highly 
effective expansionary policies undermined the fixed exchange rates and led to 
increasing devaluation pressures in the wake of the massive external shocks of the 
late 1990s. So, the lack of monetary policy coordination before 1999 contributed to 
the vulnerability of the fixed exchange rate regimes and to their ultimate collapses. 
After Brazil's move to floating, the disintegrated monetary policies brought the 
existing asymmetries to their extremes, so that common external shocks hit 
Argentina twice, while the impact on the Brazilian economy was buffered by the 
depreciation of the Real. 
Andrade/Falcao Silva/Trautwein (2005) substantiate the above analysis with 
empirical evidence. They find that, as was to be expected, the asymmetries in the 
transmission of domestic and external shocks were strongest when both countries 
pursued extremely different exchange rate and monetary policies568. In particular, 
their correlation analysis of Argentine and Brazilian economic indicators yields 
evidence of increasingly different reactions to exogenous variables: Argentina's 
vulnerability to changes in foreign interest rates and Brazilian output doubled after 
1999, while Brazil was affected less, after 1999, by changes in foreign interest rates 
or Argentine output than before. 
Thus, the diverging monetary policies of Argentina and Brazil have not only 
undermined economic integration within MERCOSUR569 , but also aggravated its 
member countries' vulnerabilities and, ultimately, helped evoke their deep crises. 
568 They examine the correlation of the output cycles of both countries and find significantly 
less synchronised cycles after 1999. See Andrade/Falcao SilvafTrautwein (2005), pp. 74-5. 
569 A further symptom for disintegrating monetary policies in MERCOSUR can be found in 
decreasing trade between the countries. As, according to the endogeneity argument of the theory 
of optimal currency areas, monetary integration is expected to foster economic integration, 
diverging monetary policies within a currency area are, conversely, expected to result in less, 
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5.1.5 Institutional Defects 
Given the impressive growth and disinflation results of the CBA, but the 
disturbing employment and distributional developments, it is argued that the failure 
to co-ordinate macro and micro reforms were also decisive in contributing to the 
CBA's collapse. In other words, the macroeconomic framework, defined by the rigid 
monetary regime and accompanied by the simultaneous trade liberalisation and 
privatisation policies, would have called for deeper institutional changes to help the 
economy adjust to the new conditions. As the argument goes, the lack or 
incompleteness of such microeconomic reforms worked to undermine economic 
performance and social peace, and thus lastly the per se successful 
macroeconomic reforms. 
5.1.5.1 Insufficient Labour Market Reforms 
With a fixed exchange rate, the burden of adjustment of an overvalued real 
exchange rate falls on domestic prices, the flexibility of which can be ensured only 
by, especially downward, flexible wages. Thus, theory has it that flexible labour 
markets have to act as the substitute for a flexible exchange rate. No one would 
sincerely contest the verdict that the labour market reforms Argentina implemented 
were insufficient and sometimes contradictory, often performed in a stop & go 
mode, and often paid heed more to political constraints than to fundamental 
economic necessities. 
One flaw was that the main incentive for, and measure of, the realised labour 
market reforms was always the high unemployment rate570 . While the combat of 
unemployment clearly need not run against the objective of more labour market 
flexibility, there was a neglect and failure in politics to acknowledge, internally and 
publicly, the need for reforms due to other, more fundamental, economic reasons. 
From the start, no serious efforts were made to make the public familiar with the 
thought that higher labour market flexibility was the price to pay for the cherished 
"Convertibilidad". Hence, a lack of consistency and of political courage to market 
and promote labour market deregulation with the parallel goals of reducing 
especially intra-industry, trade. This is confirmed by empirical data: intra-industry trade between 
Argentina and Brazil increased substantially until 1997, and declined afterwards. This development 
can be explained econometrically by macroeconomic policy variables. See Andrade/Falcao Silva/ 
Trautwein (2005), pp. 80ft. 
570 Other motives for reform were, occasionally, also industrial and sectoral policies, while 
distributional aspects never featured as goals of labour market policies. 
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unemployment and "insuring the economy against devaluation" is a serious blame 
the Menem administration has to bear. Clearly, the main factor behind this neglect 
were the trade unions, traditionally strong and the Peronists' fundus, anything but 
weakened from the inflationary past, and generally more worried about preserving 
regulatory achievements than about unemployment. 
Apart from this basic neglect, the reforms enacted can for the biggest part be 
labelled as "too little and too late". What happened during the early 1990s' reforms 
has to be judged partly as steps, if small, into the right direction (above all the 
denting of non-wage labour costs, especially of indemnity payments after 
dismissals), partly as neutral or potentially beneficial but running into the void 
because not achieving sufficient coverage (the employment insurance scheme), and 
partly as complicating and strengthening the regulatory framework while serving 
neither the employment nor the flexibility goals (such as the changes in working 
time and vacation regulations, the frequently altered and diluted rebates on social 
security contributions, or the to and fro manoeuvres with probation period length). 
The record of the reforms of the late 90s can be judged only slightly better: some 
mixed and counterproductive measures (such as the shortening of probation 
periods) were purely politically motivated, meant to secure trade unions' support in 
the elections of 1999. Further gradual reductions in non-wage labour costs and very 
limited freedom to change regulations through collective bargaining were the most 
important achievements. But while the need to adopt deeper labour market reforms 
generally got more acknowledged towards the end of the decade, chronic political 
opposition stood in the way of realising them. 
Potentialising a sufficient adjustment mechanism via labour and goods markets 
would have required more deregulation, especially a weakening of the dominance of 
sectoral collective bargaining in favour of an encouragement of wage negotiations 
on enterprise levels, much further reductions of contractual regulations (instead of 
introducing new, highly regularised, contracting variants), and, especially, more 
easing of the very strict hiring and dismissal regulations571 . Certainly, an agreed and 
socially acceptable level of labour regulations would have had to be respected, with 
the safety nets provided by employment insurance and cash transfer programmes 
for the unemployed, both of which the foundations were laid for. Very importantly, 
571 Likewise, institutions such as "special labour statutes" (giving some workers favoured 
status over others) and union-run health plans sheltered from competition should have been 
abolished. See IMF Independent Evaluation Office (2004), p. 32. 
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qualification measures would have been needed to reduce the mismatches between 
labour demand and supply, and especially to improve the employability of blue 
collar workers, who were hit unproportionately by rising unemployment and by the 
rise of sectors like financial services that favoured workers with higher skills572 . 
Perhaps the most severe failure is that the labour market policies of the 90s did 
not succeed in reducing unregistered employment (to the contrary, they seemingly 
helped drive registered employment into the "black" sphere). The expectation was 
that dented non-wage labour costs and more short-term labour contracts would 
bring about a higher propensity to formalise employment (which measures, to be 
sure, would certainly have helped, but were far from sufficient), but there was no 
(accompanying) direct targeting of the problem573. While one can cynically comment 
that more "black" labour means more overall labour market flexibility, the growth of 
unregistered labour during periods of strong growth is a testimonium paupertatis, 
and proof of labour market regulations still highly burdensome. 
5.1.5.2 Insufficient Diversification of Production 
Argentina's productive structure is also made responsible for standing in the 
way of smoother adjustment to changes in external conditions. In the tradables 
sector, limited progress was made in reducing the dominance of low value-added 
production in favour of the higher value-added export products needed to trigger 
future development and thus income and employment growth. Though various 
measures were taken to subsidise exports of higher value-added products (such as 
tax reimbursements on such exports), the industry's response was weak. The 
reason was the strong Peso which increasingly overlay these incentives by 
discouraging production for foreign and stimulating production for domestic 
markets574 . 
Diversification of production and trade was also encumbered by the relative 
cheapening of capital relative to labour, itself again a consequence of brakeless 
capital imports and of strong trade unions. It entailed growing capital intensity, 
declining employment, and an ongoing process of industrial concentration in capital 
intensive sectors, mirrored by a process of de-industrialisation in labour intensive, 
import-competing sectors. Small and medium sized companies were squeezed out 
572 See Pastor/Wise (1999), p. 490. 
573 Direct measures would have included, e.g., systematic compliance controls and the 
enforcement of penalties. 
574 See Pastor/Wise ( 1999), p. 486. 
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of markets by growing industrial conglomerates, which were financed by foreign 
capital and enjoyed better access to the technologies, skills, and market information 
necessary to compete on world markets575 . 
Concentration took place in the financial sector as well, with bank closures and 
takeovers in the wake of the Tequila crisis. Segmented credit markets reinforced 
industrial concentration: small enterprises were demanded interest rates for 
business loans easily double or triple those demanded from large companies576 . A 
further factor in the thinning base of small and medium sized companies was that 
few traditional links between small and large firms existed, partly a consequence of 
the economy's capricious and inflationary past where inter-business relations were 
kept as small as possible in order to minimise cost and delivery risks. 
Arguably, MERCOSUR also contributed to spare Argentina from more 
competitive pressure from the rest of the world: most (about two thirds during the 
early 90s) of total export growth resulted from intra0 industry trade with Brazil. 
Exports to Brazil consisted overwhelmingly of products from the motor vehicles 
industry, the sector still most regulated through exemptions from trade liberalisation, 
and thus least based on competitive advantages. As a result, Argentina's trade got 
increasingly concentrated on one partner (Brazil) and one sector (motor vehicles)577 . 
A further disappointing trait of Argentina's industrial development is that 
privatised firms, overall, failed to fulfil the expectations of more dynamic production 
and investment activities: neither R&D activities nor export orientation increased by 
much. This was clearly also the failure of the bodies regulating privatised utilities, 
the work of which partly was influenced by lobbying and corruption rather than by 
efficiency considerations578 . 
The sketched problems could have been tackled primarily by improving the 
business environment much more than actually happened. Though, during the 
575 Some numbers illustrate the concentration and labour saving process: in 1994, the biggest 
30 export firms, belonging to just four sectors, covered 55 percent of total exports; the biggest 500 
companies accounted for 30 percent of GDP, but employed only 20% of the workforce; both the 
number of small enterprises and of workers employed by them had fallen during the previous 10 
years by 21 percent. See Pastor/Wise (1999), p. 486. 
576 See Pastor/Wise (1999), p. 487. 
577 While trade with MERCOSUR partners was 20 percent of Argentina's total in 1991, it rose 
to 45 percent in 1998, with the bulk of exports going to Brazil. See Dominguez/Tesar (2004), p. 12. 
578 "The picture is more of oligopolistic rent-seeking than of dynamic enterprise [ ... ]." 
Pastor/Wise (1999), p. 489. 
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1990s, the physical infrastructure got, via utility privatisation, vastly better, and the 
legal framework also improved (with, e.g., a world-class bankruptcy law adopted in 
1991 ), judicial as well as political imponderabilities remained (or even increased in 
the late 1990s). As for the human resource base, this essential part of a forward-
looking business environment was vastly neglected. Striving for higher value-added 
production would have necessitated policies to promote qualification measures and 
the diffusion of technological and marketing skills, as well as measures to expedite 
R&D activities, to encourage venture capital and possibly the growth of industrial 
clusters, in order to facilitate horizontal and vertical integration between smaller and 
larger firms579 . Very importantly, these measures should have been designed 
explicitly to promote industrial development in the provinces. After all, "market 
reform in and of itself is not a development strategy"580 . 
With these cornerstones of a successful industrial policy missed, the final goal, 
an increase in Argentina's openness via a higher share of non-traditional exports, 
was also missed, which helped undermine the macroeconomic framework. 
5.1.5.3 Banking Sector Reforms Impaired 
As indicated above, the banking sector reforms, especially those carried 
through after 1995, concerning banking supervision and prudential policies, were 
considered one of the most successful reform areas within the Convertibility Plan, 
and praised as a model for emerging economies. Together with the encouraged 
entry of foreign-owned banks, assumed to diversify risk away towards their owners 
abroad, the swiftly widening and deepening Argentine financial sector was thought 
healthy and able to match the requirements of an open market economy581 . 
However, some concerns remained about credit policies. The first concern was 
the strong segmentation of credit markets, reflected in wide gaps between the 
interest rates charged small as opposed to large industrial borrowers, and between 
interest payable on Peso as opposed to Dollar loans582 . This segmentation 
579 See Williamson (2003), p. 12. 
580 Pastor/Wise (1999), p. 494. 
581 Banking assets doubled between 1991 and 1999 (from 20 to 40 percent of GDP), and the 
percentage of banking system assets held with foreign banks rose from 15 percent in 1994 to 73 
percent in 2000. See Dominguez/Tesar (2004), p. 12. 
582 Small enterprises were demanded interest rates for business loans easily double or triple 
those demanded from large companies. See Pastor/Wise (1999), p. 487. Interest rate spreads 
between Peso and Dollar currency transactions, often exceeding two percent p.a., reflected not 
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persisted even in times of strong growth, low inflation, and high confidence, such as 
during 1997, when risk spreads of government bonds over US treasuries reached 
their minimum. In discriminating against small businesses and low income earners, 
this partly excessive segmentation fostered industrial concentration and a 
deteriorating distribution of wealth. Second, in the effort to catch up and gain market 
shares in the field of consumer credit, financial institutions embarked on aggressive 
consumer credit policies. Increasingly, credit cards were pushed into a retail 
banking market that just started to develop and largely consisted of over-confident 
consumers, with the result of ever more indebted private households563 . Arguably, 
these developments mirrored neglects in the otherwise successful implementation 
of banking regulations. On the whole, though, and to judge from the weak financial 
constitution the country had started from in 1991, the elaborate prudential standards 
after 1995 represented a huge progress, and, above all, they largely satisfied the 
regulatory needs for a banking sector operating under a currency board, i.e. without 
a lender of last resort. 
But any regulatory framework, however fit, is useless if subject to political 
influence. Several instances of political meddling exposed Argentine banks to 
additional risks. These were, first, the forced resignation of the supposedly 
independent central bank manager, Pedro Pou, in April 2001. Second, the politically 
encouraged, and later openly imposed, massive purchases of government bonds by 
public and private banks (as well as by private pension funds) loaded the banking 
sector with assets of dubitable worth. The permission for banks, in April 2001, to 
include government securities up to 2 billion Dollars to meet liquidity requirements 
was thus only the first formal political abrogation of prudential standards, in a row of 
several factual violations before564 . With the growing weight of government bonds in 
banks' balance sheets, the financial sector was exposed to a broadened cluster of 
risks: not only was it vulnerable to economic downturn (non-performing loans) and 
primarily devaluation risk, but also a lack of competition among banks in a regional context, 
enabling banks to exert some degree of monopoly power on nontradables producers and 
households with a lack of access to international capital markets. See Catao (1998), p. 22. 
583 Payments via bank accounts were also politically encouraged as a means to reduce tax 
evasion. 
584 See Dominguez/Tesar (2004), p. 13. The banking system's exposure to the public sector 
doubled between 1995 and 2001, from 10 percent of total banking assets constituted by public debt 
to 20 percent. 
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to the risk of devaluation (currency mismatch), but also to default by the public 
sector (worthless assets)585 . 
The third blow to the financial sector's constitution came, finally, with the 
"corralito" in early December 2001. The drastic violation of property rights destroyed 
any reputation the banking sector had enjoyed before586 . The financial sector was 
dealt the fourth and final blow after default and the end of the CBA had been sealed, 
with asymmetric pesification in February 2002, which entailed a massive 
redistribution of wealth between depositors, lenders, and financial institutions, as 
well as a cauda of court injunctions and legal action that should occupy banks and 
courts for years, and which left the banking system in shatters. 
What remains is that banking sector reforms of the early and mid-1990s 
basically deserved their reputation as having been apt and well implemented, and 
served the financial sector and the economy well - so long as banks remained free 
from fiscal desires587 . With the central bank, in its supervising and regulating 
function, captured by politics, and the banking system saddled with worthless 
assets, the financial sector was directed towards the utmost exposition to 
devaluation and public default. 
5.1.5.4 Other Deficient Reforms 
The single most neglected area of reform undoubtedly has been (it still is) the 
sphere of federal fiscal relations. Though the damaging nature of the existing 
regulations has always been recognised, political intricacies constantly stood in the 
way of approaching more rational norms. Even the constitutional commitment of 
1994 to redefine the coparticipation scheme until 1996 failed to produce a result: no 
585 Public sector banks (such as the federally owned Banco de la Nacion, the Banco de la 
Provincia de Buenos Aires, and a few other provincial banks) were particularly vulnerable to 
reduced confidence in the government, as they were especially exposed to political influence. This 
perception affected the banking system as a whole. See IMF Independent Evaluation Office (2004), 
p.35 
586 Though meant to dam capital flight, the corralito contained a loophole that facilitated a legal 
transfer of funds abroad for the financially versed. It worked via so-called "ADRs" (American 
Depository Receipts), shares of Argentine companies also listed in the US. The corralito allowed 
depositors to use funds in excess of the monthly 1,000 Dollars withdrawal maximum to buy either 
government bonds or shares of Argentine companies. Shares of Argentine companies cross-listed 
in the US could be legally converted into ADRs, sold in the US, and the Dollar proceeds deposited 
on a US-account. See Dominguez/Tesar (2004), p. 15. 
587 See Calvo/Mishkin (2003), p. 4. 
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fundamental reform passed the fierce resistance of the main beneficiaries of the 
existing regulations, the provincial governors. To the contrary, the few realised 
modifications, such as the introduction of "precoparticipaciones", or the guaranteed 
fixed transfer sums, made the system even more complex and, above all, 
counterproductive in creating additional moral hazard and procyclical fiscal 
outcomes. The effects of several sensible fiscal reforms realised in the areas of tax 
compliance and tax structure effectively got stifled by the increasingly perverse 
fiscal redistribution process588 . Besides a rationalisation of federal fiscal relations, 
the fiscal task would have also been to reduce the reliance on regressive taxes, 
above all VAT, in favour of higher direct taxes on income, and, generally, to improve 
tax compliance and tax administration589 . 
The social security reform, while completely necessary and broadly judged as a 
success, proved to create a massive burden on the government's borrowing 
requirements. Its consequences for the public purse should have received greater 
consideration, as a result of which the financing of reform costs via taxes or 
expenditure cuts, rather than via borrowings, should have been envisaged590 . 
Generally, social policy is a field massively disregarded during the whole of the 
1990s. As Argentina disposed of a highly educated population and comparatively 
wide welfare coverage, the market reforms of the early 90s were implemented 
without social compensation schemes. But as the described productive changes, 
such as increases in low value-added production and industrial concentration, took 
hold and the employment and distribution situation continued to worsen, it would 
have been necessary to boost and coordinate industrial and social policies. Better 
targeting of social expenditures to high risk groups on the one hand and, as 
indicated above, more active industrial policies (favouring higher value-added 
production and educational training programmes) on the other would have been 
needed to tackle the increasing social problems. Again, a shift in taxes towards 
more taxation of income (which is typically at least mildly progressive), away from 
regressive VAT, would also have created an element of redistribution. 
As for commercial policies, apart from the proposed measures to promote trade 
diversification, limited capital controls, such as, e.g., reserve requirements on 
external debt by firms, or minimum stays of FDI, could have been used to encounter 
588 See IMF Independent Evaluation Office (2004), p. 30. 
589 See Pastor/Wise (1999), p. 494. 
590 See IMF Independent Evaluation Office (2004), p. 34f. 
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short term and volatile capital flows. As long as the repatriation of profits from FDI is 
not restricted, the experience shows that such measures can be implemented 
without discouraging long-term capital inflows, and without compromising trade 
liberalisation591 . Such limited capital controls could, at the same time, have been 
tailored to bring up "infant" industries, i.e. to confront the dominance of low value-
added primary production by supporting investment in a broader spectrum of higher 
value-added production for export purposes592 . 
In parallel, Argentina's trade policies should have been aimed more at 
diversifying not only the basket of traded goods but also of its trading partners. 
Negotiations within MERCOSUR, though essentially rational in terms of boosting 
intra-industrial trade, have always been hampered by lack of bilateral and industrial 
commitment, and should have been in any case complemented by efforts to deepen 
trade relations with industrial, but also with other developing countries. With the 
latter, the development of trade patterns beyond Argentina's traditional patterns 
would possibly have been easier to stimulate, and possible common exchange rate 
links to the US-Dollar would have reduced the exposedness of trade to Dollar 
appreciation. 
Finally, several public sector institutions, such as the judiciary, regulatory 
commissions, social ministries, the civil service, police, and provincial governments, 
remained prone not only to lobbying interests and corruption, but also to political 
pressure. They would have needed a thorough remake to comply with the 
requirements imposed by an efficiency seeking market economy. Instead, state 
institutions continued to justify the suspicion it was viewed with by the Argentine 
public, in times when their conduit should have been targeted at fostering greater 
equality in the benefits of market reform593 . 
The described failure to co-ordinate macro and microeconomic reforms, with 
macroeconomic stabilisation highly successful, but micro reforms failing to help the 
economy adjust to the rigid macro conditions, was, as late as 1999, generally 
viewed as still curable. Accordingly, a "second generation of reforms" was urgently 
called for, in order to secure the successes of stabilisation and growth and to shield 
591 Chile successfully implemented such capital controls in the 1990s. See Rojas-Suarez 
(2003), p. 151. 
592 Capital controls are in any case preferable to the more protectionist stance of import tariffs 
and duties, which make counteractions from trading partners more probable. 
593 See Pastor/Wise (1999), p. 495. 
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the economy against external shocks594 . Such a second generation of reforms 
should have been designed to confront the described inadequacies of institutional 
defects, broadly along the proposals made above. 
5.1.6 Politics 
While thorough political analysis is beyond the scope of this investigation, the 
field of politics cannot be left out in the search of explanations for the Argentine 
CBA's fate. The analysis shall be confined to some conspicuous traits of Argentine 
politics during the 1990s and their relation to economic outcomes. 
Though next to unbelievable with a view to its roots, Peronism has, by its 
figurehead Carlos Menem, got inseparably linked to Convertibilidad. Among 
Menem's merits was, in the late 1980s, the broadening of the Peronist electoral 
base, to add larger business and middle class segments to the traditional backbone 
of working classes, and thus turn Peronism into a granter of majorities595 . While this 
was a precondition for the agenda of market-oriented reforms to realise, it also 
entailed ample potential for intra-party rivalry, which favoured autocratic governing, 
corruption, and the turning of a blind eye towards the country's military past. A 
symptom of this is the massive "governing by decree" the President took recourse to 
in order to overcome anti-market sentiments within party and government. Topics 
such as the revision of tax and labour laws, the setting of the trade regime, or the 
modification of public contracts were settled autocratically, by executive decree, and 
the core of the reform programme comprised in the Convertibility Plan was realised 
as decrees of "necessity and urgency"596 . Circumvention of the parliament, defiance 
of the constitution, and biased nominations for the Supreme Court were customary 
traits of the Menem governing style, the legitimacy of which got additionally 
undermined by personal charges of corruption. While autocratic tendencies may be 
justified in case of economic emergency, the danger is that they persist and get 
routine; a country subscribing to market economy needs fundamentally free 
594 See Pastor/Wise (1999). 
595 According to Pastor/Wise, another tactic to grant majorities was the initial sparing of the 
provinces from fiscal tightening. and the maintenance of "clientelistic and traditional networks of 
power and mobilization in the periphery". Pastor/Wise (1999), p. 492. 
596 Between July 1989 and December 1993 alone, over 12,000 executive decrees and 308 
decrees of "necessity and urgency" were passed. The number of presidential emergency decrees 
passed by Menem exceeds the total number issued by all constitutional presidents in the past 130 
years. See Pastor/Wise (1999), p. 492f. 
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"political markets" for successful development. The persisting lack of factual 
democracy fit badly with the country's late 1990s' image of a poster boy among 
emerging economies, and inevitably turned against the government as soon as luck 
ran out597 . 
The constitutional reform of 1994, launched to allow for a second term of 
President Menem, entailed political deals with the opposition, as well as with 
provincial leaders and organised labour, which softened fiscal discipline and stalled 
or even rolled back the structural reform process. To the merits of the Peronist 
government, much of this languishing was corrected soon after, under the pressure 
of the Mexican crisis. Equally, Menem's attempt to get admitted as a candidate 
seeking a third term caused, as long as the case was not yet settled, the 
competition for nominations within the Peronist party, which entailed again 
increased public spending for political reasons598 . 
A clear political fault of the Peronists in the mid to late 1990s, in terms not only 
of securing majorities, but also of ensuring sustainability of the per se necessary 
and successful macroeconomic reforms, was the apparent lack of concern for the 
employment and distributional consequences of reform. As indicated above, turning 
a blind eye to the increasing social malaise did not only defy the Peronist stance but 
also destabilised the country politically and socially, and thus undermined the whole 
stabilisation success. 
As to the Alianza government, the coalition faced extremely difficult tasks while 
having to cope with widely diverging political positions internally. In sticking to the 
CBA and setting to increase the primary surplus to regain debt sustainability, it 
struggled with the fierce redistribution conflict which arose over who was to bear the 
adjustment costs. Since taxes and spending cuts hit predominantly the non-
597 One popular suspicion runs as follows: when political support from the traditional Peronist 
voter bases, increasingly hit by unemployment and declining real wages, wore thin in the run-up to 
the 1999 presidential elections, and the economic and fiscal situation deteriorated, the calculation 
of the ruling Peronists was to "leave the bomb to the Alianza". The bomb would be left to "explode" 
under the Radicals, and to interrupt their constitutional term, so that the Peronists could take over 
early again (of course never taking responsibility for the existence of the bomb). With hindsight, the 
course of events can be interpreted to match this assumption, with the cynical aftertaste that it 
would have been, for political reasons, perfectly consistent with such a strategy to avoid minimising 
the costs related with the end of Convertibility. Opinion expressed by Fernando Navajas during an 
interview conducted by the author on November, 18th , 2004, in Buenos Aires. 
598 See IMF Independent Evaluation Office (2004), p. 16. 
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corporate sector599 , the coalition risked its main constituency, the middle class. 
Under accusations of leaving external creditors unscathed, the Alianza finally broke 
into pieces over the redistribution conflict600 . Certainly, the chances of succeeding in 
turning the rudder and installing debt sustainability would doubtlessly have been 
higher had the government, taking over from the Peronists in 1999, appeared a 
unified whole. 
As to opposition to the Convertibility regime, there has always been some, 
mainly from the left, which criticised the negative effects of the radical liberalisation 
and privatisation policies on employment, distribution, and industrial structures601 . 
Such opposition remained marginal until the late 90s' recession exposed more of 
the CBA's vulnerabilities and led even major candidates in the 1999 elections to call 
it into question publicly. However, such criticism could not dent the CBA's popularity 
with the vast majority of the public. 
5.1.7 The IMF 
Almost continuously involved in Argentina during the whole of the 1990s, the 
IMF ("the Fund") inescapably played a role in the developments that led to the 
devastating crisis in 2001 602 . The IMF's attitude towards the CBA, its engagement 
during the CBA's existence, as well as the role it played before and during the crisis 
are the issues addressed in what follows603 . 
599 With the "impuestazo", taxes on income, personal net assets, and some consumer goods 
were increased in early 2000. The "plan deficit cero" of July 2001 included a cut of salaries and 
pensions of public sector employees by 13 percent. 
600 "Coalition governments almost never succeed in implementing long-lasting fiscal 
adjustments of the sort that are likely to have short-run expansionary effects". Eichengreen 
(2001a), p. 18. 
601 See, e.g., Rotman (1997), or, written in 2001 with the claim to offer a plan for the Argentine 
economy to arise from the ashes of convertibility: Universidad de Buenos Aires, Facultad de 
Ciencias Econ6micas (2001): "Hacia el Plan Fenix - Una Alternativa Econ6mica". 
602 Indeed, Argentina is different from most other cases where the IMF has provided 
extraordinarily large support in that the IMF was strongly involved in the country for many years 
before the emergence of the crisis. See Mussa (2002), p. 2. 
603 The Evaluation Report "The IMF and Argentina, 1991-2001 ", issued in 2004, is the result of 
the Independent Evaluation Office's (IEO) investigations into the Fund's role in Argentina. This 
recently installed office operates under the authority of the IMF's Executive Board, independent of 
staff and management, so that, though ultimately responsible to the Fund's membership, it is 
thought to be relatively free of bias. This paragraph draws in many, though not all, aspects from this 
candid analysis. 
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5.1. 7.1 The IMF and the CSA 
The Convertibility Plan of 1991, implemented by the Argentine government 
without consultation with the IMF, was initially treated with scepticism but, with a 
view to the broad agenda of market-oriented and efficiency-enhancing reforms, 
basically welcomed by the latter. The quick and impressive defeat of inflation and 
the stabilisation boom of the early years did their part to mute occasional concerns 
about the medium-term viability of the programme within the Fund604 . 
During the Tequila crisis, the Fund supported Argentina's efforts to maintain the 
CBA. The decisiveness shown by the Argentine government pushing through tax 
and financial sector reforms in the eve of presidential elections impressed even 
sceptics within the IMF. The success in mastering the crisis proved very important in 
that it brought the IMF to unambiguously endorse the fixed exchange rate regime as 
"both essential for price stability and fundamentally viable"605 . After Tequila, the 
CBA experienced a veritable credibility thrust which encouraged public and private 
spending and drove critics of the CBA into the background606 . 
During the expansionary period after Tequila, Argentina and its Convertibility 
Plan were even praised by the IMF as a model for developing countries. 
Remarkably, the IMF continued to provide funds even though there was no longer 
an immediate balance of payments need, and even when the political preconditions 
for the implementation of policies needed to sustain the exchange rate regime had 
broken away. When recession and a loss of access to international capital markets 
followed the shocks of the late nineties, the IMF stepped in with a new arrangement 
in early 2000 in support of the newly elected government's effort to halt the 
recession and redress public finances, in order to maintain the CBA. Even after 
repeated instances of non-compliance with fiscal and policy targets agreed with the 
Argentine government, and with ever smaller chances of avoiding default and 
collapse of the CBA, did the IMF stick to its support of the CBA, and granted 
604 "Little substantive discussion took place with the authorities on whether or not the exchange 
rate peg was appropriate for Argentina over the medium term, and the issue received scant 
analysis within the IMF." IMF Independent Evaluation Office (2004), p. 3. 
605 IMF Independent Evaluation Office (2004), p. 8. 
606 Daniel Heymann minted the expression "excess credibility" of the Convertibility Plan, 
responsible for a collective overestimation of Argentina's potential and long-term growth 
expectations. Expressed during an interview conducted by the author on November 16th , 2004, in 
Buenos Aires. 
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extraordinarily large sums. Thus, the Fund knowingly pursued a high risk strategy in 
support of the Argentine CBA until things could not turn to the better any more. 
5.1. 7.2 Outline of the IMF's Engagement 1991-2001 
During the decade between 1991 and 2001, Argentina maintained five 
successive financing arrangements with the IMF (see figure 29). These included 
three Stand-by Arrangements, one approved in 1991 after the introduction of the 
CBA, one in 1996 in the midst of the Tequila crisis, and one in 2000 to replace and 
continue the previous arrangement. In addition, two Extended Fund Facility 
arrangements were agreed upon in 1992 and in 1998, the latter of which was 
treated as precautionary, with no funds actually drawn. Accompanying the financial 
support, the Fund gave technical assistance, mainly in the fiscal and banking 
sphere, to support the objectives of the programmes. 
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Figure 29: IMF Financing Arrangements with Argentina 1991-2001 
Type of Approved Expired/ Amount Amount Percent Amount 
Arrangement Cancelled Agreed Agreed of Quota Drawn 
(million (million (million 
SOR) USO) USO) 
1 Stand-by 07/1991 03/1992 780 1,065 70.1 600 
Arrangement 
L Extended 03/1992 03/1996 4,020 5,661 361.2 5,661 
Arrangement 
~ Stand-by 04/1996 01/1998 720 1,045 46.8 890 
Arrangement 
4 Extended 02/1998 03/2000 2,080 2,820 135.3 0 
Arrangement 
~ Stand-by 03/2000 01/2003 16,937 22,315 800 12,854 
Arrangement 




Source: IMF Independent Evaluation Office (2004), p. 77. SDRs converted to US-Dollars at the 
respective yearly average exchange rates, with exception of the 2001 Supplemental Reserve Facility which is 
converted to USO at the exchange rate of the day of approval. 
The first two arrangements were designed to support the structural reforms 
undertaken, while the third arrangement (of 1996) supported Argentina in coping 
with the Mexican crisis. The three-year Stand-by Arrangement of early 2000, 
originally amounting to SOR 5.4 billion (around USO 7 billion), was designed to 
address the worsening recession as well as, from early 2001, when it was 
augmented by an additional SOR 5.2 billion, to help Argentina regain access to 
international capital markets. Additional financing from official and private sources 
was arranged at the same time, so that the total package was announced to 
comprise USO 39 billion ("el blindaje"). IMF assistance was further augmented in 
late 2001 by an additional SOR 6.4 billion, so that the IMF's total exposure 
amounted to around SOR 17 billion (USO 22 billion), with USO 3 billion earmarked 
for a planned debt restructuring. With the non-completion of the scheduled fifth 
programme review in December 2001, IMF support was effectively cut off. 
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5.1.7.3 The Role of the IMF during 1991 to 2000 
Criticism of the Fund's role for the Argentine CBA concentrates on the areas of 
exchange rate policy, fiscal policy, and structural reforms. 
As to exchange rate policy, the Fund had, following its statutes, to accept any 
member country's prerogative to choose an exchange rate regime of its own liking. 
However, it clearly failed to examine the consistency of the chosen exchange rate 
regime with other policy choices607 . Explanations for this failure are, first, a 
reluctance to discuss Convertibility for fear of upsetting financial markets and 
triggering self-fulfilling speculations (though this was not an argument for refraining 
from undisclosed discussion with the Argentine authorities), second, a lack of 
analytical tools to objectively evaluate the sustainability of a chosen exchange rate 
regime608 , and third, the difficulty to address the topic, in light of repeated public 
statements by the IMF supportive of the CBA. In any case, this failure "must be read 
as a weakness of [the Fund's] surveillance over exchange rate arrangements"609 . 
A similarly disappointing assessment has to be made of the IMF's stance with 
respect to fiscal policy. First, the IMF focused too much and for too long on flow 
variables without considering the year-to-year changes in the debt stock. Only in 
2000, when the debt to GDP ratio approached fifty percent, did overall indebtedness 
become an issue610 . A second critique refers to the IMF's failure to pay sufficient 
attention to provincial finances. Until 1998, formal fiscal conditionality included only 
the federal government budget, so that provincial profligacy remained largely 
unmonitored. Finally, partly due to the absence (or non-application) of diagnostic 
tools, and partly also due to neglect, the sustainable level of debt was 
overestimated by the IMF. Thus, the IMF's fiscal analysis underestimated the 
vulnerabilities emanating from Argentina's peculiar set of economic policies in the 
607 "Yet, IMF staff devoted only limited resources to determining whether the exchange rate 
regime adopted in Argentina was consistent with other policies and institutional constraints and, if 
not, what possible exit strategies Argentina should consider." IMF Independent Evaluation Office 
(2004), p. 22. 
608 "The IMF lacked a forward-looking concept of exchange rate sustainability and failed to use 
the best analytical tools." IMF Independent Evaluation Office (2004), p. 66. 
609 IMF Independent Evaluation Office (2004), p. 23. 
610 Primarily focussing on annual deficits, unmet fiscal targets remained mostly without 
consequence, or were loosened when growth fell below forecasts, but not strengthened when 
growth exceeded forecasts. See IMF Independent Evaluation Office (2004), p. 25. 
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case of potential external shocks, with the effect that the required degree of fiscal 
discipline was underestimated. 
In the area of monitoring structural reforms, the IMF's credentials are not much 
better. First, fiscal reforms, i.e. reforms of federal fiscal relations, of the tax 
structure, and of tax compliance, were only moderately successful in the latter two 
cases, and a complete failure in the former. Political and cultural (tax evasion!) 
realities may exonerate the IMF from much of the blame, but "it can be argued that 
the IMF did not employ all the available tools to bring about reform in some critical 
areas. Despite the rhetoric about the importance of structural fiscal reforms, there 
was only one structural performance criterion (on tax reform) included in all of the 
successive IMF-supported programs in this area."611 A similar judgement has to be 
made with respect to labour market reforms, rightly emphasised as crucial by the 
IMF but not followed up consequently enough, as from 1998, when political 
obstacles increasingly foiled their implementation.612 As to social security reform, 
the IMF erred in the same way as did most other observers, in overestimating the 
potential benefits of the new system and underestimating its fiscal consequences by 
far613. Finally, while the financial sector reforms, carried out with limited IMF 
assistance, were supported and recognised to be favourable with respect to 
prudential regulations and supervision, the IMF failed to address the vulnerabilities 
emanating from extensive liability dollarisation early enough. Likewise, it did not 
press the government to tackle the weaknesses of the banks still owned by the 
state.614 One general feature of the IMF's programmes with Argentina was their 
brevity with respect to structural conditionality, and "what little conditionality the 
programs contained was not rigorously enforced."615 
611 IMF Independent Evaluation Office (2004), p. 31. 
612 "However, this forbearance on an issue that was ultimately central to the viability of the 
convertibility regime had its costs, because policies that a few months earlier were meant to be at 
the core of the IMF-supported program would be delayed to the point where they would have little 
impact on the economy's ability to respond to the shocks of 1999-2000." IMF Independent 
Evaluation Office (2004), p. 33. 
613 "The IMF, among others, did not fully grasp early on the conceptual weaknesses of the way 
the transition to the new system was financed, which together with other accompanying policy 
changes implied a flawed reform with serious long-term consequences." IMF Independent 
Evaluation Office (2004 ), p. 35. 
614 See IMF Independent Evaluation Office (2004), p. 36. 
615 IMF Independent Evaluation Office (2004), p. 36. And: "Stronger conditionality would be 
unlikely to have brought greater change in the absence of domestic ownership, but the IMF did not 
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The findings about the Fund's internal decision making process shall not be 
dealt with here616 . As to the general mood, "the record suggests that the staff's 
generally upbeat public assessments were shared by most of the Executive Board", 
and "there was almost universal confidence expressed in the [Argentine] authorities' 
ability and willingness to implement the appropriate policies. Voices expressing 
serious doubt about the overall logic of the actions of the IMF or the authorities 
became rarer as the decade wore on."617 
With hindsight, the rationale for maintaining a programme relationship with 
Argentina after the Mexican crisis had been overcome does not seem justified, 
given the country's access to relatively cheap international capital and the absence 
of an immediate balance of payments need. Yet, although fiscal adjustment and 
structural reforms stalled during the second expansionary phase due to political 
obstacles, and ever more of the targets of IMF-supported programmes were 
missed, IMF support was continued, and an Extended Fund Facility approved in 
1998, while there would have been sufficient reason to end the programme 
relationship. However, markets' perception of the sustainability of policies was still 
favourable, which is why the Fund's confidence was viewed as justified618. 
5. 1. 7.4 The Role of the IMF in the Crisis 
IMF support during the years 2000/2001 consisted in a new Stand-by 
Arrangement, agreed in early 2000 to replace the Extended Arrangement of 1998, 
which was reviewed four times and augmented twice until late 2001. 
Initially, the Fund's support was based on the assumption that Argentina's 
recession and loss of market access were mostly the result of a combination of 
adequately identify the structural measures that were key to longer-term success and then make 
adequate progress in those areas a prerequisite for its continued program relationship with the 
country." 
616 Yet, the report's criticisms concerning the decision making process (both the outspoken 
and the implicit) offer lessons of a more general nature. While some of the tangible findings may 
lead to improve the working of the institution in the future, other indications point at external political 
and market pressures that influenced decision making, which are inevitably harder to detect and to 
tackle. See IMF Independent Evaluation Office (2004), p. 63. 
617 IMF Independent Evaluation Office (2004), p. 37. 
618 See IMF Independent Evaluation Office (2004), p. 38. 
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adverse, but temporary shocks, and thus constituted primarily a liquidity crisis619 . 
Hence, fiscal adjustment and measures increasing international competitiveness 
were expected to suffice to restore confidence and restart growth. A need for 
fundamental changes in the exchange rate regime and/or the debt structure was not 
recognised, as both external and public debt levels did not seem alarming, and no 
estimations were made as to the degree of misalignment of the real exchange rate. 
The provision of large Fund support therefore was viewed as justified "on catalytic 
grounds", i.e. to help build confidence in order to (re)gain complementary financing 
from capital markets620 . 
This was the also rationale of the augmentation decision in December 2000 ("el 
blindaje") which was complemented by financing assurances by the private sector, 
to amount in total to 39 billion US-Dollars. Programme conditionality was based on a 
combination of slightly relaxed fiscal deficit and debt targets (meant to limit 
contractionary effects) and intensified structural reforms aiming at promoting 
competitiveness and investment (subject to benchmarks, not to targets). Although 
the risks faced by the programme were acknowledged to be "significant" with a view 
to possible adverse external developments and the political constraints the 
government faced, the benefit of doubt was given to the Argentine authorities, 
referring to the excellent track record of the CBA as well as to the high potential 
costs of its collapse and/or a debt default, including fears of international 
contagion621 . 
This stance was basically kept through the following reviews which included a 
scheduled disbursement (of 1.2 billion USD in May 2001) and a second 
augmentation (by eight billion USD in September of that year)622 . Despite 
619 An interim improvement in external conditions during 2000 (above all growth in global 
commodity prices) seemed to justify this stance and nourished expectations of further improvement 
of external conditions. 
620 See IMF Independent Evaluation Office (2004), p. 40. 
621 In an internal briefing paper, possible exit options (move to floating, dollarisation at par, 
dollarisation at a depreciated rate) were discussed by IMF staff, but without stating the Peso's 
overvaluation or debt sustainability as fundamental problems, and without seriously pressing for 
considerations of exit strategies in IMF support. See IMF Independent Evaluation Office (2004), p. 
42. 
622 "In fact, even within the IMF, there was an increasing recognition that Argentina had an 
unsustainable debt profile, an unsustainable exchange rate peg, or both. Yet no alternative course 
of action was presented to the Board, and the decisions were made to continue disbursing funds to 
Argentina under the existing policy framework, on the basis of largely noneconomic considerations 
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continuously missed targets (partly due to political opposition, partly to deteriorating 
market access), and despite a departure from the agreed policy mix and 
deteriorating cooperation with the IMF since the advent of Minister Cavallo, the 
Fund approved continuance of the programme, at the same time recognising its low 
probability of succeeding in staving off crisis. The need for stop-loss rules for the 
Fund as well as for alternative approaches to crisis resolution was an issue in 
internal memoranda, but was not seriously followed up for fear of the catastrophic 
consequences of an exit from the CBA, and also because the Argentine authorities' 
refusal to discuss the topic was accepted. 
During 2001, the economic policy agenda was almost entirely set by the 
Argentine government without prior consultation with the Fund623 (instead 
sometimes furnished with premature public statements of allegedly secured IMF 
support624) and consisted largely of increasingly desperate and unorthodox 
measures which effectively urged the IMF to put a good face to things if it did not 
want to "shy( ] away" from its mandate and to "effectively surrender( ] to the same 
procyclical influences that are driving market behaviour"625 . 
Without straight assessment of the risks and costs of possible alternatives, 
there was, in the decision process for the augmentation of September 2001, only 
the choice between supporting a programme with a low probability of success 
(estimated internally at 20-30 percent at best) and withdrawing support entirely, with 
the consequence of triggering a catastrophic collapse, and without any idea of what 
should follow. The IMF was well aware that the money would, at best, buy a few 
months, and "would be more likely to disappear in capital flight"626 . 
Even after it had become clear, by late October, that the augmentation of the 
SBA had been a failure, the IMF continued to defer to the Argentine government's 
and in hopes of seeing a turnaround in market confidence and buying time until the external 
economic situation improved." IMF Independent Evaluation Office (2004 ), p. 5. 
623 Among the measures taken are the "competitiveness plans", the financial transactions tax, 
the modification of the Convertibility law towards a Dollar-Euro basket peg, the pertinent 
"convergence factor" installing a dual exchange rate by fiscal means, the "mega swap", the "zero 
deficit plan", the planned debt exchange, and, finally, the "corralito". 
624 See Mussa (2002), p. 25. 
625 IMF Independent Evaluation Office (2004), p. 49. 
626 IMF Independent Evaluation Office (2004), p. 53. 
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refusal to discuss alternative policy frameworks627. The conviction that the fifth 
review would most likely not be going to be completed spread within the IMF, but 
stayed without communication to the Argentine authorities. Finally, during the 
corresponding negotiations, on the background of the accelerating bank run and the 
single-handed introduction of the corralito, differences in the Fund's and the 
Argentine authorities' assessments on the prospects of the CBA became 
overwhelming, and the non-completion of the review was decided. Given the 
acceleration of social and political turbulence in December, the stance of the IMF 
was to wait for a new government in order to offer fresh assistance for a 
comprehensive medium-term solution, including debt restructuring and either 
floating or devaluation cum dollarisation. The introduction of the dual exchange rate 
regime to replace Convertibility in early 2002, however, plainly excluded further IMF 
support628 . 
5.1.7.5 The Fund's Responsibilities 
From the above, it becomes apparent that the IMF has to bear some 
responsibility for Argentina's crisis. This is not to say that the Fund was completely 
wrong with its support for the CBA, or that it was the main responsible for the 
outcome (this position is incontestably reserved for the Argentine authorities629 ). But 
it is important to detect the instances where serious errors have become obvious. 
Clearly, in retrospect things are easier to put into context than in the middle of an 
inextricable situation. 
Of course, the Argentine authorities' non-compliance as well as unfavourable 
external developments cannot be laid at the IMF's door. What can be laid there, 
however, are two fatal failures: first, the failure to press more for policy consistency, 
i.e. for much more conservative fiscal policies, during the whole of the 1990s 
(especially during the second expansionary phase), and second, the continuance of 
627 However, IMF staff had finally outlined a strategy to move to an alternative setting. It 
included further fiscal adjustment, debt restructuring with a reduction in the NPV by 40 percent, 
dollarisation at par (paying heed to the assumed preferences of the Argentine government), and full 
disbursement of undrawn balances under the existing SBA. The proposal was overtaken by events, 
as yet another stance of single-handed action by the Argentine government made it irrelevant. See 
IMF Independent Evaluation Office (2004), p. 56. 
628 See IMF Independent Evaluation Office (2004), p. 58. 
629 All the more so since the Argentine authorities "owned", i.e. stood firmly behind, virtually all 
of the key policies adopted during the decade. 
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support after mid-2001, when it had become obvious enough that efforts to maintain 
the CBA and avoid default had no reasonable chance of success. The first failure is 
nothing less than astonishing, given the Fund's usual standards, while the second, a 
reflex of lacking adequate risk assessment and contingency planning, is more of an 
embarrassment. 
Citing these two failures implies that the IMF was basically right in all the other 
instances of its relationship with Argentina. This includes its support of the CBA in 
principle, being a regime sovereignly chosen by an IMF member, with a reasonable 
chance of success, as well as its support of the attempts to stick to the CBA through 
shocks and recession up to, and including, the financial package of December 2000 
(the "blindaje"), which could be ascribed a reasonable chance of success in helping 
avert a major crisis630 . 
There are some conspicuous and ill-omened characteristics of the Fund's 
second failure, the protracted support. These are, first, the Fund's obedience to 
increasingly being taken hostage by a perceived "take it or leave it" situation with 
assumedly only two options, namely to unambiguously endorse the CBA or to take 
responsibility for triggering a crisis (this, often enough, went in parallel with being 
taken hostage by a non-complying government)631 . While such a bipolar approach, 
clearly to a large extent dictated by the centrality of credibility for the arrangement, 
may be viable under fundamentally sustainable conditions (witness the Tequila 
experience), it is clearly not in case of a severely misaligned exchange rate and/or 
an unsustainable fiscal stance. As indicated, the Fund failed for too long in 
recognising this, at the cost of a needed proactive approach to crisis resolution632 . 
630 See Mussa (2002), p. 3. Also: "Given the probabilistic nature of any such decision, the 
chosen strategy may well have proved successful if the assumptions had turned out to be correct 
(which they were not) and if the agreed program had been impeccably executed by the authorities 
(which it was not). The critical error was not so much with the decision itself as with the failure to 
have an exit strategy, including a contingency plan, in place, inasmuch as the strategy was known 
to be risky. No serious decision of alternative strategies took place, as the authorities refused to 
engage in such discussions and the IMF did not insist." IMF Independent Evaluation Office (2004), 
p. 5. 
631 " ... it may be difficult to understand how great a perversion of [the Fund's] policies and 
principles was perpetrated in this incident." Mussa (2002), p. 25. 
632 However," ... it is quite possible that a situation in which some groups in Argentina viewed 
a devaluation/debt restructuring as having been "forced" by the IMF would have been associated 
with even greater political disruptions and short-term policy choices that would have made the 
situation worse. In other words, there may well have been no feasible actions by the IMF that would 
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Second, as a consequence of the Fund's failure to correctly judge the situation 
(namely to detect that the problem had developed into a solvency problem), it 
overestimated its leverage with respect to market sentiment633. The policy of private 
sector involvement which stood behind the "blindaje", effectively linking official 
support to voluntary finance from domestic and international private markets, was 
based on the assumption that official finance had to be only as large as to create 
enough confidence to catalyze further private finance which would, in turn, restart 
economic growth. As it turned out, correspondingly limited further official finance, as 
delivered with the augmentation decision of September 2001, worked to puzzle 
markets more than to reassure them, because they rightly judged the situation 
worse than the IMF implicitly signalled634 . This is not to say that the Fund's support 
for Argentina was not enough; rather, that any sums granted after the failure of the 
"blindaje" were, in retrospect, doomed to be futile. Indeed, the Fund's exposure to 
Argentina had become exceptionally large after the subsequent augmentation, 
which created serious concerns of the country's capacity to repay635. 
The most severe reproach, however, is fed by the circumstances of the 
augmentation decision of September 2001, when the money, as even admitted by 
those responsible, was expected to buy a few months at best and to disappear in 
capital flight. This, together with the ambiguity inherent in the augmentation itself 
(the provision of funds to mend what was labelled a liquidity crisis, with parts of 
have enabled the adoption of a meaningful Plan B. But this possibility is not an adequate 
justification for failing to think about, let alone design and actively promote, such a plan." IMF 
Independent Evaluation Office (2004), p. 69. 
633 The catalytic approach suffers, above all, from free rider and first mover problems, i.e. from 
the fact that for individual investors it is rational to wait and see whether the government's 
commitment, together with other investors' new funds, brings about the hoped-for consolidation, 
before they themselves put in new money. See Eichengreen (2001a), pp. 24ff. 
634 At the same time, the 3 billion Dollars as part of the augmentation earmarked for debt 
restructuring in effect was an unambiguous warning to markets that a restructuring including a loss 
in creditors' NPV was unavoidable. 
635 Certainly, it belongs to the nature of a crisis lender to assume "beyond-market" credit risks 
(and, after all, IMF credit enjoys seniority). However, internally there seems to have been a lack of 
focus on financial risk: "It is still striking how few Directors raised this issue as a concern during 
Board discussions, especially given the lack of conditionality on net international reserves (in view 
of what was considered to be a functioning currency board arrangement) and, in September 2001, 
the absence of standard assurances in the staff report concerning Argentina's ability to repay the 
IMF." IMF Independent Evaluation Office (2004), p. 61. 
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those funds earmarked to facilitate a debt restructuring), worked to feed the 
suspicion that external interests, political and economic alike, might have been 
unduly involved636 . The potential motives would not be hard to conjecture, as, in the 
last weeks of the CBA, what remained of big and sophisticated investors' capital 
had time to leave the country637 . 
One positive thing may be derived from the Fund's travails in Argentina, and this 
is the supposition that contagion remained limited after Argentina's collapse 
because the crisis was so protracted as to be widely anticipated by market 
participants in the end. The IMF has rightly emerged deeply damaged from the 
Argentine crisis. It has since tackled some of the identified shortcomings, and 
accordingly revised some policies and procedures. 
5.1.8 The Washington Consensus 
The term "Washington Consensus" was coined by US-economist John 
Williamson after a conference held in 1989 in Washington, DC, with economists 
from both the World Bank and the IMF, on policy reforms in Latin America. It was 
subsequently understood to stand for a set of free-market economic policies meant, 
after the debt crisis of the 1980s, to chart a path for restoring sustained prosperity in 
the region, or, in other words, "to refer to the lowest common denominator of policy 
advice being addressed by the Washington-based institutions to Latin American 
countries as of 1989"638 . 
The Washington Consensus comprised a set of ten reforms to create growth on 
the basis of a commitment to macroeconomic discipline, market economy, and 
openness to trade. These reforms focused on fiscal discipline, a reordering of public 
636 "In fact, the practice of certain prominent shareholders [in the IMF] of bypassing the Board 
raises serious transparency concerns in the decision-making process, not only as to the negative 
effect on the lack of proper and adequate debate in the Board as the natural "locus" for discussions, 
but also as to the "agenda" - other than finding the best possible alternative in specific crisis 
prevention or crisis resolution scenarios - that such shareholders might be advancing." Lavagna 
(2004), p. 119. And, referring to shortcomings in governance and transparency in the handling of 
the Argentine crisis: "These shortcomings are indeed compounded by the fact that representation 
at the Board does not adequately reflect the importance of emerging economies in the global 
economy." Ibid. 
637 "Argentina's program was explicitly tailored to take the country out of the capital market 
through the end of 2001. That is to say, it allowed creditors with maturing claims to exit without 
losses. It was the opposite of a bail in." Eichengreen (2001a), p. 28. 
638 See Williamson (2000), p. 251. 
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expenditure (towards more spending on primary health, education, and 
infrastructure) and revenue (tax reforms that combine a broader tax base with 
moderate marginal tax rates), financial and interest rate liberalisation, a competitive 
exchange rate639 , trade liberalisation (replacement of quantitative restrictions with 
low and uniform tariffs), liberalisation of inward FDI, privatisation, deregulation (to 
abolish barriers to entry and exit), and secure property rights. The Washington 
Consensus has become to be viewed by its critics as a manifesto of neoliberalism 
and market fundamentalism. 
Clearly, the policy set around the Argentine "Convertibilidad" was in line with the 
recommendations formulated in the Washington Consensus. Although the choice of 
exchange rate regime did not explicitly form part of them640, being claimed by the 
IMF as a "poster boy for emerging economies" was tantamount to being praised as 
a "poster child for the Washington Consensus"641 . 
There are (apart from, first, piles of mainly ideologically founded anti-capitalist, 
anti-US, and anti-globalisation criticisms, and second, claims that the Washington 
consensus neglected environmental and political issues642 ) basically three areas 
where the Washington Consensus ideas arguably were too blunt. These are, first, 
the requirement of financial liberalisation, which seemed to require completely open 
capital accounts and thus the encouragement of foreign capital to flood in without 
restraint. Together with fixed exchange rates and/or irresponsible fiscal policies, this 
inevitably led to overvaluation and/or fiscal unsustainability, and so made countries 
vulnerable to the vagaries of international capital markets643 . Second, it can be 
639 "The term 'competitive exchange rate' [ ... ] signifies a rate that is either at, or undervalued 
relative to, its long-run equilibrium." Williamson (2000), p. 263. 
640 Williamson noted on the recommendation of "competitive exchange rates" in 2002: "I fear I 
indulged in wishful thinking in asserting that there was a consensus in favor of ensuring that the 
exchange rate would be competitive, which implies an intermediate regime; in fact Washington was 
already beginning to subscribe to the two-corner doctrine." Williamson (2002). 
641 See Eichengreen (2001 a), p. 1. 
642 See Stiglitz (1998). 
643 "Too many countries encouraged money to flood in and overvalue the currency when the 
capital markets were throwing money at the region, or used a fixed or crawling exchange rate as a 
nominal anchor, or pursued a procyclical fiscal policy. They thereby made themselves vulnerable to 
"sudden stops" in capital inflows, and they left themselves no scope to relax fiscal policy in difficult 
times. The policy agenda of a decade ago certainly did not warn countries against such foolish 
acts, and indeed in certain cases countries may even have been encouraged to do some of those 
things." Williamson (2003), p. 5. 
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argued that the Washington Consensus did not emphasise sufficiently the 
importance of institutional (later called "second-generation") reforms which are 
necessary to make any "first-generation" reform (i.e. the original policy set) work644. 
With incomplete or neglected fiscal and labour reforms, and other, complementary, 
institutional preconditions lacking (e.g. on fields such as the judiciary, civil service, 
tax collection, fiscal federalism, education), advantage could not be taken from the 
per se beneficial "first-generation" reforms645 . The third critique is that policies 
shaped after the Washington Consensus were too narrowly focussed on growth, 
instead on "growth plus equity"646 . There was little concern for income distribution or 
the social agenda, relegating to the conviction that the proposed reforms were 
generally pro-poor in being pro-growth. The prevalence of an already relatively 
unequal income distribution and of different income elasticities with respect to 
aggregate growth across different layers of income was not taken account of, with 
the effect that income distribution even worsened during growth phases. 
The proponents of the Washington Consensus have largely, and productively, 
accepted such criticism647 . The position claiming that, in Argentina, "the neo-liberal 
economic model was never implemented or, if it was, it was half-baked"648 contains 
both aspects of the Washington Consensus' responsibility for Argentina's 
experience: on the one hand, the Washington Consensus represented a paradigm 
that seemed to fit ideally with Argentina's needs at the beginning 90s, and so 
(irrespective of the fact that, anyway, the stabilisation need made a very hard 
external anchor, and thus an economic alignment somewhere along the Washington 
Consensus proposals, unavoidable) offered a perfect ideological backing for the 
Convertibility Plan (which also helped in the relationship with the IMF). On the other 
hand, Argentina proved to comply least with the most important, namely the fiscal, 
644 See Burky/Perry (1998). 
645 See Huber/Solt (2004), p. 162. 
646 "My version quite consciously eschewed redistributive policies, taking the view that 
Washington had not reached a consensus on their desirability". Williamson (2000), p. 258. 
647 They have made a variety of proposals to tackle the post-1990s' problems of Latin America, 
paying heed to some lessons they, along with many economists worldwide, have learned from the 
experience with Latin America during the past 15 years. See Kuczynski, P.-P., and Williamson, J. 
(eds.): After the Washington Consensus. Restarting Growth and Reform in Latin America, Institute 
for International Economics, Washington, D.C., March 2003. 
648 Hanke (2002), p. 2. 
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policy requirements of the Washington Consensus, and so clearly disqualifies as a 
case study, and therefore also as a prey, of the Washington Consensus. 
5.1.9 The Currency Board Itself 
A popular attitude is that the 2001 crisrs was a direct and necessary 
consequence of the chosen monetary constitution, i.e. of the CBA itself. The 
arguments are obvious: both the straitjacket the CBA imposed on monetary policy 
and the dollarisation it encouraged left the country without the flexibility to 
adequately respond to external shocks. The fiscal dimension plays, for the "culprit 
CBA" advocates, no independent role in causing the crisis. 
Prima facie, there is little to oppose. However, such argumentation goes easy in 
fading out the very origins and the purpose of the CBA, i.e. the historical 
dependencies any responsible analysis cannot avoid bothering with. It is a fact that 
the CBA precisely was chosen as a last resort from chaos owed to decades-long 
macroeconomic mismanagement. There is no doubt that it was initially, and could 
well have been for a longer term, good at rectifying this. The true mistake was the 
failure of those responsible to acknowledge that, beneath its immediate 
effectiveness, the CBA, if it was to be viable in the medium to longer term, needed 
making the economy compatible with the CBA's functioning principles and limits, i.e. 
with restricted policy options, with harder adjustment processes, and with the 
elementary obligation to balance public budgets649 . Beyond a wholesale 
condemnation of a potentially beneficial monetary constitution (which has been 
amply tested in history, and not only in pre-globalisation times), therefore, it is 
imperative to investigate into the defects in the Argentine CBA's gearing - as has 
been done above. Such investigation inevitably suggests that Argentine politics did 
not live up to their own commitment, to the CBA650 . Thus, the CBA cannot per se be 
made responsible for the crisis. 
A slightly more acceptable variant of the "culprit CBA" thesis is that the CBA 
obviously failed to fulfil expectations of its disciplining effect on fiscal policy651 . 
However, such expectations enjoyed very little justification from the start: the 
649 "But surely, the ultimate tragic collapse was not preordained from the time that Argentina's 
stabilization and reform efforts began a decade earlier." Mussa (2002), p. 30. 
650 See e.g. Lavagna (2004), p. 116. 
651 Calvo/Mishkin claim that hard pegs may even weaken governments' incentives for fiscal 
rectitude, as they make foreign borrowing easier and thus allow them to delay necessary reforms. 
See Calvo/Mishkin (2003), p. 25. 
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Convertibility regime hinges on an open economy, and an open capital account, 
wherefrom deficits were financed, is a necessary precondition for the choice of an 
external nominal anchor. So, expectations of the CBA disciplining fiscal policy could 
realistically be based less on some sort of built-in restraints than on hopes that 
either responsible policies or, if not, rational capital markets would take over the 
disciplining role, in providing funds to a debtor just as much and as costly as 
sustainable. However, as long as international capital markets can reasonably 
expect international financial institutions to eventually bail out the country, the latter 
hope is ill-founded - moral hazard makes the provision of unserviceable finance a 
perfectly rational act652 . So, there has never been a way around responsible fiscal 
policies. 
5.2 Taking Stock 
So far, the different factors that contributed to the collapse of the CBA have 
been examined. It has become evident that many of these factors have their origins 
well before the advent of crisis, some of them even before the CBA's inception. Just 
as in medical sciences where it is well known that pathogens unfold their worst 
effects when coming across a weak physical constitution, one has to distinguish 
here between the factors that created vulnerabilities (invaliding factors) and other 
factors that evoked crisis when encountering the vulnerable constitution (triggering 
factors). This implies the notion that, in the absence of triggering factors, the crisis 
would not (yet) have unfolded, and on the other hand that, in the absence of 
vulnerabilities, the triggers would have met a much more resistant environment and 
thus not have been able to do so much harm. Categorising and weighing the 
individual factors is what remains to be done. 
5.2.1 Vulnerability 
The uncontested lead in the ranks of the invaliding factors is held, not 
surprisingly, by fiscal profligacy. The most serious mistake made was that the high 
growth years, especially the post-Tequila years, were not used to generate fiscal 
surpluses in order to potentialise anticyclical fiscal policies, and to moderate later 
652 There are hopes that the hitherto unseen losses investors incurred in the aftermath of 
Argentina's sovereign default (the haircut was by 70 cent on the Dollar) will discipline future 
lending. History, as well as the fact that international capital quickly returned to Argentina, however, 
suggest otherwise. 
Jutta Maute - 978-3-631-75447-4
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 04:44:44AM
via free access
245 
liquidity constraints653. Mussa (2002) argues that an improvement of the primary 
fiscal balance by two percent on average since 1991, or, alternatively, a roughly 
equivalent improvement starting after Tequila (of one, two, and three percent in 
1996, 97, and 98 respectively, and the subsequent maintenance of this 
improvement) would have been sufficient to cumulatively reduce Argentine 
sovereign debt in 2001 by enough as to reduce concerns about sovereign default. 
Such fiscal performance would have been imaginable in political as well as 
economic terms, and would have allowed lower interest rates and better conditions 
for economic recovery654 . The chronic fiscal deficits, financed largely by Dollar-
denominated government bonds placed on international capital markets, facilitated 
domestic absorption financed from abroad and persisting current account deficits, 
and left public accounts heavily currency mismatched655 . Fiscal irresponsibility is 
thus the root cause for the triple macroeconomic vulnerability Argentina developed 
up to the late 1990s, consisting of high indebtedness, high leverage towards the 
exterior, and vast currency mismatches in public balance sheets. Thus, fiscal 
profligacy is also co-responsible for the increasing gap between the Peso's nominal 
exchange rate and its intrinsic, i.e. fundamentals oriented, value, i.e. for much of its 
overvaluation. Clearly, not all of the blame is with the public sector: the private 
sector equally borrowed freely from abroad, and/or incurred Dollar liabilities while its 
revenues were in Pesos (as in the nontradables sector). However, in doing so, it 
responded to the framework, policies, and mood set by the authorities. 
Correspondingly, among the institutional weaknesses, those were most 
damaging that were responsible for the vast, especially non-discretionary, portions 
of federal public spending. As has been shown, the counterproductive rules that 
govern federal fiscal relations bear significant responsibility for the fiscal outcome. 
Had the provinces been prompted to balance (or improve) their budgets, the overall 
653 See Galiani et al. (2002), p. 22. 
654 "Thus, the margin between sustained success of Argentina's stabilization and reform 
efforts of the past decade and the tragic collapse at the end of last year was far from 
insurmountable." Mussa (2002), p. 31. 
655 "The combination of a weak fiscal policy and heavy reliance on external borrowing within 
the constraint of the Convertibility regime became a recipe for disaster, when the country was hit by 
the prolonged adverse shocks." Independent Evaluation Office (2004), p. 15. Thanks to careful 
management of maturity structure, the impact of the sudden stop on the public sector's immediate 
financing needs was not as bad as it could have been with shorter maturities; but this only meant 
that the crisis took a few years to develop. 
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fiscal stance would have been easier to keep sustainable (between 1992 and 2001, 
the combined annual provincial deficits added on average 1.1, and in 2001 alone 
2.4, percent of GDP to the federal fiscal deficit656 ). Other traits, such as the 
generally weak tax administration, persisting loopholes, widespread tax evasion, as 
well as the corrupt judiciary, added to fiscal morbidity. The social security reform 
cannot be left unmentioned here as the single most fiscally burdensome, because 
blatantly ill-financed, institutional reform. 
Very importantly, economic policy constellations within MERCOSUR were highly 
adverse in boosting expansionary Argentine fiscal policies before 1999, and in 
aggravating the effects of external shocks after 1999. MERCOSUR thus acted, for 
Argentina, as an amplifier of unsound policies and negative shocks, and thus added 
massively to its vulnerability. 
Next come the much-lamented labour market rigidities. Undoubtedly, the labour 
market reforms stayed insufficient, and the regulatory burden was anything but 
helpful for the needs of structural change and wage flexibilisation. Nevertheless, the 
argument of rigid labour markets preventing the "automatic adjustment mechanism" 
is dented by the observation that the deflationary process significantly reduced 
nominal wages in the private sector as from 1998. This suggests that market 
pressures did pass through on wages, but that the degree of deflationary 
adjustment could not make up for the massive overvaluation657 . Thus, maybe labour 
markets were not as flexible as they could have been, but they would have been in 
any case vastly overstrained if they had been expected to bring about the whole of 
the required real exchange rate adjustment658 . Hence the reluctance to place labour 
market rigidities at a more prominent place in the score of culprits. 
Other neglects follow, with declining importance as to their contribution to 
Argentina's crisis (though not necessarily for the country's long-term perspectives). 
Though the country made big efforts to move away from inward orientation and 
improve efficiency, and, overall, the realised privatisations brought significant 
efficiency gains and improved supply, in several cases, unduly monitored 
privatisation processes and deficient regulatory institutions, as well as generally 
insufficient industrial policies stood in the way of better meeting the demands of the 
new economic alignment. The educational system continued to deteriorate 
656 See IMF Independent Evaluation Office (2004), p. 10. 
657 See Lavagna (2004), p. 116. 
658 See Williamson (2003), p. 4. 
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throughout the 1990s, while it would have been crucial to match it with new 
qualification needs of those set free in privatised state companies. The complete 
lack of concern for social and distribution policies went largely unpunished during 
the high growth years but turned into a curse during the protracted recession. 
5.2.2 Triggers 
It is well known which factors triggered the crisis and exhibited Argentina's 
vulnerabilities. However, as will be argued, they are not exclusively of external 
origin. 
First comes, now proceeding chronologically, the Dollar appreciation, which 
started in 1995 and unexpectedly continued even in the wake of the high-tech 
bubble burst, to appreciate, in total, by 34 percent between 1995 and early 2002. It 
contributed to the overvaluation the Peso entered the crisis with (the Dollar had 
appreciated by roughly 18% between 1995 and early 1999), and helped slow down 
export growth and attract international capital. However, as Argentina's trade share 
remained comparatively low, the appreciated Dollar's impact on growth stayed 
limited, which is also why Argentina's problem was not predominantly one of 
competitiveness. More important than the Dollar's rise was that part of the Peso's 
overvaluation that developed as a consequence of country risk considerations, i.e., 
of Argentina's increasingly unsustainable fiscal situation given its characteristics of 
relative closedness and of currency mismatched balance sheets. In the absence of 
other external shocks, the Dollar's appreciation could plausibly have been 
compensated via deflationary adjustment (the Dollar's rise between 1999 and late 
2001 was by roughly another 12 percent659). Given the high credibility of 
Convertibility, the Dollar's rise alone would, with sounder fundamentals, probably 
not have evoked speculative attacks of the CBA, even though the external shocks of 
the late 90s would have put the economy under strain (as they did with other 
emerging economies). 
Clearly, the sequence of emerging economies' crises between 1997 and 1999, 
starting with the Asian crisis, among them most severely the Russian crisis that 
dried out international capital markets, as well as the Brazilian devaluation that hit 
Argentina's trade balance, were the most fatal triggers for Argentina660 . 
659 See Joint Economic Committee (2005), p. 2. 
660 Turkey and Brazil also suffered major crises induced by the sudden stop. Uruguay's crisis, 
however, was the reflex of Argentina's collapse; contagion remained limited to Argentina's highly 
dependent neighbour. 
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It has been said that until some point in 2000, Argentina's fiscal situation 
seemed not unsustainable. As has been argued, even the "blindaje", disbursed in 
early 2001, still had a reasonable chance of success, as there were still ample 
international reserves available in the vaults of the central bank, the banking system 
was as yet unaffected by confidence losses, and there was the hope that the 
slowing US economy would weaken the Dollar661 . 
This implies an additional category of trigger, pulled by the Argentine authorities 
themselves. Arguably, two events within just four weeks sealed Argentina's fate, the 
first of them by perforating hopes that politics could bring about the necessary fiscal 
redressing, and the second by lancinating the exchange rate peg. The refusal of the 
Argentine government to embark on the fiscal consolidation measures, as proposed 
by the new economy minister Ricardo Lopez Murphy, and his forced resignation in 
March 2001, was the first of these fatal triggers662 , while the second completed the 
damage with what has been called above "meddling with the CBA", i.e. with the 
announcement in April 2001 of a change to a basket peg. This worked to actively 
undermine the CBA, in demolishing confidence into the peg and thus destroying any 
hope of avoiding default, and was helped by the violation of central bank 
independence a few days later when the central bank governor was removed from 
office663 . To be sure, the change to a basket was, in principle, a fundamentally 
rational goal, and could have been envisaged in a fundamentally stable economic 
environment, but in the prevailing situation, the softening of support for the Dollar 
parity that had been firmly held up since ten years could not do other than upset 
markets as well as the Argentine public, accelerate bank runs and bankruptcies, 
and ultimately provoke the end of Convertibilidad664 . Subsequent measures such as 
661 "While skeptical that the chance of success was as great as 50 percent, my view was that 
in late 2000 there still was a reasonable chance that tragedy could be avoided - if the Argentine 
government assiduously implemented fiscal measures that reassured private creditors about 
longer-term debt sustainability." And: "An interest rate spread of 750 basis points indicated 
concerns in financial markets about debt sustainability, but not yet firm conviction that sovereign 
default was virtually inevitable." Mussa (2002), p. 19. 
662 "In my view, this event marked the effective end to any realistic hope that the Argentine 
government would address its fiscal difficulties with sufficient resolve to avoid sovereign default and 
its attendant chaos." Mussa (2002), p. 22. 
663 See Guidotti (2004), p. 22. 
664 Of course, the ,,convergence factor", tied to the hypothetical Euro-Dollar basket and, in 
effect, a devaluation by fiscal means, worked to reduce the real exchange rate misalignment, but 
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the "mega canje" and the competitiveness and zero deficit plans, therefore, were 
deprived of any chance of success. Advancing these two events as the ultimate 
triggers (the second pulled, ironically, by the "father of Convertibility" himself) 
implies the conviction that until early 2001, and with Lopez Murphy's fiscal 
programme, the collapse could have been avoided, the CBA could have stayed in 
place, and the economy could have adjusted in the required, although painful, 
manner to the external shocks. With the ensuing recovery of the world economy and 
the finally falling US-Dollar, Argentina would have been likely to recover as well, 
with its CBA in place (and possibly preparing for a softer exit at a later stage). 
So, well aware of the unabated populist attitudes that still accuse the IMF, the 
Washington Consensus, or even, for that matter, globalisation as such of being 
accountable for Argentina's recent tragedy, any responsible analysis must arrive at 
Argentine politics as lastly having spoiled its own success. Sure, the Washington 
consensus was too sweeping in several aspects, and the IMF can be blamed for 
serious misjudgements long before, as well as during, the crisis. Also, external 
developments were extremely unfavourable, and it can, by extension, even be 
argued that, again, the IMF and its ideological alignment had contributed to the 
occurrence of these external shocks (especially the Asian crisis, from which the 
other crises spread). But, even when all these findings are acknowledged, Argentine 
politics cannot be spared from the verdict that they bear the ultimate responsibility 
for having failed to pursue the policies necessary to sustain its chosen 
macroeconomic framework, the CBA. 
5.3 Missed Opportunities? 
Considerations of possible opportunities to exit the CBA hinge upon the 
prevailing political and economic constellations. In retrospect, there would have 
been basically two time windows where an exit from the CBA, after having reaped 
its stabilisation benefits, towards a more flexible exchange rate would have been 
possible out of a position of strength ("soft exit"). The years immediately before, and 
those after, the Tequila crisis would have offered such opportunities, with the latter 
period certainly more apt, given the greater distance from, and thus assumedly 
lesser fear of a relapse into, high inflation. Though more painful and unavoidably 
implying a degree of expropriation (with the inevitable consequences for further 
not enough by far, and at the cost of undermining credibility and thus the complete macroeconomic 
framework. See also Calvo/lzquierdo/Talvi (2003), p. 47. 
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policy credibility), an exit towards a flexible exchange rate would have been 
conceivable even after the advent of external shocks and recession at the end of 
the decade ("hard exit"). Fleeing ahead, i.e. taking the exit towards full dollarisation, 
would have been feasible basically anytime and in several variants. Contrary to an 
exit towards flexible exchange rates, official dollarisation would not have included a 
reneging on past commitments, but could have been viewed as a logical sequel of 
the CBA. 
Of course, the assumption that any of these options, if realised, would have 
been preferable to the factual outcome is derived from hindsight. While it might be 
thought pointless to engage in hypothetical contemplations of past opportunities, 
such considerations help not only to assess factual developments but also to draw 
some important lessons. In what follows, these possible exit opportunities, as well 
as the facts that stood in the way of seizing them, will be addressed. 
5.3.1 Soft Exit during 1993/1994 
Once the economy was stabilised, with single-digit and continuously falling 
inflation rates and strong growth, the period 1993/1994, in retrospect, could have 
looked like an opportune time to exit the hard peg. The fiscal improvement of 
1992/93, the US-Dollar depreciating in 1994 against Argentina's main trading 
partners and taking off pressure from the Peso, as well as improvements in 
competitiveness due to deregulation and privatisation, made existing concerns 
about the large current account deficit look less worrying. 
As indicated, neither the Argentine authorities, nor economists (including those 
of the IMF) seriously considered the issue of an exit at the time. One part of the 
explanation is that the CBA was still considered mainly as a stabilisation tool, and 
attention was focused on its immediate success at that. Considerations of its 
medium or long term viability had not been undertaken at its inception, and only 
slowly started to enter analysis after the advent of stabilisation. 
Moreover, memories of hyperinflation were still fresh. Raising the topic of exiting 
the peg and risking a relapse, at a time when things went well, was next to 
unthinkable. Such an exit, "soft" how it might have been (in terms of the economic 
environment and the distance between real and equilibrium exchange rate), would 
have implied the nullification of the law that was at the core of Argentina's revival. 
Thus, even if the Peso were not overvalued at that time, there would probably have 
been fears that, in the absence of the Convertibility law, the government would, at 
the first incidence of stress, take control of the central bank, which would soon lead 
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into new self-reinforcing inflationary dynamics. This is why, despite a fairly 
favourable economic environment, an exit towards floating or a more flexible peg at 
such an early stage would almost certainly have been counterproductive in reviving 
inflation expectations - regardless of whether the replacement of the external 
anchor by another monetary rule (which would in any case have been necessary to 
show commitment to further stability) would have accompanied the move. 
Perhaps the only advantage of the extremely hard exit actually seen in early 
2002 over the discussed hypothetical exit at some time during 1993 or 1994 was its 
distance from the year 1991: inflation allergy had time enough to subside, and 
economic agents time enough to get accustomed to the new macroeconomic and 
institutional framework, so that, even after the traumatic parting from the CBA, fears 
of a relapse into old inflationary habits, or even of endangered democracy, were not 
paramount, and the country's basic economic alignment was not seriously 
questioned. 
5.3.2 Soft Exit during the Second Expansionary Phase 
With hindsight, the years 1996, 1997, or even 1998 offered the last, and at the 
same time best, opportunity for a "soft" exit from the CBA. At that stage, the main 
benefits of exchange rate-based stabilisation had been reaped, and many 
preconditions for monetary stability without a fixed exchange rate seemed reliably 
installed, such as a government professedly devoted to stability, a (still) bearable 
fiscal stance, an independent central bank, and a robust financial sector. Overall 
confidence into the economy was high, and growth was expected to stay high. 
Strong growth, receding unemployment (from 17 to 13 percent between 1996 and 
1998), zero inflation, and a favourable external environment stood positively against 
the only worrying facts that the current account gap was quickly widening (from 2.5 
to 4.9 percent between 1996 and 1998), due to strongly rising imports and less 
strongly rising exports. The real exchange rate appreciated only mildly over the 
period, and spreads between Dollar and Peso interest rates were small throughout 
1996 and 1997 (never surpassing 200 basis points), indicating that the markets did 
not gauge the nominal exchange rate far from the equilibrium rate665 . 
Although in this phase some economists raised the issue of considering an exit 
from the CBA, the topic did not seem pressing. There are several reasons why an 
665 It has even been claimed, e.g. by Domingo Cavallo, that the Peso would have appreciated 
against the Dollar if floated in 1997. See interview 
<http://www.stern.nyu.edu/Sternbusiness/spring summer 2003/argentina.html>. 
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exit was not seriously considered during these boom years. First, the fear that giving 
up the hard peg and moving to a milder peg (e.g., an adjustable peg, or an 
exchange rate band} or to a floating exchange rate would bring back inflation was 
still existent. Second, the ever higher degree of debt dollarisation in both public and 
private balance sheets founded fears of payment difficulties in the case of 
devaluation, which would probably have had to be expected, as a reflex of the 
current-account deficit, initially possibly worsened by overshooting. Third, there 
were hopes that the current-account balance would improve and turn to the positive 
due to a widely expected depreciation of the US-Dollar relative to the Yen and the 
European currencies, and that Argentina would continue to grow up to its potential, 
so that eventually a more comfortable exit opportunity would arise in the future666 . 
Finally, again, the very necessity of an eventual exit was far from accepted. Both the 
Argentine government and the IMF (not to speak of the Argentine public which 
valued the Peso-Dollar parity and the growth it had brought very high), dazzled by 
the favourable experience with the Tequila crisis, had come to believe that the CBA 
was a viable long-term option for Argentina667 . 
This belief obviously stood also behind the favourable market reactions to 
Domingo Cavallo leaving office in July 1996. The "self-styled guarantor of the famed 
Convertibility Plan" could leave office and nobody felt the CBA was endangered. "It 
appeared that the country had made the transition from sole reliance on the 
credibility of just a handful of officials to a deeper faith in the macroeconomic laws 
now governing Argentina's economy"668 . 
5.3.3 Hard Exit after the External Shocks of the Late Nineties 
Finally, there would have been the possibility to exit the CBA after the advent of 
the Asian, the Russian, and the Brazilian crises, when international capital started to 
shun Argentina. The potential costs of adjustment to external shocks with fixed 
exchange rates in place were well known; the rising difficulties to finance the fiscal 
and current account deficits could have given rise to contemplations of opening the 
666 Expectations that Argentina could keep up growing at seven percent per year in the long 
run, and eventually catch up with the first world, were widespread. With hindsight, these were fed 
by a collective, and officially nourished, overestimation of the situation. Opinion expressed by 
Daniel Heymann during an interview conducted by the author on November, 16th , 2004, in Buenos 
Aires. 
667 See Feldstein (2002), p. 13. 
668 Pastor/Wise (1999), p. 477. 
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door towards flexibilisation and devaluation in 1999/2000, or even until early 
2001 669 . However, not even the Brazilian devaluation appeared to prompt the 
government, or the IMF, to seriously question the viability of the CBA. President De 
la Rua, keen on demonstrating a difference to the 1980s, when hyperinflation had 
brought down the last Radical government, won the late 1999 elections on a pledge 
to maintain Convertibility. 
Sticking to Convertibility seemed not only a laudable pose (the Tequila 
experience seemed to teach that it pays to stand firm) but, given the widespread 
currency mismatches in balance sheets, also a necessity if payment difficulties in 
the public and private sector, which devaluation would bring about, were to be 
avoided. To the credit of those responsible, an information problem also stood in the 
way of contemplating an exit: the true order of disequilibrium was not readily 
recognisable for a long time. The sluggish depreciation of the real exchange rate 
during the recession concealed the magnitude of necessary fiscal adjustment, and 
so the true distance from debt sustainability remained a matter of speculation, for 
policymakers and economists alike. 
Yet, assuming the Alianza government had suspected both magnitude and 
necessity of fiscal adjustment, and chosen the way of, as well as found the backing 
for, floating the Peso in 2000 or even in early 2001 670 : what would have been 
different from the float actually experienced later? Very importantly, even in early 
2001, there would have still been ample international reserves to smooth the 
overshoot of the exchange rate, the balance sheets in the financial sector would not 
yet have been so weakened by forced purchases of government bonds, and there 
would have been resources available from the IMF to bolster the transition. Above 
all, the independence of the central bank would not have been violated and policy 
credibility not so much eroded, which would have been an essential asset in the 
move towards a new monetary rule which could have aimed at either, again, the 
exchange rate (via exchange rate targets or some other variety of managed 
exchange rates) or inflation (via inflation or monetary targeting). 
669 See Pastor/Wise (1999), p. 494. 
670 It is likely that the government would have exposed "fear of floating", i.e. would, because of 
currency mismatches, fear of inflation, and/or concerns about credibility, not have allowed the peso 
to instantly depreciate all the way down to its equilibrium rate. Incomplete depreciation would have 
resulted in interest rates rising in expectation of further devaluation, with the concomitant real 
effects. "Therefore it is unclear that a more flexible exchange rate system would have successfully 
cleared the air in 2000." Calvo/lzquierdo/Talvi (2004), p. 38. 
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After floating the exchange rate, real wages and prices would have been 
reduced by inflation more rapidly and probably against less social resistance than 
that experienced after the "plan deficit cero", and inflation would have facilitated 
fiscal adjustment. The currency mismatches in corporate and financial sector 
balance sheets as well as on fiscal accounts would have in any case required 
remedial policies, and the restructuring of public debt would have most likely been 
unavoidable. However, all of this would have taken place on the background of a 
still less fragile economic and social environment. If coupled with a forced 
conversion of Dollar deposits and loans into Pesos671 , the devaluation would have 
implied the same abrogation of property rights, but would, to the degree that the 
realised devaluation would have been smaller than that incurred later, have entailed 
less factual economic harm and less distributional effects. To the extent that deposit 
freezes could have been reduced in extent or duration, or avoided altogether, public 
discontent would have been more limited. 
It seems plausible to assume that such policies would have been feasible and in 
their consequences less hurting than what actually happened afterwards. The 
biggest appeal of such an "emergency exit" seems indeed that it would have 
prevented the excesses in political and social development that unfolded during 
2001, done less economic harm, and possibly left the government in office. The 
comparison with solutions that would have avoided devaluation and the concomitant 
immediate balance sheet effects, however, is not so clear-cut. 
5.3.4 Exit towards Full Dollarisation until 1999 
Given the pervasive dollarisation of contracts in Argentina during the 1990s, the 
step from the CBA towards full dollarisation, i.e. the Peso's complete replacement 
by the Dollar, would have been a small one at virtually every point during the 1990s. 
Official dollarisation was indeed publicly considered by the Menem administration 
after the Brazilian devaluation, early in 1999672 . After the elections of 1999, the new 
government explicitly rejected the idea. As indicated, the IMF staff team also 
considered the option to exit towards official dollarisation (combined, of course, with 
a comprehensive debt restructuring). Would full dollarisation have been desirable 
before, during, or after the crisis, or at any other point of time, for that matter? 
671 The "pesification" of deposits and loans was widely seen as unavoidable in the case of 
devaluation. See Schuler/Hanke (2002), p. 10. 
672 Talks with the US authorities about technical aspects of dollarisation had already taken 
place in 1998. See also Hanke (1999), and Schuler (2000). 
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Clearly, nothing would have changed the fact that Argentina by no means 
formed an optimal currency area with the US673• Full dollarisation was thus, viewed 
from the optimal currency criteria, as unsuitable for Argentina as was the CBA (but 
not more). And, clearly, full dollarisation, to be sustainable, would have required the 
same set of sustainable fiscal policies and institutional preconditions as required the 
CBA. 
Thus, the only question is whether the gains of dollarisation per se, in terms of 
even more firmly "tied hands" and higher monetary credibility, would, at any point of 
time, have exceeded the costs of embarking on a monetary regime even more 
costly to exit674 , and of renouncing seigniorage income. Indeed, this trade-off would 
probably have ruled in favour of full dollarisation during the early nineties: full 
dollarisation would have prevented the speculative intermezzo of 1992 as well as 
the repercussions of the Tequila crisis, during which the Argentine CBA was put to a 
test. Thereafter, however, credibility of the peg was not the problem any more, so 
that Argentina, in the minds of its economic agents, was effectively "fully dollarised". 
So, a move towards official dollarisation would arguably have made not much 
difference after the successful mastering of Tequila until well into the crisis. 
5.3.5 Dollarisation in the Midst of Crisis 
Would full dollarisation, at par or at a previously devalued exchange rate, if 
introduced at some point during the crisis, have been preferable to, first, the factual 
outcome, and, second, to a conceivable "emergency exit" towards floating in time, 
as described above? As has been shown, the fiscal situation made sovereign 
default unavoidable since the failure of the "blindaje" in early 2001 at the very latest. 
Clearly, full dollarisation, until early 2001, would have avoided any meddling with the 
peg, and thus the massive credibility losses that translated into extreme rises of 
currency risk in spreads, the bank runs, and the capital flight evoked by the 
announcement of the switch to a basket peg. This alone would have been a clear 
advantage over the factual course of events, in preventing the acceleration down 
the road to catastrophe, and, as one can conjecture, much of public indignation and 
673 However: "The flaw with the theory of optimum currency areas is that economists presume 
to determine costs and benefits for consumers, rather than acknowledging that it is the evaluations 
of consumers that determine the costs and benefits economists must consider. If Argentines prefer 
to hold Dollars (and they do), it indicates that for them Argentina is part of an optimum currency 
area with the United States, no matter what economists may think." Schuler/Hanke (2002), p. 31. 
674 See Carrera et.al. (2002), p. 19. 
Jutta Maute - 978-3-631-75447-4
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 04:44:44AM
via free access
256 
probably even the government's dethronement. What is more, dollarisation at par 
would have prevented the breach of contracts incurred by devaluation and 
pesification, as well as the immediate balance sheet effects that led to rows of 
disorderly bankruptcies in the nontradables sector and to financial sector 
insolvency675 . And it would have brought down interest rates and so helped the 
recovery. Again, as in the scenario of the "CBA rescued", full dollarisation, whether 
at par or not676 , would not have been the optimal long-term constitution for 
Argentina, all the more so after Brazil's move to floating. But the avoidance of the 
extreme economic, social, and political costs incurred with the breach of law could 
have outweighed much in the way of economic adjustment, plus the higher costs of 
a future exit from dollarisation677 . 
One important qualification is key in comparing the options of floating versus 
dollarising. While dollarisation at par would have prevented the balance sheet 
effects of devaluation in the short run, it would not have done so in the long run, as 
the (then hypothetical) real exchange rate would nevertheless have needed to 
approach its equilibrium value, via a continuation of the deflationary process and the 
concomitant changes in relative prices. With the necessary relative fall in prices of 
nontradable goods, the increase in the real value of dollar debt would have entailed 
"creeping" balance sheet effects which, in the long run, necessarily would have 
equalled those incurred after a "once-and-for-all" devaluation678 . It is only that 
portion of balance sheet effects which occurs as a reflex of the exchange rate's 
initial overshooting after a float that can be avoided altogether via full dollarisation 
(such overshooting, again, can be limited with the help of temporary capital 
controls). Moreover, even after a move towards full dollarisation, capital and 
exchange controls, including deposit freezes, might well have been unavoidable, 
675 See Schuler (2002). 
676 Dollarisation at par would have been feasible even after the run on reserves of late 2001: 
the central bank's foreign reserves as of late December 2001, complemented by domestic assets 
sold at market rates against Dollars, would have sufficed to change the monetary base into Dollars, 
and so would have allowed adhering to the Convertibility law. See Schuler/Hanke (2002), p. 14. 
677 Over time, the relative advantage of dollarisation will decrease, as every year of imported 
stability potentially increases the country's policy credibility and thus the relative costs of forgone 
seigniorage. See Alexander/von Furstenberg (2000), p. 219. 
678 While it can be argued that giving economic agents time to adjust to the necessary real 
depreciation occurring over time could smooth its negative effects, the counterargument is that the 
overall result could well be worsened by individuals' reactions to the expected fall in the relative 
prices of their goods, in terms of lower investment and output. See Roubini (2001 ), p. 13. 
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especially after the credibility-bashing policies after April 2001, as a run on reserves 
would have been the reflex of the severely damaged balance sheets of banks 
(packed with worthless government bonds on the assets side and non-performing 
loans on the liabilities side) even without the threat of devaluation679 . Finally, without 
a seigniorage sharing agreement with the US, lost seigniorage would amount to an 
estimated 0.2 percent of GDP annually (with the respective seigniorage gains for 
the United States). While this opportunity cost is moderate because of low inflation 
and the low propensity to hold Pesos, it is higher than under the CBA where the 
bulk of Dollar reserves could be invested in interest-bearing assets680 . 
The option of dollarising at a devalued exchange rate might seem relatively 
more appealing in that it would have confronted the economy with the unavoidable 
balance sheet effects largely once-and-for-all (provided a sufficient rate of 
devaluation) while avoiding the problems with overshooting. The caveat is that it 
would have entailed the same credibility losses and abrogation of property rights as 
those incurred with a move to a float. Being the less appropriate monetary 
constitution in the long run, dollarisation cum devaluation would thus have been 
plausibly inferior to the alternative of an "emergency exit" towards a flexible 
exchange rate, as sketched above681 , but possibly still superior to the events as 
they unfolded. The ranking in the comparison with dollarisation at par is not so 
clear-cut, and lastly depends on the time preference attributed to economic 
outcomes. If an immediate relative alleviation of adjustment costs is valued very 
high against potentially higher long-run costs, and if there is the expectation that the 
potential long-run costs can, in addition, be moderated in the course of time via an 
orderly and relatively favourable debt restructuring and subsequent apt fiscal and 
structural policies, a move towards dollarisation at par might seem superior to the 
dollarisation cum devaluation option682 . 
679 See Roubini (2001 ), p. 19. 
680 See Hanke/Schuler (1999). Alexander/von Furstenberg (2000), pp. 216 and 221, give a 
higher estimate, with 0.3 to 0.35 percent of GDP. 
681 "Since that credibility will be lost anyway by devaluation, why lock the country into an 
inappropriate currency regime?" Krugman (2001 a). 
682 An appealing proposal of full dollarisation at par, designed to contain the long-run costs, 
has been made by Schuler/Hanke. According to this study, an exit towards official dollarisation 
would have been conceivable even at the turn of the year 2001/02. Among a variety of practical 
advice to model the move towards full dollarisation in the midst of chaos, a solution is given for the 
vexing problem of how to smooth further deflation and allow for recovery within the monetary 
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However, the question remains of whether Argentina would have been served 
well in the long run if surrendering its monetary autonomy to the US Federal 
Reserve, and renouncing any formal lender of last resort support683 . With a view to 
Argentina's history, there is every reason to expect more responsible monetary 
policies even from an expansive-minded Fed, than from any conceivable Argentine 
central bank with a floating or intermediate exchange rate regime. The decisive 
question is whether, with official dollarisation, the additional hurdles in the way of an 
exit would have sufficed to provide the decisive push towards inescapably 
"condemning" the country to responsible fiscal and microeconomic policies, 
designed to grant sustainability and to smooth adjustment to external shocks. The 
experience with the CBA makes for anything but an optimistic answer684 . 
Given, first, the fundamental inappropriateness of a monetary union with the 
US, second, the significant adjustment needs received as a legacy from previous 
political irresponsibility, and third, doubts of whether Argentina would be able bring 
forth better future policies, it was probably the better option for Argentina, from a 
long-run perspective, to take the exit from the CBA towards flexible exchange rates, 
although the move could have been done vastly better. 
straitjacket of dollarisation: with a move towards free banking, i.e. the encouragement of 
competitive note issue by private banks (paper money denominated in Dollars, which would be, like 
traveller's cheques, not forced legal tender), overall liquidity would increase and exchange controls 
would be largely dispensable as confidence in the banking system could be regained quickly (after 
all: "Central banking is central planning in money, and central planning works as poorly in money as 
it does in agriculture and industry." Schuler/Hanke (1999), p. 411 ). Though too late to avoid 
sovereign default, full dollarisation would have "quarantined" the government's financial problems 
and so limited their damage to the rest of the economy; coupled with fiscal reform including 
comprehensive tax reductions these measures could have spurred economic growth. Moreover, as 
they argue, dollarisation would have encouraged Argentina to extend the liberalisation and reform 
processes it started in the 1990s. See Schuler/Hanke (2002). See also de la Torre et al. (2002) with 
their similar proposal of dollarisation to be followed over time by the introduction of greater 
flexibility, including through "pesification at the margin". 
683 The independence of the US Federal Reserve to conduct a nationally oriented monetary 
policy without having to react to liquidity pressures from dollarised countries is part of the very 
stability promise of dollarisation. 
684 See Eichengreen (2001b). The belief that economic reform remained insufficient because 
the CBA remained less than credible, and that dollarisation would decisively alter the framework in 
increasing credibility, fits ill with the overall evidence for high credibility (even claimed "excess 
credibility") of Convertibility in Argentina, especially during those years, after 1995, in which the bulk 
of economic, especially fiscal, policy legacies has its origin. 
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This treatise has focussed on this latest Argentine experience of exchange rate 
based stabilisation. To that end, it has explored the characteristics and dynamics of 
high inflations in general, and analyzed their manifestation in Argentina during the 
1980s, the country's so-called "lost decade". After several failed stabilisation 
attempts and two bouts of hyperinflation, the currency board arrangement by which 
the government legally tied the domestic currency to the US-Dollar provided a 
consequential and highly effective stabilisation tool, which arguably was, short of 
official dollarisation, the only stabilisation option left. For the sake of foundation and 
complete understanding of the functioning of a currency board, the theory of 
currency boards has been expounded. The importance of complying 
macroeconomic, especially fiscal, as well as microeconomic policies accompanying 
a currency board has been deducted. Given the absence of the devaluation option 
as well as the restricted lender of last resort capacity, the dangers arising from 
irresponsible fiscal policies, on the one hand, and from external shocks, on the 
other, have become evident. 
The analysis of the Argentine CBA's configuration has yielded its assessment 
as an institutionally highly credible, though in various aspects unorthodox CBA, 
which however, given the country's structural and trade characteristics, could not be 
considered an optimal long-term solution. The depiction of the economic reforms 
accompanying the "Plan Convertibilidad" has hinted at some of them staying badly 
insufficient and putting the CBA's sustainability at risk. Argentina's economic 
performance during the 1990s has been depicted with its spectacular stabilisation 
boom of the early 90s, the momentous Tequila crisis, the second expansionary 
phase, the deep recession activated by the series of external shocks of the late 90s, 
and the country's economic, political and social implosion accompanied by public 
default and the collapse of the CBA at the turn of the year 2001/02. 
The analysis of the causes of the CBA's tragic collapse has yielded a complex 
picture of interacting factors, among them invaliding factors that had created 
multiple vulnerabilities over years, and triggering factors that unfolded their worst 
potential in meeting such vulnerable conditions. Chronic fiscal imbalances have 
been shown to stand at the centre of these vulnerabilities, having developed into a 
debt load unsustainable under other than very favourable conditions, and being 
responsible for much of the Peso's overvaluation. Among the various insufficient 
institutional reforms, accordingly, those stand out that failed to improve the fiscal 
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performance, led by the unsatisfactory tax reforms and, above all, the still untackled 
federal fiscal relations with their highly perverse fiscal outcomes. Less immediately 
obvious, differential monetary policies within MERCOSUR, even before Brazil's 
devaluation in early 1999, have been shown to have undermined both countries' 
fixed exchange rate regimes, and to vastly increase Argentina's exposedness to 
external shocks. It has been argued that labour market rigidities, though eased too 
little and adding to the country's deeper vulnerabilities, often tend to be 
overemphasised in their responsibility for the crisis, while other institutional 
inadequacies, such as unsatisfactory industrial and privatisation policies as well as 
a lack of concern for education and social policies contributed as least as much to 
Argentina's lack of institutional insurance against adverse shocks. So, when the 
capital stop in the wake of the late 90s' emerging economies' crises, helped by the 
trade effects of Brazil's devaluation and the appreciating Dollar, hit Argentina, these 
vulnerabilities were unmasked, and the ensuing recession threatened to render 
public and private debt and/or the fixed exchange rate unsustainable - as held by 
the Sudden Stop thesis which condenses Argentina's vulnerabilities to its 
closedness, its indebtedness, and the currency mismatches in the balance sheets of 
much of its economy. It has been argued that, while default and devaluation could 
have been avoided through determined action, plausibly as late as in early 2001, 
politics proved unable to bring forward such action, and instead provided the 
ultimate triggers with some grave mistakes. Against these home-made blunders, 
reproaches directed towards the IMF or towards the "Washington Consensus", 
though in certain respects justified, are bound to pale. The contemplation of missed 
opportunities, i.e. of options for a less costly exit from the CBA, has yielded the 
sobering conclusion that almost any of these options would have been preferable to 
the exit actually undergone in early 2002. 
Some Lessons 
The case of Argentina corroborates some important lessons. The first is about 
the dangers inherent in any exchange rate based stabilisation, and especially in a 
CBA: though more efficient than disinflation strategies that rely on a lengthy build-up 
of monetary credibility, in delivering credibility quickly and thus facilitating stable 
growth earlier, pegged exchange rates bear the potential of making themselves 
vulnerable by encouraging foreign indebtedness, currency mismatches, and 
overvaluation. Hence the wisdom that, if a CBA is adopted, it should remain a 
temporary arrangement, either aiming at an exit as early and "soft" as possible 
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towards more exchange rate and thus policy flexibility, or else giving way to the 
utmost commitment in the shape of a monetary union or its unilateral variant of 
complete dollarisation. In failing to do either, an economy risks to buy stability 
against probable future instability. The more far-reaching implication of this wisdom, 
and of Argentina's and other countries' experiences with more or less hard pegs685 
(and a CBA contains, though it is often lumped together with official dollarisation, 
still only a peg to a stable currency, not a stable currency itself) is that the secular 
tendency of global exchange rate regimes "hollowing in the middle" 686 (i.e. moving 
ever more towards the speculation proof corner solutions of either freely floating or 
definitely fixed exchange rates in the form of monetary unions or official 
dollarisation) is likely to intensify with increasing global financial integration. The 
Argentine experience also substantiates the finding that, beyond the immediate 
stabilisation needs of extremely eroded high inflation economies, the choice of 
exchange rate is of second order importance to the development of good fiscal, 
financial, and monetary institutions in producing macroeconomic success in 
emerging market countries. 
Thus, the second lesson from Argentina concerns the towering importance of a 
sustainable fiscal stance for emerging economies increasingly integrated in world 
financial markets, or, in other words, the necessity to run fiscal surpluses during 
upswings to potentialise non-debt financed countercyclical fiscal policies. The 
importance of sound fiscal policies is increasing with the rigour of the chosen 
exchange rate regime, i.e. with the distance from the option to devalue, reaching its 
extreme for a country forming part of a monetary union or being officially dollarised. 
The importance of lower overall debt levels is paramount for closed economies 
suffering from "original sin", i.e. unable to place local currency debt on international 
capital markets. Currency mismatches in fiscal and/or corporate balance sheets 
create a huge leverage to crisis when a real depreciation revalues debt in real 
terms. They are a recipe for disaster in case of devaluation. 
Several other aspects add to the indispensability of a solid fiscal stance. For 
one, high indebtedness risks to exert at some point a pernicious influence on a 
country's liquidity position, so that a vicious circle develops which emanates from 
685 Empirically, intermediate exchange rate regimes have recorded more crises than extreme 
regimes. See Eichengreen (2001b). 
686 See, e.g., Fischer (2001 ), Alexander/von Furstenberg (2000), Edwards (2000), or Wagner 
(2000). 
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higher perceived credit risk reducing the maturities of new debt granted and which, 
with the deteriorating maturity structure, fires back on higher credit risk again. This 
vicious circle can only be avoided when a sustainable fiscal stance keeps credit risk 
sufficiently low so as to allow for the maintenance of a crisis proof maturity structure. 
In-crisis debt restructurings that trade short-term relief against higher future interest 
and capital payments only risk undermining the hoped-for medium-term recovery 
and offer no fundamental improvement. 
The need for low public indebtedness receives further emphasis by the fact that 
fiscal consolidation under stress, i.e. in the midst of recession, is a precarious task 
to undertake. Although expansionary fiscal consolidation must not be an oxymoron 
but, on the contrary, the correction of a perceived unsustainable fiscal situation may 
bring down interest rates and increase demand (possibly helped by the Ricardian 
equivalence in reverse, i.e. by freeing demand from the suppressing expectations of 
higher future tax burdens), engineering such expansionary restriction is highly tricky. 
It depends on several preconditions, among them the reliance on expenditure cuts 
rather than on tax increases (which Argentina got wrong during Tequila and again 
with the "impuestazo" in 2000, and which it got right too late, with the "deficit cero" 
plan in mid-2001 ), and a strong political backing and high confidence in the 
maintenance of the fiscal slimming process687 . Obviously, Argentina was unable to 
bring forth these requirements, of which, as has been argued, political factors were 
certainly more damaging than the rigid currency board framework per se: first, the 
lack of unanimity in tackling the fiscal malaise, and second, political meddling with 
the own commitments proved a mixture that stabbed the last chance of 
consolidation. 
Moreover, the case of Argentina emphasises the importance of emerging 
economies' efforts to increase their openness to trade, i.e. to increase their share of 
exports relative to domestic absorption. When the latter is financed mostly from 
export revenues rather than from capital imports, the size of real exchange rate 
swings after a sudden stop is reduced. A higher share of tradables in output also 
reduces currency mismatches in private sector balance sheets, and so reduces the 
banking sector's exposedness to real exchange rate swings, thus limiting the 
probability and extent of necessary financial sector bailouts. The encouragement of 
FOi, the privatisation and streamlining of public enterprises and banks, and 
industrial policies aiming at increasing international competitiveness are still, and 
687 See Eichengreen (2001a), pp. 17f. 
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increasingly, desirable policies for any emerging economy. An important legacy of 
the late emerging markets' crises is that ideological blinders against capital controls 
aiming at reducing short-term capital inflows, and even against the idea of taxing 
foreign exchange transactions (the Tobin tax688), have been widely put off, and 
reducing speculative inflows has become a presentable endeavour. 
Further lessons have to be drawn from the international financial institutions' 
experience with Argentina. Chronically torn between the options of either leaving a 
country's solvency problems to the markets (including leaving a big emerging 
market debtor to default, risking contagion, and endangering the global economy) or 
bailing it out (and thus fuelling moral hazard by letting capital markets collect risk 
premia without bearing the risk), the IMF hoped to be able to minimise the 
drawbacks of both options with the catalytic approach, which turned out to have 
failed in Argentina. The need for new approaches in international finance has been 
articulated since the late 1990s' crises, and several proposals have been made. 
One of them is the idea of a "sovereign Chapter 11", i.e. an internationally 
acknowledged standard sovereign bankruptcy procedure including the installation of 
a bankruptcy court for sovereign debtors that would shelter them from disruptive 
legal action of creditors until an orderly debt restructuring would be carved out689 . A 
less ambitious, though easier to realise, approach is the adoption of collective action 
clauses in new bond issues so that creditors lose their right to sue individually, and 
the cost and duration of restructurings are reduced. Indeed, such collective action 
clauses are meanwhile standard in emerging-market sovereign bonds690 . Still 
another idea is the Lerrick-Meltzer proposal according to which the IMF would, for a 
crisis government, ensure liquidity in the market for defaulted debt, in order to obtain 
a market conform reduction of debt to a sustainable level, and avoiding panic and 
contagion691 . 
688 See e.g. Frankel (1996), p. 156. 
689 See e.g. Krueger (2002). 
690 Argentina has included collective clauses in the bonds issued in the debt restructuring, as 
well as aggregated voting provisions which allow for amendments in key terms with the vote of a 
pre-defined majority of the aggregate principal amount outstanding. See Gelpern (2005), p. 6. 
691 See Lerrick/Meltzer (2001 ), but also the IMF Staff Note of April 2002, available at 
<http://www.imf.org/External/NP/psi/2002/enq/041002.htm>, and Schuler/Hanke (2002), pp. 34f, 
who propose an extension of the Lerrick-Meltzer proposal to assets of stressed banks. 
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Argentina's New Challenge 
Argentina today faces not much less of a challenge than it did 15 years ago. 
True, devaluation has opened a valve and removed overvaluation, and the "flexible" 
exchange rate (indeed, it is, at the time being, held intentionally undervalued) 
potentialises more degrees of, at least temporary, freedom in economic policy692 . 
But, for the long run, such freedom depends on the very same fundamental 
preconditions that would have been required to keep the CBA sustainable693 . 
Although four years after the CBA's collapse, export (especially the agrarian 
and tourism) sectors are booming, foreign reserves are flowing in, the pre-crisis 
GDP level has been reached again, unemployment is half of its peak level, and 
public as well as current accounts are comfortably in surplus, none of the 
microeconomic deficiencies inherited, few of the numerous breaches of contract 
caused by devaluation, and little of the serious derangements added through the 
government's crisis management have been tackled as yet. The crisis and its 
aftermath would have offered a chance to renegotiate the federal fiscal redistribution 
mechanism, and to convert the tax system towards a higher reliance on income 
taxation and higher tax compliance. However, little more than some questionable 
patchwork has been done in both fields694 . 
The public debt to GDP ratio is, after the restructuring of over 100 billion Dollars 
of debt plus interest accrued, still dangerously high at 75 percent. The financial 
system is only slowly recovering from paralysis695 . Long-term credit is still virtually 
non-existent. Most utility tariffs are still at their 2001 levels (while wholesale prices 
have risen by 80 percent since that time), covering operational costs with luck, but 
none of the big investments needed. With the capacity constraints increasingly felt, 
inflation is accelerating again: the annual inflation rate has surpassed the 10 percent 
mark in late 2005. 
692 See Frankel/Schmukler/Serven (2002), p. 31. 
693 "In general, it was not the exchange rate regime alone that was the fundamental source of 
precrisis vulnerability and of subsequent substantial damage. And changing the exchange rate 
regime will not automatically correct (although, [ ... ], it may help ameliorate) these other critical 
problems." Mussa et al. (2000), p. 22. 
694 As to the federal fiscal redistribution, provincial revenues have been merely fixed at their 
2003 revenue levels. 
695 "Since we didn't have money, we had to offer time." Alfonso Prat-Gay, the then central bank 
governor, cited after N.N. (2004), p. 10. 
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Monetary restriction is now the means to avoid a relapse into chronic high 
inflation. This means reining in monetary expansion (itself the result of the 
absorption of 6 billion Pesos of quasi monies, and continuously fed by incoming 
export revenue) and strapping growth, mostly by maintaining public, and increasing 
private, saving; the development of domestic capital markets is badly needed696. A 
more restrictive monetary stance may be imaginable as long as the economy is 
comfortably growing. It is anyone's guess where Argentine politics will turn to when 
the catch-up growth slows down and/or external conditions start to worsen697. 
Worryingly, Nestor Kirchner's policies, always fickle and difficult to interpret, 
have moved from outwardly populist, but economically mostly orthodox and 
arguably sensible in many instances, to a more factual left-leaning nationalist 
stance. Since the October 2005 congressional elections, Kirchner has not only 
changed to an even more provocative rhetoric vis-a-vis the IMF, the US, and foreign 
investors (which he regularly blames flatly for Argentina's crisis), but also 
increasingly fleshes his rhetoric with action. His sacking of the well-renowned 
economy minister Lavagna in November 2005 (and replacement by a low-profile 
crony), his demonstrative turning to the Venezuelan president with his ideas of a 
Bolivarian revolution re-issued, as well as his latest decree to pay back the IMF in 
full until the end of 2005 (yet another encroachment upon central bank 
independence), all bolster his demonstrative repudiation of the global economy's 
functioning principles. They not only leave little reason to expect politics bringing 
forward the central reforms necessary to facilitate sustainable growth in the long 
run, but also compromise Argentina's basic outward orientation, and further 
endanger its development prospects. Possible hopes attached to MERCOSUR and 
its potential to stimulate efficiency enhancing economic policies698 have been 
frustrated also by the acceptance of Venezuela as a full member, which seems to 
redress regional solidarity towards mainly political ends while putting economic 
goals on hold (at least those running deeper than cheap oil or ready government 
credit). These recent developments do not leave much ground for hopes that 
696 See de la Torre et al. (2003), p. 27. 
697 The central bank is presently changing course from the quantitative targeting policy 
adopted after 2001 to inflation targeting, with the actual target band set between five and eight 
percent. See the BCRA's monetary programme for 2005, 
<http://www.bcra.gov .ar/pdfs/polmon/ProgMonPresenta2005.pdf>. 
698 See, e.g., Mussa et al. (2000), Hochreiter/Schmidt-Hebbel/Winckler (2002), or Belke/Gros 
(2002). 
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Argentina might, in the pursuit of economic sustainability, soon live up to the claim 
of getting the "serious country" its publicity experts want it to be. Nor does the worst 
expectation, a relapse into chronic high inflation, seem a completely absurd idea. 
Jutta Maute - 978-3-631-75447-4




Abramovitz, M. (1986): Catching Up, Forging Ahead, and Falling Behind, in: Journal 
of Economic History, 46, 2, pp. 385-406. 
Alesina, A., and Barro, R.J. (2001 ): Dollarization, in: American Economic 
Association, Papers and Proceedings, 91, 2, pp. 381-385. 
Alexander, V., and van Furstenberg, G.M. (2000): Monetary Unions - a superior 
alternative to full dollarization in the long run, in: The North American Journal of 
Economics and Finance, 11, pp. 205-225. 
Altimir, 0., and Beccaria, L. (2000a): Distribuci6n del ingreso en la Argentina, in: 
Heymann, D., and Kosacoff, B. (eds.): La Argentina de las Noventa - Desempefio 
econ6mico en un contexto de reformas, I. Buenos Aires, pp. 425-521. 
Altimir, 0., and Beccaria, L. (2000b): El mercado de trabajo bajo el nuevo regimen 
econ6mico en Argentina, in: Heymann, D., and Kosacoff, B. (eds.): La Argentina 
de las Noventa - Desempefio econ6mico en un contexto de reformas, I. Buenos 
Aires, pp. 331-424. 
Andrade, J.P., Falcao Silva, M.L., and Trautwein, H.-M. (2005): Disintegrating effects 
of monetary policies in the MERCOSUR, in: Structural Change and Economic 
Dynamics, 16 (2005), pp. 65-89. 
Artana, D., Lopez Murphy, R., and Navajas, F. (2003): A Fiscal Policy Agenda, in: 
Kuczynski, P.-P., and Williamson, J. (eds.): After the Washington Consensus. 
Restarting Growth and Reform in Latin America, Institute for International 
Economics, Washington, D.C., March 2003, pp. 75-101. 
Artana, D., Navajas, F., and Urbiztondo, S. (1998): Regulation and Contractual 
Adaptation in Public Utilities: The Case of Argentina. Washington, D.C., June 
1998-No0 IFM-115. 
Balifio, Th.J.T., and Enoch, Ch. (1997): Currency Board Arrangements - Issues and 
Experiences, in: IMF Occasional Paper, 151. 
Ball, L., and Romer, D. (1991): Sticky Prices as Coordination Failure, in: American 
Econmic Review, 81, June, pp. 539-552. 
Begg, D. (2002): Growth, Integration, and Macroeconomic Policy Design: Some 
Lessons for Latin America. Paper prepared for the conference "Monetary Union: 
Theory, EMU Experience, and Prospects for Latin America" organized by the 
Oesterreichische Nationalbank, the University of Vienna, and the Banco Central 
de Chile, April 15-16, 2002. 
Belke, A., and Gros, D. (2002): Monetary Integration in the Southern Cone: 
Jutta Maute - 978-3-631-75447-4
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 04:44:44AM
via free access
268 
Mercosur Is Not Like the EU? Study presented at the Conference "Towards 
Regional Currency Areas", Santiago de Chile, March 26-27, 2002, at the 
Conference "Monetary Union: Theory, EMU Experience, and Prospects for Latin 
America", April 15-16, 2002, and at the Conference "Exchange Rates, Economic 
Integration, and the International Economy", Ryerson University/Toronto, May 17-
19, 2002. 
Bennett, A.G.G. (1994): Currency Boards: Issues and Experiences. in: Balino, T.J. 
(ed.): Frameworks for Monetary Stability. Washington, pp. 186-212. 
Bernholz, P. (1995a): Currency Competition, Inflation, Gresham's Law and 
Exchange Rate, in: Siklos, P.L. (ed.): Great Inflations of the 20th Century -
Theories, Policies and Evidence. Aldershot: Edward Elgar, pp. 97-124. 
Bernholz, P. (1995b): Necessary and Sufficient Conditions to End Hyperinflations, in: 
Siklos, P.L. (ed.): Great Inflations of the 20th Century - Theories, Policies and 
Evidence. Aldershot: Edward Elgar, pp. 257-287. 
Bernholz, P. (2003): Monetary Regimes and Inflation. Cheltenham (UK) and 
Northampton (USA), 2003. 
Blanchard, O.J. (1997): Comment on "Stopping Inflations, Big and Small", in: Journal 
of Money, Credit and Banking, 29, 4, pp. 778-782. 
Blejer, M.I. (1983): On the Anatomy of Inflation - The Variability of Relative 
Commodity Prices in Argentina, in: Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 15, 4, 
pp. 469-482. 
Bardo, M.D., and Jonung, L. (2001 ): A Return to the Convertibility Principle? 
Monetary and Fiscal Regimes in Historical Perspective: The International 
Evidence, in: Leijonhufvud, A. (ed.): Monetary Theory and Policy Experience. 
Chippenham, Wiltshire, pp. 225-283. 
Broda, C. (2001 ): Coping with Terms-of-Trade Shocks: Pegs versus Floats, in: 
American Economic Association, Papers and Proceedings, 91, 2, pp. 376-380. 
Burki, J., and Perry, G.E. (1998): Beyond the Washington Consensus: Institutions 
Matter. Washington, DC: Worldbank. 
Cagan, P. (1956): The Monetary Dynamics of Hyperinflation, in: M. Friedman, ed.: 
Studies in the Quantity Theory of Money, Chicago, University of Chicago Press. 
Cagan, P. (1989a): Hyperinflation, in: Eatwell, J., Milgate, M., and Newman, P. (Ed.): 
The New Palgrave: Money. London and Basingstoke, pp. 179-184. 
Cagan, P. (1989b): Monetarism, in: Eatwell, J., Milgate, M., and Newman, P. (Ed.): 
The New Palgrave: Money. London and Basingstoke, pp. 195-205. 
Calvo, G.A., and Mishkin, F.S. (2003): 
Jutta Maute - 978-3-631-75447-4
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 04:44:44AM
via free access
269 
The Mirage of Exchange Rate Regimes for Emerging Market Countries, NBER 
Working Paper 9808, <http://www.nber.org/papers/w9808>. 
Calvo, G.A., Izquierdo, A., and Talvi, E. (2003): Sudden Stops, the Real Exchange 
Rate, and Fiscal Sustainability: Argentina's Lessons, NBER Working Paper 9828, 
<http://www. nber .org/papers/w9828>. 
Canavese, A. (2001 ): Convertibilidad en Argentina: Funcionamiento de una Caja de 
Conversion Anclada al D6Iar. Paper prepared for the Conference "Relaciones 
Econ6micas entre la Union Europea y el Mercosur" organized by the lnstituto de 
Economia Internacional (IEI), Universidad de Valencia (Espana), June 13-14, 
2001. 
Caprio, G.Jr. (1998): Banking on Crises: Expensive Lessons from Recent Financial 
Crises, in: World Bank, Country Economics Department, Working Paper 1979. 
Caprio, G.Jr .. , Dooley, M., Leipziger, D., and Walsh, C. (1996): The Lender of Last 
Resort Function Under a Currency Board. The Case of Argentina, in: World Bank, 
Country Economics Department, Working Paper 1648. 
Carrera, J.E., Feliz, M., Panigo, D., and Saavedra, M. (2002): How Does 
Dollarization Affect Real Volatility? A General Methodology for Latin America, 
<http://www.isis.unlp.edu.ar>. 
Catao, L. (1998): Intermediation Spreads in a Dual Currency Economy: Argentina in 
the 1990s, in: IMF Working Paper 98/90. 
Choueiri, N., and Kaminsky, G. (1999): Has the Nature of Crises Changed? A 
Quarter Century of Currency Crises in Argentina, in: IMF Working Paper 99/152. 
Cukierman, A.S. (1995): Rapid Inflation: Deliberate Policy or Miscalculation?, in: 
Siklos, P.L. (ed.): Great Inflations of the 20th Century - Theories, Policies and 
Evidence. Aldershot: Edward Elgar, pp. 125-182. 
Davies, Glyn (2002): A History of Money. From Ancient Times to the Present Day. 
University of Wales Press Cardiff, 2002. 
De la Torre, A., Yeyati, E.L., and Schmukler, S.L. (2002): 
Argentina's Financial Crisis: Floating Money, Sinking Banking, 
<http://www.nber.org/-confer/2002/argentina02/schmukler.pdf>. 
De la Torre, A., Yeyati, E.L., and Schmukler, S.L. (2003): Living and Dying with Hard 
Pegs: The Rise and Fall of Argentina's Currency Board, <http://www.utdt.edu>. 
Di Tella, R., and MacCulloch, R. (2004): Why Doesn't Capitalism Flow to Poor 
Countries?, <http://www.hbs.edu>. 
Dolmas, S., and Zarazaga, C. (1996): Policy Rules and Tequila Lessons: 
Conclusions from an Economic Conference, in: 
Jutta Maute - 978-3-631-75447-4
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 04:44:44AM
via free access
270 
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, Southwest Economy, 6, 1996, 
<http://www.dallasfed.org/htm/pubs/swe/6_96.html>. 
Dominguez, K.M.E., and Tesar, L.L. (2004): International Borrowing and 
Macroeconomic Performance in Argentina. Paper prepared for the NBER 
conference on International Capital Flows, December 17-18, 2004, in Santa 
Barbara, California. 
Dornbusch, R. (2001 ): Fewer Monies, Better Monies, in: American Economic 
Association, Papers and Proceedings, 91, 2, pp. 238-242. 
Dornbusch, R., Goldfajn, I., and Valdes, R.O. (1995): Currency Crises and 
Collapses, in: Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, pp. 219-293. 
Edwards, S. (2000): Exchange Rate Regimes, Capital Flows and Crisis Prevention, 
Paper prepared for the NBER Conference on Economic and Financial Crises in 
Emerging Market Economies, held in Woodstock, October 19-12, 2000, 
<http://www. nber. org/-confer/2000/wisefO0/edwards. pdf>. 
Eichengreen, B. (1996): Vom Goldstandard zum Euro - Die Geschichte des 
internationalen Wahrungssystems. Berlin 1999, pp. 238ft. 
Eichengreen, B. (2001a): Crisis Prevention and Management: Any New Lessons 
from Argentina and Turkey? 
Background Paper for the World Bank's Global Development Finance 2002, 
<http://emlab.berkeley.edu/users/eichengr/POLI CY. HTML>. 
Eichengreen, B. (2001b): What problems can dollarization solve?, in: Journal of 
Policy Modeling, 23, pp. 267-277. 
Eichengreen, B., Hausmann, R., and Panizza, U. (2003): Currency Mismatches, 
Debt Intolerance and Original Sin: Why They Are Not the Same and Why it 
Matters. NBER Working Paper 10036, <http://www.nber.org/papers/w10036>. 




Enoch, C., and Gulde, A.-M. (1998): Are Currency Boards a Cure for All Monetary 
Problems?, in: IMF Finance & Development, 35, 4. 
Enoch, C.E., and Gulde, A.-M. (1997): Making a Currency Board Operational, in: 
IMF Paper on Policy Analysis and Assessment, 97, 10. 
Fanelli, J.M., and Gonzalez Rozada, M. (1998): Convertibilidad, Volatilidad y 
Estabilidad Macroecon6mica en Argentina, CEDES, Buenos Aires, 1998. 
Feldstein, M. (2002): Argentina's Fall. Lessons from the Latest Financial Crisis, in: 
Jutta Maute - 978-3-631-75447-4
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 04:44:44AM
via free access
271 
Foreign Affairs, 81, 2, pp. 8-14. 
Fischer, St. (2001 ): Exchange Rate Regimes: Is the Bipolar View Correct?, in: 
International Monetary Fund, Distinguished Lecture on Economics in Government. 
New Orleans, January 06, 2001. 
Frankel, J., Schmukler, S.L., and Serven, L. (2002): Global Transmission of Interest 
Rates: Monetary Independence and Currency Regime, NBER Working Paper 
8828, <http://www.nber.org/papers/w8828>. 
Frankel, J.A. (1996): Recent Exchange-Rate Experience and Proposals for Reform, 
in: American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 86, pp. 153-158. 
Frenkel, R., and Gonzalez Rozada, M. (1999): Balance of Payments Liberalization. 
Effects on Growth and Employment in Argentina, CEDES, Buenos Aires, 1999. 
Freytag, A. (1998): Einige Anmerkungen zur Wahl der Reservewahrung eines 
Currency Boards, in: Zeitschrift tor Wirtschaftspolitik, 47, pp.3-19. 
Fuhrmann, W. (1999): Zur Theorie des Currency Boards, in: Zeitschrift tor 
Wirtschaftspolitik, 48, pp. 85-104. 
Fuhrmann, W., and Richert, R. (1995): Ein Wahrungssystem mit einem Currency 
Board, in: WISU, 24, pp. 1035-1039. 
Galiani, S., Gertler, P., Schargrodsky, E., and Sturzenegger, F. (2003): The Benefits 
and Costs of Privatization in Argentina: A Microeconomic Analysis, in: Inter-
American Development Bank, Latin American Research Network, Research 
Network Working Paper R-454. 
Galiani, S., Heymann, D., and Tommaso, M. (2002): Missed Expectations: The 
Argentine Convertibility. William Davidson Institute Working Paper no. 515. 
Ganapolsky, E.J.J., and Schmukler, S.L. (1998): Crisis Management in Capital 
Markets: The Impact of Argentine Policy during the Tequila Effect, in: World Bank, 
Country Economics Department, Working Paper 1951. 
Gelpern, Anna (2005): After Argentina, in: Institute for International Economics, 
Policy Briefs Number PB05-2. 
Gerchunoff, P., and Aguirre, H. (2004): 
La Politica Econ6mica de Kirchner en la Argentina: Varios Estilos, una Sola 
Agenda, <http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/documentos/122 .asp>. 
Ghosh, A.R., Gulde, A.-M., and Wolf, H.C. (1998): Currency Boards: The Ultimate 
Fix?, in: IMF Working Paper 98/8. 
Gonzalez Rozada, M., and Menendez, A. (2002): Why have Poverty and Income 
Inequality Increased so much? Argentina 1991-2002, <http://www.utdt.edu>. 
Guidotti, P. (2004): Global Finance, Macroeconomic Performance, and Policy 
Jutta Maute - 978-3-631-75447-4
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 04:44:44AM
via free access
272 
Response in Latin America: Lessons from the 1990s, <http://www.utdt.edu>. 
Gulde, A.-M., Kahkonen, J., and Keller, P. (2000): Pros and Cons of Currency Board 
Arrangements in the Lead-up to EU-Accession and Participation in the Euro Zone, 
in: IMF Policy Discussion Paper 00/1. 
Hanke, St.H. (1999): How to Make the Dollar Argentina's Currency, in: The Wall 
Street Journal, February 19, 1999. 
Hanke, St.H. (2000): The Disregard for Currency Board Realities, in: Cato Journal, 
20, 1, pp. 49-59. 
Hanke, St.H. (2002): Argentina's Blunders, in: National Post, January 5, 2002. 
Hanke, St.H., and Schuler, K. (1999): A Monetary Constitution for Argentina: Rules 
for Dollarization, in: Cato Journal, 18, 3, pp. 405-419. 
Hanke, St.H., and Schuler, K. (2000): Currency Boards for Developing Countries: A 
Handbook, in: International Center for Economic Growth, ICS Press, San 
Francisco 1994, updated June 2000. 
Heymann, D. (2000): Politicas de reforma y comportamiento macroecon6mico, in: 
Heymann, D., and Kosacoff, B. (eds.): La Argentina de las Noventa - Desempeiio 
econ6mico en un contexto de reformas, I. Buenos Aires, pp. 37-176. 
Heymann, D., and Kosacoff, B. (2000): Comentarios generales sabre el 
comportamiento de la economia y temas abiertos al finalizar las noventa, in: 
Heymann, D., and Kosacoff, B. (eds.): La Argentina de las Noventa - Desempeiio 
econ6mico en un contexto de reformas, I. Buenos Aires, pp. 9-36. 
Heymann, D., and Leijonhufvud, A. (1995): High Inflation. Oxford, 1995. 
Hicks, J. (1967): Critical Essays in Monetary Theory. Oxford, 1967. 
Hochreiter, E., Schmidt-Hebbel, K., and Winckler. G. (2002): Monetary Union: 
European Lessons, Latin American Prospects. Paper prepared for the conference 
"Monetary Union: Theory, EMU Experience, and Prospects for Latin America" 
organized by the Oesterreichische Nationalbank, the University of Vienna, and the 
Banco Central de Chile, April 15-16, 2002. 
Hopenhayn, H.A., and Neumeyer, P.A. (2003): The Argentine Great Depression 
1975-1990, <http://www.utdt.edu>. 
Huber, E., and Solt, F. (2004): Successes and Failures of Neoliberalism, in: Latin 
American Research Review, 39, 3, pp. 150-164. 
Humpage, O.F., and McIntire, J.M. (1995): An Introduction to Currency Boards, in: 
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Economic Review, 31, 2, pp. 2-11. 
Humphrey, Th. M. (1998): Mercantilists and Classicals: Insights from Doctrinal 
History, in: Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, Annual Report 1998, 
Jutta Maute - 978-3-631-75447-4




IMF Independent Evaluation Office (2004): The IMF and Argentina, 1991-2001, IMF, 
Independent Evaluation Office. Washington, D.C., 2004. 
IMF Staff Team (1999): Experimental Report on Transparency Practices: Argentina, 
in: IMF, Experimental Reports on Observance of Standards and Codes, April 15, 
1999. 
Ireland, P.N. (1997): Stopping Inflations, Big and Small, in: Journal of Money, Credit 
and Banking, 29, 4, pp. 759-775. 
Joint Economic Committee (2005), Research Report # 109-7, May 2005, 
<http://www.house.gov/jec/publications/109/rr1097 .pdf>. 
Jonas, J. (2002): Argentina: The Anatomy of a Crisis, ZEI Working Paper 802-12, 
<http://www.zei.de>. 
Keynes, J.M. (1920): The Economic Consequences of Peace, Macmillan Press, 
London. 
Kiguel, M.A. (1989): Budget Deficits, Stability, and the Monetary Dynamics of 
Hyperinflation, in: Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 21, 2, pp. 148-157. 
Kiguel, M.A. (1992): La inflaci6n en Argentina: politica de « alto y siga » desde el 
Plan austral, in: Boletin del CMLA, 38, mayo/junio 1992, pp. 103-120. 
Kiguel, M.A. (1999): The Argentine Currency Board, Universidad del GEMA, Serias 
econ6micas, 152. 
Kiguel, M.A., and Neumeyer, P.A. (1995): Seigniorage and Inflation: The Case of 
Argentina, in: Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 27, 3, pp. 672-682. 
Krueger, A.O. (2002): A New Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring, available at 
<http://www.imf.org>. 
Krugman, P. (2001a): 
Argentina's Money Monomania, <http://www.wws.princeton.edu/~pkrugman/>. 
Krugman, P. (2001 b): Notes on Depreciation, the Yen, and the Argentino 
<http://www. wws. princeton .edu/~pkrugman/>. 
Laidler, D. (1989): The Bullionist Controversy, in: Eatwell, J., Milgate, M., and 
Newman, P. (Ed.): The New Palgrave: Money. London and Basingstoke, pp. 60-
71. 
Lanata, J. (2004): AON - Mapa genetico de los defectos argentinos. Buenos Aires, 
2004. 
Lavagna, R. (2004): Statement to the Executive Board Members from the Governor 
for Argentina, His Excellency Roberto Lavagna, on the IEO Evaluation of the Role 
of the Fund in Argentina, 1991-2001, in: IMF Independent Evaluation Office 
Jutta Maute - 978-3-631-75447-4
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 04:44:44AM
via free access
274 
(2004): The IMF and Argentina, 1991-2001, IMF, Independent Evaluation Office. 
Washington, D.C., 2004. 
Leijonhufvud, A. (1990): Extreme Monetary Instability: High Inflations, in: Universitat 
Hohenheim, Diskussionsbeitrage aus dem lnstitut tor Volkswirtschaftslehre, 53. 
Lerrick, A., and Meltzer, A.H. (2001 ): Beyond IMF Bailouts: Default without 
Disruption, in: Carnegie Mellon, Quarterly Economic Report, May 2001, pp. 1-4, 
<http://www.house.gov/jec/imf/gailliot. pdf>. 
Logue, D.E., and Sweeney, R.J. (1981): Inflation and Real Growth: Some Empirical 
Results, in: Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 13, 4, pp. 497-501. 
Lopez-Murphy, R., Artana, D., and Navajas, F. (2003): The Argentine Economic 
Crisis, in: Cato Journal, 23, 1, pp. 23-28. 
Marshall, A. (2004): Labour Market Policies and Regulations in Argentina, Brazil and 
Mexico: Programmes and Impacts, in: Consejo Nacional de lnvestigaciones 
Cientificas y Tecnicas and lnstituto de Desarrollo Econ6mico y Social Buenos 
Aires, Employment Strategy Papers 2004/13. 
McCallum, B.T. (1984): Are Bond-Financed Deficits Inflationary? A Ricardian 
Analysis, in: Journal of Political Economy, 26, 1, pp. 123-135. 
Mussa, M. (2002): Argentina and the Fund: Fro Triumph to Tragedy, 
<http://www.iie.com/papers/mussa0302-1.htm>. 
Mussa, M., Masson, P., Swoboda, A., Jadresic, E., Mauro, P., and Berg, A. (2000): 
Exchange Rate Regimes in an Increasingly Integrated World Economy, in: IMF 
Occasional Paper, 193. 
Muth, J.F. (1961 ): Rational Expectations and the Theory of Price Movements, in: 
Econometrica 29, July, 315-335. 
N.N. (1994): Back in the Saddle - A Survey of Argentina, in: The Economist, 
November 26, 1994. 
N.N. (2004): The Long Road Back - A Survey of Argentina, in: The Economist, June 
5, 2004. 
Nunnenkamp, P. (1999): Latin America after the Currency Crash in Brazil - Why the 
Optimists May be Wrong, in: Kieler Diskussionsbeitrage, lnstitut tor Weltwirtschaft 
Kiel, 337. 
Oppers, S.E. (2000): Dual Currency Boards: A Proposal for Currency Stability, in: 
IMF Working Paper 00/199. 
Pastor, M., and Wise, C. (1999): Stabilization and its Discontents: Argentina's 
Economic Restructuring in the 1990s, in: World Development, 27, 3, pp. 477-503. 
Porzecanski, A. (2003): Argentina: The Root Cause of the Disaster, 
Jutta Maute - 978-3-631-75447-4
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 04:44:44AM
via free access
275 
<http://www. nber .org/% 7Econfer/2002/argentina02/porzecanski. pdf>. 
Pou, P. (2000): Argentina's Structural Reforms of the 1990s, in: Finance & 
Development, 37, 1, pp. 13-15. 
Powell, A. (2002): Argentina's Avoidable Crisis: Bad Luck, Bad Management, Bad 
Politics, Bad Advice. Paper presented at the Brookings Trade Conference, 
Washington DC, May 2nd, 2002. 
Reinhart, C.M., Rogoff, K.S., and Savastano M.A. (2003): Debt Intolerance. NBER 
Working Paper 9908, <http://www.nber.org/papers/w9908>. 
Republica Argentina, Poder Ejecutivo Nacional (2001 ): Decreto 1311/2001, in: 
Boletin Oficial 26/10/2001 -ADLA 2001, E, 5556. 
Republica Argentina, Poder Ejecutivo Nacional (2002): Decreto 401/2002, in: Boletin 
Oficial 05/03/2002 -ADLA 2002, 8, 1678. 
Republica Argentina, Poder Legislative Nacional (1991 ): Ley 23928, in: Boletin 
Oficial 28/03/1991 - ADLA 1991 - 8, 1752. 
Republica Argentina, Poder Legislative Nacional (1992): Ley 24144, in: Boletin 
Oficial 22/10/1992 -ADLA 1992 - D, 3892. 
Republica Argentina, Poder Legislative Nacional (1995): Ley 24485, in: Boletin 
Oficial 29/09/1995 -ADLA 1995 - E, 6957. 
Republica Argentina, Poder Legislative Nacional (2001 ): Ley 25445, in: Boletin 
Oficial 25/06/2001 -ADLA 2001 - D, 4043. 
Rotman, A.B. (1997): Convertibilidad y desocupaci6n en la Argentina de los '90 -
Analisis de una relaci6n inseparable. Buenos Aires 1997. 
Rojas-Suarez, L. (2003): Monetary Policy and Exchange Rates: Guiding Principles 
for a Sustainable Regime, in: Kuczynski, P.-P., and Williamson, J. (eds.): After the 
Washington Consensus. Restarting Growth and Reform in Latin America, Institute 
for International Economics, Washington, D.C., March 2003, pp. 123-155. 
Rose, A.K., and van Wincoop, E. (2001 ): National Money as a Barrier to 
International Trade: The Real Case for Currency Union, in: American Economic 
Association, Papers and Proceedings, 91, 2, pp. 386-390 .. 
Roubini, N. (1998a): An Introduction to Open Economy Macroeconomics, Currency 
Crises and the Asian Crisis, <http://www.stern.nyu.edu/globalmacro/>. 
Roubini, N. (1998b): The Case Against Currency Boards: Debunking 10 Myths about 
the Benefits of Currency Boards, <http://www.stern.nyu.edu/globalmacro/>. 
Roubini, N. (2001): Should Argentina Dollarize or Float? 
The Pros and Cons of Alternative Exchange Rate Regimes and their Implications 
for Domestic and Foreign Debt Restructuring and Reduction, 
Jutta Maute - 978-3-631-75447-4
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 04:44:44AM
via free access
276 
<http://www.stern. nyu .edu/globalmacro/>. 
Saiegh, S.M., and Tommasi, M. (1999): Why is Argentina's Fiscal Federalism so 
Inefficient? Entering the Labyrinth, in: Journal of Applied Economics, II, 1, pp. 169-
209. 
Sanguinetti, P., Pantano, J., Posadas, J. (2002): Trade Liberalization and 
Export/Import Diversification in Argentina: The Role of Tariff Preferences and 
Economies of Scale. Paper prepared for the project "Patterns of Integration in the 
Global Economy: What Does Latin America Trade? What Do its Workers Do?" 
sponsored by the World Bank. 
Sargent, Th.J. (1997): Comment on "Stopping Inflations, Big and Small", in: Journal 
of Money, Credit and Banking, 29, 4, pp. 776-777. 
Schuler, K. (1998): Introduction to Currency Boards, <http://www.cato.org>. 
Schuler, K. (2000): Basics of Dollarization, in: Joint Economic Committee Staff 
Report, July 1999, updated January 2000. 
Schuler, K. (2002): Fixing Argentina, in: Cato Institute, Policy Analysis, 445, July 16, 
2002. 
Schuler, K., and Hanke, St. (2002): How to Dollarize Argentina Now, 
<http://www.cato.org>. 
Schuler, K.A. (1992): Currency Boards. Fairfax, Virginia, 1992, 
<http://users.erols.com/kurrency/webdiss 1.htm>. 
Schumacher, L. (2000): Bank Runs and Currency Run in a System Without a Safety 
Net: Argentina and the ''Tequila" Shock, in: Journal of Monetary Economics, 46, 1, 
pp. 257-277. 
Schwartz, A.J. (1989): Banking School, Currency School, Free Banking School, in: 
Eatwell, J., Milgate, M., and Newman, P. (Ed.): The New Palgrave: Money. 
London and Basingstoke, pp. 41-49. 
Setzer, R. (2001 ): Das optimale Wechselkurssystem fur Argentinien. Stuttgart-
Hohenheim, 2001. 
Siklos, P.L. (1995): Hyperinflations: Their Origins, Development and Termination, in: 
Siklos, P.L. (ed.): Great Inflations of the 20th Century - Theories, Policies and 
Evidence. Aldershot: Edward Elgar, pp. 3-34. 
Spahn, H.-P. (2001): From Gold to Euro. On Monetary Theory and the History of 
Currency Systems. Berlin, Heidelberg, 2001. 
Stiglitz, J.E. (1998): More Instruments and Broader Goals: Moving toward the Post-
Washington Consensus. United Nations University / World Institute for 
Development Economics Research, Helsinki. 
Jutta Maute - 978-3-631-75447-4
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 04:44:44AM
via free access
277 
Sturzenegger, F.A. (1994): Hyperinflation with Currency Substitution: Introducing an 
Indexed Currency, in: Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 26, 3, pp. 377-395. 
Vasquez, I. (1996): The Brady Plan and Market-Based Solutions to Debt Crises, in: 
Cato Journal, 16, 2, <http://www.cato.org>. 
Vegh, C.A. (1995): Stopping High Inflation: An Analytical Overview, in: Siklos, P.L. 
(ed.): Great Inflations of the 20th Century - Theories, Policies and Evidence. 
Aldershot: Edward Elgar, pp. 35-95. 
Wagner, H. (2000): Which exchange rate regimes in an era of high capital mobility?, 
in: The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, 11, pp. 191-203. 
Waisgrais, S. (2003): Wage Inequality and the Labour Market in Argentina: Labour 
Institutions, Supply and Demand in the Period 1980-1999, in: International 
Institute for Labour Studies, Discussion Paper DP/146/2003. 
Walters, A. (1989): Currency Boards, in: Eatwell, J., Milgate, M., and Newman, P. 
(Ed.): The New Palgrave: Money. London and Basingstoke, pp. 109-114. 
Williamson, J. (1995): What Role for Currency Boards?, in: Institute for International 
Economics, Policy Analyses in International Economics, 40. 
Williamson, J. (2000): What Should the World Bank Think about the Washington 
Consensus?, in: The World Bank Research Observer, vol. 15, No. 2, pp. 251-64, 
<http://www.worldbank.org/research/journals/wbro/obsaug00/pdf/(6)Williamson.pd 
f>. 
Williamson, J. (2002): Did the Washington Consensus Fail?, Outline of speech at the 
Center for Strategic & International Studies, Washington, DC, November 6, 2002, 
<http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/paper.cfm?researchid=488> 
Williamson, J. (2003): Overview -An Agenda for Restarting Growth and Reform, in: 
Kuczynski, P.-P., and Williamson, J. (eds.): After the Washington Consensus. 
Restarting Growth and Reform in Latin America, Institute for International 
Economics, Washington, D.C., March 2003, pp. 1-19. 
Wohlmann, M. (1998): Der nominale Wechselkurs als Stabilitatsanker: 
Die Erfahrungen Argentiniens 1991-1995, in: Gottinger Studien zur 
Entwicklungsokonomik, 5, Frankfurt am Main. 
Zarazaga, C.E. (1995a): Can Currency Boards Prevent Devaluations and Financial 
Meltdowns?, in: Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, Southwest Economy, 4, 1995, 
<http://www. dallasfed. org/htm/pubs/swe/4 _ 95. html>. 
Zarazaga, C.E. (1995b): The Tequila Effect, in: 
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, Southwest Economy, 2, 1995, 
<http://www.dallasfed.org/htm/pubs/swe/2_95.html>. 
Jutta Maute - 978-3-631-75447-4
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 04:44:44AM
via free access
278 
Zarazaga, C.E. (1995c): Argentina, Mexico, and Currency Boards: Another Case of 
Rules Versus Discretion, in: Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, Economic Review, 
4, 1995, pp. 14-24. 
Jutta Maute - 978-3-631-75447-4





Figure 30: Argentine Real GDP Growth and its Components 







Source: IMF Independent Evaluation Office (2004), p. 10. 
[] Feal QYgo,,Al1 (percert) 
• Feal priwte a:rsurptirngo,,Al1 
(percert) 
tll Feal pwlic a:rsurptirn goMl1 
(percert) 
D Feal fi>ed i..-..eslrrert goMl1 
(percert) 
Figure 31: Foreign Trade and Current Account Balance 
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Figure 32: Real Effective Exchange Rate and International Reserves 
An increase in the real effective exchange rate indicates a Peso appreciation. 
Source: IMF Independent Evaluation Office (2004 ), p. 10. 
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Financial and Banking Indicators 
Figure 34: Inflation and Money Growth 
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Figure 36: Money Market and Lending Rates 







• Nov 30rd (last day of Peso interbank market): 689% 
• l\/b1ey rra1<.et rae, Pesos 
(!B"cm) . 
• l\/b1ef rrai<.et rae, [kjjas 
(!B"cm) 
l:ll L.a-.:lrg rae, Pesos (!B"cm) 
ID L.a-.:lrg rae, Ddlas (~) 
Source: Hanke/Schuler (2002), p. 4, on data from IMF, INDEC, MECON, BCRA, and J.P.Morgan. 
Figure 37: Interest Rate and Risk Spreads 
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Figure 38: Peso Interest Rates 
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International Financial Statistics. 
Figure 39: Bank Lending to Public and Private Sector 
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Figure 40: Peso and Dollar Bank Deposits 
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Fiscal Indicators 
Figure 41: Public and External Debt 
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Figure 43: Primary Government Balance 
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Figure 44: Overall Government Balance 
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Figure 45: Major Taxes in Argentina, as of December 2001 
Tax 
Federal 




Financial transactions tax 
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Tariffs 
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Presumptive minimum tax 
All other revenue 
Total (including nontax) revenue 
Provincial and local 
Tax on gross sales 
Property tax 
Moire vehicle tax 
Stamp taxes 
All other revenue 
Total of these taxes 
Rate(s) Revenue Remarks 















6.4• Employees pay 11%, including 5% (down from 11% before Nov. 2001) to private 
pension funds; employers pay 21.9% 
11.9 Main rate: 21%; special rates of 10.5% and 27%. 
8 Corporate rate: 35%; individual rates: 9%-35%, with top rate starting at 120,000 
Pesos. 
2.5 Rates vary, and were rejiggered in 2001. 
1.9 Imposed in April 2001 at 0.4%, increased in August 2001; paid on both bank 
credits and debits 
1.3 Part of revenue shared with provinces. 
1.3 Raised on many items March 2001. 
0.5 Bottom rate starts at total assets of 102,300 Pesos; top rate slarts at 300,000 
Pesos. 
0.4 Starts at assets of 300,000 Pesos. 
5.9 
---4-0.-1 Revenue for national nonfinancial sector, cash basis, Jan.-Sep. 2001. See notes. 
3 Averages 3%; many exemptions. 
1 
0.5 A common rate is 3%. 
0.4 Most common rate is 1%. 
0.5 
---5.-4 Revenue for Jan.-June 2001. See notes. 
*: Plus 3.3 billion Pesos to priate pension accounts. 
Capital gains tax for individuals and gift and estate taxes are zero, but real estate sales are subject to a 1.5% transfer tax. 
The provincial governments receive considerable federal revenue sharing {about 12 billion Pesos over nine months). 
Source: Schuler/Hanke (2002), p. 36, on data from Fundaci6n lnvertir Argentina, MECON, and 
Administraci6n Federal de lngresos Publicos. 
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Distribution and Poverty Indicators 
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Figure 47: People Living below the Official Poverty Line 
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Figure 48: Key Economic Data 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Real GDP Growth (percent) 10.5 10.3 6.3 5.8 -2.8 5.5 8.1 3.8 -3.4 -0.8 -4.4 -10.9 
Real Private Consumption 
Growth (percent) 15 12.1 7.1 5.4 -4 7.3 8.7 2.5 -4 0.3 -4.9 -13.3 
Real Public Consumption 
Growth (percent) -13.1 22.7 12.1 2.7 -1.6 -0.9 3.8 7.1 5.6 -0.1 -1.9 -13.5 
Real Fixed Investment 31.5 33.5 16 13.7 -13 8.8 17.7 6.5 -12.6 -6.8 -15.7 -36.4 
Inflation (CPI, Dec. -Dec., 84 17.5 7.4 3.9 1.6 0.1 0.3 0.7 -1.8 -0.7 -1.5 41 
Money (M1, Dec.-Dec., 
percent, in Pesos) 148.6 49 33 8.2 1.6 14.6 12.8 0 1.6 -9.1 -20.1 78.4 
Broad Money (Dec. -Dec., 
percent, in Pesos) 167.9 63 55.9 14.9 -4.3 20 26.9 10.3 2.3 4.4 -19.7 18.3 
Current Account Balance 
(Billion US-Dollars) -0.4 -6.5 -8 -11.1 -5.2 -6.8 -12.2 -14.5 -11.9 -8.8 -4.5 9.6 
Current Account Balance 
(percent of GDP) -0.2 -2.9 -3.4 -4.3 -2 -2.5 -4.2 -4.9 -4.2 -3.1 -1.7 3.1 
Export of Goods and Services 
(US-Dollars, percent growth) -2.1 3.4 8.5 17.8 28.9 13.6 9 0.7 -10.5 11.6 -0.5 -7.4 
Import of Goods and Services 
(US-Dollars, percent growth) 68.3 58.8 30.3 11.3 -4.6 15.8 24.1 3.4 -15.3 0.5 -16.6 -52.6 
Public Sector Debt (percent of 34.8 28.3 30.6 33.7 36.7 39.1 37.7 40.9 47.6 50.9 62.2 
External Debt (percent of 34.5 27.7 30.5 33.3 38.4 40.6 42.7 47.5 51.2 51.6 52.2 42.9 
Debt Service Ratio (percent) 33.6 27.5 30.9 25.2 30.2 39.4 50 57.6 75.4 70.8 66.3 
International Reserves Minus 
Gold (billion US-Dollars) 6.2 10.2 14 14.6 14.5 18.3 22.3 24.8 26.3 25.1 14.6 10.5 
Exchange Rate (Peso/US-
Dollar, end period) 3.4 
Real Effective Exchange Rate 
(end period, average of 1990 
= 100) 140.5 165.4 177.8 169.3 162.9 163.3 175.8 170.6 177.6 184.8 184.7 71.6 
Terms of Trade (goods and 
services, percent change) 7.6 6.1 -7.7 14.4 -4.5 9.9 0.2 -5.1 -8.4 7.2 -5.7 -10.8 
Central Government Primary 
Balance (percent of GDP) 1.3 2.1 0.8 0.1 -0.5 0.4 0.9 0.4 0.1 0.7 
General Government Primary 
Balance (percent of GDP) 1.3 1.5 0.1 -1.3 -0.7 0.3 0.5 -0.8 -0.5 -1.4 0.3 
Central Government Overall 
Balance (percent of GDP) -0.2 0.9 -0.5 -1.5 -2.2 -1.6 -1.3 -2.5 -2.4 -3.8 -11.9 
General Government Overall 
Balance (percent of GDP) -0.4 0.1 -1.4 -3.2 -2.9 -2.1 -2.1 -4.2 -3.6 -6.2 -12.8 
Source: IMF Independent Evaluation Office (2004), p. 10. 
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Figure 49: Indicators of Economic Structure in Selected Emerging Market 
Economies 
Period Argentina Brazil Chile Average• 
Gross savings/GDP 1990-2001 14.8 18.6 21.9 24.1 
Exports/GDP 1990-2001 9.4 9.3 30.7 34.2 
Domestic debt markets/GDP 1992-2001 42 123.1 110.4 113.2 
External debt/GDP 1990-2001 41.3 52.7 45.6 50.6 
External debt/exports 1990-2001 368.2 322.4 143.3 176.4 
Short term external debt/foreign reserves 1992-2001 110.3 79.9 37.4 80.6 
Foreign-currency-<lenominated debt/total public sector debt•• 1996-1999 89.2 ... 26.5 56.3 
General government overall balance/GDP 1990-2001 -2.5 -3.5 0.2 -1.6 
General government total revenue and grants/GDP 1990-2001 22 28.9 21.7 22.2 
Central government total expenditure and net lending/GDP 1990-2001 19.6 20.2 20.4 19.6 
• Contains Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Philippines, and Thailand. 
,.. Public sector debt for Argentina and central government debt for the rest of the countries. Argentina's debt includes the debt of 
the central bank and the govei'nment-guaranteed debt of public sector banks. Argentina's foreign-currency-denominated debt is the 
sum of bilateral and multilateral loans, and foreign-currency-denominated bonds and securities. It does not include foreign-
currency-denom/nated loans from private banks. 
Source: IMF Independent Evaluation Office (2004 ), p. 86. 
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